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THE ARCHITECT
OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE

THE ARCHITECT
OF THE
ROMAN EMPIRE

BY
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PER LA STORIA DI ROMA ANTICA

Thomas Edward, 1855-1933

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PREFACE

WHILE *The Roman Republic*, which was mainly concerned with the years 81–44 B.C., was passing through the press, I began to work upon a history of the Augustan Age, but, feeling that I might not live to finish it, decided to publish this instalment, which covers the period from the death of Caesar to the foundation of the Principate. Although, apart from one important fragment, the extant correspondence of Cicero, which so enlivens the history of the Caesarian Age, terminated in July, 43, the writers upon whom we have thereafter to rely make it possible to construct a tolerably vivid narrative, the credibility of which is confirmed by numismatic and epigraphical evidence. If Cleopatra had but written reminiscences with the candour of *My Story*, that recent volume which French critics have compared with the *Confessions* of Rousseau and the *Memoirs* of Casanova,——. Should the hunters of papyri ever unearth such a work, it would certainly take rank in the Loeb Series as a 'best seller'. The letters and the memoirs written by Augustus (copies of which may conceivably be brought to light by the excavations at Herculaneum) might reveal errors in the most truthful account that can be based upon our available materials; but it is better to risk a few mistakes than to sacrifice the vitality which detail can give. Moreover, close study of some recent period is a good preparation for that of ancient history. As the present writer has remarked (*The Roman Republic*, i, 339), in checking original records, printed and manuscript, by the testimony of survivors who had watched or had taken part in the events which he described, he learned how mistakes in detail arise and what kinds of statements are open to suspicion.

I must express gratitude to friends. During the last

three years I have been so crippled that research in public libraries has become increasingly difficult. Mr. Arthur I. Ellis of the British Museum has more than once saved me time and trouble by searching catalogues for press-marks, filling up tickets, and having the volumes brought to me ; Mr. Johnston Bell has lent me some books which are not in the joint library of the Hellenic and Roman Societies ; Mr. Hugh Last, Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford, has in two successive years given me bibliographical information for which I would otherwise have had to await the publication of his articles in *The Year's Work in Classical Studies*.

1 Akehurst Street,
Roehampton, S.W. 15,
July 13, 1927.

[About three weeks ago Miss Margaret Alford, a member of the Hellenic and Roman Societies, who was then personally unknown to me, but whom I may now call a friend, heard that I was disabled and wrote to me, offering ' to verify references, look out passages, or the like ' as often as I might desire her aid. I have only had occasion to ask her to check three references, which she did instantly and with scholarly thoroughness ; but she has made me feel that I may ask for her help again and again, if I should ever need it. It is difficult to express adequately gratitude for such kindness.

November 23, 1927.]

NOTE. In referring to Ferrero's *Greatness and Decline of Rome* I have cited the original—*Grandezza e decadenza di Roma*—as well as the translation whenever I could ; but some passages which in the translation appear as foot-notes, are not to be found on the corresponding pages of my copy of the Italian edition, but in a separate volume of appendices, to which I have not had access.

General readers, who have no use for mere citations of authorities, will not, I hope, neglect those foot-notes which contain more. I suggest, however, that the best plan would be to read the narrative first from beginning to end without looking at foot-notes, which might be reserved for later reading. To the few who not only desire truth, but wish to satisfy themselves that it has been discovered, they and the appendices may be useful ; to others, I trust, inoffensive.

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[Except in the case of Italy, I am largely indebted to the *Schlachten-Atlas* of Professor Kromayer and the late Colonel Georg Veith: but places and names unnecessary for my purpose have been omitted; the geographical position of Doriscus has been rectified; hachures have been substituted for contours; and in the Campaign of Actium two corrections have been made, the reasons for which are stated on pp. 154 n. 10, 251.]

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THE ARCHITECT OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

CHAPTER I

THE DEATH STRUGGLE OF THE REPUBLIC

The Roman Republic in decline.

FOR sixty years before the death of Caesar the expansion of Roman dominion had been sapping the strength of the Republic. Roman democracy, if it had ever flourished, had perished when Rome ceased to be a city-state; for in the ancient world, where there were no newspapers and communication was slow, democracy, except in a small community, was impossible. The Senate, which, recruited mainly from the families whose members administered the great offices, governed, because it alone possessed the necessary knowledge of affairs, during the period of the great wars, and which, after the long struggle with Carthage, established the power of Rome in Southern Europe and North-western Africa, found its authority disputed when its work was done. Social and economic problems pressed for solution. Traditional beliefs were unsettled by Greek philosophers. While riches, derived not from industry but from conquest, poured into Italy, agriculture, in the absence on foreign service of the cultivators, was decaying. The agrarian laws of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus did little to restore the prosperity of the smallholders; the distribution of artificially cheapened grain, by which Gaius bought the support of poor electors, seduced idlers to abandon labour and swell the mob in the capital. When, to meet the necessity of long service in foreign lands, Marius transformed the national militia into a professional army, he unwittingly forged a weapon for revolution. The Social War, in which the Italians who had hitherto been treated as subject allies, and had helped Rome to consolidate her dominion, won full citizenship, devastated the peninsula. The legislation by which Sulla attempted to restore the authority of the Senate and to reduce the tribunes of the people to impotence, was undone by politicians who rose to power by courting a corrupt electorate. Governors of provinces, with some honourable exceptions, permitted

and practised extortion. The campaigns of Marius, Sulla, Lucullus, Pompey, and Caesar involved the prolonged retention of extraordinary commands; and since no pensions were provided by the State, the soldiers, who on enlistment had sworn allegiance not to it but to their general, looked to him for the rewards that would enable them to subsist on their retirement, and became a menace to the Republic. Caesar, who, having attained power by the coalition called the First Triumvirate, reluctantly embarked on civil war [1] to avoid political extinction, devoted himself, when he became supreme, to reconstruction; but in the few months that Fate allowed him he could not, if he so desired, reform the constitution. The task of creating a monarchy which should restore the orderly government that in the Republic had become impossible, and yet not offend Republican sentiment, remained to be performed. Men had not yet lived through the experience that made them long, above all, for peace, nor had the time yet come when any one, even if he had the sagacity of an Augustus, could rule as the first citizen of a nominally self-governing commonwealth. It was open to Caesar to enact the benevolent despot, provided that he terrorized irreconcilable opponents; but the clemency which distinguished his dictatorship from that of Sulla led to the assassination that cut short his work.

March 15, 44 B. C.

Caesar's assassins disillusioned.

But the assassins, who had imagined that the removal of the Dictator would revive the moribund Republic, were swiftly disillusioned. In the excitement that followed the murder there was no sign of rejoicing. Amazed by the unsympathetic attitude of the populace, the assassins took refuge in the Capitol; and though their leaders, Brutus and Cassius, ventured on the following day to descend and address the assembly in the Forum, they were received in silence and returned. Meanwhile the senior consul, Mark Antony, who had been a trusted lieutenant of the Dictator, received an assurance of support from Lepidus, the Master of the Horse, whom he rewarded by securing his appointment as Chief Pontiff; [2] and the widow of the Dictator

March 16.

Policy of Antony.

[1] Cic., *Fam.*, ix, 6, 2. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, ii, 268.

[2] Vell., ii, 63, 1; Livy, *Epit.*, 117; App., *B. C.*, ii, 132, 552 (inaccurate); Dio, xliv, 53, 6–7. Cp. Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.*, ii³, 31, n. 3, G. Ferrero,

entrusted to him her husband's papers and his fortune, equivalent to nearly a million pounds.[1] Caesar had intended that Cicero's son-in-law, Dolabella, who, despite youthful follies, had served him well, should succeed to the consulship which he himself would resign on departing for his Parthian campaign; but Antony, as an augur, declared the election invalid, and Caesar was murdered before he could decide the question.[2] The Senate, which assembled at Antony's summons on the 17th of March, resolved under his influence that no inquiry should be made relating to the assassination, that a general amnesty should be proclaimed, and that the acts of Caesar—not only the measures that had been duly recognized, but also those that could be shown to have been resolved upon by him—should be ratified.[3] Antony on the same day invited the assassins to come down from the Capitol, entertained them at dinner,[4] and made no demur when Dolabella, who had approved the assassination, but whom he now found it politic to conciliate, assumed the vacant consulship.[5] But if any one hoped for a peaceable settlement, he was disappointed. The speech which Antony delivered at the funeral of Caesar was not intended as a sedative.[7] Touched by the recital of the gifts which the Dictator had bequeathed to every citizen and of the violated oath by

44 B.C.

March 20.[6]

Grandezza e decadenza di Roma, iii, 51, n. 3 (Eng. tr., iii, 38, n. †), and A. von Premerstein (*Hermes*, lix, 1924, pp. 100–2). The law by which T. Labienus, acting in the interest of Caesar, had restored the election of the Chief Pontiff to the people (see *The Roman Republic*, i, 242) was disregarded.

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 15, 1.

[2] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 331.

[3] App., ii, 135, 563; iii, 5, 16. Cp. von Premerstein (*Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung f. Rechtsgesch.*, röm. Abt., xlii, 1922, p. 131, and p. 187, *infra*.

[4] Livy, *Epit.*, 116; Vell., ii, 58, 3; Appian (ii, 142, 592–4) incorrectly refers the invitation to the day (March 18) following the session of the Senate.

[5] *Phil.*, i, 13, 31; *C. I. L.*, i, pp. 440, 466; Vell., ii, 58, 3; App., ii, 119, 500; 122, 511; 129, 538–9; Dio, xliv, 53, 1.

[6] *The Roman Republic*, iii, 347, n. 1.

[7] E. Schwartz (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, ii, 230), citing Suetonius (*Div. Iul.*, 85), stigmatizes Appian's account of Antony's speech (cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 351) as 'a romantic exaggeration'; and Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iii, 27, n. *]) asserts that 'Cicero makes no allusion to a great inflammatory speech by Antony in his letters of this time: he refers to it only in his Philippics [ii, 38, 90–1] . . . after Antony had definitely broken with the conspirators' party'. If Ferrero will read Cicero's letter to Atticus (xiv, 10, 1) of April 19, he will find the allusion the existence of which he denies.

44 B.C. which the senators had bound themselves to protect him, the lawless attempted to set fire to the houses of the chief assassins; a marble pillar, inscribed 'To the Father of his Country', was erected in the Forum, and prayers were offered round it; and one Herophilus, who called himself a grandson of Marius, delivered violent harangues against the enemies of Caesar.[1] While the assassins were popular in rural districts where landowners were inclined to support the Conservative cause,[2] the indignation of the urban populace and of the veteran soldiers, who revered their late commander, became so threatening that Brutus, Cassius, and others fled for their lives; and Antony, whose attitude towards them was not unfriendly, procured a decree granting Brutus dispensation from a law which forbade the urban praetor to remain away from the capital longer than ten days.[4] About the same time Cleopatra, who may have felt that after the assassination of her protector she was no longer safe in Rome, departed for Alexandria and, if we may believe Josephus, poisoned her boy husband, in whose lifetime Caesarion, the son whom she had borne to her lover, could not be associated with herself in sovereignty, and whom, if she suffered him to return, her opponents might exalt against her.[5] Gaius Matius, that friend of Caesar who paid the noblest tribute to his memory,[6] remarked to Cicero, who was then his guest, that nothing could be worse than the political situation: 'if Caesar, with all his genius, could not find a way out, who

About April 13 or earlier.[3]

Flight of Brutus and Cassius.

Cleopatra returns to Egypt.

[1] *Att.*, xii, 49, 1; *Phil.*, i, 2, 5; ii, 36, 91; 42, 107; Val. Max., ix, 15, 1; Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 85; App., iii, 2, 2–3; Dio, xliv, 51, 1. Cp. Livy, *Epit.*, 116. See also Th. Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.*, iv, 1906, p. 182.

[2] *Att.*, xiv, 6, 2; 20, 4; *Brut.*, i, 15, 5; *Phil.*, ii, 41, 107.

[3] *Att.*, xiv, 7, 1. Cp. *Class. Philol.*, x, 1915, pp. 257–8.

[4] *Att.*, xiv, 6, 1; *Phil.*, ii, 13, 31. Cp. Ferrero, *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 51, n. 1 (Eng. tr., iii, 37, n. §).

[5] *Att.*, xiv, 8, 1; Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 4, 1; Porphyry (Eusebius, ed. Schoene, i, 168–70). Cp. Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 222, 227, 228, n. 1. As Professors Grenfell and Hunt observe (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, xiv, 1629, p. 10), a papyrus dated July 26, 44 B.C. indicates that the death of Ptolemy XV was not then known to the writer. Remarking that the news of his death, if he died at Rome, would probably have reached Oxyrhynchus by that date (although papyri exist 'dated by an emperor who had been dead for . . . five months'), they are inclined to believe that he died in Egypt. But might not Cleopatra have concealed his death for a time? [See p. 267.]

[6] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 349–51.

will now?'[1] Cicero himself was not more hopeful. 'What troubles me', he told his devoted friend, Pomponius Atticus, 'is that we have not regained constitutional government along with liberty. . . . But, come what may, the Ides of March console me.'[2] He distrusted Antony and regretted that he had not been assassinated as well as Caesar.[3] Antony had offended influential senators by his funeral oration, to which they attributed the excesses of the populace, and he needed their support. He conciliated Republican sentiment by a motion, which was accepted without a division, to abolish the office of Dictator,[4] by arranging that Lepidus should be commissioned to offer terms to Sextus, the son of Pompey, under which he might receive a recompense for the confiscation of his father's property,[5] and by supporting a proposal of the famous jurist, Servius Sulpicius, that no decree of Caesar should thenceforth be published[6]—in other words, that while his laws already published were to be respected, his contemplated measures, or what might be represented as such, should be ignored; but he did not intend to tolerate a rival, and though he executed Herophilus without a trial, the arbitrary deed was approved.[8] Perhaps it was in recognition of the goodwill which these measures seemed to indicate that a senatorial decree was passed, assigning the provinces of Macedonia and Syria to Antony and Dolabella respectively for the following year.[9] But Antony was not satisfied with the assurance of future power. Cicero, upon whom we have mainly to rely for knowledge of his deeds, was not meticulously accurate in describing the conduct of his enemies; but Antony did not scruple to use

44 B.C. Cicero despondent.

Antony conciliates the Senate, Early in April.

Before April 13,[7] which assigns to him the province of Macedonia for 44;

[1] *Att.*, xiv, 1, 1. [2] *Ib.*, 4, 1–2.

[3] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 351–2.

[4] *Phil.*, i, 1, 3; ii, 36, 91; App., iii, 25, 94 (chronologically inaccurate), Dio, xliv, 51, 2. See pp. 187–8.

[5] App., iii, 4, 11; Dio, xlv, 10, 6. Cp. *Phil.*, xiii, 5, and *The Roman Republic*, iii, 310, 317.

[6] *Phil.*, i, 1, 3; ii, 36, 91. Cp. *Att.*, xiv, 14, 2; Dio, xliv, 53, 4; xlv, 23, 7; and von Premerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 132. The proposal was made with a view to grants in favour of individuals and remissions of taxation which had not been made public, and to which Caesar might not have intended to give effect.

[7] *Att.*, xiv, 8, 1. [8] *Ib.*; Livy, *Epit.*, 116; App., iii, 3, 6.

[9] See pp. 188–90.

44 B.C. any expedient for raising the money which he required and collecting followers upon whom he could depend. Having

but he tampers with Caesar's papers. seized the public treasure deposited in the temple of Ops, he added to it by selling privileges to individuals and provincial communities, by officially recognizing a recent seizure by the Galatian prince, Deiotarus, of the Lesser Armenia, of which Caesar had deprived him for having aided Pompey, and by forging a bill, which he attributed to Caesar, for conferring Roman citizenship upon the Sicilians. He declared that he was merely giving effect to laws or decrees which had been accepted by the people or the Senate; but he did not hesitate, the Sulpician decree notwithstanding, to display tablets, embodying forged laws and decrees, on the Capitol, and, with the assistance of Caesar's clerk, Faberius, to make fictitious entries in Caesar's papers.[1] Cicero, who was staying on the Bay of Naples at Puteoli, which, despite the political tension, was

His correspondence with Cicero. thronged with visitors,[2] received a letter from him, asking his consent to the rehabilitation of an exile, who had been a follower of the notorious Clodius.[3] His reply, conveying an assent which, as he knew, was superfluous, may well have made Antony smile: 'while I have always had a warm regard for you, in these times the public interest has recommended you to me so strongly that I hold none more dear'.[4] Writing to Atticus and enclosing a copy of Antony's letter, he expressed his real views: 'you will readily see how reckless and unprincipled is his request—so mischievous that at times one could wish Caesar back.'[5] Antony was just then preparing to utilize the force which Caesar had created.

His law for the benefit of discharged soldiers. In conjunction with his colleague he had carried a law for assigning fresh allotments to retired veteran soldiers,[6] and

[1] *Att.*, xiv, 8, 1; 12, 1–2; 14, 4; *Fam.*, xii, 1, 1; *Phil.*, i, 10, 24; ii, 36, 92; 37; 38, 97–8; iii, 12, 30; v, 4, 11–2; vii, 5, 15; xii, 5, 12; Vell., ii, 60, 4; Dio, xlv, 53, 2–3. Cp. L. Lange, *Röm. Alt.*, iii, 1871, pp. 485–6 (=iii², 496) and von Premerstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–4.

[2] *Att.*, xiv, 9, 2. Cp. 16, 1.

[3] *Ib.*, 13A. Cp. *Phil.*, i, 1, 3, and Lange, *l. c.*

[4] *Att.*, xiv, 13B, 1.

[5] *Ib.*, 13, 6.

[6] *Phil.*, v, 4, 10. Cp. *Hermes*, xlvii, 1912, pp. 146–7, 149–50. This law—the *lex Antonia Cornelia de coloniis in agros deducendis*—must not be confounded with the agrarian law (see p. 16, *infra*) which the consuls carried in June.

towards the end of April[1] he left Rome for Campania to give effect to this measure. 44 B.C.

Dolabella executes Caesarian rioters.

Immediately after his departure Dolabella, who, though he had hitherto acted with him, owed him a grudge,[2] again assumed the role of a Republican. The rioters who supported Herophilus had not been cowed by his execution: crowding into the Forum, they called upon the magistrates to dedicate the pillar which they had erected in honour of Caesar and to join them in sacrificing to his soul.[3] Backed by the soldiers of Lepidus, Dolabella drove them out, crucified the slaves who had mingled in the throng, and caused the citizens and the other freemen who were arrested to be hurled from the Tarpeian rock.[4] Vibius Pansa, one of the consuls designate, reprobated such illegal methods; but Cicero approved them. He had indeed repeatedly lamented that the assassination of Caesar had not restored constitutional government: 'There could be no greater anomaly than that, while the tyrannicides are lauded to the skies, the tyrant's acts are defended;'[5] 'Our heroes, or rather our gods . . . have a strong consolation—the consciousness of a great and glorious deed: what consolation is there for us, who, though the tyrant is slain, are not free?'[6] But the unconstitutional action of Dolabella had been directed against Caesarians, and he had earned the gratitude of Cicero by declaiming against Lucius,[7] the brother of Antony. 'My Dolabella,' he wrote to Atticus, 'how splendid he is! Now I can call him mine: before, believe me, I had my doubts.' He was assured by correspondents in the capital that the action of his son-in-law was 'loudly cheered and heartily approved by the lower classes', of whom the more respectable doubtless welcomed the restoration, by any means, of order; and he hastened to congratulate him. 'I cannot help confessing to my crowning joy—that public opinion associates me with your praises . . . it is an honour to me that you, our youthful consul, are being glorified as my pupil. . . . Shall I set before

Some days before May 1.

Cicero approves his action.

[1] See pp. 190–1.
[2] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 330–1.
[3] App., iii, 3, 7.
[4] *Ib.*, §§ 7–9; *Fam.*, xii, 1, 1; *Phil.*, ii, 42, 107; Dio, xliv, 50, 3 (inaccurate).
[5] *Att.*, xiv, 6, 2.
[6] *Ib.*, 11, 1.
[7] *Ib.*, 20, 4. Cp. W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, ii², 1902, p. 492, n. 5.

44 B.C. you the example of illustrious men, as is usual in exhortation? I can think of none more illustrious than yourself.'[1]

Prospects of Antony.

Meanwhile Antony was preparing for the struggle which he foresaw. The assassins had paid a compliment to that vigorous man when, dreading the courage and the skill with which he would use his strength, they deputed Trebonius to engage him in conversation outside the hall in which they had planned to perpetrate the deed.[2] Devoted though he was in hours of ease to wine and women, a jovial boon companion, who bore no malice against those who ventured to return his raillery,[3] he had acquired experience of war and of political affairs; and we may assume that he appraised every element in the political situation. Lepidus, the Governor of Southern Gaul (commonly called the Province) and of Nearer Spain,[4] had already backed him. Decimus Brutus, who commanded three legions as Governor of Cisalpine Gaul,[5] had been prominent in the conspiracy against Caesar, and would doubtless support the Senate; but he was not formidable. Quintus Cornificius, the Governor of Africa, though he had served Caesar well in Illyricum,[6] was a faithful adherent of the existing Government, but not likely to give trouble. Asinius Pollio, who held Further Spain with three legions, was devoted to the memory of Caesar.[7] From Munatius Plancus, an ex-lieutenant and an intimate friend of Caesar, who governed the whole of Gaul,[8] north of the Province, there was no reason to expect hostility. As Cicero confessed,[9] the Republican party had no force then to oppose to the ambition of Antony; and Antony had devised a plan for obtaining legal control of the Gallic provinces, which would make him irresistible.

He enlists discharged soldiers.

Travelling through Campania, where large numbers of discharged veterans were settled, Antony induced many of them to swear that they would uphold Caesar's acts, and urged them to arm.[10] By the middle of May he had

[1] *Att.*, xiv, 17A (=*Fam.* ix, 14), 1–2. 6.
[2] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 343.
[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 24, 6.
[4] Vell., ii, 63, 1; Nic. Dam., 28.
[5] Nic. Dam., 28; App., iii, 49, 201.
[6] *The Roman Republic*, iii, 216.
[7] *Fam.*, x, 31, 3; 32, 4.
[8] *Ib.*, x, 24, 5; Nic. Dam., 28.
[9] *Brut.*, i, 15, 4.
[10] *Att.*, xiv, 21, 2.

assembled six thousand men,[1] with whom he intended to overawe recalcitrant senators. Cicero was seriously alarmed not only by these proceedings, but also by the fear that Sextus Pompeius, who had raised a force in Spain,[2] intended to challenge the supremacy of Antony. Civil war seemed to him inevitable, and his personal safety would be imperilled. 'One won't be allowed now, as one was in Caesar's war, to remain neutral. For if this vile junto think that any one has rejoiced at Caesar's death—and we have all displayed our joy openly—they will treat him as an enemy, and that means wholesale massacre.'[3] Atticus must help him to decide; for, he explains, 'so many arguments come into my head on either side'. Shall he go to Greece? If he does, he will avoid the risk of death, but will probably incur the reproach of having deserted his post. Or shall he remain—in personal danger, but perhaps able to serve his country? A day or two later, while he is waiting for an answer, he asks his friend whether senators, when the House meets on the 1st of June, to consider an expected motion of Antony for giving him control of the provinces of Gaul in exchange for Macedonia, will be free to vote according to their convictions: if not—if they are to be coerced by Antony—'what will the change of masters have brought me except the delight with which I feasted my eyes upon the righteous doom of a tyrant?'[4] 'I must', he wrote a few days later, when he was perturbed by the news that Antony was canvassing the veterans, 'read and re-read my *Cato*[5] . . . for old age is making me bitter. I am irritated at everything.'[6] When Hirtius, one of the consuls designate, whom he had just entertained at dinner, was bidding him good-bye, he earnestly exhorted him to work for peace. Hirtius replied that the enemies of Caesar were not less to be dreaded than Antony. 'He is not sound,' said Cicero, when he repeated the remark to

44 B.C.

Anxieties of Cicero.

April 27 or 28.

May 17.

[1] *Fam.*, xi, 2; *Phil.*, i, 11, 27; ii, 39, 100; 42, 108; v, 6, 17; App., iii, 4–5, §§ 13–5 (who incorrectly says that the Senate authorized Antony to raise a bodyguard, and adds that the 6,000 were all centurions!).

[2] App., iv, 83; 84, 352; Dio, xlv, 10, 1–4. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 310.

[3] *Att.*, xiv, 13, 2. Cp. 22, 2.

[4] *Ib.*, 14, 4. Cp. xv, 4, 1; 22, 2.

[5] The treatise on old age, commonly called *De senectute*.

[6] *Att.*, xiv, 21, 3.

44 B.C. Atticus.[1] But by this time Antony had encountered a formidable rival.

C. Octavius. Gaius Octavius, whom Caesar had named in his last will as his adopted son, and to whom he had bequeathed three-fourths of his property,[2] was the son of an Octavius who had served as Governor of Macedonia[3] and of Atia, a daughter of Caesar's sister, Julia. He was descended, as he related in his lost memoirs, from an old and wealthy family of the middle class,[4] in which his father was the first to attain the nobility conferred by office. Antony taunted him, apparently with truth, as the grandson of a money-changer.[5] A friend of Cicero, the learned Pythagorean Nigidius Figulus, drew his horoscope on learning the hour of his birth,[6] and announced that the infant was destined to become the ruler of the world.[7] When Octavius was four years old his father died,[8] and his mother soon afterwards married an ex-consul, Marcius Philippus.[9] Caesar, attracted by the boy's ability and character, began, in the short period which he spent in Rome after his victory at Thapsus, to initiate him in politics, and determined to adopt him in the hope that he would eventually carry on his work. Octavius was prevented by illness from accompanying his grand-uncle to Spain, but as soon as he recovered set out for the peninsula and joined him a few

Dec. 45 B.C. weeks after the crowning victory of Munda.[10] Soon afterwards he was sent with his aged tutor, Apollodorus of Pergamum, and Vipsanius Agrippa, who had been his closest friend at school, to Apollonia in Epirus, to study the art of oratory and the art of war, and to qualify him-

[1] *Att.*, xv, 1A, 3. Cp. 6, 1–2.

[2] *The Roman Republic*, iii, 317–8, 346. Nicolaus of Damascus (8) says that Caesar had already adopted Octavius at the time of his first triumph (46 B.C.). Dr. C. M. Hall (*Nicolaus of Damascus's Life of Augustus*, 1923, p. 79) suggests that Nicolaus may have 'had access to a statement in Augustus' memoirs to the effect that' he 'knew of the existence of an earlier will in which he had been made Caesar's adopted son'.

[3] *C. I. L.*, vi, 1311 (H. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 47). [4] Suet., *Aug.*, 2, 3.

[5] *Ib.*, 4, 2. Cicero in a eulogy of Octavian (*Phil.*, iii, 6, 15), while he notices the bad taste of Antony's taunts, does not deny the truth of the one which I have mentioned.

[6] Sept. 23, 63 B.C. [7] Suet., *Aug.*, 94, 5 ; Dio, xlv, 1, 3.

[8] Suet., *Aug.*, 8, 1. [9] *Ib.*, § 3.

[10] *The Roman Republic*, iii, 312. Cp. Dio, xlv, 2, 7.

self to accompany the Dictator as his Master of the Horse in his projected campaign against the Parthians. He made good use of his time, reading diligently, exercising with the cavalry who were quartered in the neighbourhood, and mingling freely with the officers, to whom he made himself agreeable.[1] The astrologer Theogenes, to whom he had reluctantly disclosed the date and the hour of his birth, confirmed the forecast of Nigidius, and knelt in veneration at his feet.[2] Three months[3] passed away. One evening, towards the end of March, a messenger handed Octavius a letter from his mother. Breaking the seal, he saw that Caesar had been murdered, and that his mother desired him to return to Italy and join her: 'you must now play the man', she added, 'consider what ought to be done, and act'. In the course of the night he took counsel with his friends. Some urged him to join the legions quartered in Macedonia, to return to Rome at their head, and to take vengeance on the assassins: others gave more prudent advice. After listening patiently to every one, the boy decided to return to Italy, to ascertain what had followed the murder, and to act accordingly. Crossing the Adriatic, he refrained from heading for Brundisium, for he did not yet know the temper of the garrison, and, landing a few miles southward, proceeded on foot to Lupiae, on the road between Brundisium and Hydruntum. There he was informed of the events that had followed the murder and of the provisions of Caesar's will, and, after sending messengers to ascertain whether he could do so safely, proceeded to Brundisium, where the troops thronged to welcome him. Letters from his mother and his step-father were awaiting his arrival. Both counselled him to decline the adoption and the legacy; but, cautious though he was, he rejected their advice, and wrote to Philippus that he intended to avenge the murder of his adoptive father and to succeed to his authority. Impetuous friends urged him to visit the colonies of retired veterans which Caesar had

44 B.C.

Hearing at Apollonia of the murder of Caesar, he returns to Italy.

[1] *C. I. L.*, i², p. 28; Strabo, xiii, 4, 3; Vell., ii, 59, 4; Nic. Dam., 16; Seneca, *Ep.*, 15, 2. 46; Quintil., iii, 1, 17; Suet., *Aug.*, 8, 2; 89, 1; App. iii, 9, 30; Dio, xliii, 51, 7.

[2] Suet., *Aug.*, 94, 12.

[3] Appian (iii, 9, 32) says five; but Nicolaus is a better authority.

44 B.C. founded, assuring him that the men would gladly follow him; but he agreed with more prudent counsellors that the time for such action had not yet come. Sending to Asia for the treasure which Caesar had deposited there in view of the Parthian campaign,[1] he travelled overland to Puteoli, where his step-father was staying, with the intention of going on to Rome.[2]

Cicero anxious about his intentions.

Cicero was keenly interested about the return of Octavius. Writing to Atticus on the 11th of April, about a fortnight after the lad reached Brundisium, he inquired anxiously, 'is there any suspicion that he intends a *coup d'état*? I don't suppose so, but I want to know'.[3] A few

Apr. 19. days later he wrote again from his country house at Cumae, 'Octavius arrived at Naples on the 18th. Balbus saw him there early next morning, and on the same day in conversation with me . . . remarked that he intended to take possession of his legacy. But, as you say, he'll have

Apr. 21. to fight hard for it with Antony'.[4] Two days later Cicero told his friend that Octavius was staying in his step-father's villa. Doubtless the boy calculated that the illustrious orator, with his vast circle of influential friends and his high standing in the political world, might be useful: probably he knew his character; at all events he treated him with more than deferential courtesy, habitually addressing him as 'father'.[5] 'He is quite devoted to me,' wrote Cicero.[6] But Cicero was anxious when he reflected on what Octavius was likely to do in Rome, surrounded as he would be by irreconcilable enemies of Brutus, Cassius, and their fellow assassins, whom Cicero revered: 'He says that the present situation is intolerable. But what do you think of the boy going to Rome, where our liberators cannot live in safety?'[7]

[1] Nicolaus (18) adds that Octavius procured from the province Asia one year's tribute, which, however, he paid into the treasury. Cp. App., iii, 11, 39.

[2] Cic., *Att.*, xiv, 10, 3; 12, 2; Vell., ii, 59, 5; 60, 1; Nic. Dam., 16–8; Suet., *Aug.*, 8, 2–3; App., iii, 9–12, §§ 30–40; Dio, xlv, 3, 1. Appian incorrectly says that Octavius heard from Atia at Lupiae.

[3] *Att.*, xiv, 5, 3.

[4] *Ib.*, 10, 3: *Sed, ut scribis, ῥιξόθεμιν magnum cum Antonio.* As Tyrrell and Purser remark, 'It is hopeless to try to restore this [corrupt Greek] word'. But the general sense is evident.

[5] Cic., *Brut.*, i, 17, 5; Plut., *Cic.*, 45, 1.

[6] *Att.*, xiv, 11, 2.

[7] *Ib.*, 12, 2.

Towards the end of April Octavius proceeded up the Appian Way, meeting many of the discharged veterans, who trooped to welcome him, and told him that they were prepared to avenge the death of Caesar. About the beginning of May he entered Rome,[1] where he was received by a crowd of sympathizers; and it was long remembered that a halo, prismatically coloured, had appeared round the sun, a phenomenon which some interpreted as a symbol of royalty.[2] On the following day he presented himself in the Forum, where his friends had assembled, and, accosting Gaius Antonius, one of the urban praetors, brother of the absent consul, formally announced his acceptance of the adoption.[3] Soon afterwards he was introduced by the tribune Lucius Antonius to a popular gathering in the Forum, and made a speech, the tone of which Cicero disliked.[4] Finding that the officials appointed to hold the festival which Caesar had instituted in honour of his victory at Thapsus dreaded the opposition of the Republicans,[5] he prepared to celebrate it at his own expense, and Cicero was displeased on hearing of his intention.[6] But about the middle of the month Antony, who had doubtless been informed that Octavius was becoming popular, hurried back from Campania.[7]

44 B.C.

Octavius accepts his adoption by Caesar.

Antony returns from Campania to Rome.

Before his return he had purchased the support of Dolabella by giving him a share in the plunder of the temple of Ops.[8] Octavian (for by that name Octavius was now

[1] *Ib.*, 20, 5; 21, 4; App., iii, 12, 40–2; 13, 43; Dio, xlv, 5, 2. Dr. C. M. Hall (*Nicolaus*, &c., p. 84) wrongly infers from *Att.*, xiv, 5, 3, that Octavius entered Rome before April 11. Appian says that near Tarracina [in Latium and on the Appian Way] he learned that the consuls had deprived Brutus and Cassius of their provinces, Macedonia and Syria. Those provinces had never belonged to them. Plutarch (*Cic.*, 43, 3) incorrectly implies that Octavius did not appear in Rome till after September 1.

[2] Livy, *Epit.*, 117; Vell., ii, 59, 6; Seneca, *Nat. quaest.*, i, 2, 1; Pliny, *Nat. hist.*, ii, 28, 98; Suet., *Aug.*, 95; App., iii, 13, 43; Dio, xlv, 4, 4; Obseq., 68.

[3] App., iii, 14, 49. Cp. Suet., *Aug.*, 8, 2.

[4] Dio, xlv, 6, 3 (inaccurate); *Att.*, xv, 2, 3.

[5] Pliny, *Nat. hist.*, ii, 24 (23), 93; Suet., *Aug.*, 10, 2; Dio, xlv, 6, 4; Obseq., 68.

[6] *Att.*, xiv, 20, 5; 21, 4; xv, 2, 3. Cp. *Fam.*, xi, 28, 6.

[7] He arrived in Rome before May 21 (*Att.*, xv, 3, 1. 3; 4, 1). See p. 191.

[8] Cicero (*Phil.*, ii, 42, 107. Cp. i, 12, 29) suggests that Dolabella was intimidated by Antony; but, writing to Atticus (xvi, 15, 1) towards the end of this year, he affirmed that the junior consul had 'deserted the Republic

44 B.C. known in accordance with his adoptive father's will [1]) called upon him in the mansion that had belonged to Pompey, where he was then residing, with the intention of claiming his inheritance. But Antony had no intention of giving up what he needed for the fulfilment of ambition. Octavian was kept waiting in an antechamber. When he was at last admitted to the consul's presence, he reproached him, if we may believe Appian, for not having punished the assassins, and, though he was too wary to demand restitution of the treasure that had been abstracted from the temple, boldly, but with the deference due to his senior and to a consul, claimed the sum that would enable him to pay the legacies which Caesar had bequeathed. Antony, astounded by the boy's audacity, made excuses for declining his request, and contrived to delay the enactment that was required to confirm the adoption.[2] Despite this rebuff, Octavian found an opportunity of showing how he cherished the memory of his adoptive father. One of the magistrates gave a series of games for the entertainment of the populace. Octavian desired to have the gilded chair which the Senate a few weeks before had authorized Caesar to use and the diadem which Antony had offered to him, exhibited in the Circus; but the tribunes, doubtless prompted by Antony, forbade him, and the knights who were present in their reserved seats applauded their decision. 'Bravo!' wrote Cicero to Atticus.[3]

He refuses Octavian's demand for payment of Caesar's legacy.

Octavian forbidden to exhibit Caesar's chair in the Circus.

Meanwhile Antony was preparing to make his position impregnable. He had convened a meeting of the Senate

for a bribe', and on the 9th of May (*Att.*, xiv, 18, 1) he had charged him with having (like Antony) plundered the temple of Ops. If Dolabella did so with the connivance of Antony, and if this was the form which the bribe took, Antony must have administered the bribe by letter before he returned to Rome, on hearing of Dolabella's drastic measures.

[1] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 346.

[2] Livy, *Epit.*, 117; Vell., ii, 60, 3; Nic. Dam., 28; Plut., *Ant.*, 16, 1; Flor., ii, 15, 2; Suet., *Aug.*, 10, 2; App., iii, 14, 50 (inaccurate); 15–20; Dio, xlv, 5, 3; Obseq., 68.

[3] *Att.*, xv, 3, 3; Plut., *Ant.*, 16, 1; App., iii, 28, 105–7. Appian says that the aedile Critonius objected to Octavian's attempt on the ground that he was himself defraying the cost of the games; that Octavian appealed to Antony as consul; that Antony promised to refer the question to the Senate; that Octavian replied, 'Do so: while the senatorial decree [in favour of Caesar] holds good, I will bring in the chair'; and that Antony thereupon forbade him to do so. See p. 191.

for the 1st of June, and it was rumoured that he was collecting troops to overawe senators who might oppose him.[1] Cicero, knowing that he intended to procure a law for transferring the government of Cisalpine Gaul from Decimus Brutus to himself, dreaded the outbreak of civil war and half regretted the assassination of Caesar: 'With Caesar I was in such favour—may the gods damn him though he is dead!—that at my age he was not a master to be feared.'[2] As the 1st of June approached Hirtius warned him to keep away from the Senate, adding that he dared not go himself because, devoted though he was to the memory of Caesar, some of the veterans, whose claims to allotments had not yet been granted, were threatening him.[3] Brutus and Cassius, with whom Antony had hitherto kept up a show of friendship, wrote to ask him whether in the presence of the veterans, in whose interests they had heard that he intended to propose a bill, they could safely enter Rome.[4] On the appointed day Antony and Dolabella, followed by an armed force, appeared; but, if we may sift the truth from the rhetoric of Cicero,[5] no senators, except those who supported them, ventured to attend. Antony had intended to obtain the provinces which he wanted from the Senate;[6] but he now chose a more summary way. A tribune carried a plébiscite, of which due notice had not been given, and by which, in violation of one of Caesar's laws,[7] which the Senate, under the influence of Antony, had resolved to uphold, the provincial commands of the consuls were prolonged from two to five years, while Antony was empowered to exchange Macedonia for Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul, and at the same time to retain the Macedonian legions.[8] Next day[9]

44 B.C.

Cicero warned to keep away from the Senate.

Antony obtains a plébiscite empowering him to exchange Macedonia for the Gallic provinces.

June 2.

[1] *Att.*, xiv, 22, 2.
[2] *Ib.*, xv, 4, 3.
[3] *Ib.*, 5, 2. Cp. 8, 1, and *Phil.*, i, 2, 6.
[4] *Fam.*, xi, 2.
[5] *Phil.*, i, 2, 6; ii, 42, 108.
[6] *Att.*, xiv, 14, 4.
[7] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 285.
[8] See pp. 192–6. According to Appian (iii, 30, 118), whom the latest biographer of Octavian (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 283) follows, the people, much as they disliked Antony, voted for the plébiscite, which Appian assigns to a date later than that of the games in honour of Venus Genetrix (July 20–30), because Octavian pleaded for him. Apart from the chronological blunder, one may suppose that if Octavian had thus supported Antony, Cicero would have heard of the fact and mentioned it. See pp. 195–6.
[9] *Att.*, xvi, 16c 11.

44 B.C. the consuls passed a law which nullified a recent senatorial decree. Not long after Antony assented to the proposal that no decree of Caesar should thenceforth be published,[1] he had induced the Senate, which perhaps trusted that Dolabella would prevent him from abusing his authority,[2] to empower himself and his colleague with the assistance of a commission to determine the measures upon which Caesar had decided, but which had not yet been published.[3] By a law which Antony had promulgated in the first week of May, and to vote for which veteran soldiers, in response to his appeal,[4] had travelled from Campania,[5] the commission was now appointed—to consist of the consuls alone![6] But while Antony used the law for his own purposes, he took advantage of it to pass judicious measures, including the famous 'Julian municipal law', which had been drafted by Julius Caesar.[7] In the course of the month the consuls conjointly carried a law which assigned all the available public land in Italy for distribution among veteran soldiers and needy citizens, and appointed a commission, over which Lucius Antonius was to preside, while Antony himself and Dolabella were among the members, to carry the law into effect.[8] Thoughtful observers must have foreseen that, while it would strengthen the hold of Antony upon the veterans and the proletariat, the law relating to the exchange of provinces must lead to civil war; for Decimus Brutus had for some weeks been in possession of Cisalpine Gaul, which Caesar had assigned

Lex Antonia de actis Caesaris confirmandis.

Between June 3 and Oct. 9 (when Antony left Rome).

Agrarian law.

[1] See p. 5.

[2] See Drumann-Groebe, *Gesch. Roms*, i², 1899, p. 424 [84, 2].

[3] *Att.*, xvi, 16C, 11; 16F, 18; *Phil.*, ii, 39, 100; Dio, xliv, 23, 7; 53, 4. Cp. von Premerstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–6.

[4] See p. 8.

[5] *Fam.*, xi, 2, 1–3; *Att.*, xv, 4, 4; *Phil.*, i, 2, 6; ii, 39, 100; v, 4, 10; 6, 17–8. Cp. von Premerstein, pp. 137–40.

[6] *Att.*, xvi, 16C, 11. Cp. von Premerstein, pp. 141–4.

[7] *Ib.*, pp. 148–9. See p. 196, and cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 553–64.

[8] *Fam.*, xi, 2, 3; *Phil.*, v, 3, 7. 9; Dio, xlv, 9, 1 (chronologically inaccurate). Cp. *Hermes*, xlvii, 1912, pp. 147–50, where W. Sternkopf, contrasting *Phil.*, v, 3, 9 (*quod cum eo conlega* [Dolabella] *tulit*) with § 7 (*Tribuni plebis tulerunt de provinciis*), shows that this agrarian law was carried by Antony and Dolabella, not, as had before been thought (Drumann-Groebe, *Gesch. Roms*, i², 424–5), by the tribune L. Antonius. We may infer from *Att.*, xvi, 3, 1, compared with xv, 12, 2, that the commissioners intended to confiscate *private* land.

44 B.C.

to him, and would not yield to Antony without a struggle. 44 B.C.

Meanwhile Gaius Cassius and Marcus Brutus had to be provided for.[1] Remaining in Italy, they might stir up opposition to Antony; but they must not be allowed to obtain power abroad. On the 5th of June the Senate, under the influence of Antony, decreed that at some future time provinces should be assigned to them, and by the same decree they were invested with temporary offices: Brutus was to superintend the export of corn to Rome from Asia, Cassius from Sicily.[2] On the 8th Cicero visited Brutus at Antium. A large party, including Servilia, the mother of Brutus, and his wife Porcia, was assembled. Brutus asked Cicero what he would advise him to do. Cicero urged him to accept the appointment. While Cicero was speaking, Cassius entered the room and said with a determined look, 'To Sicily I will not go. Am I to accept an insult as a favour?' 'What are you going to do then?' asked Cicero. 'I shall go to Achaia,' replied Cassius, intending, as we may infer from later events, to proceed thence to Syria and to assume the government of that province. 'And you, Brutus?' asked Cicero. 'To Rome, if you approve.' 'I don't at all; you won't be safe.' Finally, Servilia, who had in her youth been the mistress of Caesar,[3] and remained a great lady, promised to get the clause about the corn-commissionership cut out of the senatorial decree; and Brutus abandoned the thought of going to Rome.[4] Whether the influence of Servilia prevailed is uncertain: at all events in the following month the province of Crete was assigned by senatorial decree to Brutus, that of Cyrene in North-east Africa to Cassius.[5] In these pro-

Assignment of temporary offices to Brutus and Cassius.

Cicero's advice to Brutus.

Provinces assigned to Brutus and Cassius.

[1] M. Gelzer (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 994–5), citing *Brut.*, ii, 5, 1; 4, 4, *Att.*, xv, 1, 3, and Dio, xlvi, 31, 4 (which is irrelevant), says that there is no doubt that if in May Brutus had embarked upon a campaign for liberty, volunteers would have rallied round him, as they did a year later [when his circumstances were far more favourable]. Very likely (see *Fam.*, xi, 2, and *Phil.*, x, 3, 7); but of what use would volunteers have been against veterans?

[2] *Att.*, xv, 9, 1. 10; App., iii, 6, 18. 20.

[3] *The Roman Republic*, i, 277, &c.

[4] Att., xv, 11, 1–2; 12, 1. Sternkopf (*Hermes*, xlvii, 382) infers from the promise of Servilia that the decree contained some other provision besides the one relating to the corn-commissionership.

[5] See pp. 196–7.

44 B.C. vinces they would be powerless to contend against Antony or his colleague.

Octavian in opposition to Antony gains popularity.

Meanwhile Octavian was holding his own against Antony. The boy had no official standing and no troops: but he was the inheritor of a great name; many of the veterans were prepared to fight for him; and all the world has recognized that he acted with the circumspection, the caution, the astuteness, and the adroitness of an experienced politician. As Antony had refused to give him the means of paying the legacies which Caesar had bequeathed, he sold the property that accrued to him under the will,[1] and, addressing the people in the Forum, urged them to give him their support in return. Moderate men, including Cicero and Servilius Vatia, who had been joint consul with Caesar five years before, tried to foment enmity between him and Antony, whose ambition they hoped thus to curb; and the youth, who was well aware that they desired to curb him also, did not repel them.[2] Early in July an annual festival was celebrated in honour of Apollo. Brutus, who, in the ordinary course, would, as urban praetor, have presided, had avoided risking his life in Rome; but in the hope of winning popularity he expended large sums on the games and on the wild-beast fights that were to follow.[3] Octavian, not to be outdone, devoted the money which he had got from the sale of his bequest to the payment of Caesar's legacy, and even offered for sale his own patrimony.[4] Soon afterwards followed the games in honour of Caesar's victory.[5] Octavian, who had prepared for them two months before, and now defrayed the cost, again attempted to introduce the diadem and the gilded chair, and was again prevented by Antony;[6] but he was loudly

July 20–30.

[1] App., iii, 21, 77. Appian adds (22, 86; 23, 89) that Pedius and Pinarius gave the bequests which they were to receive under the will (see *The Roman Republic*, iii, 346) to Octavian.

[2] Nic. Dam., 28. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 1898, p. 184, and C. M. Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

[3] *Att.*, xv, 12, 1; xvi, 4, 1; *Phil.*, ii, 13, 31; Plut., *Brut.*, 21, 2; App., iii, 23, 87; Dio, xlvii, 20, 2.

[4] Nic. Dam., 28; App., iii, 23, 88–9. [5] See p. 13.

[6] App., iii, 28, 107; Dio, xlv, 6, 4–5. E. Schwartz (*Hermes*, xxxiii, 206, n. 2) says that Cicero (*Att.*, xv, 3, 2 [or rather 3]) gives a different account, and that it is clear from *Att.*, xv, 2, 3 compared with *Fam.*, xi, 28, 6 that he

applauded by the populace and the old soldiers, who were indignant at Antony's refusal.[1] On the last seven days of the festival, about an hour before sunset, a comet appeared, which admirers of Caesar believed to symbolize his soul, now associated with the gods. Octavian saw his opportunity. Encouraged by his reception, he caused a statue of the Dictator, with a star above the head, to be placed in the temple of Venus Genetrix,[2] which the Dictator had himself erected. Antony harangued the populace and denounced Octavian; but the military tribunes who commanded his bodyguard remonstrated with him, urging him to treat the youth more fairly and to be reconciled with him. Antony, who could not afford to offend his troops, said that reconciliation was just what he desired, if only Octavian would treat him with due deference, and that he was ready to confer with him in their presence. They agreed: Antony went to the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol, and the officers went to fetch Octavian. Greeting him cordially, they told him that he too ought to do his part: he and Antony should put away all resentment and be reconciled unreservedly. They then conducted him to the Capitol. Many of the veterans, on whose support Antony was relying, had congregated there, prepared to defend Caesar's adopted son if their leader should attempt to injure him. When Octavian appeared most of them withdrew: the principals, each supported by his friends, conversed, and professed themselves willing to be reconciled.[3] Meanwhile a meeting of the Senate had been fixed

44 B.C.

They are outwardly reconciled.

was speaking of the *ludi victoriae Caesaris* (see p. 13). Now in *Att.*, xv, 3, 3, Cicero referred to games which were held on or before May 21 (see p. 191); and Schwartz apparently forgets that the *ludi victoriae Caesaris* were held on July 20–30 (*C. I. L.*, i, p. 397). Comparison of *Att.*, xv, 2, 3, with *Fam.*, xi, 28, 6, proves only that in May Octavian was already preparing to celebrate these games.

[1] Nic. Dam., 28; App., iii, 28, 108.

[2] Val. Max., iii, 2, 19; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, ii, 25 (23), 93–4; Seneca, *Nat. quaest.*, vii, 17, 2; Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 88; Dio, xlv, 7, 1; Obseq., 68. Cp. E. Babelon, *Monn. de la rép. rom.*, ii, 417–8, and Th. Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.*, iv, 1906, pp. 180–2 (=*Rev. belge de numism.*, xliii, 1887, pp. 402–5).

[3] Nic. Dam., 29; App., iii, 28, 109; 29. Cp. Plut., *Ant.*, 16, 2, and Dio, xlv, 8, 2, who, however, if one may judge from the date—later than the *ludi victoriae Caesaris* (see p. 18)—to which he assigns the incident, may be referring to the second reconciliation (see p. 26, n. 9) which Appian (iii, 39, 156) describes.

44 B.C. for the 1st of August, and men asked each other why Cicero, who glorified the assassins of Caesar as heroic liberators, had not returned to Rome to play his part in the impending struggle.[1]

Cicero intends to absent himself from Italy till the end of Antony's consulship; June 2. June 15. Between June 17 and 20. July 3.

Since the meeting of the Senate in the early days of June Cicero had been disquieted. Feeling that war was impending and wishing to leave Italy, he had asked Dolabella, who was about to start for Syria, to appoint him one of his lieutenants, on the understanding that the post was to be a sinecure. Dolabella promptly agreed.[2] About a fortnight later Cicero applied to him for sumpter mules, at the same time telling Atticus what he had done and adding, 'I really don't feel safe; but if you think otherwise, I wish you would write to me, for I would much rather stay at home if I can do so prudently.'[3] Before he received an answer he made up his mind to go: should he, he asked again, sail from Puteoli or cross the peninsula and embark at Brundisium?[4] 'I really do wish', he assured his freedman, Tiro, 'to keep up my long-standing friendship with Antony.'[5] He intended to return by the 1st of January,[6] when the new consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, would take office. Before he started many of his friends remonstrated with him for abandoning his country, though he assured them that he would soon be back.[7] Up to the moment of his departure he was busy, whenever he could banish political cares, on an ethical treatise, which he was writing for the edification of his son, then studying at Athens;[8] and when he left his Tusculan villa at the end of June,[9] he took with him materials for further literary work. Replying at Arpinum, where he halted for some days, to a letter of farewell which he had just received from Atticus, 'I am sad', he confessed, 'at your having wept after parting from me. If you had done so in my presence, I might perhaps have changed my mind about going.'[10] From Puteoli, where he intended to embark, he crossed to Nesis, an islet in the Bay of Baiae, to visit Brutus, who, like him, was offended because the festival in honour of Apollo had been

[1] See p. 22. [2] *Att.*, xv, 11, 4. [3] *Ib.*, 18, 2.
[4] *Ib.*, 20, 3. [5] Fam., xvi, 23, 2. [6] *Att.*, xv, 25; *Phil.*, i, 2, 6.
[7] *Att.*, xvi, 7, 5. Cp. Plut., *Cic.*, 43, 1. [8] *Att.*, xv, 14, 4.
[9] *Ib.*, 26, 1. [10] *Ib.*, 27, 2.

advertised for the 7th of July—the name which had been given to the month in compliment to Caesar—instead of the old name, Quintilis.[1] Brutus and Cassius had each collected a fleet, probably as a protection against pirates, including ships of war.[2] Ventidius Bassus, a soldier of fortune, who had been a slave and had afterwards made money by contracting for the supply of carriages and mules to provincial governors,[3] was raising recruits for Antony, and it was rumoured that he was about to march on Rome. The rumour, as Cicero told Atticus, was 'a *canard*',[4] but it made him uneasy.[5] After long hesitation he had decided —for the time—to start for Greece from Brundisium, in order to avoid encountering pirates;[6] but on the 17th, having moved into his country house at Pompeii, he was on the point of beginning his voyage. Just before he stepped on board, he sent to Atticus a revised copy of his essay 'On Glory.' with the injunction: 'read it privately to your guests . . . when they are mellow after a good dinner, lest they should vent their displeasure on me, though really angry with you.'[7] A week later, after coasting leisurely past Lucania, while he translated Aristotle's *Topica*[8] in his cabin, he reached Vibo, where he was hospitably received by Sica, who, fourteen years before, had sheltered him in exile.[9] Resuming his voyage, he reached Syracuse on the 1st of August, and re-embarked next day for Greece; but the vessel was driven by contrary winds to the promontory of Leucopetra, on the southern extremity of the Bruttian peninsula.[10] On the 6th he started again, but was again forced to return.[11] While he was waiting in the house of a friend for a favourable breeze, visitors came in with

44 B.C.

July 11.

July 11.

July 24.

[1] *Ib.*, xvi, 1, 1; 4, 1.

[2] *Ib.*, 4, 4. See p. 197.

[3] *Fam.*, x, 18, 3; Gell., xv, 4, 2–3.

[4] *Att.*, xvi, 1, 4.

[5] Nonius, p. 92, 16–7. Appian (iii, 66, 270–1), after reporting the junction of Hirtius with Octavian (see p. 43), says that Ventidius hurried to Rome to kidnap Cicero, and that Cicero (who never left Rome after he returned on December 9, 44) fled! O. E. Schmidt (*Philol.*, l, 1892, p. 204), quoting from the fragment—*nos Ventidianis rumoribus calfacimur*—of a letter of Cicero preserved by Nonius (*l. c.*), acutely suggests that it misled Appian's authority.

[6] *Att.*, xvi, 2, 4. Cp. 1, 3.

[7] *Att.*, xvi, 3, 1. Cp. 2, 6.

[8] *Fam.*, vii, 19. Cp. Cic., *Topica*, 5.

[9] *Att.*, xvi, 6, 1. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, i, 335.

[10] *Phil.*, i, 3, 7.

[11] *Ib.*; *Att.*, xvi, 7, 1. Cp. *Fam.*, xii, 25, 3.

44 B.C. important news. A copy of a speech which Antony had delivered in the Forum was handed to Cicero; and he was so pleased with its unexpectedly moderate tone that he began to think of returning.[1] Brutus and Cassius had jointly published a farewell manifesto, in which they announced that they were willing to live in perpetual exile, provided that the State was secure and harmony was restored,[2] and that the consciousness of having done right in assassinating Caesar was enough for them; but they demanded the repeal of the decree by which they had been charged to superintend the supply of corn.[3] At the same time they had written to all senators of consular and praetorian rank, urging them to attend on the 1st of August a meeting of the Senate in which their demand would be considered. It was hoped, so Cicero was informed, that Antony would then consent to an accommodation with Brutus and Cassius, abandon his claim to the Gallic provinces, and conform to the wishes of the Senate. Cicero's presence at the meeting was desired, and his absence was generally condemned. Plainly there was no room for doubt: he determined there and then to return.[4] As he was passing through the Strait of Messana he read a letter from Atticus, who warned him: 'Money is wonderfully tight, owing to the fear of war.'[5] By the 17th he reached Velia, on the Lucanian coast. Brutus, whose flotilla was anchored hard by, came to see him,[6] expressed delight at his return, and inspired him with fresh courage,[7] but told him that in the meeting of the Senate on the 1st of August the optimistic forecast expressed at Leucopetra had been falsified: Piso, the father of Caesar's widow, had alone ventured to oppose Antony.[8] Cicero learned further particulars from documents which Brutus showed to him —a manifesto issued by Antony and a letter in which

but on the point of departure he is induced to return.

[1] *Phil.*, i, 3, 8.

[2] Vell., ii, 62, 3. My identification of this manifesto with that which Cicero received (*Att.*, xvi, 7, 1; *Phil.*, i, 3, 8) is conjectural. See p. 267.

[3] See Drumann-Groebe, *op. cit.*, 430–1 [104, 2].

[4] *Att.*, xvi, 7, 1; *Phil.*, i, 3, 8; Plut., *Cic.*, 43, 2. See pp. 197–8.

[5] *Att.*, xvi, 7, 6.

[6] *Ib.*, § 5; *Phil.*, i, 4, 9.

[7] *Att.*, xvi, 7, 5; *Brut.*, i, 10, 4.

[8] *Att.*, xvi, 7, 5. 7; *Fam.*, xii, 2, 1; *Phil.*, i, 4, 10.

Brutus and Cassius had replied to it. Antony, whose anger was roused by their having made their request in a published manifesto, publicly refused it and wrote to them in terms which in their reply they described as insolent, menacing, and intolerable.[1] They had already determined to sail, not to the provinces that had been assigned to them,[2] but to those which they preferred—Macedonia and Syria. 44 B.C.

Cicero now headed for Pompeii, where he intended to rest before starting for Rome, and wrote on board to Atticus, who, though he had not disapproved of his leaving Italy, had lately challenged him to justify his conduct: 'Can you honourably abandon your country, you who talk of a glorious death?'[3] Cicero was wounded by the taunt and insisted that he needed no defence.[4]

On the last day of August[5] the great orator arrived in Rome, where he was welcomed at the gate Capena by a multitude of citizens.[6] Should he attend the Senate on the morrow? Antony would certainly be there, and he had heard that his enemies would resort to violence.[7] Moreover, a motion was to be made that a day should be added to all thanksgiving services, in honour of the murdered Dictator. This would be an abuse of religious ceremonial, against which he would be bound by conscience to protest,[8] and thus he would come into collision with the hot-tempered consul. Although he had travelled leisurely and rested at his Tusculan villa,[9] only a few miles from Rome, he excused himself from attending on the plea that he needed repose. Antony refused to accept the excuse, ordered soldiers to fetch him, and told the senators that, should he fail to appear, he would send workmen to break open his doors, but abandoned his intention in deference to remonstrances from moderate men.[10] Next day the

[1] *Att.*, xvi, 7, 7; *Fam.*, xi, 3.

[2] See p. 17.

[3] *Bene igitur tu, qui εὐθανασίαν, bene relinques patriam?* (*Att.*, xvi, 7, 3). Tyrrell and Purser, following Klotz, read *relinques* instead of *relinque*, which is in the MSS. Cp. G. E. Jeans, *Life and Letters of . . . Cicero*[2], 1887, p. 342, note. [Purser in *Oxford Classical Texts* reads *relinque*.]

[4] *Att.*, xvi, 7, 3.

[5] Plut., *Cic.*, 43, 3, compared with *Phil.*, v, 7, 19.

[6] Plut., *Cic.*, 43, 2.

[7] *Ib.*, § 3.

[8] *Phil.*, i, 6, 13.

[9] *Fam.*, xi, 27, 1.

[10] *Phil.*, i, 5, 12; v, 7, 19; Plut., *Cic.*, 43, 3. Cp. *Fam.*, x, 1, 1.

44 B.C. Senate met again. Antony was absent, and Cicero delivered the oration which has ever since been known as the First *Philippic*. He was still anxious to avoid an open breach with Antony, and he spoke with comparative restraint. Although he complained of Antony's violent language, he gave him credit for having abolished the dictatorship and restored order, declared himself his friend, and in criticizing his later measures refrained from the invective to which his hearers were accustomed. While he did not shrink from recalling the intimidation which Antony had practised on the 1st of June, and hinted broadly that he had plundered the treasury, tampered with Caesar's papers, and sold divers privileges, he gravely condemned certain measures by which he purposed to nullify the most beneficent laws of Caesar although the Senate, at his instance, had resolved to ratify them all. Caesar had limited the tenure of consular provinces to two years, Antony had virtually abrogated that most salutary law; Caesar had restricted the right of serving on juries to men whose integrity might be presumed, Antony proposed to empanel centurions and private soldiers upon whose devotion he might rely.[1] Worse than this, he had dealt a fatal blow at judicial authority by promulgating another bill for permitting persons convicted of sedition or treason to appeal to the mob. Finally, after again complimenting Antony on his earlier measures, and imploring him to follow the example of his grandfather, the illustrious orator, Cicero bade him take warning from the fate of Caesar.

He delivers the First *Philippic*.

Cicero could hardly have expected that this speech would have a conciliatory effect. Antony betook himself to his country house at Tibur, and there, surrounded, as Cicero heard, by harlots and stimulated by copious potations, spent a fortnight in elaborating his reply.[2] On the 19th he delivered it. 'He seemed to every one', wrote Cicero to Cassius, 'to be vomiting in his usual way, not speaking.'[3] Copies of the speech must have been circu-

Antony's reply.

[1] It appears from *Phil.*, v, 5, 12–3, that Antony's bill became law.
[2] *Fam.*, xii, 2, 1.
[3] *Ib.* Cp. 25, 4, and *Phil.*, ii, 17, 42; v, 7, 19.

lated; for Cicero knew all the points to which he would have to reply. One of the most galling was that Antony, disregarding the convention that forbade the unauthorized publication of private correspondence, read aloud the letter in which Cicero had written, 'while I have always had a warm regard for you . . . in these times the public interest has recommended you to me so strongly that I hold none more dear'.[1] Not less provocative (for, as an ardent admirer of Cicero insists, much truth underlay the charge [2]) was a passage in which Antony held him responsible for the murder of Caesar.[3] He dared not rebut the accusation in the Senate: if he had appeared there on the 19th of September, Antony, he declared, would have murdered him,[4] and, as he told a friend, 'no one who frankly expresses his opinion can appear there without danger . . . nor do I think it consistent with my dignity to speak where armed men would hear me better and nearer by than senators'.[5] But he immediately set to work on the lampoon which has been famous for twenty centuries as the Second *Philippic*, and which he cast in the form that should make it appear to have been delivered in the House. While he was writing, his indignation waxed fiercer at the news that Antony had caused the words PARENTI OPTIME MERITO—'To the Father for his splendid services'—to be inscribed on a statue of Caesar, which he had erected on the Rostra,[6] and that in a speech which he addressed to a popular gathering he gave warning that, so long as he lived, there could be no room in the State for the assassins.[7] Towards the end of October the lampoon was finished, and Cicero sent a copy from Puteoli for the criticism of Atticus.[8] 'When', he asked, 'shall I see the day when you think it should be published?' 'It will never come out', he added a day or two later, 'unless the Republic is restored.' [9] The indefatigable writer had barely finished it when he set to work again on the treatise which he had begun for the

44 B.C.

Cicero composes the Second *Philippic*.

Oct. 2.

[1] *Phil.*, ii, 4, 7. See p. 6.
[2] R. Y. Tyrrell, *The Correspondence of . . . Cicero*, vi, 1899, p. xvi.
[3] *Fam.*, xii, 2, 1; 3, 1; *Phil.*, ii, 11, 25.
[4] *Fam.*, xii, 2, 1.
[5] *Ib.*, x, 2, 1. Cp. *Phil.*, ii, 44, 112.
[6] *Fam.*, xii, 3, 1.
[7] *Ib.*, § 2; 23, 3. Cp. App., iii, 33–8.
[8] *Att.*, xv, 13, 1.
[9] *Ib.*, 13a, 7. See pp. 198–9.

44 B.C. benefit of his son: 'I am philosophizing,' he told Atticus, 'getting on splendidly with the *De officiis*. . . . After it I shall begin something new.' [1]

If antiquity was right in hailing the Second *Philippic* as Cicero's masterpiece, we may feel our attention diverted from appreciation of its merit by its scurrility; and in his eagerness to heap abuse upon his enemy he provided a test by which we may appraise his credibility. When he presumes to denounce Antony for cowardice,[2] one asks oneself whether it can be true that that virile soldier began his adult life by prostituting himself as a catamite to an effeminate boy.[3] Cicero averred that if the Senate and the Roman People had a leader such as they had had in the days of Catiline, Antony, like Lentulus and Cethegus, would be strangled in the Tullianum;[4] he told his readers, as he often told his friends,[5] that, if he had been among the heroes of the Ides of March, Rome would have been rid of Antony as well as Caesar;[6] and in his peroration he incited tyrannicides to slay him.[7] He must have reflected as he wrote that between him and Antony there would thenceforth be a truceless war, and that, if he were worsted, he could expect no mercy from the man whom he had so venomously insulted and so savagely denounced. But before the Second *Philippic* became known to the Roman world he had found a powerful ally.

Renewed enmity between Antony and Octavian.

The reconciliation of Antony and Octavian was short-lived. Immediately after their interview the soldiers who had clustered round Antony on the Capitol escorted Octavian to his house.[8] Antony was exasperated by this mark of favour, though Octavian, if we may believe Nicolaus, paid him daily visits and treated him with due deference.[9] About this time one of the tribunes died, and Octavian hoped to succeed him. His candidature was illegal, not only because he was too young, but also because he was a patrician; and senators feared that if he obtained

[1] *Att.*, xv, 13a, 6.
[2] *Phil.*, ii, 29, 70.
[3] *Ib.*, 18, 44; 20, 50.
[4] *Ib.*, 7, 17.
[5] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 351–2.
[6] *Phil.*, ii, 14, 34.
[7] *Ib.*, 46, 117.
[8] Nic. Dam., 30.
[9] *Ib.* Appian (iii, 39, 156) describes a second reconciliation of Antony with Octavian.

the office, he would use it to prosecute the tyrannicides. 44 B.C.
Antony, as consul, forbade him to violate the law and threatened to punish him if he disobeyed. The populace, we are told, resented this action, and Antony thought it prudent to suspend the election.[1] Soon afterwards he Oct. 5 or 6.
arrested certain veterans who belonged to his bodyguard, informing his partisans that they had been suborned, as he hinted, by Octavian, to assassinate him. Octavian sent word to Antony that he was prepared to protect him with his own retinue; but his messengers were rebuffed and dismissed.[2] His step-father and his mother urged him to leave the city for a few days pending investigation; but he insisted that to do this would be construed as an admission of guilt. A few cool observers, says Appian, reflected that it was to the interest of Octavian that Antony should live, for, if he perished, Brutus, Cassius, and their fellows, backed by the Senate, would do what they pleased.[3] Very different was the view of Cicero, who was then in Rome. 'The masses', he wrote, 'believe that Antony trumped up the charge, to enable him to make a raid on the youngster's money; but men of sound judgement and good citizens believe in the deed and approve it. . . . I have great hopes of the lad; there is nothing that he may not be expected to do for honour and renown. As for our friend Antony, he knows that he is so detested that, although he caught his would-be assassins in his own house, he dare not divulge the fact.'[4] Whether Octavian instigated the assassins is uncertain, though Cicero affirmed that he had himself 'spurred the willing horse';[5] but nobody who knows the views of that age on political assassination and under-

Alleged attempt of Octavian to assassinate Antony.

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 16, 1; App., iii, 31, 120–2; Suet., *Aug.*, 10, 2; Dio, xlv, 6, 2–3. Appian says that the people resolved to elect Octavian although he did not formally stand. Nicolaus does not mention the incident.

[2] So Nicolaus says (30), perhaps on the authority of Octavian. The statement, however, is quite credible and not inconsistent with the hypothesis of Octavian's guilt. Appian (iii, 39, 160) says that Octavian went to Antony's house himself.

[3] Did Appian and the 'observers' forget that Octavian, backed by Lepidus and other Caesarians, might be too strong for Brutus and Cassius? Octavian may have thought that, if Antony were removed, the soldiers who followed him would be willing to join the heir of the great Dictator; but perhaps he reflected that Antony was popular with the troops whom he had led.

[4] *Fam.*, xii, 23. 2.

[5] *Phil.*, iii, 8, 19.

44 B.C. stands his character will believe that he would have shrunk from such a deed if he had deemed it wise.[1]

Antony goes to Brundisium to meet the Macedonian legions.

On the 9th of October Antony, accompanied by his wife, Fulvia,[2] left Rome for Brundisium, intending to meet the Macedonian legions, which he had sent for, at their head to expel Decimus Brutus from Cisalpine Gaul, and, in pursuance of the recent plébiscite, to possess himself of that province and of Transalpine Gaul.[3] Octavian saw that it behoved him to act promptly. Antony had made the first warlike move, and he might fairly counter it. His friends and advisers—Agrippa, Maecenas, and others—approved his plan.[4] Sending agents to Brundisium to conciliate the legions, and providing them with leaflets, which, if they could not effect their purpose orally, they were to distribute among the men,[5] he set out for Campania, accompanied by soldiers who had supported him in Rome, intending to visit the Caesarian colonies and to enlist the veteran settlers.[6] Every municipality which he visited welcomed him with enthusiasm,[7] and the veterans at Calatia and Casilinum, three thousand strong, to each of whom he promised a sum equivalent to twenty pounds sterling, instantly joined him.[8] Antony had planted a colony at Casilinum on ground to which Caesar's veterans had a prior claim, and thus contributed unwittingly to his success.[9]

Octavian enlists veterans in Campania.

Antony himself had been disappointed. Halting on his journey at Suessa in the southern extremity of Latium, he executed a number of soldiers, probably because he

[1] Nic. Dam., 30; Vell., ii, 60, 3; Seneca, *De clem.*, i, 9, 1; Plut., *Ant.*, 16, 3; Suet., *Aug.*, 10, 2; App., iii, 39, 157–63. Dio is silent about the attempted assassination; Velleius suggests that Antony invented the story; Plutarch says that Octavian tried, but failed to convince people that he was innocent; Suetonius asserts that he made the attempt on the advice of certain individuals.

[2] *Phil.*, iii, 2, 4; v, 8, 22.

[3] *Fam.*, xii, 23, 2; App., iii, 40, 164. By what right did Antony, who had exchanged Macedonia for the Gallic provinces (see p. 15), take over the Macedonian legions? Probably in virtue of a clause of the law (*lex tribunicia de provinciis=lex de permutatione provinciarum*) that authorized the exchange. See *Hermes*, xlvii, 1912, p. 380.

[4] Nic. Dam., 31.

[5] *Ib.*; Dio, xlv, 12, 1–2; App., iii, 43, 176; 44, 179.

[6] *Ib.*, 40, 164.

[7] *Att.*, xvi, 11, 6.

[8] *Ib.*, 8, 1; *Phil.*, iii, 2, 3; iv, 2, 3; v, 8, 23; 16, 44; *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 1–3; Vell., ii, 61, 2; Nic. Dam., 31; Plut., *Cic.*, 44, 1; *Ant.*, 16, 2; Tac., *Ann.*, i, 10; Flor., ii, 15, 4; Suet., *Aug.*, 10, 3; App., iii, 40, 164–5.

[9] *Phil.*, ii, 40, 102. Cp. C. M. Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 96, n. 1.

believed that they had been concerned in the attempt upon his life.[1] At Brundisium he found that only three legions had arrived, and when he confronted them he was not cordially received. The men upbraided him for not having punished the assassins of Caesar. Angrily telling them that they ought to be thankful for having been brought to Italy instead of going to Parthia, he announced his intention of leading them to Cisalpine Gaul and promised them four hundred sesterces apiece—just one-fifth of what Octavian had given. They scoffed at the offer and, when he stormed at them, raised an uproar and began to disperse. 'You shall learn to obey orders,' he shouted, and, ordering the military tribunes to arrest the ringleaders, summarily executed them. Octavian's agents, noticing that the rest were rather exasperated than cowed, distributed the leaflets and contrasted the cruelty and meanness of Antony with the liberality of their chief. Reports of Octavian's tour in Campania confirmed what they had said. Antony saw that he must conciliate the troops whom he had failed to terrorize. Assuring them that he was grieved to have been forced to punish a few agitators, he explained that the bounties which he had offered were a mere instalment. The men were apparently satisfied, and Antony ordered the legions to march in successive divisions to Ariminum, while he himself started with his praetorian cohort, or bodyguard, for Rome.[2] The other legion would advance under his brother Lucius as soon as it arrived.[3]

44 B.C.

Hostile reception of Antony by the Macedonian legions.

Failing to coerce, he is forced to conciliate them.

On the 1st of November Cicero, who was staying at Puteoli, received a letter from Octavian, reporting the success of his tour. 'Evidently', Cicero told Atticus, 'he is contemplating war against Antony, with himself in command. . . . Which are we to follow? Consider his name: consider his age.' Octavian asked Cicero to grant him a secret interview at Capua: Antony was marching on Rome with the Gallic legion *Alaudae*[4] and levying contributions

Octavian corresponds with Cicero.

[1] *Phil.*, iii, 4, 10; iv, 2, 4; xiii, 8, 18. See L. Lange, *Röm. Alt.*, iii, 1871, p. 505 (=iii², p. 515).

[2] *Att.*, xvi, 8, 2; *Phil.*, iii, 4, 10; xiii, 8, 18; Livy, *Epit.*, 117; App., iii, 43–4, §§ 175–83; 45, 184; Dio, xlv, 13, 1–2. [3] See p. .

[4] See *The Roman Republic*, ii, 231, 253; iii, 123, 542, &c. Where Antony joined *Alaudae* is unknown.

44 B.C. on the municipalities: what would Cicero advise him to do—go to Rome with his three thousand veterans, or bar Antony's advance at Capua, or join the Macedonian legions on their march, in the hope that they would prove friendly? Cicero replied that an interview was unnecessary and impracticable—it could not be kept secret. Octavian's best course would be to go straight to Rome. 'I think', Cicero told Atticus, 'that he will have on his side both the city mob and also sound constitutionalists, if he can inspire them with confidence. . . . Now I ask your advice. Am I to come to Rome, or stay here, or take refuge in Arpinum—a place which gives a feeling of security? To Rome, I think, lest my absence should be remarked. . . . Solve this
Nov. 3 or 4. problem. I was never in greater perplexity.'[1] A day or two later two more letters were delivered from Octavian. He urged Cicero to come to Rome at once, saying that he wished to act with the sanction of the Senate and on his advice. Knowing that he could count upon the aid of Decimus Brutus (whom he meant to punish in due course as an assassin of Caesar), he had determined to take the field against Antony, and was busily organizing his force at Capua and paying them their promised bounties. Though he continued in successive letters to urge Cicero to come to Rome, Cicero continued to hesitate. Octavian, he admitted to Atticus, had acted with extraordinary vigour; but he was 'a mere boy'. The boy, however, had already seen much of the world, and knew that Cicero liked to be reminded how he had saved Rome from Catiline: he urges me, wrote Cicero, 'to save the Republic again'.[2] Cicero was willing enough; but he dared not come to Rome so long as there was danger of his encountering Antony, and therefore, while he was waiting for Atticus to solve his problem, he took shelter at Arpinum, where, irresolute, but, as ever, indefatigable, he was completing his treatise 'On Friendship'.[3] Though he desired to enlist the aid of Octavian, he was not sure that he would be a loyal ally. Doubtless he would fight Antony—but for himself or for the Republic? He communicated his doubts to Atticus: 'I quite agree with you that if Octavian gets

Cicero doubts whether he should support Octavian.

Soon after Nov. 11.

[1] *Att.*, xvi, 8. [2] *Ib.*, 9; 11, 6. [3] *Ib.*, 13C, 2.

much power, the acts of the tyrant will be far more decisively confirmed than they were in the temple of Tellus . . . but if he is beaten, Antony, you can see, will become intolerable; so one doesn't know which to prefer.'[1] 44 B.C.

Octavian in Rome.

Octavian, acting in accordance with the advice of Cicero, but probably also on his own judgement, had by this time arrived in the outskirts of Rome. The tribune Cannutius, a bitter enemy of Antony, met him, learned his intentions, and told the people in the Forum that they would do well to enlist his aid against Antony. Entering the city, Octavian went to the temple of Castor, between the Forum and the Palatine, which his soldiers presently surrounded. Cannutius inveighed acrimoniously against Antony; Octavian reminded his hearers of the great deeds of his adoptive father, dilated on the wrongs which he had himself suffered from Antony, and promised to oppose him in the interest of the State. But he had misjudged the temper of the veterans. Many of them had served under Antony; they were not yet ready to fight against him; and some of them frankly avowed their dissatisfaction. Octavian, seeing that he had spoken too candidly, gave them leave to go home if they wished, at the same time promising additional bounties. It was time for him to leave the capital, for he was not yet strong enough to encounter Antony, who was rapidly approaching. Moving northward down the Cassian Way with the soldiers who had elected to remain, he raised fresh levies in Etruria, which he ordered to assemble at Arretium, near its northern frontier. The few who had accepted their discharge, reflecting that bounties and booty were preferable to hard labour in the Campanian fields, speedily returned.[2]

Nov. 10.

He starts for Cisalpine Gaul.

Cicero's last extant letter to Atticus.

A copy of Octavian's speech reached Cicero, and, strongly disapproving its eulogy of Caesar, he wrote to Atticus: 'Many words of wisdom on the subject of politics

[1] *Ib.*, 14, 1.

[2] *Att.*, xvi, 15, 3; App., iii, 41–2. Cp. Dio, xlv, 12, 4–6. Cicero's letter, which Schwartz cites (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, ii, 232), does not support his statement that, according to Appian (iii, 41), Octavian in his speech said the opposite of what he really said (see p. 199 *infra*). Appian (iii, 47, 191), contradicting his former statement, says incorrectly that Octavian ordered the legions to assemble at Alba. [See pp. 203–4.]

44 B.C. I have often had from you, but none wiser than your last letter—"that youngster is capable, and at present he is making a fine stand against Antony; but we must await the end". What a speech! . . . "so may I attain the honours of my father".' Cicero went on to express agreement with another remark of Atticus—that when the new tribunes came into office on the 10th of December, it would be possible to judge how Octavian was likely to act. Would he acquiesce in the election of Casca, or would he oppose him as one of the tyrannicides? 'When', Cicero added, 'Oppius urged me to open my arms to the young man and . . . his band of veterans, I replied that I could by no means do so unless I were satisfied that he would not only not be hostile to the tyrannicides, but be their friend.' Finally he announced that come to Rome he must, even into the conflagration, for he was threatened with financial ruin, and that catastrophe he was bound somehow to avert.[1] So ended the last extant letter which he wrote to his life-long friend. If others followed (and that is wellnigh certain), either Atticus prudently forbore to publish them, or the emperor on whose youthful intrigues they might have thrown a light too glaring, forbade their publication. Henceforth we must grope our way through the records of the dying Republic with less of Cicero's illuminating aid.

Antony in Rome.

By this time Antony had arrived in Rome, having left the bulk of his troops at Tibur. In defiance of constitutional practice he entered the city with armed followers, promising to let them plunder the houses of his enemies;[2] replied in scurrilous manifestoes to the recent speech of Octavian, asserting that he had purchased his adoption by the prostitution of his body;[3] and summoned a meeting of the Senate for the 24th of November with the intention of denouncing him as a public enemy, adding that any senator who neglected to attend should be deemed *his* enemy.[4] He himself failed to appear—if he was not calumniated by Cicero, because he was drunk—and the meeting was postponed till the 28th.[5] In the interval Antony went

[1] *Att.*, xvi, 15, 3. 6.
[2] *Phil.*, xiii, 9, 19.
[3] *Phil.*, iii, 6, 15–7; 8, 21; xiii, 9, 19; Suet., *Aug.*, 68.
[4] *Phil.*, iii, 8, 19.
[5] *Ib.*, § 20.

back to Tibur, harangued his troops, and returned forthwith to Rome.[1] He had received the alarming news that the Martian legion, one of the three which he had ordered to march to Ariminum, had diverged to Alba Longa with the intention of joining Octavian;[2] and this may have been the motive of his speech at Tibur. On the 28th the Senate duly met in the temple on the Capitol. One of the consulars came prepared with a motion for declaring Octavian a public enemy,[3] but before it could be put to the vote a message was delivered to Antony: another of his legions, the 4th, had joined Octavian.[4] There was no time to be lost. Hastily carrying a motion for granting the honour of a thanksgiving service to Lepidus, who had effected a reconciliation between Sextus Pompeius and the Senate,[5] Antony hurried to Alba in the hope of regaining the loyalty of the Martian legion. A shower of arrows from the walls warned him to be gone, and he posted back to Rome, for important business had to be transacted before he could leave the city. In the evening, when the Senate could not lawfully meet, thirteen provinces were assigned by lot, the lots being manipulated, as Cicero hinted, so that the friends of Antony should have those provinces which they desired. Gaius Antonius obtained Macedonia; Africa fell to Calvisius Sabinus, that ex-lieutenant of Caesar who had bravely tried to save his life;[6] Crete and Cyrenaica were allotted anew, for Brutus and Cassius, to whom they had been assigned a few months before, had gone to Macedonia and Syria instead; Asia, in disregard of the provision of Caesar which had given it to Trebonius, was allotted to another.[7] Thus the amnesty, which Antony had himself recommended, was undone. Immediately afterwards he started for Tibur to rejoin his force.[8] The senators who belonged to his party and other prominent citizens assembled there to do him honour; and, with his bodyguard

44 B.C.

Hearing that two of his legions have joined Octavian,

he assigns provinces to his supporters and marches for Cisalpine Gaul.

[1] *Ib.*, xiii, 9, 19. See pp. 199–200. [2] See p. 199. [3] *Phil.*, iii, 8, 20.

[4] *Ib.*, 3, 7; 9, 24; *Fam.*, xi, 7, 2; Livy, *Epit.*, 117; Vell., ii, 61, 2; App., iii, 45, 185; Dio, xlv, 13, 3. Octavian was also reinforced by some of Antony's auxiliary troops (*Phil.*, v, 17, 46; Dio, xlv, 13, 4; 42, 1; xlvi, 37, 2).

[5] *Phil.*, iii, 9, 23–4; xiii, 5, 12; App., iii, 4, 11 (chronologically inaccurate); Dio, xlv, 9, 4; 10, 6. [6] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 344.

[7] *Phil.*, iii, 10. See pp. 200–1. [8] See p. 200.

44 B.C. and two legions,[1] he marched for Ariminum.[2] Despite his recent losses, he had little to fear. Octavian, indeed, would soon follow him, and Decimus Brutus would of course resist; but Lepidus, though he might not aid, would certainly not oppose him; Plancus could not be expected, notwithstanding the law which had given it to Antony, to surrender his province, but was not likely to be actively hostile unless events rendered such a course expedient; Pollio was far away. Lucius Antonius would in due course reinforce his brother with the remaining Macedonian legion, and Ventidius would arrive when he had trained his recruits.

Decimus Brutus in Cisalpine Gaul. About Apr. 9.

Decimus Brutus, who had complained soon after the murder of Caesar that Antony would not permit him to go to his province,[3] plucked up courage in April to set out.[4] Wishing to give his legions a chance of acquiring booty and at the same time to harden them in the field, he undertook a campaign against certain Alpine tribes, and was saluted as Imperator.[5] But he was now to encounter a more formidable enemy.

Antony orders him to surrender the province: he refuses and occupies Mutina.

Antony, on arriving in Cisalpine Gaul, formally ordered Brutus to leave the province in accordance with the plébiscite of June. Brutus replied by sending to Antony a copy of the instructions which he had received from the Senate on taking office,[6] and at the same time issued a manifesto,

[1] See pp. 201–2.

[2] App., iii, 46, 189; Dio, xlv, 13, 5. Cp. *Phil.*, v, 9, 24, and *Fam.*, x, 28, 1, where Cicero calls the departure of Antony 'very inglorious' (*foedissimum*).

Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 159 [Eng. tr., iii, 119]), remarking on the authority of one of Cicero's letters (*Fam.*, xi, 7, 3, which was written about a fortnight after Antony left Rome), that it was known that Decimus Brutus had 7 legions, asserts that the object of the 'prominent citizens' was 'to attempt a reconciliation'. Appian says nothing about this; but, Ferrero adds, 'Unfortunately, Lucius [Antonius] . . . intervened, and succeeded, according to report [*Phil.*, vi, 4, 10], in dissuading' Antony [from returning to Rome] 'by using threats'. The truth of the 'report' is at least questionable; for, as Cicero had already implied (*Phil.*, iii, 12, 31, with which cp. p. 29), Lucius was at that time far from Tibur.

[3] *Fam.*, xi, 1, 1. [4] *Att.*, xiv, 13, 2. Cp. App., iii, 2, 4, and see p. 203.

[5] *Fam.*, xi, 4, 1. See pp. 202–3.

[6] App., iii, 49, 198; Dio, xlv, 14, 1. If Appian meant *recent* instructions, Schwartz (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, ii, 232) is right in saying that *Fam.*, xi, 7, 2, convicts him of a blunder. Ferrero, however (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 164, n. 2 [Eng. tr., iii, 123, n.†]), hastily attributes to Appian a blunder which he did not make.

announcing that he intended to hold the province under the authority of the Senate and the Roman People.[1] Then, feeling that he was not strong enough to cope with Antony in the field, he moved southward to Mutina (now Modena), requisitioned grain from the inhabitants, slaughtered and salted a sufficient number of his transport cattle, and prepared to stand a siege.[2] 44 B.C.

Meanwhile Cicero, who arrived in Rome on the 9th of December,[3] abandoned his literary studies and braced himself to consecrate all his energies to the cause of constitutional government. Plancus, whom he exhorted to work for the same end,[4] assured him, seasoning the assurance with well-turned compliments, that he would ever serve the Republic to the utmost limit of his powers;[5] and Cicero, though he may have had reason to suspect that Plancus was really a trimmer, replied by reiterating his exhortations, emphasizing the glory that was to be gained by following them, and remarking that while every citizen, the 'brigands' only excepted, detested Antony, the hopes of all were centred upon Plancus.[6] To Decimus Brutus, on whom, as one of the 'liberators', he could confidently rely, he wrote not less earnestly.[7] Before the manifesto which Brutus had published was delivered in Rome, he told him that he must act upon his own responsibility, and not wait for authorization from the Senate; for, though it wished him to act boldly, it was deterred from expressing its real sentiments.[8] What he meant was that, although Antony had gone, his partisans in the Senate were still powerful. A few days later a copy of the manifesto arrived, and was immediately published. Cicero was delighted. The tribunes had given notice that the Senate would meet on the 20th of December. Cicero had before resolved not to attend until the 1st of January,[9] when the consuls, Hirtius

Cicero prepares to support Decimus and Octavian.

Dec. 20.

[1] *Fam.*, xi, 6, 2; *Phil.*, iii, 4, 8. Brutus may, as Sternkopf says (*Philol.*, lx, 1901, p. 302, n. 7), have been influenced by a letter from Cicero (*Fam.*, xi, 5), written probably on December 9. See p. 204.

[2] App., iii, 49, 200; Dio, xlvi, 36, 1. [3] *Fam.*, xi, 5, 1. See p. 204.

[4] *Fam.*, x, 1–3. [5] *Ib.*, 4, 3. [6] *Ib.*, 5.

[7] *Ib.*, xi, 5 (Dec. 9).

[8] *Ib.*, 7, 2 (about Dec. 12 [*Philol.*, lx, 1901, pp. 301–2, 305]).

[9] Cicero recorded this resolve in *Fam.*, xi, 6, 2 (written on December 20). Twice in the *Philippics* (iii, 1, 1; v, 11, 30) he declared that he had repeatedly

44 B.C. and Pansa, would take office; but he felt that he must do honour to the courage with which Decimus had opposed Antony. Octavian too had passed the test which Cicero had defined in his last letter to Atticus: he had made no opposition when the tyrannicide Casca became a tribune.[1] Evidently he would use his legions in support of the good cause, and his services must be acknowledged without delay. Early in the morning Cicero entered the House, and as the news spread members came trooping in.[2]

The object of the tribunes in convening the Senate had been to provide for the presence of armed guards on the 1st of January; for there was reason to fear that, notwithstanding the departure of Antony, his supporters might attempt violence.[3] After the preliminary business Cicero

The Third *Philippic.*

delivered his Third *Philippic* oration. As a matter of course he inveighed against Antony, renewing his incitement to assassinate the 'monster';[4] but his main purpose was to urge the Senate not to wait till the new year, but to oppose him instantly. Gaius Caesar, boy though he was, had acted with incredible, nay almost divine wisdom and valour. On his own responsibility and at his own cost, he had saved his country from deadly peril by raising veteran troops and gaining the support of legions—all honour to them—with which Antony had designed to enslave it. Then let the Senate sanction what he had done and reward the gallant soldiers who had backed him. Decimus Brutus, following the example of the Brutus who expelled Tarquin, had nobly resolved to hold Cisalpine Gaul for the Senate and the Roman People, and not to yield to Antony, compared with whom Tarquin was a patriotic citizen: his conduct also it behoved the Senate to recognize. If Antony were in truth, not merely in name,

urged that the Senate should be summoned for a day earlier than December 20, when he delivered the Third. Any one who takes the trouble to think will see that, Ferrero notwithstanding (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 166, n. 1 [Eng. tr., iii, 124, n. †]), there is no inconsistency between the two statements.

[1] *Phil.*, xiii, 15, 31; Dio, xlvi, 49, 1.

[2] *Fam.*, xi, 6, 2–3. Cp. xii, 22, 3–4. Tyrrell (*op. cit.*, vi, 49, 51) argues, on grounds too weak to require notice, that the house 'was probably a small one'.

[3] *Fam.*, xi, 6, 2; *Phil.*, iii, 5, 13; 10, 25; 15, 37; Dio, xlv, 15, 3.

[4] taeterrimam beluam (11, 28).

a consul, the legions that deserted him deserved the punishment of death, Caesar and Brutus, who opposed him, were criminals; but he had disgraced his office and should be deemed a public enemy. Finally, after recapitulating the crimes with which he charged Antony, Cicero moved that the consuls designate should see to it that the Senate could meet safely on the 1st of January; that the Senate should recognize the services of Decimus Brutus and confirm him and the other governors, whose provinces had been wrongfully assigned by the recent proceedings of Antony, in their authority; and that Gaius Caesar, the veterans who followed him, the Martian and the 4th legion should be awarded the honours and the thanks which they so well deserved.[1] Unwearied by his effort, the old man went straight from the House to the Forum, and harangued the populace. The Senate, he told them, having just agreed to his motion for bestowing honours upon the youthful hero, Gaius Caesar, had thereby virtually adjudged Antony a public enemy; let them then brace themselves to regain their liberty and rest assured that, as he had himself once crushed Catiline, so they should soon hear of the overthrow of Antony.[2] Then he went home and wrote to Decimus Brutus, assuring him that he might rely upon his unwavering support.[3]

44 B.C.

The Fourth *Philippic.*

Eleven days passed away, during which news reached Rome that Antony was blockading Mutina,[4] and that Octavian had marched to relieve Brutus.[5] On the 1st of January, after the customary religious ceremony, the Senate duly met.[6] Armed guards were present to keep the peace.[7] Cicero waited anxiously to hear the new consuls speak. When he said that Hirtius was 'not sound'[8]—and he thought much the same of Pansa—he meant that he was not a staunch Republican. Hirtius and Pansa were both Caesarians and owed to Caesar the high offices which they now held. On the other hand, they were staunch opponents of Antony, and might be trusted, so long as Antony should

43 B.C.

Meeting of the Senate.

[1] *Phil.*, iii, 15, 37–9. Cp. v, 2, 3; 11, 28; *Fam.*, xi, 6, 3; 22, 3; 25, 2; App., iii, 47, 193; Dio, xlv, 15, 2.
[2] *Phil.*, iv. [3] *Fam.*, xi, 6. [4] *Phil.*, v, 9, 24.
[5] *Ib.*, 17, 46. [6] App., iii, 50, 202. [7] Dio, xlv, 15, 3.
[8] See p. 9.

43 B.C. be dangerous, to give general support to the policy of Cicero. They opened the debate by speaking in a tone which greatly encouraged him. But Pansa had married the daughter of Fufius Calenus,[1] who had been one of Caesar's marshals, and was not only a personal enemy of Cicero,[2] but was then entertaining Fulvia, the wife of Antony, and her children in his house. The consuls called upon him first to state his views.[3] The business comprised the siege of Mutina, the general state of affairs, and the rewards which it had been proposed to confer upon Octavian, his soldiers, and Decimus Brutus.[4] Calenus moved that instead of treating Antony as a public enemy, envoys should be sent to reason with him and induce him to lay down his arms.[5] After two other consulars had spoken [6] Cicero rose. Supporting his view by the inevitable invective, which was perhaps beginning to pall, he argued that to send an embassy to Antony would be inconsistent with the stern judgement that had been passed upon him by implication twelve days before, and would be interpreted as a sign of fear; for a rebel should not be entreated to forbear, but compelled to surrender. The laws of Antony should be annulled, for they had been passed by force and in disregard of religious sanctions; and those that were laudable, for instance the abolition of the dictatorship, should be re-enacted. Instant action was required: troops should be levied immediately throughout Italy. The rewards that had been proposed in favour of those who served the State should be granted, and, furthermore, Lepidus, who had averted civil war by restoring Sextus Pompeius to his country, should be honoured with an equestrian statue. As for Gaius Caesar, that heaven-sent youth, who had emulated the heroic deeds of Scipio Africanus and Alexander the Great, his pre-eminent services should be recognized by giving legal sanction to what he had achieved—by conferring upon him a military command with the rank of propraetor and by admitting him to the Senate with the right to stand for office, though he had not attained the legal age, as if he had already served

Calenus moves that envoys be sent to Antony.

Cicero replies in the Fifth *Philippic*, proposing action against Antony and honours for Octavian.

[1] *Phil.*, viii, 6, 19. [2] *Att.*, xi, 8, 2. [3] *Phil.*, v, 1, 1.
[4] *Ib.*, 2, 4; 11, 28. [5] *Ib.*, 1, 1; 2, 4. Cp. x, 1, 3. [6] See p. 205.

as a quaestor. He would never abuse these honours, for he was very different from his adoptive father. 'I promise, Conscript Fathers,' said the orator, 'I warrant you, I pledge my word that Gaius Caesar will ever be the good citizen he is to-day, ever such as we ought fervently to wish and to desire that he should be.'[1] 43 B.C.

The debate continued.

After Cicero sat down, Piso, though he alone had ventured to oppose Antony in the session of the 1st of August, argued that to condemn him unheard was un-Roman, and moved that he should be brought to trial.[2] Other speakers followed, and at nightfall the session was adjourned. Early next morning the debate was continued. The 3rd and the 4th were days on which the Senate could not lawfully meet, and this rule had been observed even in that memorable week, six years before, in which Caesar had been declared a public enemy; but now the excitement was so great that it was disregarded.[3] It appeared certain that Cicero would gain his object; but Salvius, one of the tribunes, exercised his veto and prevented the motion from being put to the vote.[4] Supporters of Cicero trooped into the Forum, incited the populace against Salvius, and called upon him to justify his conduct to the assembly. He was eager to go, but yielded to the remonstrances of senators who feared that he might persuade the people to accept his view. The Senate, however, adopted Cicero's motion as far as it related to Octavian and Decimus Brutus, even going beyond it. Octavian was to command against Antony, with the rank of propraetor, conjointly with the consuls, who would soon take the field, and to become a senator; the donative which he had promised to the two legions that had forsaken Antony was to be paid by the State; they and the troops raised by Octavian were to be exempted from further service after the close of the cam-

Honours for Octavian and rewards for his troops decreed;

[1] *Phil.*, v, 18, 51. Dio (xlv, 18–47) gives his own version of Cicero's speech. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 204, n. 2.

[2] App., iii, 50, 205. Piso was not, as Appian says, Antony's agent. Calenus was (*Phil.*, xii, 7, 18).

[3] Dio, xlv, 17, 1–2. Cp. P. Willems, *Le sénat*, &c., ii, 152, n. 7.

[4] *Phil.*, vii, 4, 14; App., iii, 50, 206–7; Dio, xlvi, 29, 2. Both Dio and Appian incorrectly state that the proceedings in the Senate lasted only three days.

43 B.C. paign; and lands were then to be allotted to them. Furthermore, it was decreed on the motion of Philippus that a gilded statue should be erected in honour of Octavian, and on the motion of Servilius Vatia that he should be entitled to stand for the consulship ten years before the legal age—that is to say, in his thirty-third year.[1] Though no division had been taken on the motion for declaring Antony a public enemy, Cicero saw that the House, with a few exceptions, was still on his side.[2] But in the night of the 3rd and the 4th of January the mother of Antony, his wife, and his little son went as suppliants to the houses of prominent senators, and in the morning knelt with piteous lamentations at the feet of others on their way to the final debate. Many were thereby influenced; and Cicero, observing their temper, spoke again. Piso answered him, arguing that Cicero adjudged Antony a public enemy, though he was acting in accordance with the law that had given him Cisalpine Gaul, but not Decimus Brutus, who was violating that law.[3] Whether they were swayed by the arguments of Piso, by the entreaties of Antony's family, or by some unrecorded motive, the Senate decided, in accordance with the motion of Calenus, to send an embassy to Antony. Servius Sulpicius, Piso, and Philippus were entrusted with the mission.[4] Their instructions were to order Antony to desist from attacking Brutus, to raise the siege of Mutina, to withdraw his army from Cisalpine Gaul, not to advance within 200 miles [5] of Rome, and to submit to the authority of the Senate and the Roman People. They were also to insist upon having an interview

but envoys are sent to Antony.

[1] Cic., *Brut.*, i, 15, 7; *Phil.*, v, 16–7, 45–6; 19, 53; Nonius, p. 270, 19–20; *C. I. L.*, x, 8375; xii, 4333 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 108, 112); *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 3–5; Livy, *Epit.*, 118; Vell., ii, 61, 2–3; Plut., *Cic.*, 45, 2; *Ant.*, 17, 1 (inaccurate); Tac., *Ann.*, i, 10; Suet., *Aug.*, 10, 3; App., iii, 51, 209; Dio, xlvi, 29, 2–3 (whom Schwartz [*Paulys Real-Ency.*, iii, 1711] corrects); H. Cohen, *Descr. hist. des monn.*, &c., i², 1880, p. 96. 243. 245; Babelon, *op. cit.*, ii, 37. 65–6. Cp. Drumann-Groebe, *op. cit.*, i², p. 443 [174, 8], and Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic*, &c., ii, 1910, p. 381.

[2] *Phil.*, vi, 1, 3.

[3] App., iii, 51, 210–61, 249. Cp. *Paulys Real-Ency.*, iii, 1718. Appian (55, 225) makes Piso say that Antony had obtained Cisalpine Gaul by a plébiscite in the presence of Cicero, who was not then in Rome!

[4] *Fam.*, xii, 4, 1; *Phil.*, viii, 10, 28; ix, 1, 1.

[5] About 183 English miles.

with Decimus Brutus, to whom they were to convey the vote of thanks that had been passed in his favour; and should Antony refuse obedience, they were to warn him that the Senate would declare war.[1] Before the senators dispersed, the agrarian law which Antony and Dolabella had passed in the preceding June was formally repealed.[2] 43 B.C.

Immediately after the session ended, Cicero went into the Forum and mounted the Rostra. Reminding the populace that when he addressed them on the 20th of December they had unanimously declared that he had saved his country from Antony as he had saved it from Catiline, he deplored as half-hearted the decree which the Senate had just passed: not ambassadors, but legions should have been dispatched to Gaul, for Antony would never obey. The instant action which he had counselled was delayed. But his hearers would rise to the occasion: never had he seen a greater, a more unanimous assembly. Already they had endowed the Senate with new strength, and in the coming struggle they would conquer, for they were Romans and would never submit to tyranny.[3] To Octavian, with whom he was in constant correspondence, Cicero wrote, 'I am very sure that you will justify my confidence'.[4] The Sixth *Philippic*.

Soon after the departure of the envoys the Senate decreed that the consuls should proceed to the theatre of war, and that a levy should be held throughout Italy.[5] Hirtius, though he was unwell, immediately started.[6] Writing to Decimus Brutus,[7] Cicero remarked that people were waiting in anxious suspense for the return of the envoys, and that recruits were coming in spontaneously in response to the levy: 'the affection', he assured him, Troops levied.

[1] *Fam.*, xii, 24, 2; *Phil.*, vi, 2, 4; 3, 5; vii, 9, 26; Dio, xlvi, 29, 4 (inaccurate). Appian (iii, 61, 250–1) says that Cicero was charged to draft the instructions, and that he altered them 'passionately and falsely'. Nevertheless the instructions which he attributes to Cicero substantially agree, so far as they go, with those which Cicero defined in the Sixth and the Seventh *Philippic*, the latter of which was addressed to the Senate. One's trust in the credibility of Appian's unsupported statements is not increased when one sees that in the same breath (§ 253) he says that Dolabella was declared a public enemy, which, as we learn from *Phil.*, xi, 4, 9. 7, 15; xiii, 10, 23, happened later.

[2] *Phil.*, vi 5, 14; xi, 6, 13.

[3] *Phil.*, vi.

[4] Nonius, p. 371, 6–7.

[5] *Phil.*, vii, 4, 11. 13; Dio, xlvi, 29, 5.

[6] *Phil.*, vii, 4, 12.

[7] *Fam.*, xi, 8.

43 B.C. 'which all citizens feel for you is unparalleled'. Before the end of January the Senate met to dispatch business which had no relation to the political crisis. Revenue had been assigned by Caesar for the endowment of the Lupercal college, over which Antony presided, and it was proposed to cancel the grant.[1] Perhaps the motion, which reflected upon Caesar, indicated that a section of the House was hostile to Octavian: anyhow Cicero availed himself of the opportunity to make another speech.[2] The friends of Antony, he declared, were manœuvring for a dishonourable peace; but in effect the Senate had already declared him a public enemy, and, unless he submitted absolutely to the requirements of the Senate, there could be no peace save at the price of war.

The Seventh *Philippic*.

The eloquence of Cicero was ineffective; but on the 1st or the 2nd of February Piso and Philippus returned.[3] Their colleague Sulpicius, who, though he was seriously ill when he left Rome, resolutely faced the hardships of a winter's journey, had died before he could join in delivering the commands of the Senate to Antony.[4] Far from promising unconditional submission, Antony refused to permit the envoys to see Decimus, and presented demands of his own. The Senate must reward his soldiers (reinforced by three legions of recruits[5]), confirm the laws which, as he alleged, he had based upon the acts of Caesar, and those which he had originated himself, take no account of the moneys which he had drawn from the temple of Ops, recall Brutus and Cassius from the provinces which they had illegally occupied, and, in case they should refuse compliance, assign to him the province of Transalpine Gaul, then held by Plancus, together with the six legions which Plancus commanded, for the next five years. On these conditions he would not refuse to give up his claim to Cisalpine Gaul, disband his army, and retire into private

The envoys return with a defiant reply from Antony.

[1] *Phil.*, vii, 1, 1; xiii, 14, 31; Nonius, p. 273, 5–6. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 335.

[2] *Phil.*, vii.

[3] F. L. Ganter (*Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, cxlix, 1894, p. 614) infers from *Phil.*, viii, 1, 1 (*Confusius . . . excusavit*) that Piso and Philippus returned on February 1, two days before Cicero delivered the Eighth *Philippic*. Cp. p. 205, n. 10.

[4] *Fam.*, x, 28, 3; *Phil.*, ix, 1; 7, 15.

[5] See p. 202. Two of these legions were numerically weak.

life.[1] Piso and Philippus agreed to refer these demands to the Senate, while Antony sent one Cotyla, a boon companion of his own, to urge their acceptance.[2] 43 B.C.

A state of war declared.

Pansa immediately convened the Senate; and, though Lucius Caesar, an uncle of Antony, pleading his relationship, carried a motion, which Pansa supported, for treating his nephew as an adversary instead of branding him as a public enemy,[3] a state of war was declared, and the 'ultimate decree'—that the consuls and Octavian 'should see that the State took no harm'—was passed.[4] The House adjourned till the following day, and Cicero, returning home, vented his anger in letters to Cassius and Trebonius. 'Nothing', he wrote to Cassius, 'could be more disgraceful, nothing more scandalous than Philippus and Piso: they were sent to give Antony definite orders . . . they have actually brought back intolerable demands.'[5] 'How I wish', he told Trebonius, recurring to his regret that Antony had not been assassinated as well as Caesar, 'you had invited me to that most glorious banquet on the Ides of March! We should have had no leavings.'[6] He had still to prepare two speeches which he intended to deliver on the morrow, and he told the truth when he wrote to an old friend, 'You may be sure, my dear Paetus, that day and night I do nothing, think of nothing but to ensure the safety and the liberty of my countrymen.'[7]

Cicero comments on Antony's reply.

Dispatches had lately arrived from Hirtius and Octavian. Three municipalities—Bononia, Regium Lepidum, and Parma—had declared for Antony; but the rest of the province was loyal.[8] Hirtius had joined Octavian at Ari-

[1] *Phil.*, viii, 9, 25–7. Cp. App., iii, 62; 63, 257; Dio, xlvi, 30; 35, 3 (inexact), and Drumann-Groebe, *op. cit.*, p. 444 [182, 8].

[2] *Phil.*, viii, 10, 28.

[3] *Ib.*, 1. Cp. *Fam.*, x, 28, 3.

[4] *Phil.*, viii, 2, 6; *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 6–7; Dio, xlvi, 29, 5; 31, 1–2. E. Schwartz (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, iii, 1712) points out inaccuracies in Dio's narrative. In regard to the ultimate decree see *The Roman Republic*, iii, 612.

[5] *Fam.*, xii, 4, 1.

[6] *Ib.*, x, 28, 1. Tyrrell (*op. cit.*, vi, 61), commenting on Cicero's description in this letter (§ 2) of his Third *Philippic*, says, ' In the margin of [the MS. known as] M is written *sile, obsecro* ['hold your tongue, I beg you'], perhaps ⟨!⟩ a reflection on Cicero's boastfulness'.

[7] *Ib.*, ix, 24, 4.

[8] *Ib.*, xii, 5, 2. Cp. Drumann-Groebe, *op. cit.*, p. 452 [212, 16]. *Regium Lepidum* (*C. I. L.*, xi, 972=Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 6670) is the true form, not *Regium Lepidi*, as Cicero calls it.

43 B.C. minum.[1] On the 3rd of February Cicero reproached Lucius Caesar for his weakness, branded Calenus, who had spoken before him,[2] and who urged the advantages of peace, as the pertinacious champion of Antony, and insisted that war had already begun. On the same day[3] he delivered a panegyric[4] on Sulpicius, who had left Rome with a faint hope of delivering his message to Antony, but had never expected to return, and moved that a statue should be erected to his memory and that he should be honoured by a public funeral. The motion was of course passed and carried into effect.[5]

The Eighth and Ninth Philippics.

M. Brutus in the East.

For the moment the attention of the Senate was diverted to the situation in the East. Early in February[6] a dispatch arrived from Marcus Brutus, who had left Italy soon after his interview with Cicero.[7] After staying for some weeks at Athens, where he was honoured as a champion of liberty, attended lectures on philosophy, and at the same time prepared for war, he moved into Illyricum. Roman youths studying at Athens, among them Horace and Cicero's son, joined him with enthusiasm; the acting Governor of Macedonia, Hortensius Hortalus, placed himself at his disposal; Vatinius, Caesar's old lieutenant, who was then Governor of Illyricum, transferred to him his army; and the quaestors of Asia and Syria—Marcus Appuleius and Antistius Vetus—supplied him with funds.[8] Early in January[9] Gaius

[1] Nonius, p. 383, 7.

[2] *Phil.*, viii, 4, 11.

[3] Drumann-Groebe, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

[4] *Phil.*, ix.

[5] *Ib.*, 7, 16; *Dig.*, i, 2, 2, 43.

[6] See pp. 205–6.

[7] *Att.*, xvi, 7, 5; *Phil.*, x, 4, 8. Cp. Drumann-Groebe, i, 431 [105, 1]; iv, 34, n. 13. Nicolaus (31) and Dio (xlvii, 20, 3) wrongly ascribe the departure of Brutus to fear of the military preparations of Octavian. Groebe, wrongly in my opinion, thinks that Cassius left at the same time as Brutus. I infer from *Fam.*, xii, 2 and 3, that he remained in Italy till October, and I find that this is also the view of O. E. Schmidt (*Rhein. Mus.*, liii, 1898, p. 235). M. Gelzer (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 999) infers from *Fam.*, xii, 3, 2, in which Cicero complained that Antony had deprived one of Cassius's lieutenants of his 'travelling-money' (*viaticum*) that Brutus and Cassius had departed for Macedonia and Syria with the sanction of the Senate.

[Mr. J. D. Denniston, who argues (Cic., *Phil. I, II*, 1926, p. 118) that Cassius left Italy in August, will, I hope, re-read *Fam.*, xii, 2, carefully.]

[8] *Phil.*, xiii, 16, 32; *Brut.*, i, 11, 1; ii, 3, 5; Hor., *Ep.*, ii, 2, 43–9; Livy, *Epit.*, 118; Vell., ii, 69, 3; Plut., *Brut.*, 24; App., iii, 63, 259; iv, 75, 316; Dio, xlvii, 20, 4; 21, 3–7. Cp. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, vi, 128–9.

[9] *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, cxlix, 1894, pp. 619–20.

Antonius landed at Dyrrachium to take over the government of Macedonia, which had been conferred upon him in the nocturnal session of the 28th of November,[1] and which he had been required on the 20th of December to resign;[2] but Brutus, whose forces were far superior, expelled him from the town and drove him southward to take refuge in Apollonia. The Senate met on the day after the dispatch from Brutus arrived,[3] and Calenus moved that he should be deprived of his command, not only because he had no legal title to retain it, but also because, if honours were to be conferred upon that assassin, the veterans who had served under Caesar would be offended. Indignantly Cicero rose. Why, he asked, did Calenus never agree with the consul who called upon him to speak? Why was he always in a minority of one? Why did he attack men whom all his colleagues respected—condemn Brutus and Decimus, but approve of the Antonii?[4] If Brutus had no legal title to Macedonia, he was there to safeguard the State, Antonius to destroy it. As to the veterans, were not veterans serving under Decimus Brutus, who was one of the tyrannicides, and under Hirtius and Octavian, who were fighting to rescue him? Better death than that senators should submit to be ruled by veterans. Let the Senate sanction all that Marcus Brutus had done, as they had already sanctioned the deeds of Decimus Brutus and of the youthful Gaius Caesar.

43 B.C.

The Tenth *Philippic*

The Senate was compliant, and Cicero wrote in good spirits to Cassius.[5] If Decimus Brutus could only break the blockade of Mutina, the war would probably be over, and there were good hopes of his success, for the bulk of Antony's force was detained in Bononia. 'The Senate,' he added, 'except the consulars, of whom Lucius Caesar alone is staunch and upright, is most resolute. . . . The unanimity of the Roman People and the whole of Italy[6] is marvellous.' He had the satisfaction of taking part in a session,

[1] See p. 33. [2] See p. 37. [3] *Phil.*, x, 1, 1.

[4] Cp. Dio, xlvi, 32, 1–2.

[5] *Phil.*, xi, 14, 36; xiii, 15, 30; *Fam.*, xii, 5, 2–3. Cp. App., iii, 63, 258 (chronologically inaccurate); Dio, xlvi, 40, 3; xlvii, 22, 2.

[6] Against Antony and for orderly government, I suspect, rather than for the 'loyalists'.

43 B.C. Antony's laws annulled.

in which, as he had proposed on the 1st of January, the laws of Antony, including his sale of privileges, were annulled, and it was declared that he had embezzled the moneys deposited by Caesar in the treasury,[1] though Pansa was careful to provide not only for ratifying anew the enactments of Caesar, but also for re-enacting those laws of Antony—particularly the one that assigned lands to veterans[2]—which, although they had been irregularly passed, were admitted to be useful.[3] But towards the end of February[4] news arrived from the province Asia which Cicero received with horror.

Early in January Dolabella had entered Asia on his way to Syria, the province that had been assigned to him by the Senate in the preceding year. Trebonius, as Governor of Asia, made arrangements for feeding his troops on their march, but took precautions against their admission into any stronghold. Dolabella, whom he met near Smyrna, informed him that he intended to proceed to Ephesus in order to superintend the embarkation of his troops, and without suspicion he consented; but in the following night Dolabella turned back, captured Smyrna by escalade, seized Trebonius, and ordered that his head should be cut off. If Appian may be trusted, the soldiers of Dolabella, exasperated against Trebonius as an accomplice in the assassination of Caesar, kicked his head, like a football, through the streets.

Trebonius murdered by Dolabella,

who is proclaimed a public enemy.

Immediately after the news reached Rome Dolabella, on the motion of Calenus, was proclaimed a public enemy.[5] On the following day Cicero, warning his hearers that every good citizen might expect from Antony the fate that had befallen Trebonius, moved that although Cassius, like

[1] *Phil.*, xii, 5, 12; xiii, 3, 5; xiv, 2, 5. Cp. Drumann-Groebe, i, 447 [201, 4].

[2] See p. 6.

[3] *Phil.*, x, 8, 17; xiii, 15, 31. Cp. *Jahrb. f. class. Philol.*, 13 Suppl., 1884, p. 699.

[4] See p. 206.

[5] *Phil.*, xi, 2, 5; 3, 7–8; 6, 15; 7, 16; Livy, *Epit.*, 119; Vell., ii, 69, 1; App., iii, 26; Dio, xlvii, 29, 1–3; Oros., vi, 18, 6. Cicero alone says that Dolabella tortured Trebonius before putting him to death. As Long (*Cic. orat.*, iv, 635) remarks, 'it is likely that there were reports [in Rome] of Dolabella's cruelty, and we may be sure that Cicero would make the most of them'.

Dio says that Dolabella encountered Trebonius *after* he heard that Cassius had been ordered to attack him—a double blunder.

Brutus, had no legal claim to the province which he occupied, the Senate should recognize his moral claim and entrust him with the prosecution of the war against Dolabella. Pansa vehemently opposed the motion, and it was rejected;[1] but Cicero forthwith harangued the populace on behalf of Cassius. 'I strained my voice', he told him, 'till it filled the Forum, amid such thunderous, such unanimous applause that I have never seen the like.'[2] 43 B.C.

Though Cicero was in constant correspondence with Octavian,[3] no news that he thought worth publishing was yet coming from the North. But early in March[4] Piso and Calenus, taking advantage of the anxiety which the friends of Decimus Brutus felt for his safety, proposed that a second embassy should be sent, not to dictate terms, but to negotiate with Antony. Five envoys were appointed—Servilius, Lucius Caesar, Piso, Calenus, and Cicero, who at the moment acquiesced. But in the following night he thought over the matter and felt that he had made a tactical mistake. Next day he addressed the Senate and argued that the embassy would be useless: the people, who were full of enthusiasm for the war, would slacken; Antony would yield nothing; he himself could not be expected to meet his bitter enemy, or (though no one was less of a coward) to risk his life on a perilous journey. The majority, it would seem, were convinced: at all events the proposal was dropped.[5] A proposal to send a second embassy to Antony dropped.

But Antony had another supporter, who had perhaps not yet decided that it would be expedient to join him. Soon after the proposal of Calenus and Piso was abandoned the Senate received from Lepidus a dispatch, urging that peace should be made with Antony. In the debate that followed Servilius argued that it would be time to consider the question of peace when Antony laid down his arms, and Cicero vigorously supported him.[6] He was in high spirits, for on the previous day the Senate had paid him March 20. The Thirteenth *Philippic*

[1] *Phil.*, xi; Nonius, p. 329, 30–1 (where the MS. reading *eam* [sc. *sententiam*] is right); *Fam.*, xii, 14, 4; Dio, xlvii, 29, 4. Cp. Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, vi, p. xxxvii. Appian (iii, 63, 260) antedates the appointment of Cassius to command against Dolabella.

[2] *Fam.*, xii, 7, 1. Cp. *Brut.*, ii, 4, 2.

[3] See the fragments preserved by Nonius.

[4] See p. 207.

[5] *Phil.*, xii; Dio, xlvi, 32, 3–4.

[6] *Phil.*, xiii, 4, 7; 20, 49; 21, 50.

43 B.C. a graceful compliment: the statue of Minerva, 'the guardian of Rome', which, fifteen years before, he had placed in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol before he went into exile,[1] had been thrown down by a storm, and the House decreed that it should be restored.[2] With Antony, he insisted, there could be no peace: the Senate had already annulled his laws, levied troops to oppose him, and proclaimed his colleague, Dolabella, a public enemy; and he had refused to listen to the three consulars who had conveyed to him the mandate of the Senate. Cicero had in his hand a letter which Antony had recently written to Hirtius and Octavian, and, to fortify his argument, he read it aloud. Antony declared that the death of Trebonius had given him both joy and sorrow—joy at the punishment of the wretch who had plotted against the Father of his Country, sorrow because Dolabella had been condemned for having slain a murderer—and, after a long indictment of Hirtius and Octavian, ended by asserting that he had an understanding with both Lepidus and Plancus,[3] and would on no account desert them. Of the comments which Cicero interjected, sentence by sentence, as he read, the most venomous was the remark which he had made in a friendly spirit to Trebonius himself[4]—the one crime that could be laid to his charge was that by detaining Antony in conversation outside the Senate on the Ides of March he had saved Antony from the fate of Caesar. Expressing his agreement with Servilius, he added the proposal that a vote of thanks should be accorded to Sextus Pompeius, who had announced his readiness to serve against Antony.[5]

Cicero admonishes Lepidus and Plancus. March 20.

But while Cicero had discreetly spoken in the highest terms of Lepidus and Plancus, he privately admonished them: Lepidus had neglected to thank the Senate for the honours that had been bestowed upon him, and would do well to abstain from promoting a peace which neither the Senate nor the people approved, and which would put a

[1] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 334.

[2] *Fam.*, xii, 25, 1; Dio, xlv, 17, 3.

[3] Pollio assured Cicero in April (*Fam.*, x, 31, 4) that 'Lepidus was . . . writing to tell everybody that he was at one with Antony' (*Lepidus . . . omnibus scriberet se consentire cum Antonio*).

[4] *Fam.*, x, 28, 1.

[5] *Phil.*, xiii, 6, 13; 10, 22; 21, 50.

scoundrel in possession of uncontrollable tyranny;[1] Plancus, like Lepidus, had advocated peace with Antony, by whom his colleague, Decimus Brutus, was besieged, and Cicero would beseech him to dissociate himself from disloyal consulars, to be true to himself, and to stand forth as a leader in support of the Senate and of all good citizens.[2] 43 B.C.

Before Plancus received this exhortation he wrote privately to Cicero,[3] officially to the chief magistrates, the Senate, and the Roman People,[4] protesting his fidelity. In his official dispatch he stated that attempts had been made to bribe his army, and that, having seen what danger had befallen Decimus because he had prematurely avowed his loyalty, he had judged it best to pretend, however reluctantly, that he was well disposed to Antony. With his five legions and their auxiliaries he was ready to serve the State in any capacity. Plancus protests fidelity to the Senate.

Letters written by Cicero during the next few weeks reveal the intense anxiety with which news was being awaited from the theatre of war. On the 19th[5] Pansa, at the head of four legions of recruits, marched to join his colleague. 'The decisive moment has come: Brutus can hardly hold out at Mutina: if he is saved, we have won; if not—which God forbid! the one road for us all is to you'[6]—so about the end of the month Cicero wrote to Cassius. In a more hopeful vein he told Marcus Brutus that the armies and their leaders might be trusted: the consuls were loyal, though many people suspected them, but they had not acted with the promptitude for which he had pleaded, and which would have averted war.[7] On the 11th of April he wrote again, 'I am anxiously waiting for news. . . . Our whole hope depends on relieving [Decimus] Brutus, about whom I am greatly alarmed'; but he was encouraged by news that Cassius had done well in Syria.[8] Brutus, whose temperament as well as his philosophic studies disposed him to lenient measures, had arrested Gaius Antonius, and, being unable to decide what he should do with him, asked the advice of Cicero, remarking that he had read two of Cicero corresponds with Cassius and Brutus. Apr. 1.

[1] *Fam.*, x, 27. [2] *Ib.*, 6. [3] *Ib.*, 7.
[4] *Ib.*, 8. [5] See pp. 206–7. [6] *Fam.*, xii, 6, 2.
[7] *Brut.*, ii, 1, 1. [8] *Ib.*, 2, 2–3. Cp. 3, 3.

43 B.C. the *Philippics*: 'you of course', he added, 'are waiting for me to praise them'.[1] Cicero advised him to keep Antonius a prisoner until the fate of Decimus should be known,[2] and Apr. 14. two days later complained that in a dispatch which had been read aloud he had referred to Antonius with a leniency that scandalized the Senate.[3] 'What is at stake in this war', he insisted, 'is simply our bare existence.'[4]

Rumours and dispatches from Mutina.

About the 17th of April it was rumoured in the capital that Antony had gained a victory, that Pansa had been killed, and that Cicero intended to seize the vacant consulship. Panic arose, and many citizens prepared to emigrate. On the 20th a tribune, Publius Apuleius, a staunch friend of Cicero, called a meeting in the Forum, and convinced his hearers that the rumour about Cicero was false. Two or three hours later glad tidings came from the north; Cicero was fetched from his house, escorted in triumph by a vast multitude to the Capitol, and thence back to his home. 'I have no vanity', he wrote to Brutus, 'but . . . it is glorious that I should be the hero of the people when I have worked for their safety.'[5]

Operations of Hirtius and Octavian against Antony.

It is time to relate the events that had led to this result. Octavian, when he arrived in Cisalpine Gaul, had four legions—the 7th and 8th,[6] which had joined him in Campania, but which, composed as they were of retired veterans, numbered only three thousand men, the Martian and the 4th, which had come over from Antony—and recruits, whom he had raised in Etruria. Dissatisfied with the decree which the Senate had passed in his favour, he felt that his authority, as a mere propraetor, would be null in the presence of the consuls,[7] and was well aware that the

[1] *Brut.*, ii, 3, 4. [2] *Ib.*, 4, 3. Cp. i, 2, 5.

[3] *Ib.*, ii, 5, 3. Cp. i, 2, 5, App., iii, 79, 321–3, Dio, xlvii, 21, 7, and Tyrrell, vi, xliv, who, however, is not justified in concluding that 'Brutus was trying to make friends with the Antonians.' M. Gelzer (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 1004), with whom I agree, remarks that it is incredible that Brutus, as Dio (xlvii, 22, 3) affirms, corresponded with Octavian, and was preparing to return to Italy. Perhaps he remembered that Antonius had befriended him by presiding in his stead at the games in July, 44 (App., iii, 23, 87).

[4] *Brut.*, ii, 5, 5. [5] *Ib.*, i, 3, 2; *Phil.*, xiv, 4, 10. 6, 15–6.

[6] See *Phil.*, xi, 14, 37, where, as Groebe suggests (*op. cit.*, i², 451 [212, 9]), the words *ut septima, ut octava legio* should be inserted after *periculo*, and *C. I. L.*, x, 4786 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 2239).

[7] App., iii, 64.

Senate, despite the eloquence with which Cicero pleaded his cause, intended merely to use him against Antony until Antony should be overthrown. But he knew how to bide his time, and when Hirtius, in accordance with secret instructions, required him to resign the command of the legions that had deserted Antony, made no demur.[1] The two leaders encamped not far from one another—Hirtius at Claterna, on the Aemilian Way, ten miles south-east of Bononia, which Antony held, Octavian, who daily found time to read and practise declamation,[2] at Forum Cornelii, on the same road, thirteen miles further in the same direction.[3] But as time passed, the beleaguered army of Decimus Brutus began to suffer from shortage of supplies,[4] and the two leaders marched to relieve him.[5] Antony, finding himself unable to retain Bononia without the risk of being forced to abandon the siege, thereupon withdrew his garrison and moved in closer to Mutina.[6] Hirtius and Octavian were debarred by a piquet from crossing the Scultenna, which flowed past Mutina;[7] but, to encourage Brutus, they sent men to swim the river by night, with thin plates of lead, on which were inscribed messages, fastened to their arms. Brutus replied in the same way, and further messages were exchanged by means of pigeons.[8] Antony, seeing that Decimus, now that relief was at hand, would not surrender, left his brother Lucius to continue the blockade, and marched to encounter the relieving force. Hirtius and Octavian were too wary to fight a battle until Pansa should arrive, but frequent cavalry skirmishes ensued, in which the Antonians, though numerically superior, gained little advantage, because the plain was scored by torrents. Antony, however, was so far successful that he was emboldened to attack his adversaries' camp.[9] 43 B.C.

About the 1st of April[10] Servius Galba, an ex-lieutenant

[1] App., iii, 65, 266.
[2] Suet., *Aug.*, 84, 1.
[3] *Fam.*, xii, 5, 2; Dio, xlvi, 35, 7.
[4] App., iii, 65, 267.
[5] *Ib.*; Dio, xlvi, 36, 2.
[6] *Ib.*, § 3; App., iii, 65, 267.
[7] See pp. 207–8.
[8] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 16, 118; x, 37 (53), 110; Frontin., *Strat.*, iii, 13, 7–8; Dio, xlvi, 36, 3–5.
[9] App., iii, 65, 267–8; Dio, xlvi, 37, 1–3.
[10] Galba had to march 200 Roman (183 English) miles, for he advanced 100 miles before he met Pansa (*Fam.*, x, 30, 1), and would have required thirteen or fourteen days.

43 B.C. Battle of Forum Gallorum.

of Caesar and one of the assassins, was sent to meet Pansa, who was moving down the Cassian Way, and to hasten his arrival. Pansa was expected to join his colleague on the 14th. Early on that day[1] Antony marched up the Aemilian Way to encounter him with two legions—the 2nd and the 35th—two praetorian cohorts belonging to himself and a lieutenant of Lepidus, who, perhaps with the connivance of his chief, had joined him,[2] a few time-expired volunteers, a body of Moorish cavalry, and some light-armed auxiliaries. He felt sure that with this force he would be more than a match for Pansa, who, as he knew, had left Rome with only four legions, which had never seen a sword drawn in anger. But Antony failed to credit Hirtius with ordinary caution. On the previous day Hirtius had dispatched Decimus Carfulenus, an excellent officer,[3] with the Martian legion and two praetorian cohorts, belonging respectively to himself and Octavian, to reinforce Pansa and enable him to debouch safely from the pass of the Apennines, which Antony had omitted to occupy. Threading the pass in the night, the column was moving down the road at dawn, the Martian legion and the praetorian cohorts in front, when, near the village of Forum Gallorum, about eight miles from Mutina, the Antonian cavalry and auxiliaries were descried. Pansa's cavalry and the Martians, who had not forgotten how their comrades had been executed at Brundisium, pressed forward, in disregard of orders, to attack. The road, a high causeway, was fringed by dense reeds, which were seen to be swaying; and presently the gleam of helmets and shields was observed. Antony had posted his legions in ambush on either side—the 35th on the north, the 2nd on the south—and suddenly his own praetorian cohort was seen advancing up the road. Pansa, when he saw that the Martian legion was getting out of hand, had ordered two of his newly raised legions to follow in support; and after the defile of marshy ground had been passed, but before the recruits had come up, the Martians and the praetorians were formed in line of battle. The Antonians, emerging from the village, instantly charged, and a threefold battle began—Octavian's

[1] See pp. 208–9. [2] See Dio, xlvi, 38, 7. [3] Cp. *Bell. Alex.*, 31, 1.

praetorian cohort encountering Antony's in the centre, 43 B.C.
eight of the Martian cohorts under Carfulenus and Galba being opposed to the 35th on the right, the other two and the praetorians of Hirtius to the entire 2nd legion on the left. When the recruits came up, they stood still (for the Martians had requested that they should keep out of the fight, lest from inexperience they should cause confusion), and gazed with amazement and admiration at the silent order with which veterans fought. The combat on the road was protracted: the weak left wing struggled resolutely against heavy odds until Pansa, severely wounded, was carried off the field, when, finding itself in danger of being outflanked by the Antonian cavalry, it began to give ground; the right wing gradually forced back its opponents, advancing nearly half a mile from its original position. Perhaps the 35th had deliberately retreated, to give the Antonian cavalry an opportunity: at all events the cavalry began to outflank the right wing, and Galba (for Carfulenus had been killed in action), withdrawing the cohorts, posted his auxiliaries in the way of the cavalry to protect his rear. Antony, thinking that he had won the battle, moved to attack the hostile camp, to which the recruits had fled when they saw the defeat of the left wing. The Martians, alined outside the entrenchment, which had been thrown up during the battle, were evidently prepared to defend themselves, and Antony left them alone; but he succeeded in forcing an entrance from another side and killing some of the recruits, not without considerable loss. Meanwhile Hirtius, who had heard that a battle was in progress, was marching up the road with the 4th and the 7th legions, to succour his colleague, while Octavian remained to hold the camp. Towards sunset Hirtius encountered the Antonians, who, singing triumphantly, were beginning to return, and instantly attacked their disorderly array. They formed up as best they could and resisted stoutly, but, unable to stand long against fresh opponents, were defeated with great slaughter and fled for the marshes, whither Hirtius did not think it safe to pursue. Antony, whose standards had all been captured, abandoning the fugitives, reached his camp with his cavalry some three

43 B.C. hours after sunset. Hirtius bivouacked in the camp of Pansa. He, his colleague, and Octavian, who had stoutly defended the camp near Mutina, were saluted as Imperatores.[1]

On the 20th of April dispatches from Hirtius, Pansa, and Octavian were received by the Senate, and on the following day Cicero delivered the last of his extant orations. Decimus Brutus was still, as he believed, blockaded; but the occasion was one for rejoicing. Servilius had moved that a thanksgiving service should be held in honour of the victors, and Cicero, warmly supporting the motion, remarked that it implied that Antony was a public enemy, for a thanksgiving had never been awarded in a war between Roman citizens. He proposed that the service should last for fifty days, that a monument should be erected in memory of the men who had died for Roman liberty, and that the rewards which the Senate had already promised to the loyal soldiers should be duly given—in the case of the fallen to their surviving relatives.[2] Writing joyfully to Marcus Brutus, he extolled the 'innate manliness' of 'the boy Caesar', and prophesied that, with all his honours thick upon him, he could be kept thenceforth, as in the past, in the right path; for 'the youth is convinced, above all by me, that it is he who has kept us safe'.[3]

Cicero supports a motion for rewarding the victors.

Antony defeated and Mutina relieved.

On the 21st of April Antony risked a battle at Mutina, to avoid losing his hold on the town, of which Hirtius and Octavian threatened to break the blockade, and suffered a defeat, though Hirtius fell.[4] Five days later the news reached Rome.[5] In the general rejoicing extravagant hopes were formed, and Cicero believed that the Republic would be safe for many generations.[6] Antony and his followers were at last proclaimed public enemies: [7] to all appearance

[1] *C. I. L.*, x, 8375 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 108). The authorities for the battle are examined on pp. 209–10.

[2] *Phil.*, xiv, 2–4, §§ 6–11; 8, 22; 14. [3] *Brut.*, i, 3, 1.

[4] *Fam.*, x, 33, 4 (inaccurate); App., iii, 71, 293; Dio, xlvi, 39, 1; Oros., vi, 18, 5. Florus (ii, 15, 5, with which cp. *Fam.*, x, 33, 4, and Suet., *Aug.*, 10, 4) incorrectly says that Octavian was wounded. See p. 210.

[5] *Fam.*, xi, 14, 3. [6] *Ib.*

[7] *Brut.*, i, 3, 4; 5, 1; Livy, *Epit.*, 119; Vell., ii, 64, 4; App., iii, 63, 258 (chronologically inaccurate); Dio, xlvi, 39, 3. Cp. Drumann-Groebe, i, 457 [222, 7].

he was now decisively beaten, and those who had pleaded on his behalf doubtless felt that he might safely be condemned. Cicero moved that as the glad news had been received on the birthday of Decimus, his name should be inscribed in the *Fasti* under that date; but though other honours which Cicero proposed to confer upon him were allowed to pass, he had enemies who deemed an inscription an excessive reward, and the motion was rejected.[1] Cicero also proposed the honour of a public funeral for Pansa, whose life was despaired of, Hirtius, and Pontius Aquila—that rancorous Republican who had publicly insulted Caesar[2] and had taken part in his assassination; but when he moved that an ovation—not the greater honour of a triumph, which was reserved for Decimus—should be granted to Octavian, friends of Marcus Brutus opposed the motion, which was rejected.[3] The Senate, indeed, were not disposed to exalt Octavian. Reducing, perhaps for lack of funds, the bounties that had been promised to his troops,[4] they decreed that those which the consuls had commanded should be transferred to Decimus, and that the further conduct of the war should be entrusted to him alone.[5]

43 B.C.

Apr. 27.

Octavian ignored, despite Cicero's advocacy, in the award of honours.

The republican soul of Marcus Brutus was incensed at the honours that had before been bestowed upon Octavian. Cicero had failed to convince him that the young man could be kept in the right path. Writing to Atticus, he insisted that 'the boy's unscrupulous ambition had been stimulated rather than checked by Cicero': 'death, exile, and poverty—I believe that these are the worst evils in Cicero's eyes, and so long as he has people from whom he can get what he wants, and who will make much of him

Brutus offended by Cicero's support of Octavian.

[1] *Brut.*, i, 15, 8. Cp. *Fam.*, xi, 10, 1.

[2] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 318.

[3] *Brut.*, i, 15, 8–9; Livy, *Epit.*, 119; Vell., ii, 62, 4. Appian (iii, 74, 302) says that Cicero proposed a thanksgiving service of fifty days; Dio (xlvi, 39, 3) of sixty: but I suspect that both were thinking of the service of fifty days for the victory of Forum Gallorum, which they do not mention. Tyrrell (*op. cit.*, vi, pp. xlvi, 259) notwithstanding, there is no evidence that the ovation was decreed. Certainly it was not held (*Mon. Ancyr.*, 1, 21; Suet., *Aug.*, 22); and both Velleius (ii, 62, 5) and Appian (§ 304) state that in the senatorial decree Octavian was ignored.

[4] App., iii, 86, 355; Dio, xlvi, 40, 6. See p. 39.

[5] Livy, *Epit.*, 120; App., iii, 74, 302; 76, 311; Dio, xlvi, 40, 1. Cp. *Fam.*, xi, 19, 1; 20, 4; 14, 2.

43 B.C. and flatter him, he has no horror of servitude, provided it is tempered with a show of respect.'[1] On the 15th of May he wrote to Cicero, regretting that impulsive generosity had led him to heap excessive honours on the young Caesar, who, if he became consul prematurely, would not even then be satisfied.[2]

Antony marches to join Lepidus in Transalpine Gaul.

Octavian had already given signs that the forecast of Brutus was sound. Antony after his defeat called a council of war. His officers urged him to stand fast: he had inflicted no less loss than he had sustained; Hirtius was dead, Pansa mortally wounded; famine would soon compel Mutina to surrender. The experienced soldier, two of whose new legions had deserted,[3] rejected this advice. If he suffered another reverse, Lepidus and Plancus would regard his cause as hopeless; if he retreated, Ventidius, who was already on the way, would soon reinforce him, Lepidus and Plancus would sooner or later join the stronger side.

Apr. 22. On the following day therefore Antony pushed westward, reinforcing the remnant of his army by enlisting slaves, resolutely enduring every privation, and inspiring the troops by his example.[4] His object was to join Lepidus, with whom, as he had avowed,[5] he had an understanding, and to whom, as well as to Plancus and Pollio, he had sent envoys.[6]

Apr. 27. But what meanwhile was Decimus doing? Cicero, on the day after he heard of the battle of Mutina, assured Marcus Brutus that Decimus was in pursuit,[7] and two days later Decimus wrote to Cicero that he hoped to prevent Ventidius from getting past him and to drive Antony out

[1] *Brut.*, i, 17, 1. 4.

[2] *Ib.*, 4, 4. Cp. Plut., *Brut.*, 22, 3. Brutus, after reading an extract from a letter written by Cicero to Octavian, complained of the 'abject humility' with which he had thanked him for his services (*Brut.*, i, 16, 1). I have not used this letter in the text because, though Tyrrell (vi, 153) refutes the view that it was written in December, 44, he is wrong in referring it to May, 43. Read §§ 7–8 (with which compare Plutarch, *Comp. Demosth. et Cic.*, 4, 2) and you will find that it must have been written about the time when Brutus heard that Octavian had been elected or was about to be elected consul. See M. Sjögren, *M. Tulli . . . liber nonus*, 1910, p. 60, and M. Gelzer (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 1009). In regard to the authenticity of *Brut.*, i, 16–7, see Tyrrell, vi, pp. cxi–cxvii, and *The Roman Republic*, iii, 340, n. 4.

[3] See p. 202.

[4] *Fam.*, xi, 10, 3; Plut., *Ant.*, 17, 2–3; App., iii, 72.

[5] See p. 48.

[6] *Fam.*, xi, 11, 1.

[7] *Brut.*, i, 3, 4.

of Italy: Cicero must keep Plancus straight, and now that Antony was beaten, it was to be hoped that he would not play false. But Decimus had then advanced no farther than Regium Lepidum, barely twenty miles from Mutina.[1] Effective pursuit had been impossible. Decimus had no cavalry; his transport cattle had for the most part been eaten by his beleaguered troops; the troops themselves were not only much reduced in numbers, but in poor condition from semi-starvation and prolonged confinement. Decimus felt unable to take the field until he should have ascertained whether Octavian was willing to work with him;[2] and perhaps Appian[3] told the truth, however much he may have overloaded it with fiction, when he said that Octavian declined to associate with a murderer of Caesar. When, on the day after Antony began his retreat, Decimus was about to follow, he was summoned by Pansa to Bononia, but learned on the way that he was dead. Thus, when he was able to set out, Antony had got two days' start.[4] Marching on rapidly, he crossed the Apennines by a pass leading from Dertona to Vada Sabatia, some thirty miles south-west of Genua, where on the 3rd of May Ventidius with three legions joined him.[5] 'If', wrote Decimus, 'Caesar had listened to me and crossed the Apennines, I should have reduced Antony to such straits that he must have been undone by famine rather than by the sword.'[6]

43 B.C.

Decimus unable to pursue him effectively.

Apr. 23.

But it did not suit the purpose of the young Caesar to interfere with Ventidius or Antony. He had taken the field against Antony because Antony had opposed and insulted him, because he needed, for a time, the support of Cicero and the countenance of the Senate, because policy required that he should weaken the power of Antony, because he was determined to compel Antony to treat with him on equal terms; but it is safe to infer from his subsequent action what Appian[7] plainly records, that he already

[1] *Fam.*, xi, 9. [2] *Ib.*, 13, 1.

[3] iii, 73, 298–300. Appian's description of a meeting between Decimus and Octavian is notoriously untrustworthy.

[4] *Fam.*, xi, 13, 2. Marcus Brutus (*Brut.*, i, 6, 2) gave good reasons for disbelieving a rumour (Tac., *Ann.*, i, 10; Suet., *Aug.*, 11) that Pansa had been murdered.

[5] *Fam.*, xi, 10, 3; x, 33, 4; 34, 1; App., iii, 80, 328. Cp. *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, cxlv, 1892, p. 326. [6] *Fam.*, xi, 10, [7] iii, 80, 326.

43 B.C. Octavian resents his neglect by the Senate.

contemplated a coalition with his former enemy. Moreover, the Senate had taken no pains to conciliate him, and had honoured the enemies and the murderers of his adoptive father. Sextus Pompeius had been appointed to command at sea;[1] Cassius had been entrusted with the province of Syria and the command against Dolabella;[2] Decimus had received the promise of a triumph, and was virtually appointed the superior officer of Octavian, to whom even an ovation was denied. Worst of all, the Senate had instructed the envoys who were sent to Cisalpine Gaul to announce the decree of the 27th of April, to communicate it to the troops of Octavian without his knowledge; and although he affected to ignore this insult, the soldiers resented it and refused to listen to any message except in the presence of their commander.[3] While he declined to co-operate with Decimus, he treated his Antonian prisoners with every consideration and made it clear to one of the officers, whom he permitted to rejoin his chief, that he no longer regarded the latter as an enemy.[4] Cicero told Decimus that bitter disappointment had succeeded the exultation with which the announcement of the retreat of Antony had been received in Rome, and that people were complaining that Decimus had failed to pursue him;[5] 'as', he added, 'the thanksgivings which we offered in your name at all the temples are so recent, this renewal of alarm

Between May 14 and 19.

Cicero disappointed by the failure of Decimus.

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 119; Vell., ii, 73, 2; App., iii, 4, 11 (inaccurate); iv, 70, 298; 84, 353; 94, 394; 96, 404; Dio, xlvi, 40, 3; 51, 5; xlvii, 12, 1–2; xlviii, 17, 1. Cp. Drumann-Groebe, iv, 567, n. 6. Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 224, n. 6 [Eng. tr., iii, 168, n. †]), citing Dio, xlvi, 51, 5, argues that Sextus was not appointed until after Lepidus joined Antony (p. 62, *infra*), and rejects the earlier statement of Dio (xlvi, 40, 3) on which I have relied, because Cicero (*Brut.*, i, 5, 1–2) 'says that in the session of April 27, when the decisions respecting . . . Cassius were formed, [Sextus] Pompeius was not discussed at all'. That is not true. Cicero merely omits to mention Sextus: he does not say anywhere that he was appointed admiral.

[2] *Brut.*, i, 5, 1; Vell., ii, 62, 2; 73, 2; Livy, *Epit.*, 121; Dio, xlvi, 40, 3; xlvii, 28, 5. According to an unsupported statement of Dio (*l. c.*), Cassius had already written to Octavian, proposing an accommodation.

It may be inferred from *Fam.*, xii, 14, 4 (cp. *Phil.*, xi, 9) that Hirtius and Pansa, who had been originally authorized to command against Dolabella, were to act until Mutina should have been relieved by deputy (Cassius?) [*Phil.*, xiii, 15, 30]. Cassius was not definitely appointed to the command until after the deaths of Hirtius and Pansa were known in Rome.

[3] Vell., ii, 62, 5; Dio, xlvi, 41, 2.

[4] App., iii, 80, 329.

[5] *Fam.*, xi, 12, 2.

causes great disappointment'.[1] Decimus had himself been disappointed. He had expected that the 4th and the Martian legion would join him in obedience to a senatorial decree;[2] but the men refused to serve under one who had joined in the murder of their great commander, and Octavian would not permit any of Pansa's legions to join Decimus.[3] He had a grudge against Cicero, who, he heard, had remarked epigrammatically, 'the young man must be praised, honoured, and—got rid of'.[4] 'I shall not allow myself', said Octavian, 'to be got rid of.'[5] 43 B.C.

But, despite his disappointment, Decimus believed, even after he knew that Ventidius had joined Antony, that he had succeeded in baffling his formidable enemy. Advancing to a point some thirty miles from Vada, he was informed that Antony had called upon his men to follow him across the Alps, that he might join Lepidus, whereupon, pleading that it was their duty to conquer or to die in Italy, they had induced him to let them march to Pollentia, on the eastern edge of the Graian Alps. Decimus instantly sent a detachment to Pollentia, and followed with the rest of his force. The detachment reached Pollentia before the cavalry which Antony had sent thither appeared. 'How I rejoiced,' wrote Decimus, 'for I think this means a victory.'[6] He did not know that Antony had lured him away from the road that led to Vada, and got safely into the Province of Gaul, which Lepidus ruled.[8] Decimus outwitted by Antony. May 15?[7]

Meanwhile Lepidus professed loyalty to the Senate,

[1] *Fam.*, xi, 18, 3.

[2] *Ib.*, 19, 1 (May 21)—*putarem quartam et Martiam legiones mecum futuras, ut Druso Paulloque placuerat vobis adsentientibus.* I agree with Tyrrell (*op. cit.*, vi, 182) that by *vobis* Decimus meant the senators in general, including Cicero; but Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 204, n. 3 [Eng. tr., iii, 158, n. ‡]) infers from a statement of Dio (xlvi, 40, 4), which is perhaps antedated, that the motion of Drusus and Paullus was rejected in the fear that the legions would not obey. If it was, why did Brutus expect that they would join him?

[3] *Fam.*, xi, 14, 2; 20, 4.

[4] *Ib.*, § 1. Cp. Vell., ii, 62, 6, and Suet., *Aug.*, 12. Cicero, replying (*Fam.*, xi, 21, 1) to the letter in which Decimus, citing one Segulius Labeo as his authority, reported this story, did not expressly deny its truth, though he called it a piece of folly. Whether he was the author of the epigram or not, does not matter: Octavian thought that he was.

[5] *Fam.*, xi, 20, 1.

[6] *Ib.*, 13, 4.

[7] See pp. 210–1.

[8] *Fam.*, x, 17. 1.

43 B.C. Operations of Plancus in Transalpine Gaul. End of April. May 5. May 12. [Fréjus.]

while Plancus, who was unwilling to surrender his province to Antony, doubtless purposed to remain loyal so long as he could do so safely. On the 26th of April he had crossed the Rhone, near its confluence with the Saone, intending to march for Mutina,[1] but, hearing that Antony had been defeated, and expecting that he would endeavour to join Lepidus, he halted, and wrote to assure Cicero that he was doing his best to induce Lepidus to co-operate with him.[2] Cicero, though, as he told a friend, he was now 'utterly tired out',[3] found time to encourage him, and added, 'Even now that the enemy have been routed, our whole hope is in you'.[4] Anxious to secure his fidelity, he induced the Senate to pass a decree in his honour, and bade him remember, 'The man who smashes Antony will have ended the war'.[5] Plancus had already urged Lepidus to work with him, and Lepidus, pledging his honour to attack Antony if he should fail to exclude him from the Province, had in turn asked Plancus to join him. Plancus accordingly bridged the Isère [6] near the site of Grenoble, transported his army to the southern bank, and, learning that Lucius Antonius with the advanced guard of his brother's army had entered the Province and reached Forum Iulii, near the mouth of the Argens, sent four thousand horse to encounter him, intending to follow with the rest of his force.[7] Lepidus, on hearing of the approach of Antony, had moved eastward from the neighbourhood of Avignon.[8] Plancus, after crossing the Isère, met an orderly, who handed him a letter from Lepidus, telling him not to come, but to await his arrival, as he could finish the campaign unaided.[9] For some days Plancus hesitated, and writing to Cicero, he explained his reasons. The safe course, he felt, would be to wait until Decimus Brutus should join him: on the other hand, if he did not himself join Lepidus, and Lepidus suffered a reverse, he would be blamed. Not

[1] *Fam.*, x, 9, 3. [2] *Ib.*, 11, 2–3. [3] *Ib.*, xii, 25, 6.
[4] *Ib.*, x, 14, 1. [5] *Ib.*, 13.
[6] Camille Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iv, 1913, p. 51 [n. 6]) takes *Isara* (*Fam.*, x, 15, 3) to mean the Drac, an affluent of the Isère. Surely it means the Isère itself. Plancus calls it 'a very large river'; and if he crossed the Drac, he must have crossed the Isère first.
[7] *Ib.*, 15. See p. 211. [8] *Ib.*, 34, 1. [9] *Ib.*, 21, 2.

only Lepidus, with whom he was on bad terms, but also Laterensis, a lieutenant of Lepidus, whose good faith was above suspicion, had entreated him to come. On the 18th therefore, after constructing redoubts, which he garrisoned, at either end of the bridge, so that Decimus, on his arrival, might be able to cross safely, be broke up his camp and marched southward, hoping to join Lepidus in eight days.[1] Lepidus was at this time encamped on the western bank of the Argens, near Forum Voconii,[2] whence he wrote to assure Cicero of his devotion to the Republic, and to complain that he had been calumniated.[3] Antony and Ventidius were in two camps on the opposite bank.[4] By the 27th [5] Plancus had marched as far as the Verdon, a tributary of the Durance, less than forty miles from the position occupied by Lepidus. He had reason to hope that Lepidus would be true to him, for he had sent a hostage.[6] Nevertheless, as a precaution, he advanced no further, but took up a position behind the river, intending, if it should appear safe, to march on and join Lepidus, but in case he should be attacked, to retreat through the territory of the Vocontii.[7] At this juncture he received a letter from Laterensis, warning him to be on his guard against Lepidus, who was not to be trusted,[8] and on the 30th he got news which made him resolve to retreat with speed.[9] When Lepidus became aware that Antony intended to invade the Province, he ordered his lieutenant Terentius Culleo to bar his passage; but Culleo, with or without the connivance of his chief, offered no opposition and even joined Antony, who relied so confidently on the goodwill of Lepidus that when he approached the Argens he did not take the trouble to entrench his camp.[10] Laterensis probably had these facts in mind when he wrote to warn Plancus. The soldiers in the two armies fraternized; those of Lepidus declared that they wanted peace, for there had been enough bloodshed

43 B.C.

[1] *Ib.*, 18, 2–4. The true reading of the date in § 4 is (a.d.) *XV* (Kalend. Iun.) =May 18. Tyrrell followed it in dating the letter, but incorrectly printed *XII* (May 21) in the text.

[2] Vidauban?

[3] *Fam.*, x, 34, 1. 3.

[4] *Ib.*, 17, 1.

[5] Cp. Drumann-Groebe, i, 464 [256, 3].

[6] *Fam.*, x, 23, 2; 17, 3.

[7] *Ib.*, 23, 2.

[8] *Ib.*, 21, 3.

[9] *Ib.*, § 5; 23, 2.

[10] *Ib.*, 34, 2; Vell., ii, 63, 1; App., iii, 83, 340.

43 B.C. and, since the two consuls had been killed and many good citizens declared public enemies, they did not intend to fight any more.[1] Lepidus, who, as Plancus heard, was anxiously expecting the aid which he had a few days before rejected, despaired, or affected to despair, of his arrival and made no attempt to suppress the mutiny.[2] Antony was admitted by the troops into the camp; Lepidus agreed to join him, and on the following day, protesting his loyalty, wrote a veiled account of what had happened to the Senate. His army, he explained, had with one accord constrained him to defend the lives and fortunes of a vast multitude of Roman citizens: 'I beg and beseech you, conscript fathers . . . in this time of civil discord not to regard my compassionate feeling and that of my army as a crime.'[3] Laterensis, resolved not to survive the dishonour which he had striven to avert, committed suicide; and the Senate commemorated his loyalty by a public funeral.[4]

Antony joins Lepidus.

May 29.

May 30.

Meanwhile Antony, the man of action, was marching against Plancus,[5] who, however, getting timely news of his approach, made good his retreat, transported his whole army across the Isère, and, destroying the bridge which he had built, awaited the arrival of Decimus Brutus. 'My dear Cicero,' so ended the letter in which he described his movements, 'believe me, I hold you dearer every day.'[6] Decimus heard of the desertion of Lepidus on the 3rd of June, when he had begun his march, and, understanding what it portended, wrote to the Senate for reinforcements and privately to Cicero,[7] upon whose support he could depend. Soon after he joined Plancus they reported conjointly that their cavalry, which they had sent forward in advance, aided by the loyal Allobroges, had succeeded in checking Antony, and that with the rest of their forces they felt sure that they could prevent him from crossing the Isère.[8]

June 4.

Decimus joins Plancus.

[1] App., iii, 83, 342; 84, 345; *Fam.*, x, 21, 4; 35, 1.

[2] *Ib.*, 21, 4; 23, 2.

[3] *Ib.*, 35.

[4] *Ib.*, 23, 4; Vell., ii, 63, 2; App., iii, 84, 346; Dio, xlvi, 51, 3–4; Eutrop., vii, 2; Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic*, &c., ii, 384, 392–4 (nos. 31–3).

[5] Plancus, who was misinformed, told Cicero (*Fam.*, x, 23, 2) that Antony and Lepidus both marched against him. But Antony started on May 29, and Lepidus wrote to the Senate from his camp on the Argens on May 30.

[6] *Fam.*, x, 23, 7.

[7] *Ib.*, xi, 26.

[8] *Ib.*, 13, 4; App., iii, 81, 333 (chronologically perverted). See pp. 211–2.

But for the Republican party the situation remained serious enough. Even before the end of May Cicero had written again in profound depression to Decimus that people were greatly disappointed at the renewal of war, and that the legions which garrisoned Africa had been summoned;[1] and when Antony made good his retreat from Mutina the Senate had passed a resolution, calling upon Marcus Brutus to return with his army to Italy.[2] Early in June Cicero wrote to him, expressing surprise that he had never noticed the resolution and urging him to obey it instantly. Decimus, he said (for he was not convinced by the explanation which Decimus had given[3]), had made so many mistakes that the victory at Mutina was virtually nullified. But Marcus was not required to act only against external enemies. The young Caesar, 'hitherto guided by my advice', had been led by unprincipled advisers to count upon obtaining the consulship.[4] Cicero had repeatedly advised him to abandon the idea and had not hesitated to reveal in the Senate the source of the conspiracy: if the young man would obey, all might yet be well; if not, Marcus alone could save the situation. Let him come then quickly and urge Cassius to do the same.[5] After the defection of Lepidus became known Cicero again and again renewed his exhortations both to Marcus and to Cassius,[6] telling the former that the army of Caesar, which was already disposed to insist that their young commander should be elected consul, made it necessary to summon his army from the East: 'help us then in God's name, and that speedily'.[7]

43 B.C.

Disappointments and anxieties of Cicero.

Before this last appeal Lepidus had been declared a public enemy,[8] and Cicero amongst others voted for the

June 30.

Lepidus declared a public enemy.

[1] *Fam.*, xi, 14, 2. Appian (iii, 85, 351) says that the legions were summoned after the news of the junction of Lepidus with Antony reached Rome —about June 10. Schwartz (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, ii, 232) corrects him for chronological inaccuracy; but perhaps a message was then sent to hasten their embarkation.

[2] *Brut.*, i, 10, 1. Cp. App., iii, 85, 350, and Dio, xlvi, 51, 5.

[3] See pp. 56–7, 59.

[4] See p. 213. After Hirtius and Pansa fell the consular elections were for legal reasons postponed (*Brut.*, i, 5, 4).

[5] *Brut.*, i, 10.

[6] *Ib.*, 9, 3; 12, 2; 14, 2; *Fam.*, xii, 8, 1; 9, 2; 10, 4.

[7] *Brut.*, i, 14, 2.

[8] *Fam.*, xii, 10, 1; Vell., ii, 64, 4; App., iii, 96, 397.

43 B.C. removal of the statue which had been erected in his honour;[1] but Marcus Brutus was his brother-in-law, and efforts were made to mitigate his punishment. Cicero told Marcus that he had not felt justified in granting the petition of Servilia and of the wife of Lepidus, who had begged him to have consideration for his children and not to confiscate his property.[2] Some weeks earlier, the Senate, fearing that Lepidus and Plancus might join Antony and hoping doubtless to keep them out of mischief, had decreed that, in pursuance of a plan which must have been formed long before,[3] they should jointly establish a colony for veteran soldiers.[4] Since Lepidus, after his disgrace, could not participate in the ceremony, Plancus had the sole honour of founding the colony at Lugudunum, the nucleus of Lyons.[5]

A colony founded at Lugudunum.

Plancus and Decimus inactive.

But for the moment interest was centred upon Octavian. Plancus and Decimus made no move against Antony and Lepidus, for, though they had fourteen legions, of which four were veteran, Plancus believed that, with such a large proportion of recruits, it would be rash to pit them against the combined forces of the enemy.[6] Antony was too prudent to waste his strength, for he knew that time was working in his favour; Octavian was preparing, despite the exhortations of Cicero and the revelations which he had made in the Senate, for the stroke by which he intended to gain the consulship. Cicero clung to the hope that the youth whose exploits he had celebrated and whom he still regarded as his pupil, would not be false to the Republic: 'young Caesar,' he told Marcus Brutus, 'to whom, if we would confess the truth, we owe it that we still exist, is an influence that derived its source from my counsel'.[7] But before July was out he was beginning to lose hope. 'I am greatly distressed: the Senate accepted me as a sponsor for the young man—I might almost say, the boy . . . and

Cicero begins to lose faith in Octavian.

[1] *Brut.*, i, 15, 9; Dio, xlvi, 51, 4.

[2] *Brut.*, i, 12, 1–2. On July 27, only two or three weeks later, Cicero told Brutus that he had from the first pleaded with the Senate for the children of Lepidus (*a principio . . . causam egi puerorum in senatu* [*Brut.*, i, 18, 6]).

[3] Cp. C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, iv, 43, n. 1. [4] Dio, xlvi, 50, 2.

[5] *C. I. L.*, x, 6087 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 886). Cp. Suet., ed. Roth, *Rel.*, p. 289, Dio, xlvi, 50, 4–5, Babelon, *op. cit.*, i, 168–9, and Jullian, *l. c.*

[6] *Fam.*, x, 24, 3. [7] *Brut.*, i, 15, 6.

I hardly seem able to fulfil my pledge. . . . Still, I shall hold 43 B.C.
even him, I hope, despite many adverse influences.'[1] To add to his anxieties, the State was almost bankrupt, for the tribute due from the province Asia and from Syria had been intercepted by Brutus, Cassius, and Dolabella.[2] It had become necessary to impose a property tax in order to pay the bounties promised to the soldiers of Octavian,[3] and, 'owing to the shameless returns made by the rich' (though the rate was only 1 per cent.), the amount collected was barely sufficient for two legions,[4] leaving nothing to defray the expenses of the armies in the field. Brutus had made no response to the summons of the Senate or to the reiterated appeals of Cicero, who failed to see that if he were so fatuous as to obey, Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian would combine to crush him. Plancus wrote that he had unceasingly urged Octavian, whom the Senate had appointed to command conjointly with Decimus against Antony,[5] to come and join him, and that Octavian had uniformly replied that he was coming without delay: if, Plancus added, he had kept his promise, the war would have been over, or, at least, the hostile armies would have been driven into Spain; as it was, his claim to the consulship and the offensive manner in which he urged it were causing general alarm.[6]

The boy had indeed thrown off the mask. The time was approaching when it might be prudent for him to join Mark Antony, and, to prevent that alliance from being one-sided, he would need all the prestige that the consulship could give. Moreover, with all the experience which he had so rapidly acquired, he was boyish enough to brood over the sneers that had been directed against his youth;[7] and it would be a pleasure to humiliate those who had uttered them. The Senate, fancying that he might accept a compromise, had offered to sanction his candidature for the praetorship; but they were speedily undeceived. He

[1] *Ib.*, 18, 3–4 (July 27).
[2] See pp. 44, 76; *Fam.*, xii, 14, 6; 15, 1; and Ferrero, *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 213 (Eng. tr., iii, 160).
[3] *Fam.*, xii, 30, 4; Dio, xlvi, 31, 3–4.
[4] *Brut.*, i, 18, 5.
[5] App., iii, 85, 352; Dio, xlvi, 42, 1. Cp. *Fam.*, x, 23, 6.
[6] *Fam.*, x, 24, 4. 6 (July 28).
[7] Suet., *Aug.*, 12.

43 B.C. Early in July. Octavian demands the consulship, sent a party of centurions to demand the consulship and immediate payment of the promised bounties. In reply to the objection that their commander was too young, they quoted the precedents of the Scipios, Pompey the Great, and Dolabella, and reminded the objectors that Octavian had already been authorized to stand for the consulship at an age ten years below the legal term.[1] Leaving the House, one of the envoys grasped his sword and said grimly, 'If you will not give Caesar the consulship, this will.'[2] When the party returned, the troops demanded to be led to Rome, and Octavian with his eight legions, cavalry, and auxiliaries instantly set out. The news of his approach caused a panic in the capital, for only one legion of recruits, left by Pansa, was at hand.[3] The Senate, hastily resolving to pay the bounties, and to permit Octavian to stand for the consulship in absence, sent messengers to announce these concessions, but, hearing immediately afterwards that the legions summoned from Africa[4] had arrived in port, repented of their panic and rescinded their resolve.[5] A levy was hastily held, and all the available troops were detailed to guard the bridge over the Tiber and the Janiculan hill, to which the public treasure had been removed.[6] While Octavian was receiving the messengers, he was informed that the senators had changed their minds, and, fearing for the safety of his mother and his sister Octavia, pushed on rapidly and occupied the northern suburb, outside the Quirinal hill. High and low thronged to welcome him.[7] Next day, leaving the bulk of his force outside the walls, he entered the city with his bodyguard. Atia and Octavia with the Vestal virgins saluted him in the temple of Vesta, while the three legions in the city, ignoring their officers, assured him of their devotion.[8] The urban praetor,

marches on Rome,

[1] See p. 40.

[2] Suet., *Aug.*, 26, 1; App., iii, 88, 361–2; Dio, xlvi, 41, 3; 42, 4; 43, 1. 3–4.

[3] App., iii, 88, 363–5; 89, 367–8. Cp. Dio, xlvi, 43, 5–6; 44, 1–2.

[4] See p. 63.

[5] App., iii, 90; 91, 373; Dio, xlvi, 44, 4.

[6] App., iii, 91, 374; Dio, xlvi, 44, 5.

[7] App., iii, 92, 377–8; Dio, xlvi, 45, 2.

[8] Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 232, n. 3 [Eng. tr., iii, 174, n. †]), setting the authorities at defiance, says that the revolt of these legions 'must have happened as soon as Octavianus arrived; otherwise we cannot understand why his entrance to Rome was unopposed'. Though he had eight legions!

Caecilius Cornutus, a stanch Republican and, since the death of the consuls, the first magistrate, committed suicide; the legionary officers surrendered and received a pledge of safety.[1] On learning this, says Appian,[2] who never missed an opportunity of pouring scorn upon the Republican leader, Cicero obtained an audience with Octavian, and dilated upon the zeal with which he had urged the Senate to grant him the consulship:[3] Octavian replied with a scoff that Cicero was the last of his friends to welcome him. 43 B.C.

On the following night a rumour spread that the Martians and the 4th legion had deserted Octavian, on the ground that they had been deceived about the reason for leading them to Rome. Senators believed it, sent an officer to raise a levy in Picenum, and flocked to the House, where they were received by Cicero; but, says Appian[4] with a parting thrust, 'as soon as the rumour was falsified he fled'. Octavian, who took no notice of the senatorial ebullition, moved on into the Field of Mars, seized the State treasure, and, after paying an instalment to every soldier, left Rome, pending the consular election, to avoid the appearance of having coerced the voters.[5] In the absence of an interrex the acting urban praetor nominated two persons as proconsuls to hold the election; on the 19th of August Octavian and his kinsman Quintus Pedius, whom he desired as his colleague, were proclaimed consuls;[6] and historians did not forget to record that Octavian saw twelve vultures, as Romulus was said to have done.[7] Cicero, who had quitted the city which he loved, never to return, wrote a letter, of which one fragment remains—the last that has been preserved from his pen— and procures election.

Cicero's last letter to Octavian.

[1] App., iii, 92, 379–81; Dio, xlvi, 45, 2.

[2] iii, 92, 382. [3] See p. 213, n. 3. [4] iii, 93.

[5] *Ib.*, 94, 386–7; Dio, xlvi, 45, 5; 46, 5; 47, 1. Dio seems to imply that the troops were paid after the election. I have used the narratives of Appian and Dio, on which we have to depend for the details of this paragraph, with the utmost caution. The main facts are recorded by the epitomizer of Livy (119), Velleius (ii, 65, 2), and Eutropius (vii, 2).

[6] *C. I. L.*, i, p. 310 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 108); *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 7–8; Tac., *Ann.*, i, 9; Suet., *Aug.*, 31, 2; App., iii, 94, 388; Dio, xlvi, 45, 3; 46, 1; lv, 6, 7; lvi, 30, 5; Macrob., i, 12, 35. Velleius (ii, 65, 2) incorrectly gives Sept. 23 as the date. Cp. V. Gardthausen, *Augustus u. seine Zeit*, ii, 48, n. 11.

[7] Suet., *Aug.*, 95; Dio, xlvi, 46, 2; Obseq., 69.

43 B.C. to the boy who had outwitted him: 'I rejoice doubly that you grant leave of absence to Philippus and myself, for it means pardon for the past and indulgence for the future.'[1] Could his sternest detractor remain insensible to the pathos of those words?

Laws passed under Octavian's influence.

The adoption of Octavian was now confirmed by the popular assembly,[2] while laws were passed abrogating the sentence that had been passed upon Dolabella and providing for the prosecution of the assassins of Caesar. In the trial which followed one juror, Publius Silicius Corona, who was soon to pay the penalty of his courage,[3] dared to vote for acquittal. The condemned were 'interdicted from fire and water'; but most of them were abroad, and the rest, including the tribune Casca, had fled.[4]

Octavian marches to join Antony.

The time had come for Octavian to consummate that formal reconciliation with Antony which he had long meditated,[5] and, leaving Rome, he marched leisurely towards Cisalpine Gaul.[6] Since Antony and Lepidus had combined, he must either join them or submit; and without the aid of Antony he could not punish Brutus and Cassius, the murderers of his adoptive father.[7] Pedius urged the humbled Senate to heal all feuds by coming to an accommodation with Antony and Lepidus; and, after communicating with Octavian, they annulled their sentence of outlawry, and wrote to both in a pacific spirit.[8] Meanwhile Asinius Pollio, leaving one of his three legions to hold his province, had quitted Corduba. He had written to Cicero, protesting that, though he had been a devoted friend of Caesar, he was an uncompromising enemy of tyranny, and

[1] Nonius, p. 436, 22–4.

[2] App., iii, 94, 389; Dio, xlvi, 47, 4.

[3] App., iv, 27, 119.

[4] Livy, *Epit.*, 120; Vell., ii, 69, 5; App., iii, 95, 392–3; Suet., *Nero*, 3, 1; *Galba*, 3, 2; Dio, xlvi, 48, 1–4; 49, 6; xlvii, 22, 4. The law, proposed by Pedius, under which the trial was held, is attributed loosely, but with substantial truth, to Octavian by the epitomizer, Appian, and Dio. Cp. *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 10–11. Dio (xlvi, 48, 1–2) says that Octavian paid with public money, which had been raised for the war, the [? balance of the] bequests made to the people by Caesar.

[5] Dio, xlvi, 51, 2. According to Livy (*Epit.*, 119 [cp. Plut., *Ant.*, 19, 1]), Eutropius (vii, 2), and Orosius (vi, 18, 6), Lepidus mediated between Antony and Octavian; according to Dio (xlvi, 43, 6; 52, 1), Octavian was first reconciled with Antony, and then with Lepidus.

[6] App., iii, 96, 396; Dio, xlvi, 50, 1; 52, 3.

[7] See pp. 214–5.

[8] App., iii, 96, 396–7; Dio, xlvi, 52, 3–4.

explaining that it would be impossible to force his way through Gaul against the will of Lepidus, but that he intended nevertheless to start; complaining that he had received no instructions, and insisting that, if only he had been summoned, the disastrous consequences of the battle of Mutina would never have occurred. Antony, he said, had attempted to seduce his legions; but if the Senate had known him as well as they ought to have done, they would have got more assistance out of him.[1] Whatever judgement may be passed upon his protestations and excuses, he saw when he reached the Rhone that Antony was master of the situation, and, being no enthusiast, he not only joined him, but persuaded Plancus to follow his example.[2] Decimus Brutus, already condemned as an assassin, was now left without support, and resolved to join Marcus in Macedonia. Fearing to encounter Octavian if he took the direct route, he attempted to reach the Rhine: but he had no money; his troops, who dreaded the prospect of a long march through an unknown country, gradually deserted; and finally, abandoned by all except ten horsemen, he was captured by Celtic brigands, whose chief, Camulos,[3] though Decimus had once befriended him, informed Antony, and by his order killed him. He failed to meet death as became a Roman and the favourite officer of the great Dictator.[4]

43 B.C.

Pollio and Plancus join Antony.

The end of Decimus.

Antony and Lepidus, strengthened by the accession of Pollio and Plancus, were far superior in force to Octavian,[5] but they needed his assistance; they and their new allies were also Caesarians; and they knew that his soldiers were devoted to him. All was ready for an accommodation. Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian agreed to meet on a penin-

Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian decide to form a triumvirate.

[1] *Fam.*, x, 31, 3. 4. 6; 33, 1. 5; 32, 4. 5. See p. 215.

[2] App., iii, 97, 399. Jullian (*Hist. de la Gaule*, iv, 48) thinks that 'cette "mauvaise foi de Plancus", que ses ennemis ont rendue fameuse [Vell., ii, 63, 3], n'était peut-être que fidélité au peuple romain'.

[3] See A. Holder, *Altcelt. Sprachschatz*, i, 727.

[4] Livy, *Epit.*, 120; Vell., ii, 64, 1; Val. Max., v, 7, 6; ix, 13, 3; Seneca, *Ep.*, 82, 11–2; App., iii, 97, 400—98, 407; Dio, xlvi, 53, 1–3; Oros., vi, 18, 7. Appian's account of Brutus's force is incorrect. Cp. *Fam.*, x, 24, 3. For a conjectural restoration of Brutus's itinerary, see Jullian, *op. cit.*, iv, 51.

[5] Octavian had 11 legions (p. 66); Lepidus 7 (App., iii, 84, 348); Antony 25, including 3 contributed by Pollio, 5 by Plancus, and 10 which had belonged to Decimus Brutus (*Fam.*, x, 8, 6; 32, 4; 33, 4; 24, 3). Cp. pp. 217–8.

43 B.C. sula formed by the river Lavino, near Bononia. Each was accompanied by five legions. Parting from their escorts at the ends of the bridges that connected the peninsula with the opposite banks, they took their seats, Octavian as consul in the middle.[1] The conference lasted for two entire days. It was decided that Octavian should transfer his consulship for the rest of the year to Ventidius; that the three should procure their appointment as 'Triumvirs for settling the Republic' with consular—strictly proconsular—power for five years; that they should appoint urban magistrates; and that Octavian should have as his sphere of government Sicily with the adjacent isles, Sardinia and Africa, Antony the whole of Gaul except the province adjoining the Pyrenees, Lepidus that province and Spain. Since Sicily was then in the possession of Sextus, who, moreover, being master of the sea, could impede access to Sardinia and Africa, one may perhaps suppose that Octavian was obliged to accept what Antony chose to give.[2] Macedonia and Syria, then held by Brutus and Cassius, with whom Octavian and Antony were about to make war, were for the present left out of account. Lepidus, instead of going to Spain, which he was to govern by his lieutenants, agreed to remain in Rome and assume the government of Italy.[3] To secure the fidelity of their troops, the confederates resolved that, besides other rewards of victory in the contemplated campaign, they should receive in allotment eighteen of the richest Italian towns with the lands belonging thereto.[4] One other business remained to be performed. The State treasury was depleted; funds were needed to defray the expenses of the war; and it was necessary to prevent the Republican leaders from fomenting opposition during the absence of Octavian and Antony. To achieve these ends the confederates decided, in pursuance of the precedents set by

Their reasons for holding a proscription.

[1] Plut., *Cic.*, 46, 2; *Ant.*, 18, 3; 19, 1; Flor., ii, 16, 3 (inaccurate); Suet., *Aug.*, 96, 1; App., iv, 2, 4–5; Dio, xlvi, 54; 55, 1. Cp. *C.I.L.*, xi, p. 133, and see p. 216.

[2] Cp. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, vii, 45 (46), 147.

[3] Suet., *Aug.*, 27, 1; App., iv, 2, 6—3, 9; Dio, xlvi, 55, 3–4; 56, 1. Cp. Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.*, ii³, 707, n. 2.

[4] *C.I.L.*, x, 6087 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.* 886); App., iv, 3, 10–11. Cp. *Hermes*, xviii, 1883, pp. 169 ff.

Marius and Sulla, to hold a proscription, and drew up a list of those whose names should be included—personal enemies, men whose political activity was to be feared, and others who were marked out as victims by their wealth.[1] 43 B.C.

Remarks on the proscription.

In this age it is expected that historians, disregarding the example of the Synoptists, who told the story of Judas without the impertinence of blame, should condemn such ruthless deeds; and even in antiquity historians who execrated Antony and Lepidus felt bound to excuse the boy who signed the death-warrant of three hundred senators and two thousand Roman knights[2]—above all of Cicero, whom he had called 'Father',[3] whose eloquence had celebrated his deeds, with whom he had long intimately corresponded, and whom he had deceived. It is useless to decide between those who pleaded that Octavian had striven to prevent proscription, that he had learned the quality of mercy from his adoptive father, that he had saved many lives and taken few,[4] and his impartial biographer, who, admitting that he opposed proscription, affirmed that he carried it through more relentlessly than either of his colleagues.[5] We only know that he was not less responsible than they. But it is a common failing of idealists, among whom critics of political morality are generally to be found, to avert their eyes from facts. If Octavian shrank from consenting to the proscription, he knew that he must either banish scruples or abandon the field of statesmanship: to support his colleagues was part of the price which he had to pay for attaining the power that enabled him to become one of the greatest benefactors of mankind. Ponder and understand this hard saying of an upright scholar,[6] who knew the world, though he was not of it—'he who is strictly honest and unbending is not fit for the direction of political affairs'. Moralists who have never felt the stress of political conflict might well consider how much they owe to men of robust conscience who, unswervingly loyal to principle, never suffered scruples to paralyse statesmanship.

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 120; Vell., ii, 66, 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 27, 1; App., iv, 3, 12–3; 5, 16–8; Dio, xlvi, 56, 1; xlvii, 6, 5.

[2] App., iv, 5, 20.

[3] *Brut.*, i, 17, 5; Plut., *Cic.*, 45, 1.

[4] Vell., ii, 61, 1; Dio, xlvii, 7. Cp. Flor., ii, 16, 6.

[5] Suet., *Aug.*, 27, 1–2.

[6] G. Long, *Cic. Orat.*, iv, 1858, p. vi.

CHAPTER II

THE TRIUMVIRATE

43 B.C. The Triumvirate legalized.

BEFORE the three confederates set out for Rome, Octavian, though he was already betrothed, found it politic to yield to the wishes of his own soldiers and those of Antony, who were anxious to cement the reconciliation of their leaders, and agreed to marry Claudia, a daughter of Antony's wife, Fulvia, by her former husband, Clodius.[1] On three successive days Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus, each with his bodyguard and one legion, severally entered Rome,[2] and forthwith proceeded to legalize the arrangement which they had made. On the 27th of November a tribune, Publius Titius, convened a meeting in the Forum, which was surrounded by troops, and, dispensing with the formality of promulgation, proposed and carried a law by which the confederates were appointed 'Triumvirs for settling the Republic' for five years—to terminate on the last day of 716[3] (38 B.C.). In the following night the names of one hundred and thirty proscribed persons were placarded in the city,[4] and a proclamation was issued, in which the Triumvirs formulated and justified the terms of the proscription.[5] Experience, they explained—above all, the fate of the murdered Dictator—had taught them that their enemies were not to be conciliated; and they were determined to leave none behind when they should proceed to wage war against the murderers. Still, they would temper justice with mercy: the number of the proscribed would be less than under the dictatorship of Sulla. Whoever sheltered a proscribed person should himself be proscribed; the heads of the slain were to be brought to the Triumvirs; one hundred thousand sesterces would be paid to the slayer if he were a free man, forty thousand

The proscription.

[1] Vell., ii, 65, 2; Plut., *Ant.*, 20, 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 62, 1; Dio, xlvi, 56, 3.

[2] *Ib.*, xlvii, 1, 1; 2, 1; App., iv, 7, 26.

[3] *C.I.L.*, i, p. 466; Livy, *Epit.*, 120; App., iv, 7, 27; Dio, xlvii, 2, 1–2; E. Babelon, *Monn. de la rép. rom.*, i, 131–2. 33–5, 171–2. 37–41; ii, 37–45; H. A. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic*, ii, 380. Cp. Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.*, ii³, 728 and n. 4.

[4] App., iv, 7, 28.

[5] *Ib.*, 8–11. Cp. Dio, xlvii, 13, 4.

with the gift of freedom if he were a slave; informers should receive the same rewards. 43 B.C.

Ancient historians, who diligently ransacked the grim records of this year, collected many instances of heroism, of baseness, of hairbreadth escapes, and of vicissitudes of fortune. Paulus, a brother of Lepidus, was allowed to leave Italy; Lucius Caesar, an uncle of Antony, was saved by his sister, the aged mother of the Triumvir, who openly sheltered him and successfully pleaded for his life.[1] Varro, the famous scholar, owed his safety to the fidelity of slaves, who, scorning the promised rewards, would not reveal his hiding-place.[2] The younger Quintus Cicero atoned for many follies by refusing under torture to say where his father was concealed, whereupon, overhearing the colloquy, he revealed himself, and both submitted to their fate.[3] The younger Marcus, the only son of the orator, who was serving under Brutus in the East, lived to become a consul and ultimately Governor of Syria.[4] Many who evaded pursuit took refuge with Sextus Pompeius, who gladly gave them places in his fleet.[5] Some committed suicide rather than wait for execution.[6] The son of a praetor led the assassins to the place where his father was hiding, but was killed by them in a quarrel before he could enjoy the reward of parricide.[7] There were wives who betrayed their husbands [8] and others who shrank from no peril to save them;[9] slaves who rescued their masters;[10] masters who were not ashamed to allow slaves in disguise to die for them.[11] The Senate awarded the wreath for saving life to each of the Triumvirs (who must have smiled grimly at such ironical subservience) in recognition of their forbearance in limiting the number of their victims.[12] The estates

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 19, 2; 20, 2; App., iv, 37; Dio, xlvii, 8, 1. 5.

[2] App., iv, 47, 202–3.

[3] Dio, xlvii, 10, 6–7, whose story is not inconsistent with that of Appian, iv, 20, 83.

[4] App., iv, 51, 220–1; *C.I.L.*, i, p. 544.

[5] Livy, *Epit.*, 123; Vell., ii, 72, 5; App., iv, 25, 105; 36, 150–1; v, 143, 597; Dio, xlvii, 12.

[6] App., iv, 15, 57.

[7] *Ib.*, 18, 69–70.

[8] *Ib.*, 23, 96.

[9] *Ib.*, 36, 154; *C.I.L.*, vi, 1527 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.* 8393); Val. Max., vi, 7, 2; Dio, liv, 10, 2.

[10] Val. Max., vi, 8, 5–7; Seneca, *De benef.*, iii, 25; App., iv, 43; Dio, xlvii, 10, 4–5; Macrob., i, 11, 18–20.

[11] App., iv, 44, 185–6.

[12] Dio, xlvii, 13, 3.

43 B.C. of the proscribed found few purchasers, who offered such low prices that the calculations of the Triumvirs were Taxation. upset. To supply the deficiency, they published an edict requiring fourteen hundred wealthy ladies to declare the value of their properties and to contribute whatever proportion they might demand. Any false declaration was to be punished by a fine, and rewards were promised to informers.[1] The ladies induced the mother of Antony and Octavia, the younger sister[2] of Octavian, to intercede for them, but were rebuffed by Fulvia, to whom they also appealed. As no man dared to plead their cause, Hortensia, a daughter of the illustrious advocate who had been the professional rival of Cicero, presented herself, accompanied by the ladies, before the tribunal of the Triumvirs in the Forum and made an indignant speech. The Triumvirs ordered their attendants to remove the petitioners; but the sympathetic crowd raised such a clamour that they thought it prudent to postpone the matter till the following day. The number of those required to pay was then reduced to four hundred; but every male who possessed more than four hundred thousand sesterces (equivalent to four thousand pounds) was ordered to make a declaration under the same penalty and to contribute one year's income to the cost of the impending campaign.[3] Soldiers, knowing that they were indispensable, murdered individuals who were not included among the proscribed, and plundered their property.[4]

The fate of Cicero. But of the many who suffered in that year of sorrow there was only one whose fate has touched the hearts of all mankind. Cicero, when he heard of the proscription, was in the country house near Tusculum where he had spent his happiest hours. Intending to sail for Macedonia and there to join Marcus Brutus, he hurried to the coast and embarked, but soon landed, after a stormy voyage, at Caieta, and took shelter in his villa at Formiae. Those who have read his letters may believe the story that he

[1] Cp. Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.*, ii³, 374, n. 1.

[2] Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.* 8783.

[3] Val. Max., viii, 3, 3; Plut., *Ant.*, 21, 4–5; App., iv, 31, 133–4; 32–4; Dio, xlvii, 14, 2; 16, 5.

[4] *Ib.*, 14, 4; 17, 4–6; App., iv, 35.

was heard to say, 'I will die in the Fatherland, which I have often saved'. He was being carried in a litter to the coast by slaves who were ready to fight for a kind master when some soldiers, led by an officer, Popillius Laenas, whom he had defended in a trial for parricide, discovered him. Cicero forbade his slaves to resist, and met death as those who revered him would have wished. His head and the hand with which he had written the *Philippics* were displayed by the order of Antony in the Forum upon the Rostra, from which he had so often addressed the populace.[1] He had once feared that six centuries after his death his fame would be less than that of Pompey:[2] what would he not have given to foresee that in the twentieth every word from his pen would be scrutinized by scholars of all nations, that historians would study his personality and the part which he enacted in the decadent Republic, that with the most ignorant his name would be a household word and a winner of the Derby would be called after him, that all the world would recognize that, despite his frailties, he was among the most illustrious of men? 43 B.C.

The Triumvirs had already done honour to the memory of Caesar. On the first day of the new year they took a solemn oath to maintain his acts, required all senators and magistrates to do likewise, and ordained that the oath should be yearly renewed.[3] The Senate and the Roman People obediently resolved that he should be recognized as Divine;[4] under a plébiscite carried by the tribune Rufrenus statues were to be erected to his memory throughout the peninsula;[5] and Octavian found it politic to call himself officially *Divi filius*—'son of the Deified'.[6] Caesar's memory honoured. 42 B.C.

It is time to describe the movements of Brutus and Cassius, of whom the former had been recognized by the Brutus and Cassius in the East.

[1] See pp. 216–7.

[2] Cic., *Att.*, ii, 17, 1–2. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, i, 318–9.

[3] Dio, xlvii, 18, 3.

[4] *C.I.L.*, ix, 2628 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.* 72). Cp. Th. Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.*, iv, 1906, p. 181. 'January 1, 42,' says Warde Fowler (*Roman Ideas of Deity*, 1914, pp. 121–2), 'was the date of the first Roman official ordinance that made a dead man into a god.'

[5] *C.I.L.*, ix, 5136 (Dessau, 73 a).

[6] *Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 276. Cp. *C.I.L.*, ix, 4191, and Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic*, ii, 4.

43 B.C. Senate as the acting Governor of Macedonia,[1] and the latter had been authorized to prosecute the war with Dolabella.[2] With all their faults, the Greek compilations upon which we have principally to depend enable those who study them with caution to discern the important events; but whoever desires information on such details as give verisimilitude to narrative will miss the help not only of writers like Caesar and his continuators, but of letters, such as are included in the correspondence of Cicero, written by men who had experienced the difficulties that impede the simplest operations of war. The two Republican leaders were well aware that the Caesarians would sooner or later attack them, and they were both preparing for the struggle. It behoved them to obtain the funds which were as necessary to them as to their opponents and which could not be obtained from Rome,[3] to raise additional forces, and to crush all the native communities that might be disposed to act against them.

Dolabella, after he murdered Trebonius, seized all the money that he could wring from the province of Asia, hired ships of war from the Rhodians, Lycians, and other peoples, and marched with his two legions through Cilicia for Syria, to which his fleet was also bound. But Cassius, who had already arrived in Syria, was too strong for him. Cavalry, sent into the province in advance by Dolabella, readily joined him; Marcius Crispus and Statius Murcus, who had been dispatched by Caesar with six legions to quell a Pompeian adventurer, Caecilius Bassus,[4] placed their entire army at his disposal, and Bassus himself, though with extreme reluctance, surrendered a legion of his own;[5] four legions, including those that had been left by Caesar to protect Cleopatra, were passing through Palestine to reinforce Dolabella, with whom, in order to purchase the recognition of Caesarion as her fellow-ruler, she had made a compact,[6] when Cassius intercepted and compelled them to join him.[7] Dolabella, failing to force

[1] See p. 45.
[2] See p. 58.
[3] Cic., *Brut.*, ii, 3, 5; 4, 4.
[4] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 326.
[5] *Fam.*, xii, 11, 1; 12, 2.
[6] App., iv, 61, 262–3; Dio, xlvii, 31, 5.
[7] *Phil.*, xi, 12, 30; Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 11, 2; App., iii, 78, 317–9; iv, 59; Dio, xlvii, 26, 1–2; 28, 1. 3; 30, 1.

his way into Antioch, took refuge in Laodicea. Cassius, 43 B.C.
who had received a large sum of money from the financial authority of Asia and obtained ships from Sidon and Tyre, laid siege to the fortress. Naval victories in the harbour enabled him to shut it off from the sea and to blockade it by land; he gained admission by bribing officers of the garrison; and Dolabella, doubtless reflecting that, as the murderer of Trebonius, he could expect no mercy, committed suicide. Cassius exacted a heavy contribution from the citizens; and, as often happened in the civil wars, the troops of Dolabella, who had to earn their pay and might hope for bounties and for loot, swore fidelity to their conqueror.[1]

Cassius now intended to invade Egypt and punish Cleopatra for having attempted to send aid to Dolabella, but yielded to Brutus, who urged him to devote all his energies to saving the Republic.[2] He had already sent one of his lieutenants to punish the citizens of Tarsus, who had tried to prevent Tillius Cimber, the Governor of Bithynia, from reinforcing him; and he now hastened to the disaffected city, upon which a fine of fifteen hundred talents was imposed.[3]

Having thus settled affairs in Syria and Cilicia, Cassius proceeded to Smyrna, to consult with Brutus, who had been busy in Macedonia and Asia. Emboldened by the defeat of Antony at Mutina, he had marched, leaving a detachment to hold Macedonia, into Asia, where he raised auxiliaries. Returning to Europe, he took steps to secure his rear, making a punitive raid with the help of Rhascuporis, a Thracian prince, against the Bessi, while Polemocratia, the widow of another Thracian magnate, gave him the bullion which her husband had amassed. Coins stamped with a figure of an oaken wreath, the decoration awarded to Romans who saved a compatriot in battle or rescued the State from peril, suggest that he claimed to have earned it by the assassination of Caesar.[4] From

[1] *Fam.*, xii, 11, 1; 12, 1. 5; 13, 4; 14, 6; 15, 1. 7; Livy, *Epit.*, 121; Strabo, xvi, 2, 9; Vell., ii, 69, 2; App., iii, 78, 320; iv, 60–2; Dio, xlvii, 30; Oros., vi, 18, 13.

[2] Plut., *Brut.*, 28, 3; App., iv, 63, 269–70.

[3] *Ib.*, 64, 273–5; Dio, xlvii, 31, 1–3.

[4] Grueber, *Coins*, &c., ii, 477 (nos. 57–8).

43 B.C. Thrace he advanced westward, and, after settling affairs in Macedonia, went back to Asia.[1] Hearing about this time that his kinsman Decimus and Cicero had been put to death, he ordered that Gaius Antonius, who had plotted against him, but whom, despite the protests of Cicero, he had hitherto treated leniently [2] in the belief that he might be useful, should be executed.[3] In their interview at Smyrna the Republican leaders decided upon a plan of action. Antony and Octavian were still busy in Italy, and their departure would be delayed by Sextus Pompeius and his fleet: for themselves then the best course would be to dispose of Ariobarzanes, the King of Cappadocia, and of the Rhodians and the Lycians, who, like him, were both Caesarian in sympathies, lest they might be attacked in the rear when they should have to confront the army of the Triumvirs.[4] Cassius accordingly proceeded to deal with Ariobarzanes and the Rhodians, Brutus with the Lycians.

Cassius subdues and pillages Rhodes, Brutus the Lycian communities.

The Rhodians of the upper class shrank from encountering ships in which the combatants were Roman; but the ignorant populace were eager for a fight. In a naval action off the port of Myndus the Romans were victorious; Murcus gained a victory near Rhodes; and Cassius followed it up by transporting troops into the island, which he also attacked from the sea. The Rhodian ships were transferred to his fleet; citizens who had been prominent in resistance were put to death; all the gold and silver in the treasury and the temples, save only the venerated chariot of the sun, was seized, and every one was compelled to give up the money which he privately owned or, as we may suppose, which he failed to conceal. It is said that Cassius, who of course placed a garrison in Rhodes, required all the communities of Asia to pay the tribute that would nor-

[1] Cic., *Brut.*, i, 2, 2. 9; 5, 3; 6, 4; Livy, *Epit.*, 122; App., iv, 75, 319–20; Dio, xlvii, 25, 1–3. Cp. Babelon, *op. cit.*, ii, 114, 117–9, von Sallet, *Beschr. d. ant. Münzen*, ii, 1889, p. 23, and Grueber, *op. cit.*, ii, 474, n. 1, 475 (nos. 52–4), 477 (nos. 57–8). There is no evidence for associating the coins of Brutus that bear the inscription ΚΟΣΩΝ with Polemocratia.

[2] See pp. 49–50.

[3] Livy, *Epit.*, 121; Seneca, *Consol. ad Polyb.*, 35; Plut., *Ant.*, 22, 3; *Brut.*, 28, 1; App., iii, 79, 323; Dio, xlvii, 24, 4. Cp. Drumann-Groebe, *Gesch. Roms.*, iv, 1908, p. 36, n. 8.

[4] Plut., *Brut.*, 28, 4; App., iv, 65, 276–7; Dio, xlvii, 32, l. 3–4; 33, 1–2.

mally have been collected in the next ten years; but what time was allowed for payment, how communities which had already been ruthlessly plundered by Dolabella were to pay, or how they contrived to survive these exactions, we are left to imagine, if we can.[1] Ariobarzanes was put to death, on the ground or the pretext that he had plotted against Cassius, who took possession of his treasure and military equipment.[2] Of the Lycian communities the greater number surrendered to Brutus without resistance; but the inhabitants of the chief city, Xanthus, who knew that he was pressed for time, resolved, in reliance upon the strength of their position, to stand a siege. After a desperate resistance the fortress was taken by assault: many citizens killed their wives and children to save them from dishonour, and committed suicide; apart from slaves, only a few women and barely a hundred and fifty men survived.[3] Patara, the naval port of the Xanthians, surrendered, and all the treasure, public and private, which it contained was pillaged; the few remaining towns paid what Brutus demanded, while the Lycian fleet with his other ships sailed for Abydos, where he intended to cross the Hellespont.[4] 42 B.C.

[1] Vell., ii, 69, 6; Val. Max., i, 5, 8; Plut., *Brut.*, 30, 2; 32, 2; App., iv, 66–73; 74, 313; Dio, xlvii, 33, 3–4; Oros., vi, 18, 13. Coins struck by Cassius commemorated his victory over the Rhodian fleet (Grueber, *op. cit.*, ii, 451, 483–4 [nos. 82–4]).

[2] App., iv, 63, 272; Dio, xlvii, 33, 1.

[3] Vell., ii, 69, 6; Plut., *Brut.*, 30, 3–4; 31; App., iv, 76–80; Dio, xlvii, 34, 2–3.

[4] Plut., *Brut.*, 32; App., iv, 81; 82, 344–5; Dio, xlvii, 34, 4–6; Grueber, *op. cit.*, pp. 451, 478 (no. 62). Fr. Rühl (*Rhein. Mus.*, lxx, 1915, p. 324, with which cp. *Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 1012) remarks that the Greek letters of Brutus (R. Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci*, 1873, pp. 182, 185, nos. 25, 27, 43), the authenticity of which he accepts, show that his treatment of the Lycians was very different from that which Plutarch and Appian describe. Brutus (in 25 and 27) dwells upon the fate of the Xanthians, who had rejected his εὐεργεσία—the humanity with which he would have treated them if they had joined him—as a warning, and threatens all who may shelter Xanthian fugitives with the same punishment. In 43 he says that he rejected the prayer of the Xanthian captives for mercy. This, says Rühl, contradicts Plutarch (30) and Appian (iv, 77–80). Rühl should have quoted 80 only, where Appian says that, after the capture of Xanthus, he in vain invited the citizens to surrender, and did his best to save the temples from fire. Plutarch (31, 2–3; 32, 1) says that he tried to save the town and its inhabitants, that after the capture of Patara he released the women, and that they persuaded the men to surrender. He also (32, 2) praises Brutus for having exacted only 150 talents from the Lycians.

42 B.C. Brutus and Cassius meet at Sardes and move thence to the Hellespont.

Before he and Cassius began their march they met at Sardes, where in the colloquy which Shakespeare commemorated they composed certain misunderstandings that had arisen between them.[1] It would seem that Cassius had sharply criticized the idealism of his colleague, in whose administration of Asia there was an incident which illustrated the character of the doctrinaire. Brutus publicly disgraced a Roman officer whom the people of Sardes accused of extortion, and Cassius, who had privately admonished two of his friends, arraigned on the same charge, but publicly acquitted them, remonstrated with him for ill-timed observance of legal forms.[2]

About the middle of July the troops quitted Sardes and in September reached the Hellespont. The stake for which Brutus and Cassius were about to contend was not merely the life of the Republic: as the arch-assassins of Caesar, they had both been judicially condemned, and they knew that if they were defeated and survived defeat, the extreme penalty would be inevitable. They actually stooped, as Pompey had done,[3] to solicit aid from Orodes, the Parthian King; and the envoy whom they entrusted with this mission was Quintus Labienus,[4] a son of the great marshal who helped Caesar to conquer Gaul and afterwards became his most embittered enemy.

They solicit aid from Parthia.

Antony and Octavian prepare for war against Brutus and Cassius.

Meanwhile Antony and Octavian had difficulties to encounter. To secure tranquillity during their absence, they nominated magistrates in advance for several years.[5] Their united forces, when the Triumvirate was formed, amounted to forty-three legions, besides cavalry and other auxiliaries. Lepidus transferred three of the ten legions which he controlled to Octavian and four to Antony; and after they had provided for the safety of their provinces twenty-eight remained for the impending campaign.[6] Eight had already

[1] Plut., *Brut.*, 34; Dio, xlvii, 35, 1. [2] Plut., *Brut.*, 35.

[3] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 114.

[4] Justin., xlii, 4, 7; Dio, xlviii, 24, 5. Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 263, n. 2 [Eng. tr., iii, 196, n. †]) stigmatizes the statement as 'an invention of his [Cassius's] enemies', remarking that to solicit aid from Orodes was 'so impossible an idea'. Apparently he forgets that Pompey had done the same.

[5] App., iv, 2, 7; Dio, xlvii, 19, 4.

[6] See pp. 217–8.

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

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been dispatched to Macedonia under two commanders, Decidius Saxa and Norbanus Flaccus. Antony was at Brundisium, superintending the embarkation of further detachments, when Murcus, who had been entrusted by Cassius with sixty galleys, seized the outlying island and attempted to bar the exit of the transports. Antony resisted as best he could with the few galleys in the harbour, but, as he suffered considerable loss, sent for Octavian, who was in conflict near Sicily with Sextus Pompeius.[1] 42 B.C.

When Sextus was appointed Admiral-in-Chief[2] he did not intend to act in the interest of the Senate. Having already acquired considerable power, he strengthened the fleet which he had brought from Spain by ships which he found in Italian harbours.[3] Hearing after the formation of the Triumvirate that he was one of the proscribed,[4] he sailed to Sicily: the propraetor, Pompeius Bithynicus, refused his summons to surrender, but soon found it prudent to accept him as a colleague. Sextus obtained money from Messana, subdued Syracuse and other cities, and was reinforced not only by pirates and proscribed fugitives, but also by the denizens of towns which the Triumvirs had promised to assign to their soldiers as the reward of victory and by seamen from Africa and Spain. A lieutenant of Octavian, Salvidienus Rufus, who was dispatched against him with a squadron which his chief had contrived to raise, was defeated; and Octavian, before he went to join Antony, was obliged to promise that Rhegium and Vibo, two of the towns that had supported Sextus, should be exempted from the list of those that were to be allotted to the troops. 43 B.C. Sextus Pompeius, having subdued Sicily, defeats a lieutenant of Octavian.

Murcus, hearing of the approach of Octavian, sheered off to avoid the risk of being surrounded by the combined

[1] App., iv, 82, 346–7.

[2] See p. 58.

[3] Kromayer (*Philol.*, lvi, 1897, p. 444) infers from the weakness of the triumviral squadrons that Sextus, as Admiral-in-Chief (*praefectus orae maritimae*), had taken over the bulk of the ships that composed the fleet of Caesar at the time of his death.

[4] It appears from Dio, xlviii, 17, 1 (cp. App., iv, 96, 404), that Sextus was condemned to death, along with the assassins of Caesar, under the *lex Pedia* (see p. 68, n. 4). Groebe (*op. cit.*, i², p. 247, n. 7) denies that he was proscribed; but Dio (§ 3, cp. Oros., vi, 18, 19) expressly says that he was, and Lange (*Röm. Alt.*, iii, 542 [=iii², 552]) is justified in concluding that his condemnation was followed by proscription.

42 B.C. fleets of the Triumvirs, and attempted to intercept the transports; but, convoyed by a few triremes and served by a favourable wind, they eluded him, and though, when they were returning, he tried again, the whole force that had assembled at Brundisium got safely across. Murcus, however, joined by Domitius Ahenobarbus, a son of Caesar's bitterest enemy, whom Brutus and Cassius had sent to reinforce him, inflicted some damage upon the ships that conveyed the stores, the equipment, and the fresh drafts that were intended to make good the losses in the field.[1]

Triumviral reinforcements cross the Adriatic.

Despite opposition Brutus and Cassius advance [Kavala.] westward from the Hellespont,

Decidius Saxa and Norbanus, after traversing Macedonia, had marched past Philippi and occupied successively two defiles, known as the passes of the Sapaei and the Corpili.[2] Through these defiles, of which the nearer was about six miles north-east of Neapolis, the further some seventy miles eastward by the modern Chirka, ran the Egnatian Way, by which the Republican leaders were expected to advance from the Hellespont. But they had already learned how they might turn these obstacles. Advancing through the Gallipoli peninsula, they moved westward by way of Lysimachia, and, skirting the Gulf of Saros, halted for the religious ceremony called the lustration of the army.[3] Besides the detachments which they had left to hold important points, they had nineteen legions, amounting to about eighty thousand men, thirteen thousand cavalry—Gauls, Lusitanians, Spaniards, Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and Galatians—and four thousand mounted archers.[4] The legions commanded by Cassius were under a stronger discipline than those of Brutus;[5] but the generals knew that their Caesarian veterans could not be expected to fight with much spirit against old comrades whose leaders represented the Caesarian tradition, and might even be tempted to desert. To avert this danger it was not enough to deliver the harangues with which Roman generals endeavoured before going into action to hearten

[Héxamili.] [Melas sinus.]

[1] *Eph. epigr.*, vi, 1885, pp. 50–1; Livy, *Epit.*, 123; Vell., ii, 72, 4–5; Flor., ii, 18, 1; App., iv, 84–6; Dio, xlvii, 36, 4; 37, 1; xlviii, 17–20.

[2] App., iv, 87, 368; Dio, xlvii, 35, 2. See p. 218.

[3] Dio, xlvii, 38, 4; 40, 7; App., iv, 88, 371; 89, 374.

[4] *Ib.*, 88, 372–3; 89, 374.

[5] Frontin., *Strat.*, iv, 2, 1.

their troops: the bounties that had been promised, and for which the plunder of the Rhodians and the Lycians was now available, were paid to every officer and man.[1] The army continued its advance as far as Doriscus, a long day's march from the easternmost defile. Tillius Cimber then moved along the coast with the fleet, in which a legion and some archers were embarked, thus turning the pass; Norbanus, fearing that the army might seize the pass of the Sapaei, recalled the force that held the other and retreated. The Sapaean pass remained in his possession, and when Cassius found the road barred his men began to despond. Rhascuporis, however, came to the rescue. It would be possible, he explained, to reach Philippi by striking north-westward over the mountains: there was no road, but a track might be made through the forests, and on the fourth day the column would reach the Harpessus—an affluent of the river which is now called Karasu. Till then the men might carry enough water to slake their thirst, and in one more day they would reach their goal.[2] 42 B.C.

A party of sappers was sent ahead, and succeeded in clearing a track which enabled the transport cattle to advance. On the fourth day the water-bottles were drained dry, and, as no stream was visible, the men began to suspect that Rhascuporis was a traitor; but the officer in charge exhorted them to be of good cheer, and before sunset the promised waters were descried. Norbanus, on learning what had happened, hastily quitted the Sapaean pass and retreated in the night towards Amphipolis, at the same time withdrawing a piquet which he had posted in Symbolum, seven miles south-east of Philippi and close to the Egnatian Way.[3] [Karaula.]

Brutus and Cassius now proceeded to reconnoitre. Philippi, situated on a southern spur of the mountains through which they had just made their way, was flanked on the south at a distance of ten furlongs by a marsh, the further edge of which was separated by hills from the sea. About

[1] App., iv, 89, 374; 100, 422; 101, 424.

[2] *Ib.*, 101, 424–6; 102–3; Dio, xlvii, 35, 4.

[3] Plut., *Brut.*, 38, 1; App., iv, 104; 105, 438; Dio, xlvii, 36, 1. Dio says that the piquet was expelled from Symbolum; but in that case would not Norbanus have been cut off from Amphipolis?

42 B.C. the same distance from the town, on the north-west and the south-west, were a plot of undulating ground and a knoll,[1] nearly a mile apart, between which ran the Egnatian Way: Brutus encamped on the northern site, hard by the mountains, Cassius on the southern; and across the road they erected a rampart, which connected the western sides of the camps. Past the eastern side of the camp of Brutus and between it and that of Cassius a streamlet, the Gangites,[2] flowed into the marsh. The fleet anchored in the harbour of Neapolis, whence it could communicate with the island of Thasos, fifteen miles to the south-east, where the supplies were stored.[3]

and encamp near Philippi.

Antony marches from Dyrrachium and encamps opposite them.

Meanwhile Antony was marching rapidly from Dyrrachium to seize Amphipolis, which he intended to make his base. Finding it duly prepared, he left the baggage that was not immediately required in charge of a legion, and, pushing on, encamped in the plain north of the marsh and less than a mile from the rampart that connected the camps of the Republican chiefs. Octavian, who was unwell, had remained for the present at Dyrrachium. No running water was available within reach of Antony, and he was therefore obliged to dig wells. To prevent him from striking at the communications with Neapolis, Cassius proceeded to construct an entrenchment from the south-western corner of his camp to the marsh. During some days, however, there was no fighting except occasional skirmishes between the horsemen and the light-armed auxiliaries of the two armies. Octavian, hearing that Antony had suffered a reverse, braced himself, though he was still only convalescent, to enter his carriage, and travelled quickly to join him. On his arrival he took up his quarters in the camp which his colleague had constructed, and had himself carried in a litter from time to time to inspect what was being done. He and Antony were eager to force on a battle: their legions, numerically stronger than those of

Octavian, though unwell, joins him.

[1] Appian (iv, 106, 443), who describes both sites as knolls (λόφοι), is inaccurate, as Heuzey shows (*Mission archéol. de Macédoine*, 1876, p. 101).

[2] Cp. Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, ii, 1891, p. 77.

[3] App., iv, 105, 439–40; 106; Dio, xlvii, 35, 5–6; 36, 1; 45, 4; Heuzey and Daumet, *Mission archéol. de Macédoine*, pp. 102–3.

their opponents, were also more trustworthy and, on the whole, of better quality,[1] and, as Sextus Pompeius, Murcus, and Ahenobarbus commanded the sea, and the resources of Macedonia were inadequate, they feared that their supplies would be soon exhausted. For the same reasons Brutus and Cassius, who hoped to starve them out, were anxious to postpone the fight.[2] 42 B.C.

Preliminary operations of Antony.

Day after day Antony formed his troops in line of battle, but he was too wary to attack opponents who were arrayed immediately in front of their entrenchments. Seeing, however, that if he could sever their communications with Neapolis, they would be compelled to fight in self-defence, he sent a detachment in the night to make an embankment across the northern part of the marsh. During ten days the work progressed, the workers being concealed by high reeds, while Antony constructed redoubts at right angles with his camp in the space between it and the marsh. When the embankment could no longer be hidden, Cassius hastily threw up a transverse work, strengthened by a palisade, in continuation of the entrenchment which he had already made, his object being to cut off the workers in the eastern part of the embankment from communication with the redoubts. Antony, discovering his intention, instantly sent his right wing, provided with scaling-ladders and tools for breaking down the palisade, to attack Cassius's northern entrenchment, while he himself prepared, despite the strength of its position, to attack his camp. Thereupon the troops of Brutus, without awaiting orders, charged the attacking force in flank, and presently, turning against the troops of Octavian, which faced them, routed

First battle of Philippi. Oct. 23.[3]

[1] App., iv, 108, 454; Dio, xlvii, 37, 6; 38, 2. The statements of Appian and Plutarch (*Brut.*, 38, 2; 39, 3) that the ranks of the Triumvirs' legions were fuller than those of their enemies are virtually contradicted by Dio (xlvii, 38, 2).

[2] Plut., *Brut.*, 38, 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 13, 1; App., iv, 106, 444; 107–8; Dio, xlvii, 36, 2; 37, 1–3. 5–6. Appian (108, 454) says that Brutus and Cassius had 20,000 horse, thus apparently contradicting his own statement (88, 373) that they had 17,000.

According to Plutarch (*Brut.*, 39, 3–4), Brutus and others constrained Cassius to fight instead of protracting the war. This statement, inconsistent with that of Appian (cp. Dio, xlvii, 38, 2–3), which I have followed, is contradicted, says M. Gelzer (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 1018), by the conduct of Brutus after the first battle.

[3] *The Year's Work in Classical Studies*, 1922–3, p. 108; 1923–4, p. 33.

42 B.C. them and broke into the camp. Octavian, warned, as he related in his Memoirs, by a dream, had quitted his tent.[1]

Meanwhile Antony, pushing up the slope under a shower of missiles against the Cassian legions, broke the line, fiercely attacked the entrenchment that extended from the camp to the morass, tore down the palisade, filled up the trench with fascines, undermined the rampart, cut up the piquet at the entrance, and broke through. All this was done so quickly that when the Cassian troops at work in the marsh came to the rescue, they too were routed, and the victors turned to attack the camp of Cassius, which, as it was weakly garrisoned, they swiftly pillaged. Cassius, unaware that the legions of Brutus had defeated the enemy's left wing, committed suicide.[2] Brutus ordered the corpse to be removed to Thasos and buried there, fearing that the funeral, if it took place in presence of the troops, might cause them to despond.[3]

Suicide of Cassius.

Oct. 24. Further operations.

On the following day Brutus moved into the camp of Cassius, where he would be better able to guard his communications with Neapolis. All the troops whom he could spare were posted for this purpose in piquets along the road, while the rest remained behind the entrenchments of the camp. As he would not quit his strong position to encounter the troops which Antony formed daily in line of battle, the Triumvirs devised a plan for stopping his supplies. Octavian with four legions occupied by night a knoll, which Brutus had injudiciously abandoned, close to the southern rampart of his camp: ten other legions, marching

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 124; Vell., ii, 70, 1; Val. Max., i, 7, 1; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, vii, 45 (46), 148; Plut., *Ant.*, 22, 1; *Brut.*, 41, 3; Flor., ii, 17, 9; Suet., *Aug.*, 91, 1; App., iv, 108, 453; 109; 110, 461–3; Dio, xlvii, 41, 3–4; Eutrop., vii, 3; Oros., vi, 18, 15. 'According to Appian,' says Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 272, n. 3 [Eng. tr., iii, 203, n. ‡]), 'Antony was the first to attack, while Plutarch asserts that Brutus and Cassius began the action. The latter version seems . . . the more probable, for it is difficult to understand from Appian's account how Antony could have forced Cassius to give battle.' Plutarch is characteristically vague, and I am glad to find that Kromayer (*Schlachten-Atlas*, röm. Abt., col. 116) agrees with me in following Appian's account, in which we find no difficulty.

[2] Livy, *Epit.*, 124; Vell., ii, 70, 1–3; Val. Max., vi, 8, 4; ix, 9, 2; Plut., *Ant.*, 22, 2; *Brut.*, 42; Flor., ii, 17, 10. 13; Suet., *Aug.*, 13, 1; App., iv, 111–3; Dio, xlvii, 43–6; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 83, 6.

[3] Plut., *Brut.*, 44, 1; App., iv, 114, 477; Dio, xlvii, 47, 1.

past it, encamped five furlongs to the south-east in the northern fringe of the morass; two more a little further in the same direction. To counteract this plan, Brutus constructed a series of redoubts nearly parallel with the three new camps of his opponents.[1] Meanwhile news arrived from Dyrrachium, which encouraged him and caused grave anxiety to the Triumvirs. On the day of the recent battle Domitius Calvinus, an ex-lieutenant of Caesar, was transporting reinforcements across the Adriatic when he was attacked by the combined squadrons of Murcus and Ahenobarbus. A few transports, forming the vanguard, escaped: the rest were suddenly becalmed; seventeen of the escorting triremes were forced to surrender, and the combatant crews, as well as the troops in the captured transports, were compelled to take service under Murcus.[2] The position of the Triumvirs was becoming serious, for their supplies were nearly exhausted and winter was approaching. They sent a detachment to Achaia to collect all the food that could be found; contrived to scatter leaflets in the hostile camp, promising to reward deserters; and at last in desperation ascended the slope right up to the rampart and challenged their opponents with abusive taunts to fight. Brutus, we are told, adhered for a time to his resolve: but his troops were impatient; unlike Cassius, he was too mild to enforce his will; and when his officers exhorted him to strike, he remonstrated, but yielded—because, so Appian observes, he feared that soldiers who had served under Caesar might otherwise desert.[3] A modern historian may be allowed to conjecture that he had a more cogent reason —the fear that Antony would succeed in his persistent efforts to sever the line of his supply.[4]

42 B.C.

Oct. 23.

Transports conveying reinforcements for the Triumvirs captured.

Whatever his motive may have been, Brutus led out his legions and formed them in front of his redoubts. The afternoon was far advanced when the battle began. The

Second battle of Philippi. About Nov. 16? [5]

[1] App., iv, 121; Dio, xlvii, 47, 2.

[2] Plut., *Brut.*, 47, 1–2; App., iv, 115–6; Dio, xlvii, 47, 4; Grueber, *op. cit.*, pp. 487–8 (nos. 93–7).

[3] App., iv, 122–4, who (124, 520) tells a story about Brutus which Plutarch (*Brut.*, 40, 1) tells about Cassius; Dio, xlvii, 47, 3–5; 48, 1–2.

[4] I agree with Kromayer (*Schlachten-Atlas*, röm. Abt., col. 117).

[5] Suet., *Tib.*, 5.

42 B.C. assailants after a desperate struggle, broke the first line; the second and the third gave way; and then followed a rout. The troops of Octavian seized and blocked the entrances of the camp, and the beaten troops fled, hunted by Antony's cavalry, some towards the sea, others across the river Zygactes into the hills.[1] Brutus, himself, with four legions, finding that escape was barred, passed the night on the heights, and at dawn, persuading a friend to kill him,[2] recited a couplet which some unknown poet had put into the mouth of Hercules:

Death of Brutus.

> Unhappy Virtue, thou wast but a name:
> I followed thee as something real; but thou wast Fortune's slave.[3]

Antony treated his corpse with due honour;[4] and those who cannot forget how 'the noblest Roman of them all' had combined with the pursuit of virtue an attempt to extract interest at the rate of forty-eight per cent. from a community in Cyprus,[5] may nevertheless accept the judgement which Plutarch[6] ascribed to the Triumvir, and which Shakespeare[7] reproduced:

> All the conspirators, save only he,
> Did that they did in envy of great Caesar;
> He only, in a general honest thought
> And common good to all, made one of them.

It is said that Octavian, grossly insulting the most distinguished captives, who replied with foul abuse, sent the head of Brutus to Rome, to be cast at the feet of Caesar's

[1] Val. Max., i, 4, 7; vi, 4, 5; Plut., *Brut.*, 49, 1–3; App., iv, 125, 522; 128; 129, 539–42; Dio, xlvii, 48, 3–5. Cp. *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 11–2.

[2] Livy, *Epit.*, 124; Vell., ii, 70, 4–5; Plut., *Brut.*, 52; Flor., ii, 17, 11; App., iv, 130–1; Dio, xlvii, 49, 1–2; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 82, 6; Eutrop., vii, 3; Oros., vi, 18, 16.

[3] Ὦ τλῆμον ἀρετή, λόγος ἄρ' ἦσθ'· ἐγὼ δέ σε | Ὡς ἔργον ἤσκουν· σὺ δ' ἄρ' ἐδούλευες τύχῃ.

This couplet, the gist of which is given by Florus (ii, 17, 11) and Zonaras (x, 20), may be the 'verse' which Volumnius, who was with Brutus, and on whose authority he is said to have recited a verse (Eurip., *Medea*, 322) quoted by Appian (iv, 130, 547) and Plutarch (*Brut.*, 51, 1), said that Brutus also recited, but that he himself forgot.

[4] Val. Max., v, 1, 11; Plut., *Brut.*, 53, 2; Suet., *Aug.*, 13, 1; App., iv, 135, 568; Dio, xlvii, 49, 2.

[5] See *The Roman Republic*, ii, 258–9.

[6] *Brut.*, 29, 3.

[7] *Julius Caesar*, v. v. 69–72.

statue, but that on the voyage, which was stormy, it fell into the sea.[1] 42 B.C.

Immediate consequences of his defeat.

The legions that had remained with Brutus and the piquets that had guarded the redoubts surrendered, and, as a matter of course, took service with the victors.[2] Of the leading men in the defeated army who had not fallen the majority, including proscribed persons and assassins of Caesar, committed suicide or were captured and executed; others, who had taken refuge in Thasos, obtained pardon on delivering up the stores; the rest escaped to join the fleets of Sextus Pompeius and Statius Murcus. These fugitives were welcomed by lieutenants of Brutus and Cassius, who had been left by them in charge of ships and troops at Rhodes and other important points, and who, on hearing what had befallen their principals, sailed to seek their fortune with Murcus, Sextus, or Ahenobarbus.[3]

Antony and Octavian make a fresh compact and arrange to reward their troops.

The Triumvirs, before they separated, came to an agreement. All the legionaries who had completed their period of service were disbanded, except eight thousand, who desired to prolong their term. Altogether there remained eleven legions, including those soldiers of Brutus who had taken the oath of allegiance to their conquerors, and fourteen thousand horse: it was agreed that Antony, in view of further campaigns, should have six legions and ten thousand horse; and Octavian consented to give him in addition two of the five legions that fell to his share in exchange for two of those which had been left in Cisalpine Gaul under Calenus.[4] The two colleagues resolved also to make a fresh division of provinces at the expense of Lepidus, whom they could afford to treat with the contempt which they had long felt for his unstable character. The pretext was a rumour that he was corresponding treacherously with Sextus Pompeius. Antony was to retain Transalpine Gaul and to take over the Province, which belonged to Lepidus, but to resign Cisalpine Gaul, which was recognized as autonomous: Octavian was to retain Africa, Sar-

[1] Suet., *Aug.*, 13; Dio, xlvii, 49, 2.
[2] App., iv, 135, 568–9; Dio, xlvii, 49, 3.
[3] *Ib.*, § 4; xlviii, 7, 4–5; 19, 3; Vell., ii, 71, 3; App., iv, 135, 570–2; 136; v. 2.
[4] *Ib.*, 3, 13–4; Dio, xlviii, 2, 3.

42 B.C. dinia, and Sicily, though it was still occupied by Sextus. It would appear from a statement of Appian that Spain was to be transferred from Lepidus to Antony; but this arrangement, if it was made, may not have been clearly defined. Nothing seems to have been settled about the East, though it was perhaps tacitly recognized as Antony's sphere. If Lepidus could clear himself, he was to be compensated for his loss.[1] But the most pressing need was to satisfy the demands of the soldiers—especially the disbanded veterans who had fought at Philippi. The obligation was divided, Antony undertaking to pay the promised pecuniary rewards, Octavian to distribute allotments in Italy to the disbanded men and to settle them in colonies. Octavian, still in poor health, then started for Italy, while Antony departed for the much-enduring province, Asia.[2]

41 B.C. Antony exacts money from Asia,

The provincials were not kept in suspense. Assembling the principal inhabitants at Ephesus, where he was hailed as Dionysus incarnate,[3] Antony announced that although money was urgently required to reward the troops that had served in the late campaign,[4] he would demand no more than what his enemies, Brutus and Cassius, had exacted in the previous year: ten years' tribute would suffice, to be paid within twelve months. Abject entreaties induced him to abate these terms: no more than nine years' tribute was finally required, and two years were allowed for payment.[5]

[1] See pp. 218–9.

[2] Livy, *Epit.*, 125; Vell., ii, 74, 1; Flor., ii, 16, 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 13, 3; App., v, 3, 11; Dio, xlviii, 2, 2–3; 3, 1.

[3] M. H. Jeanmaire (*Rev. arch.*, 5e sér., xix, 1924, pp. 241–61—especially 244–7, 250–1), citing Plutarch (*Ant.*, 24, 2; 60, 2) and *C.I.A.*, ii, 482, observes that during the next ten years Antony figured in Asia as an incarnation of Dionysus and in Egypt as the equivalent Osiris (see p. 143, *infra*), and argues that he found it politic to encourage the cult.

[4] 28 legions, according to the speech which Appian (v, 5, 21) attributes to Antony. Remarking (6, 25) that the Triumvirs, at the time when the Triumvirate was formed, had had 43 legions, he conjectures that the number had been reduced in the course of the war. Apparently he forgot that, as he himself implied in a later chapter (22, 87), the 28 legions were only those that had taken part in the war—the campaign of Philippi (see p. 80). The 'other army' (ἑτέρου στρατοῦ), to which Antony is supposed to have alluded in his speech (5, 21), means, I suppose, the remaining 15 legions.

[5] U. Wilcken (*Griech. Ostraka*, i, 1899, p. 206), citing App., v, 4, 18, says, 'Antony emphasizes, as an instance of the mildness and the justice of Roman rule, that in Asia [fixed] proportions of the produce had been demanded,

Readers who will not accept without inquiry statements which do violence to reason, while they will readily believe that kings, dynasts, and free states were compelled to contribute what they could, will perhaps ask by what means the communities that had already been 'bled white' (in the Bismarckian sense) by Cassius and his colleague, were able within three years to satisfy a not less ruthless extortioner, and may conjecture that even his reduced demand could not be fulfilled.[1] Quitting the province, Antony made a quasi-royal progress through Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine, bestowing rewards upon the Lycians, the Rhodians, and others who had suffered for their resistance to the Republican leaders, imposing taxes, selling titles,[2] and granting the kingdom of Cappadocia to Archelaus,[3] the son of a courtesan with whom he was momentarily enamoured, at the expense of his rival, Ariarathes, the son of the late king.[4] Finally he journeyed to Cilicia, to meet a visitor who was destined to influence his life. He had not received in the late campaign the assistance which he expected from Cleopatra, for whom Caesar had secured the throne of Egypt; and he summoned her to explain her conduct. There is no reason to question the story of his biographer that the envoy whom he selected, his friend and comrade, Dellius, assured her that she need not fear: she would find the General the most chivalrous of men, who would treat her with due honour. Many years before, when she was a girl of fourteen, Antony, as a young cavalry officer, had cast amorous eyes upon her in her father's court; she must have met him when she was living as Caesar's mistress in his suburban villa; and she doubtless knew his temperament by repute. Fresh from the victory which his skill had won, he was the foremost man in the Roman world; his countenance was a prize worth winning; and with it she might

41 B.C.

rewards adherents,

is visited by Cleopatra in Cilicia,

for by this system it [the Roman Government] participated . . . in an unfortunate deficiency of the harvest. In contrast thereto he pointed to the assessment of fixed taxes, under which the Government protected itself against all contingencies. . . . Antony . . . forgot to add that under the quota-system the Government shared in good harvests', &c.

[1] Cp. Dio Chrysostom., *Or.* 31 (vol. i, p. 601 R.).

[2] Plut., *Ant.*, 24; App., v, 4–7; Dio, xlviii, 24, 1.

[3] Also called Sisines. [4] App., v, 7, 31. Cp. *Paulys Real-Ency.*, ii, 451.

42 B.C. secure and exalt her dynasty. If she had lost a little of the bloom that had delighted Caesar—and she was still only in her twenty-ninth year—she had gained much in knowledge of men. Who can forget the tale of her passage up the Cydnus? Reclining in her galley, like a Venus, beneath an embroidered canopy, attended by girls habited as Nymphs and Graces, and fanned by dainty little Cupids, the Queen was borne up the river to the accompaniment of music with which the oars were made to keep time. Not only was her vindication accepted—for she declared with truth that she had attempted to aid the Triumvirs and had refused aid to Cassius—but her judge, like the Dictator, became her lover, sent his agents to kill her sister, Arsinoe, whom she perhaps regarded as a menace to her throne,[1] and, after he had quelled disturbances that had arisen in Syria, went to Alexandria to be with her for the winter. How he revelled in the luxury of the gay city, how his mistress, adapting herself to his humour, kept him constantly amused, while she shared his counsels when his mood was serious, is a tale that need not be retold.[2]

and joins her in Egypt.

Octavian meanwhile was contending with difficulties that strained his statesmanship. He became so ill on his homeward journey and at Brundisium, where he was obliged to rest, that rumours, which delighted many, arose that he was dead. Before he returned to Rome the Senate, though the sympathies of the majority were Republican, decreed that a thanksgiving service should be held in honour of the victory that had been gained over the leaders whom they had themselves appointed; and on his arrival he performed the customary religious rites.[3] The representatives of Antony, to whom he showed his copy of the agreement that had been signed at Philippi, ordered Calenus to transfer two legions to him in pursuance thereof; and as he could find no evidence that the rumours concerning Lepidus were true, he assigned to him Africa in lieu of the provinces of which he had been deprived.[4]

Octavian in Rome.

[1] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 188–9.

[2] Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xiv, 13, 1; Plut., *Ant.*, 25–9; App., v, 8; 9, 34; 10; Dio, xlviii, 24, 2–3.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 23, 1; App., v, 12, 45; Dio, xlviii, 3, 1–3; 5, 1.

[4] App., v, 12, 45–7. Appian adds, incorrectly, that Calenus obeyed the order. See p. 95.

Octavian had now to grapple with the task of providing allotments for the disbanded veterans. They insisted that, in fulfilment of the promise that had been made by the Triumvirs, the richest towns should be assigned to them; the townsmen demanded that the burden of supporting the claimants should be shared by the whole country, and that full compensation should be given for alienated lands. But to find the money was impossible. Landholders flocked into Rome, vociferating that they were being hunted out of house and home, and idlers, muttering that the battles at Philippi had been fought to destroy the Republic, listened sympathetically to their complaints. Octavian in vain appealed to the municipal authorities to consider the necessities of the case, in vain remonstrated with impatient veterans who seized lands that had not been allotted to them. Among the evicted were Horace,[1] who had served under Brutus at Philippi,[2] and Virgil, who in his first Eclogue [3] expressed his gratitude to Octavian, the 'deity' to whom he owed his restitution. Fulvia, the turbulent wife of Antony, his agent Manius, and his brother, Lucius, who was one of the consuls in this year, endeavoured to get the settlement postponed until Antony should return to Italy, and, as the impatience of the veterans forbade delay, demanded, despite the formal agreement which Octavian had produced, that they themselves should have the management so far as it related to Antony's men. Pointing to Fulvia and her children, Lucius and Manius besought the veterans not to suffer the great general, who had served them so faithfully, to be robbed of the credit of giving them their reward. Octavian, who could ill brook the insolence of Fulvia, resolved to sever the connexion which he had formed when he married her daughter Claudia, and divorced the girl, whose virginity he had not disturbed;[4] but he thought it prudent to forbear from insisting upon his rights, and permitted Lucius to appoint agents, who encouraged Antony's veterans to plunder as they pleased. The sufferers attributed their misery to Octavian, whose life

41 B.C. He encounters obstacles in providing allotments for the veterans.

Fulvia and Lucius Antonius oppose him.

[1] *Ep.*, ii, 2, 50. [2] *Carm.*, ii, 7, 9–10. [3] 6–10.

[4] At the time of her wedding she was 'hardly of marriageable age' (*vixdum nubilem* [Suet., *Aug.*, 62, 1]).

41 B.C. was endangered by the mutinous spirit of the soldiery. A legionary in the theatre at Rome, failing to find a vacant place, sat down on the bench reserved for Roman knights.[1] The spectators raised an outcry, and Octavian, who was present, ordered an attendant to remove the offender. On leaving the theatre, Octavian was surrounded by a mob of soldiers, who had heard that their comrade had been killed, and was only saved from violence by the sudden appearance of the ejected legionary. The capital was threatened with famine because Sextus intercepted the ships that were bringing corn from abroad; theft and violent crime were rife in the unpoliced streets; agriculture was neglected in consequence of the disturbed condition of the country and the raids that the corsairs were making in the south of the peninsula. Lucius and Fulvia, observing the exasperation of the dispossessed landholders, espoused their cause, at the same time making specious promises to the veterans, and Lucius, posing as a democrat, denounced the Triumvirs as usurpers. The Antonian veterans, on the other hand, abused him as an enemy of Antony. When, perambulating the Antonian colonies, he inveighed against Octavian as a traitor to his colleague, Octavian assured the colonists that he and their old chief were the best of friends, that Lucius was a mischief-maker, and that the Triumvirs would secure them in the tenure of their farms. He found it prudent, however, to abstain from further confiscation of lands that belonged to senators.

The principal officers endeavoured to patch up a reconciliation; but a meeting, arranged between Octavian and Lucius, was abortive. Octavian, aware of his own unpopularity, was anxious for an accommodation, and the officers, supported by influential senators, made a fresh attempt; but, perhaps through the interference of Manius, it also failed. Veterans, belonging to two legions which had served under Antony, sent envoys to Rome, to implore the disputants to keep the peace. Accepting the assurance of Octavian that he was not attacking Antony, but was himself attacked by Lucius, they requested the latter to submit his case to arbitration, warning him that, if he should

[1] Cp. *The Roman Republic*, i, 249.

refuse, they would resort to force. He consented, and 41 B.C.
Gabii, midway between Rome and Praeneste, was selected as the place of meeting. Octavian punctually appeared. Some troopers, whom he sent ahead to see whether Lucius intended foul play, encountered others belonging to him, and a fight ensued, in which a few of the consul's men were killed. Lucius retreated, declaring that he apprehended treachery, and though his officers begged him to return, promising to ensure his safety, he refused. War was now inevitable.[1]

Octavian, besides a powerful bodyguard, had four veteran legions at Capua, and recalled six that were marching under Salvidienus towards Spain; but the two which Calenus should have transferred to him had been withheld. Lucius had six, which he had raised as consul, and counted upon the support of eleven, which were quartered in Cisalpine Gaul. The Italians of the rural districts favoured him as their champion against the interloping veterans; but he had made a mistake in refusing to return to Gabii, for the veterans of Octavian, who really desired peace, were offended, and flocked to join their General. Both leaders raised recruits. Octavian made a last attempt to avert war, convening the Senate and urging the members to try to reconcile Lucius and his followers with him; but Lucius, perhaps influenced by Manius, refused to listen to the deputation which the Senate sent, and actually made a raid on Rome, where he was welcomed by the populace.[2] He was endeavouring to collect a force from Antonian colonists when one Barbatius, an officer who had been dismissed by Antony, assured them that Antony was himself displeased with all who were in arms against his colleague, and many deserted Lucius for Octavian. Prominent citizens, however, who were hostile to the Triumvirate, gave him their support.

The campaign opened with desultory operations, which The Perusian War.
the ancient historians[3] apparently did not quite compre-

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 125; Vell., ii, 74, 1–3; Flor., ii, 16, 1–2; Suet., *Aug.*, 14; App., v, 12, 48–50; 13–21; 22, 86–8; 23; Dio, xlviii, 4, 1. 3; 5, 2. 6; 7, 1–4; 8; 9, 1–2. 4–5; 10, 3; 11, 1. 3; 12, 1–3.

[2] See the remarks of E. Groag (*Klio*, xiv, 1915, p. 44) on App., v, 29, 112.

[3] Appian and Dio, who alone described them in detail.

41 B.C. hend, and which it is impossible to illustrate upon the map. It would seem that Lucius marched against Salvidienus, who was being followed half-heartedly by Antony's lieutenants, Ventidius and Asinius Pollio—half-heartedly because they thought that Lucius had done wrong in going to war, were doubtful whether Antony approved his conduct, and were, moreover, mutually jealous. Agrippa, who commanded a division, feared that Salvidienus might be surrounded, and, hoping to divert the march of Lucius, occupied Sutrium, a town in Southern Etruria, which was friendly to his cause. So it happened, says Appian—precisely how, he does not explain.[1] Lucius, leaving Salvidienus unmolested, attempted to join Pollio and Ventidius; Agrippa succeeded in joining Salvidienus, with whom he hoped to surround Lucius; and Lucius, seeing his own [Perugia.] danger, encamped near the hill-fortress of Perusia, some twelve miles east of the famous Lake Trasimene, where he intended to await the arrival of Ventidius and Pollio.[2]

Siege of Perusia. But the two lieutenants of Antony had no mind to bestir themselves, and Lucius, finding himself encompassed by Octavian, Salvidienus, and Agrippa, and knowing that the recruits who composed the bulk of his army could not stand against veterans, was compelled to take refuge inside the fortress, which he had neglected to provision. All that he could do was to urge Ventidius and Pollio to come to his relief and to send his cavalry to plunder the lands of the Caesarian colonists in the hope of drawing off Octavian from the blockade.

But Octavian never allowed minor issues to distract him from his object. He had trapped his enemy and in the trap

[1] Groebe (Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, i², 296, n. 8), remarking that Sutrium was on the road [the Cassian Way] by which Pollio and Ventidius might be expected to march, concludes that the object of Agrippa was to prevent their junction. L. Antonius, he continues, came between Agrippa on the Cassian Way and Salvidienus on the Flaminian. On what road, then, was L. Antonius? How does Groebe know that Agrippa, whose starting-point is unknown, was on the Cassian Way? Or that Salvidienus was on the Flaminian? Or that Pollio and Ventidius, who were pursuing Salvidienus, had not already joined forces? I agree with Kromayer (*Schlachten-Atlas*, röm. Abt., col. 121) that the evidence is insufficient to enable one to illustrate on a map the operations that preceded the siege of Perusia.

[2] Vell., ii, 74, 3; Flor., ii, 16, 3; Suet., *Aug.*, 14; App., v, 24, 95–6; 27–9; 31; 32, 124; Dio, xlviii, 12, 3–4; 13, 2–6; 14, 1; Eutrop., vii, 3.

he was resolved to hold him fast. Summoning reinforce- 41 B.C.
ments and sending detachments to oppose Ventidius and Pollio, he proceeded to enclose Perusia with a contravallation, while, to stop the introduction of supplies, he threw out two earthworks to the Tiber, which flowed about two miles from the eastern side of the town. Ventidius and Pollio, urged by Fulvia to come to the rescue, advanced slowly and without concert, and when Octavian and Agrippa, leaving subordinates to prosecute the siege, marched to encounter them, retreated respectively to Ariminum and Ravenna, while Plancus, to whom the indefatigable virago had given the command of a force which she had herself raised, though he destroyed an isolated corps of Octavian, was too far-sighted to commit himself further, and took refuge after the retreat of his colleagues at Spoletium in Umbria. Octavian disposed the troops [Spoleto.]
whom he could spare to prevent the three trimmers from uniting, and, returning to complete the blockade, constructed, like his adoptive father at Alesia, an outer ring of earthworks, to prevent any hostile force from getting in, and, again mindful of the defences that had enclosed that Gallic stronghold, erected wooden turrets at intervals of sixty feet on the contravallation, the circumvallation, and the projecting entrenchments. No less than fifteen hundred were required; but the work of the engineers, for the most part, was hardly put to the test. The garrison, indeed, made occasional sallies, and on the last night of December, as the supplies were nearly exhausted, Lucius, hoping that the besiegers would relax their vigilance in the festivities of New Year's Day,[1] made a desperate effort to cut his way out; but a legion appeared presently at the threatened point, Octavian hurried up with a picked corps, and, after a fierce struggle, the garrison was beaten back. Perusia was not the only place in the afflicted country in which scarcity was felt.[2] The granaries at Rome, in which, through the depredations of Sextus, stocks were already

[1] Cp. W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, 1899, p. 278.

[2] In regard to the famine at Perusia—the *Perusina fames* became a by-word—see, besides the historians, *Eph. epigr.*, vi, p. 69, and Ausonius, *Ep.*, 22, 42.

40 B.C. dwindling, had been ransacked to feed the armies; and famished wretches pillaged private houses for food. Ventidius and his colleagues attempted to relieve the beleaguered army; but when Agrippa and Salvidienus moved [Foligno.] against them, they retreated to Fulginium, some twenty miles south-east of Perusia, where Agrippa hemmed them in; and though Ventidius and Pollio prepared to fight, they were dissuaded by the arguments of Plancus. Lucius was obliged to withhold all rations from the slaves, who devoured grass when they could get it, and whose corpses, when they perished, were pitched into a trench. After the failure of a last desperate sortie he sent envoys to ask for terms.

Lucius surrenders.

Octavian replied that he would pardon all the veterans who had served under Antony; the rest must surrender at discretion: but one of the envoys was privately informed that Lucius and others, the personal enemies of Octavian excepted, would be treated leniently. Lucius therefore went out, attended only by two lictors, obtained an interview with Octavian, and, protesting that his sole motive had been to obtain the restoration of Republican government, requested that he, and he alone, should be held responsible. Octavian answered that Lucius by his unconditional surrender had disarmed his anger. In what sense this assurance had been given presently appeared.

About the end of February.[1]

Octavian's treament of the garrison.

Next day at dawn, after Octavian had offered sacrifice in accordance with prescribed ritual, the vanquished troops defiled through the gates of Perusia. Octavian, wreathed as Imperator with laurel and seated on his tribunal, bade them lay down their arms and summoned the veterans of Antony to approach. His own legions were paraded hard by. Suddenly the veterans among them broke their ranks, embraced their old comrades, and besought the General to pardon them. Octavian fulfilled his pledge. Lucius, who followed his army, the senators and the knights, who accompanied him, were placed in custody. The ordinary burgesses of Perusia, who were next summoned, were all pardoned; but the councillors were imprisoned. Next day, after a fire, kindled by a half-witted soldier, had destroyed

[1] *Hermes*, xxix, 1894, p. 562.

the greater part of the town, the councillors (except one Lucius Aemilius, who, serving as a juror at the trial of the assassins of Caesar, had voted for condemnation), those senators and knights who were enemies of Octavian, and perhaps others, politically suspect, were put to death. To all who begged for mercy Octavian made but one answer: 'You must die.' The well-known story that on the anniversary of the murder of his adoptive father the victims were slaughtered at an altar dedicated to his memory justifies the conjecture that his motive was partly desire for revenge; but he may also have calculated that their fate would serve as a deterrent.[1] 40 B.C.

Why Lucius made war and Antony remained inactive.

The few to whom historical problems seem to need solution may ask what could have induced Lucius to tempt fortune with an army composed mainly of recruits and depending upon the support of troops whose commanders were puzzled, half-hearted, and disunited. He may have fancied that he was acting in the interest of his brother, and, if he was not the tool of Fulvia,[2] by whose personality the ancient writers were all impressed, he may have obeyed her influence; but there is no reason to doubt his frank avowal that he was an enthusiast for Republican government—an enthusiast who lacked the sense for what was practicable and had no military skill. It is more important to account for the inaction of Antony. Our original authorities,[3] making a loose inference from insufficient data, explained that he was sunk in love for Cleopatra—and, Dio characteristically added, in drunkenness; but the inference might, with a little care, have been disproved: Antony did not join Cleopatra in Alexandria until the quarrel between his brother and Octavian was far advanced; and since,

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 126; Vell., ii, 74, 4; Seneca, *De clem.*, i, 11, 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 15; App., v, 32–49; Dio, xlviii, 14, 2–5. Cp. Drumann-Groebe, *Gesch. Roms*, i², 474–8, and *Eph. epigr.*, vi, 52–78.

[2] The remarks of F. Münzer (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, vii, 283–4) are worth reading. E. Groag (*Klio*, xiv, 46, n. 1), following E. Schelle (*Beitr. zur Gesch. d. Todeskampfes*, &c., p. 35), points out, in refutation of Appian (v, 19, 75; 59, 250; 66, 278) and Plutarch (*Ant.*, 30, 2), according to whom Fulvia forced on the Perusian war in the hope of getting Antony away from Cleopatra, that when the disturbances that led to the war began Fulvia could not have heard of the impression which Cleopatra had made on him.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 28, 1; 30, 1; Dio, xlviii, 27, 1.

41 B.C. after he left Alexandria, he was able to endure her absence for almost four years, the compilers might have reflected that he did not allow the pleasures of love to distract his attention from political affairs. A modern commentator,[1] who asserts that his attitude was a political blunder, and that there must have been a cogent reason for it, offers a simple explanation: Antony and Octavian had undertaken to reward their troops with allotments and with money; Octavian fulfilled this obligation, Antony did not.

That there was a cogent reason for the attitude of Antony is certain, and probably he had in great part dissipated the treasure which he had exacted for the payment of the troops; but that was not the reason. He and Octavian had formally agreed after the battle of Philippi to share the obligation: he was to find the money, Octavian was to parcel out the land. It is probable enough that when he learned what was going on in Italy their relations became strained,[2] and that he would not have been sorry if his brother and his wife had overcome Octavian; but with what face could he have come to Italy to disturb the measures which Octavian was taking in pursuance of the arrangement to which he had himself formally assented, and, if he had been so ill-advised, what chance of success would he have had? Even if Octavian had failed to prevent his disembarking a sufficient force, is it likely that his troops would have fought for a cause that threatened the subsistence of their comrades? He may have reflected that he had blundered in allowing the colleague who was his rival to reap the sole credit of distributing allotments; but he was constrained to abide by the agreement which he had signed.

Affairs in Africa. 42–40 B.C.

Meanwhile Lepidus had perforce accepted the restricted authority that was left to him. After the formation of the Triumvirate Sextius, who had been appointed by Caesar Governor of New Africa,[3] requested Cornificius to quit the old province on the ground that, under the compact between the Triumvirs, the whole country belonged to

[1] Groag (*Klio*, xiv, 43–51). [2] App., v, 60, 251–3.
[3] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 273, and pp. 219–20, *infra*.

Octavian. Cornificius refused to obey without an order from the Senate: fighting ensued, and Cornificius was ultimately defeated and slain. In the summer that followed the battle of Philippi Sextius, in obedience to the representatives of Antony, gave way to Fuficius Fango, a lieutenant of Octavian, to whom, under the recent concordat of the Triumvirs,[1] the provinces belonged; but, having been urged by Fulvia after the outbreak of the Perusian War to recover them, attacked and overcame him with the support of the natives, thus becoming master of both provinces, which he held until Lepidus arrived with an irresistible force and took possession.[2] 40 B.C.

Lepidus allowed to take possession of the province.

But there was reason to fear that between Antony and Octavian peace might soon be broken. Sextus Pompeius, who had executed his nominal colleague, Bithynicus,[3] was the rival of both, and the corsairs were a menace not only to Italy and even to the subsistence of the people of Rome, but also to the stability of the Triumvirate. The three commanders who had failed to rescue Lucius made their way with their contingents to various ports of the Adriatic, and, though Agrippa persuaded a part of the force of Plancus, which he intercepted, to join his standard, the rest, abandoned by their leader, who attached himself to Antony,[4] took service under Ventidius, men belonging to the other armies under Murcus, while Domitius was induced by Pollio to espouse the cause of Antony and prepared to assist him if he should attempt invasion.[5] When Antony, who had left Alexandria in the early spring, learned the fate of Perusia, he blamed his wife, his brother, and, above all, his agent, Manius, whom he afterwards executed; but he gave audience to representatives of Sextus, who were anxious to enlist his aid against Octavian, and, though he told them that if Octavian remained true to him he would endeavour to reconcile him with their

Octavian threatened by a coalition of Antony with Sextus Pompeius.

[1] See p. 89.

[2] App., iv, 53, 227; v, 12, 46–7; 26, 102–3; 53, 223; Dio, xlviii, 20, 4; 21–3. See pp. 219–20.

[3] Livy, *Epit.*, 123; App., v, 70, 296; Dio, xlviii, 19, 1.

[4] Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 327, n. 2 [Eng. tr., iii, 244, n. §]) says in a moment of oblivion that Plancus 'perished in the war of Perugia'.

[5] Vell., ii, 76, 2; App., v, 50. Cp. Dio, xlviii, 16, 2.

40 B. C. chief, he gave them to understand that, in the event of war, he would accept their overtures.[1]

Meanwhile Octavian had restored order in Campania, where Tiberius Claudius Nero, who had served with distinction under Caesar, but had followed the lead of Lucius and escaped from Perusia, had attempted to foment an insurrection.[2] Thence he set out for the Alpine region, and, as Calenus opportunely died, took over his eleven legions, which enabled him to occupy, through his own lieutenants, both Gaul and Spain.[3] When we read in Appian[4] that, suspecting Antony, he was providing either for a continuance of their friendship or for a rupture, intending in the former event to keep the legions for him, in the latter to use them against him, we may suppose that the writer was drawing his own inferences (which, however, were perhaps not mistaken) about the intentions of a statesman who did not take the world into his confidence.[5] A further statement of Appian,[6] that Octavian, on his return from Gaul, heard that Sextus had endeavoured to enlist the aid of Antony, and that, not knowing Antony's reply, he tried in vain to alienate from him the veterans to whom he had himself assigned allotments, may be true, though it is unsupported; at all events he was so alarmed at the prospect of a coalition between Antony and Sextus and so

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 30, 2; App., v, 52; 66, 278.

[2] Vell., ii, 75, 1; Suet., *Tib.*, 4, 2. Velleius (ii, 77, 3), with whom Tacitus (*Ann.*, v, 1) substantially agrees, says that Nero, one of the proscribed, was rehabilitated by a provision of the treaty of Misenum (see p. 107). Groebe (Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, i², 314, n. 10) remarks that this is contradicted by Dio (xlviii, 15, 3), who relates that after the fall of Perusia Nero with his wife and son (the future emperor Tiberius) fled and joined Antony, and by Suetonius (*Tib.*, 4, 2. 3), who says that he fled from Perusia and, after trying to foment a servile insurrection near Naples, ultimately joined Antony, but soon afterwards returned to Rome with him 'on the conclusion of a general peace'. Where is the contradiction?

[3] App., v, 51; Dio, xlviii, 20, 3–4. Grueber (*Coins of the Roman Republic*, &c., ii, 404, n. 2), correcting Babelon (ii, 36. 63), gives a good reason for assigning coins struck by Octavian in Gaul to 40 B.C.

Ganter (*D. Provinzialverwaltung*, &c., p. 67, n. 6) thinks that Appian's statement may be understood in the sense that Calenus had occupied the province, which was denuded of all troops, and that Octavian occupied Gaul in its entirety, Spain in part.

[4] v, 51, 213.

[5] That Appian here followed the autobiography of Augustus seems to me more than doubtful.

[6] v, 53, 219–20.

fearful that Sextus with his powerful fleet might starve the capital, that he tried to avert the danger by a political alliance. Scribonius Libo, who had been an ardent follower of Pompey, was the father-in-law of Sextus; but he consented to give his sister in marriage to Octavian.[1] 40 B.C.

It was soon evident that the rumours of an understanding between Antony and the corsairs were true. Sailing from Corcyra with a fleet which he had built in Asia, he joined Domitius and attempted to land at Brundisium. Five cohorts of Octavian were quartered in the town, and their commander, believing that Domitius was an assassin of Caesar and mindful of his recent depredations, closed the gates. Antony forthwith blockaded the town and sent a detachment to occupy Sipontum, while the cavalry of Sextus ravaged the country, and one of his officers, a Greek freedman, named Menas, seized Sardinia, which was then garrisoned by troops belonging to Octavian.[2] Sending Agrippa to relieve Sipontum, Octavian marched for Brundisium, whither he arrived after some delay, caused by an illness, and encamped in proximity to Antony, but, though his force was superior, prudently forbore to fight. A parley followed between representatives of the two armies. The Antonians complained that they had been excluded from Brundisium: the Caesarians retorted that Antony, allied with Sextus and the assassin Domitius, was besieging the town, and, though they had hoped to reconcile the two Triumvirs, they would resist Antony if he proved obdurate.[3] Meanwhile it was announced that Fulvia, who had joined her husband in the Peloponnese, was dead, and both sides were glad to be rid of the turbulent woman who had stirred up strife.[4]

Antony and Octavian reconciled.

The efforts of the soldiers to reconcile their leaders were supported by Lucius Cocceius Nerva, a tactful mediator,

[1] *C.I.L.*, vi, 7467, 26032–3 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 126, 7429, 8892); Tac., *Ann.*, ii, 27; App., v, 53, 221–2; Dio, xlviii, 16, 2–3 (chronologically and circumstantially inaccurate). See p. 220.

[2] Vell., ii, 76, 2; App., v, 55–6 (cp. 26, 104; 27, 105); Dio, xlviii, 27, 3–5. Grueber (*op. cit.*, ii, 494, n. 2) remarks that certain coins (nos. 111–3 [Pl. cxiii. 6–8]) relate to the reconciliation of Antony with Domitius, who had opposed him in the campaign of Philippi. Appian (v, 55) describes the reconciliation.

[3] App., v, 57–8; 59, 246–8; Dio, xlviii, 28, 1.

[4] Plut., *Ant.*, 30, 2; App., v, 59, 249–50; Dio, xlviii, 28, 2–3.

40 B.C. whom Octavian had entrusted with a mission to Antony in the previous summer, and who had accompanied him from Greece. Knowing that the scarcity at Rome was bringing Octavian into odium, and that the corsairs interposed obstacles to peace which could be removed only by healing the misunderstanding between the two Triumvirs, he obtained the consent of Antony to his visiting Octavian, but, before starting, sounded his intentions. Antony bluntly avowed that he and Octavian were now enemies: Octavian had occupied a province that belonged to him, had appropriated the legions that Calenus had commanded, and, finally, had excluded him from Brundisium. Forbearing to irritate the choleric soldier, Cocceius returned to Octavian, who, remarking that if he had not taken over the legions of Calenus, they would have been used against him by Pollio and Domitius, insisted that Antony had been excluded from Brundisium without his orders, simply because he was associated with Domitius, a convicted and proscribed assassin. Cocceius pleaded that Domitius was not an assassin and had been condemned unjustly. It was true that he had supported the assassin Brutus; but if he were to be refused pardon on that ground, when would hostilities end? Antony had joined Sextus in no aggressive spirit, but simply because he apprehended aggression from Octavian; and if he could be assured that Octavian was not his enemy, he would try to reconcile him with Sextus. One thing was certain: if Octavian and Antony remained at feud, Sextus would invade Italy. Before Cocceius left the camp he conversed with the centurions, and, after learning their views, warned Antony that unless he would be reconciled with Octavian, they and their men would fight. Antony accepted the warning, induced Sextus to return to Sicily, and sent Domitius to govern the province of Bithynia. Hearing that he had taken these pacific steps, Octavian's soldiers elected delegates, who co-opted Cocceius, as a friend of both Triumvirs, Maecenas, the confidant of Octavian, and Pollio, as a friend of Antony. At their suggestion, a marriage was arranged between Antony and Octavia; the Triumvirs met, and, amid the plaudits of their troops, embraced each other in token of recon-

Marriage arranged between Antony and Octavia.

ciliation.[1] The meeting was followed by a fresh partition of power. Scodra, or Scutari, in Illyricum was fixed as the terminal point. Octavian was to rule Dalmatia, Italy, Sardinia, Spain, and Gaul, Antony all the lands east of the Ionian Sea as far as the Euphrates; Africa, which Octavian had already assigned to Lepidus, was recognized as his domain;[3] Sicily was left for the time being in the possession of Sextus. Octavian had now gained a sphere of influence wider than after the compact that followed the battle of Philippi. Antony, if we may believe Dio,[4] although he had made an alliance, confirmed by oath, with Sextus against Octavian, agreed with his fellow Triumvir to attack him: at all events it was settled that Octavian should do so unless he could come to some agreement with the corsair. Antony, for his part, undertook to make war upon the Parthians, who had invaded Syria, and to avenge the defeat, never forgotten though it had happened thirteen years before, which Crassus had suffered on the field of Carrhae. By a clause which was to become important, it was agreed that Antony, although his sphere was in the East, should share with Octavian the right of levying troops in Italy.[5] After the convention was signed Octavian's soldiers clustered round Antony, demanding the bounties that had been promised for Philippi, and, as he could not or would not pay, were with difficulty restrained from violence.[6]

40 B.C. End of Sept. or beginning of Oct.[2] The compact of Brundisium.

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 127; Vell., ii, 76, 3; 78, 1; Tac., *Ann.*, i, 10; Suet., *Nero*, 3, 1; App., v, 60–4; Dio, xlviii, 28, 3; 31, 3. Coins of Antony (Grueber, ii, 503, nos. 133–7 [Pl. cxiv. 1–4]) commemorated his marriage with Octavia. Cp. p. 499, n. 1, where Grueber, as often, corrects Babelon.

[2] *Hermes*, xxix, 1894, pp. 556–63; *Atti d. R. Accad. d. Archeol. . . . Napoli*, N.S., v, 1917, pp. 233–9.

[3] The coins which Lepidus issued in Africa bear the portrait of Octavian as well as his own (Grueber, ii, 567, 569 [nos. 29–30, Pl. cxxii. 2–3]).

[4] xlviii, 29, 1. I believe that Antony had made such an alliance *provisionally*. Cp. pp. 101–2.

[5] Plut., *Ant.*, 30, 2; App., v, 65, 274–5; Dio, xlviii, 28, 4; 29, 1. The reconciliation of Antony with Octavian was commemorated on coins issued by both (Grueber, *op. cit.*, ii, 408, n. 2, 497–8, nos. 120–30 [Pl. cxiii. 13, 17]). Groag (*Klio*, 1915, pp. 50–1) holds that in the compact of Brundisium Antony was forced to make concessions, because, having failed to fulfil the promise which he made after the battle of Philippi (p. 90, *supra*), he could no longer deal with Octavian on equal terms. Perhaps; but is it not arguable that Antony resigned his Western provinces because he believed that it would be politic to limit his ambitions to the East?

[6] Dio, xlviii, 30, 2–3.

40 B.C. Fate of Salvidienus.

Not long afterwards Antony informed Octavian that when he was himself blockading Brundisium Salvidienus, then consul designate, had offered to join him. Octavian charged Salvidienus in the Senate with treason, and he was executed or, if Livy was correctly informed, committed suicide. The legions which he had commanded were restored, probably in accordance with the recent compact, to Antony—the more readily because Octavian distrusted their fidelity.[1]

Depredations of Sextus.

Sextus was ill satisfied with the sop that had been offered him. When he learned that Antony had made an agreement with Octavian, he resumed his depredations. Menas ravaged the coast of Etruria, landed in Sardinia, stormed the chief town, Carales, and captured Helenus, a lieutenant of Octavian, who had regained possession of the island.[2] The Roman populace, who, rejoicing at the reconciliation of the Triumvirs, had escorted them in the ovation[3] by which it was celebrated, became restive when famine was again in prospect, and clamoured for peace at any price. The Triumvirs, who knew that such a peace would be illusory, proclaimed fresh taxes to defray the cost of war. Sedition followed; and in the course of a festival[4] a statue of Neptune, which was regarded as symbolizing the maritime supremacy of Sextus, for the moment a popular hero, evoked loud applause. Octavian confronted the rioters and was about to reason with them when stones were thrown and he was wounded. He would not budge, and Antony, who had summoned troops from outside the walls, launched them against the rioters, many of whom were killed. Nevertheless the Triumvirs saw that it would be politic to make peace, and Libo used his influence on their behalf. It was settled that the Triumvirs should confer with Sextus, and they repaired to Baiae, in

39 B.C. the neighbourhood of which the meeting was to be held.[5] Menas urged his chief to prosecute the war, or at least to

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 127; Vell., ii, 76, 4; Seneca, *De clem.*, i, 9, 5; App., v, 66, 278–9; Suet., *Aug.*, 66, 2; Dio, xlviii, 33, 1–3. Cp. Ferrero, *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 340, n. 4 (Eng. tr., iii, 254, n. **), and H. Dessau, *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit*, i, 1924, p. 28, n. 3.

[2] App., v, 66, 277; Dio, xlviii, 30, 4–8.

[3] *C.I.L.*, i², p. 50; *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 21; Suet., *Aug.*, 22 (inaccurate).

[4] Cp. *C.I.L.*, i, 406.

[5] App., v, 67–9; Dio, xlviii, 31.

temporize until the pressure of famine should compel the Triumvirs to grant him better terms, and led him to suspect Murcus, who desired peace; but although Sextus, who was jealous of Murcus, commissioned assassins to get rid of him,[1] he disregarded the advice of Menas, and met Octavian and Antony. He had imagined that he was to be recognized as a triumvir in the room of Lepidus; but he was disappointed, and the conference was broken off. Negotiations followed, and at length, on the entreaty of Mucia, the mother of Sextus, and his wife, Scribonia, the parties consented to meet again. The conference was held near the promontory of Misenum,[2] at the southern extremity of the Bay of Baiae. Sextus undertook to withdraw the troops which he had posted in Italy, to make no further raids, and to provide Rome with the grain that was regularly imported from Sardinia and Sicily: in return he was to be recognized as the ruler of those islands, of others in his power, and of the Peloponnese, to be a consul in the ensuing year, and to be enrolled in the college of augurs;[3] exiles who had joined him, except those assassins of Caesar who had been judicially condemned, were to be restored to their civic rights; proscribed persons who had taken service under him were to receive back one-fourth of their confiscated property; slaves who had taken refuge with him were to be manumitted, while the free members of his force were to receive on the expiration of their service the same rewards as the veteran soldiers of the Triumvirate. The terms, engrossed and sealed, were entrusted to the Vestal Virgins for safe custody. On the following day Sextus entertained Antony and Octavian on board a hexireme, and they returned the compliment; but, says Appian, each of the three was attended by his guards, each carried a concealed dagger, and the story ran that Menas

39 B.C.

Antony and Octavian make a treaty with him near Misenum.

[1] Vell., ii, 77, 3. According to Appian (v, 70, 295), Sextus told the assassins to give out that Murcus had been murdered by his own slaves, and, to gain credence for this fiction, crucified the slaves. If this is true, ancient history knows no more abominable scoundrel.

[2] Vell., ii, 77, 1; Plut., *Ant.*, 32, 1; Dio, xlviii, 36, 1. According to Appian (v, 72, 303), the site was near Puteoli, which is a few miles north by east of Misenum. See V. Gardthausen, *Augustus u. seine Zeit*, ii, 105, n. 20.

[3] Cp. App., v, 72, 305, with Mommsen's comment (*Hermes*, xxx, 1895, p. 461, n. 1).

39 B.C. sent a message, urging Sextus to assassinate his guests, and received the reply that, since perjury was congenial to his nature, he should have done this deed himself. The daughter of Sextus was betrothed to Marcellus, the son of Octavia by her late husband and now the step-son of Antony. Consuls had already been nominated for the next four years with a view to the projected Parthian expedition of Antony and to reward adherents of the Triumvirs; and before the proceedings terminated nominations were made for the four succeeding years, Domitius being among the nominees. At Rome there were great rejoicings; but they were premature.[1]

38 B.C. Renewed hostility between Sextus and Octavian.

Early in the following year Octavian and Sextus were again at variance. Sextus insisted that the Peloponnese had been ceded to him without reserve: Octavian, who was careful to publish his own version of the facts, affirmed that the cession had been made on the condition that Sextus should either pay to Antony the tribute that was then due from the province or refrain from taking possession until it had been collected by the agents of Antony.[2] The historian Dio[3] found in his authorities the statement that Antony, on returning from Italy, deliberately plundered the province in order to diminish the value of the cession, and that Sextus lodged a formal complaint. Whatever the truth may have been, piracy was renewed, and, despite the undertaking given by Sextus, little corn reached the capital. Captured pirates confessed under torture that they had acted in obedience to Sextus: Octavian published the confession and complained to Sextus, who made a counter complaint about the provocation which he had received.[4] Menas, whom, suspecting his fidelity, he recalled

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 127; Vell., ii, 77, 1–2; Plut., *Ant.*, 32, 2; Tac., *Ann.*, v, 1; App., v, 70–4; Dio, xlviii, 15, 1–2; 35, 1–2; 36, 1. 3–6; 37, 1; Oros., vi, 18, 20. The betrothal of Marcellus and Pompeia came to nothing (Dio, xlix, 11, 1). Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 359, n. 5 [Eng. tr., iii, 269, n. §]), comparing the statements of Dio (xlviii, 35, 1–2), who says that before the conference consuls were appointed for the next eight years, and Appian (v, 73, 313), according to whom appointments were made at the end of the conference for the years 34–31 only, concludes, reasonably enough, that Dio 'confused two appointments of consuls for four years severally made at a short interval . . . and regarded them as one appointment for . . . eight years'.

[2] App., v, 77, 325–6. [3] xlviii, 39, 1; 46, 1. [4] *Ib.*; App., v, 77, 328–9.

from Sardinia, not only refused to obey, but justified the suspicion by offering to put Octavian in possession of the island and the squadron which he himself commanded; and Octavian, accepting the offer on the ground or the pretext that Sextus had broken the pact of Misenum, made the Greek freedman a Roman knight, and even entertained him at his own table.[1] Seeing that it would be politic to act in concert with Antony, who had been a party to the pact, he requested him to come to Brundisium and discuss the situation.[2] Antony, who had spent the winter at Athens with his wife, of whom he is said to have been really fond,[3] turned to account the adulation which he received from the inhabitants. When, affecting, as the Ephesians had done, to recognize in him an incarnation of Dionysus, they added a touch of impudence by ignoring Octavia and naming Athena as his consort, he showed a sense of humour seasoned with shrewdness by exacting for the goddess a dowry equivalent to forty thousand pounds.[4] Arriving at Brundisium on the appointed day, but not finding Octavian there, he immediately returned, on the plea that Parthian affairs required his attention, and wrote to Octavian, urging him not to violate the pact. Octavian, disregarding this advice, the motive of which may have been a hope that his power would be counterbalanced by that of Sextus, prepared for war.[5] He had lately taken a step which he never had reason to regret. Having divorced Scribonia, 'because', as he afterwards wrote, 'he was heartily sick of her disagreeable temper', he married Livia Drusilla, a

38 B.C.

Jan. 17.[6]

[1] Suet., *Aug.*, 74; App., v, 78, 331–2; Dio, xlviii, 45, 4–7. 'According to Appian . . . v. 78 and 81', says Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 378, n. 2 [Eng. tr., iii, 282, n. ‡]), 'the treachery of Menodorus [so Appian calls Menas] did not take place until the war [between Octavian and Sextus] had begun. . . . The second version [Dio's, xlviii, 45] seems . . . more probable; indeed, Appian's story is contradicted by another fact, which he himself relates [c. 79] . . . that Antony was aware of the treachery . . . when he went to Brundisium.' Certainly he was; but whoever reads the various texts, and also v, 80, which Ferrero omits to cite, will find that he misrepresents Appian, who neither contradicts himself nor is contradicted by Dio.

[2] App., v, 78, 333; Dio (xlviii, 46, 2–3) says that Lepidus also was invited, but delayed.

[3] App., v, 76, 322–3. Cp. Plut., *Ant.*, 33, 3.

[4] Dio, xlviii, 39, 2. Cp. M. Seneca, *Suas.*, 1, 7.

[5] App., v, 79, 334. 336–7; Dio, xlviii, 46, 2–3.

[6] *Not. Scavi*, 1923, p. 194.

38 B.C. daughter of one of the proscribed, whose husband, Tiberius Nero, consented to give her up, though she had already borne him a son, the future emperor Tiberius, and was pregnant with another.[1]

The operations of the ensuing war are described in detail by the Greek compilers, Appian and Dio; but any one who has studied the verifiable records of modern warfare will perceive that they did not fully comprehend the authorities which they used, and that it is impossible to construct from their statements a satisfactory narrative. Nor, indeed, is such desirable. The struggle between Octavian and Sextus has not the same interest either for general readers or for students of war as the campaigns of Julius Caesar. We may be content with the main features, which it is still possible to sketch with close approximation to the truth.

The earlier operations.

The first important event was a naval action, fought in the Bay of Naples, in which a fleet of Sextus, commanded by a Greek freedman, was opposed to the combined squadrons of Menas and Calvisius Sabinus,[2] who had served as a consul in the preceding year. Although the Pompeians had the best of an indecisive battle, they sailed for Sicily, followed by Sabinus, in the hope of preventing Octavian from invading the island. While Octavian was crossing the strait, his fleet was attacked and many of his ships were destroyed, partly by the enemy, partly by a storm, in which the ships of Sabinus also suffered serious loss. Abandoning for the present the project of invasion, Octavian contented himself with posting troops to prevent Sextus from invading Italy.[3] At Rome the half-famished populace were clamouring for peace and came to blows with the soldiers employed by the farmers of the taxes.[4]

[1] Vell., ii, 79, 2; 94, 1; Tac., *Ann.*, i, 10; Suet., *Aug.*, 62, 2; 69, 1; *Tib.*, 4, 3; *Claud.*, 1, 1; Dio, xlviii, 34, 3; 43, 6; 44, 1–4; Ps. Victor, *Epit. de Caes.*, 1, 23. Dio, who occasionally atones for his sins, tells us that at a banquet a little boy, a pet of one of the guests, seeing Livia reclining on the same couch with Octavian, went up to her and, pointing to Tiberius Nero, who was at another table, said, 'Lady, what are you doing here? There is your husband.'

[2] *C.I.L.*, x, 6901 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 889).

[3] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, vii, 45 (46), 148; Suet., *Aug.*, 16, 1; App., v, 80, 338; 81, 344–5; 82–3; 84, 353; 85–91, 382; Dio, xlviii, 46, 5–6; 47; 48, 1–5.

[4] App., v, 92, 384; Dio, xlviii, 43, 1.

Yet gladiatorial shows were still being held; a senator was prevented from fighting in the arena; and a decree was issued, forbidding others to do the same.[1] Maecenas went to Greece to solicit the support of Antony: soon the news arrived that he had succeeded in his mission; and, while Sextus remained inactive, Octavian prepared to spend the winter in making fresh preparations on a colossal scale.[2] 38 B.C.

Agrippa, who had been elected consul for the following year, but was then engaged in suppressing disturbances in Gaul,[3] was recalled, after he entered office, to superintend the preparations. Much had already been done. Money had been raised both from citizens and provincials; ships, larger than those of Sextus, were being built at many points along the coast of the peninsula; senators, notables, wealthy men had lent sturdy slaves to be trained as oarsmen; fresh levies of troops had been held. But there was need of one directing mind. No harbour existed in Italy sufficiently large and secure to enable the ships to ride safely at anchor or the rowers to be trained. Agrippa solved the problem. Near the Bay of Baiae there was a shallow mere, the Lucrine Lake, separated by an embankment from the shore, and behind it an expanse of water, Lake Avernus, which was extensive and deep enough to accommodate a fleet, if only it could be converted into a port. Agrippa set labourers to excavate a channel through the embankment from the bay to the Lucrine Lake, cut down the wood that surrounded Lake Avernus, connected it by a second channel with the Lucrine Lake, and thus allowed the influx of the sea. This done, he conveyed the ships that had assembled from the various dockyards into the artificial harbours, and there trained the slaves.[4] Moreover, having a turn for engineering, he devised an instrument which might enable the naval captains to

Naval preparations of Agrippa. 37 B.C.

[1] *Ib.*, §§ 2–3. Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 348 [Eng. tr., iii, 261]), referring to this passage and to 33, 4 (where horse-races only are mentioned), infers that 'knights and senators became gladiators to gain a livelihood'!

[2] App., v, 91, 383; 92, 385–6.

[3] *Ib.*, § 386; Dio, xlviii, 49, 3; Grueber, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

[4] Virg., *Georg.*, ii, 161–5; Strabo, v, 4, 5–6; Vell., ii, 79, 2; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxvi, 15 (24), 125; Suet., *Aug.*, 16, 1; App., v, 106, 438–9; Dio, xlviii, 49–51; xlix, 1, 2.

37 B.C. neutralize the superior skill of the Greeks who officered the fleet of Sextus, and to convert any naval battle into one in which the superior fighting qualities of the legionaries should have free play. It was an improved form of the grappling irons familiar to all who have read the contemporary accounts of the victories gained by Decimus Brutus during the siege of Massilia—a wooden pole about seven feet long, cased with iron, to one end of which was attached an iron hook, to the other a ring, through which were passed ropes, controlled by a windlass, so that when the instrument, shot by a catapult, had caught hold of a hostile ship, they could be pulled taut.[1]

Antony and Octavia at Tarentum.

In the early spring[2] Antony with a powerful fleet appeared at Tarentum[3] in fulfilment of his promise. Octavian perhaps suspecting his good faith, perhaps confident that, supported by Agrippa, he could subdue Sextus without being indebted to a colleague who was really a rival, made an excuse for declining his assistance. Antony, controlling his resentment, renewed his offer; for it was difficult to take advantage of the agreement that permitted him to raise troops in Italy, and he hoped, in view of the Parthian war, to obtain legions from Octavian in exchange for the loan of ships. Fortunately Octavia had accompanied him, and proved a tactful mediator. When she visited her brother for this purpose, he complained that in the previous year Antony had left him in the lurch. She assured him that her husband in his recent interview with Maecenas had cleared himself on this score, and, after she had disabused her brother's mind of other suspicions, he promised to meet Antony near Tarentum. Both must have foreseen that sooner or later a struggle for supremacy would be inevitable; but the time was not yet ripe, and the meeting was outwardly amicable. Antony placed a hundred and twenty ships, to which his wife induced him to add ten,[4]

Compact between Octavian and Antony for mutual support.

[1] App., v, 118, 491.

[2] Cp. J. Kromayer, *D. rechtl. Begrundung*, &c., 1888, pp. 51–6.

[3] According to Plutarch (*Ant.*, 35, 1), he had been [again] excluded from the harbour of Brundisium. By order of Octavian? If so, why not also from Tarentum? Did Octavian suppose that Antony would not seek admission there?

[4] App., v, 95, 396–7. According to Plutarch (*Ant.*, 35, 2), Antony lent Octavian 100 ships, to which his wife persuaded him to add 20.

at the disposal of Octavian, who, for his part, promised to send twenty thousand legionaries for service against the Parthians, and, in exchange for the ten additional ships, transferred to Antony immediately a thousand men, whom he was allowed to select, from his own bodyguard. To cement the reconciliation, Octavian betrothed his infant daughter to a son of Antony by Fulvia; and it was agreed that Sextus should forfeit his augurship and the consulship that had been promised to him. Finally, the Triumvirs arbitrarily prolonged their term of office for five years. This measure was confirmed by a plébiscite, in which the second quinquennial period was dated retrospectively from the first day of the preceding January;[1] and since Octavian thenceforth described himself officially as 'Triumvir for the second time' while Antony omitted this addition, it seems reasonable to suppose that he deemed it politic to obtain legal sanction, and that the plébiscite was passed at his suggestion.[2] Meanwhile Antony had departed for Syria, accompanied by his wife, whom, as he was about to renew his intimacy with Cleopatra, he presently sent back to Italy on the pretext that she was unfit to share the risk of the Parthian war.[3]

37 B.C.

Prolongation of the Triumvirate.

The campaign against Sextus was opened on the 1st of July, a date which Octavian, always mindful of omens,[4] had chosen because the month had been called after the gentile name of his victorious adoptive father.[5] Agrippa

36 B.C.

Renewed operations of Octavian against Sextus.

[1] See pp. 232–4, 240.

[2] U. Wilcken (*Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1925, p. 71); H. Dessau (*Philol. Woch.*, 1925, col. 1018).

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 35, 2; Tac., *Ann.*, iv, 44; Suet., *Aug.*, 63, 2; *Nero*, 5, 1; App., v, 93–5; Dio, xlviii, 54, 1–6; C. Torr, *Anc. Ships*, 1895, pp. 118–20; Grueber, *op. cit.*, pp. 511–3. According to Appian, Antony left Octavia and her baby daughter with her brother; according to Plutarch, he left her two children and his own by Fulvia in her keeping. I agree with Bouché-Leclercq (*Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 252, n.) in preferring the statement of Dio, who, however, is silent about Antony's evident reason for sending her away. Plutarch and Appian describe what happened after Octavia returned to Italy, but omit to mention that she had accompanied her husband to Corcyra.

[4] Suet., *Aug.*, 92, 1.

[5] App., v, 97, 404. Dio (xlix, 1, 1), with whom Suetonius (*Aug.*, 16, 1) perhaps agrees, says that Octavian sailed in the spring. I was once inclined to think that there would have been hardly sufficient time for the recorded events of the war between July 1 and September 3, the date of the final victory; but Appian's statement is so circumstantial that I feel obliged to accept it.

36 B.C. was appointed admiral-in-chief, and when the fleet was ready to sail the rite of purification was solemnly performed.[1] It was intended that Octavian and Agrippa, sailing from Puteoli, Lepidus from Africa, and Statilius Taurus, who had held the consulship in the preceding year, from Tarentum, should converge upon Sicily. Sextus, keeping the bulk of his fleet at Messana, stationed a force at Lilybaeum to oppose Lepidus, guarded the important points on the north-eastern coast, and occupied the adjacent islands, to prevent their being utilized as bases for an invasion.[2] Octavian, Lepidus, and Taurus started simultaneously. Lepidus, though many of his transports were wrecked by a southerly gale, reached his destination, blockaded Lilybaeum, and took several towns: Taurus, when he encountered the storm, went about and got safely back to Tarentum; but Octavian and Agrippa suffered a reverse. When the rearmost squadron, having crossed the Bay of Naples, was rounding the peninsula of Sorrento, the ships were all scattered or dashed against the rocks, and though Octavian with the leading division contrived to take shelter in the bay of Velia, the wind, suddenly veering to the south-west, caused collisions and drove many of the ships ashore.[3] Sending the oarsmen who belonged to the vessels that had been irretrievably damaged to man twenty-eight of those commanded by Taurus, which he had hitherto been unable to use, Octavian promptly beached those ships that could be repaired, and set carpenters to work. Meanwhile Maecenas went to Rome, to reassure the populace, who were suffering from dearth and depressed by the report of the disaster. When the repairs, which required thirty days, were finished, Octavian sailed to the island of Lipara, where he left Agrippa in charge of the fleet, and, crossing to Italy, went the round of the military colonies, encouraged the settlers, and finally proceeded to Vibo, to resume the campaign.[4]

Sextus, though he allowed his flatterers to call him a son

[1] App., v, 96, 401–2. [2] *Ib.*, 97.
[3] Vell., ii, 79, 3; Suet., *Aug.*, 16, 1; App., v, 98; Dio, xlix, 1, 3. 5; 8, 2.
[4] App., v, 99; Dio, xlix, 1, 5–6.

of Neptune,[1] failed to take advantage of the gift of Fortune; and Menas, who in the previous year had deserted Octavian and taken service anew under his old master, now, finding that the chief command was not to be restored to him and feeling that he was suspected, deserted again.[2] The purpose of Sextus was to guard every point at which a landing might be attempted, while he himself remained at Messana, ready to move in any direction with his fleet.[3] Despite his defensive preparations, however, Agrippa seized the island of Hiera, close to the north-eastern coast, defeated one of the Pompeian admirals in an action off Mylae, and, following up his victory, received the surrender of several towns in the western neighbourhood of Messana;[4] and though many transports conveying reinforcements for Lepidus were captured or destroyed,[5] this disaster had no effect upon the ultimate result. Meanwhile Octavian was preparing, in conjunction with Taurus, who, accompanied by infantry on land, had sailed to Scyllaeum, opposite Messana, to attack the fortress of Tauromenium, not far east of Etna. Lepidus, who had been directed to take part in the attack, failed to arrive.[6] Joining Taurus at Scyllaeum, Octavian sailed to Leucopetra, and thence crossed to Tauromenium; but as the garrison, despite the recent victory of Agrippa, refused to admit him, he moved on and encamped not far southward, intending to attack the town. While the camp was being marked out, Sextus, who had divined his purpose, appeared with a strong fleet, infantry and cavalry marching in concert with it along the shore. The cavalry attacked the Caesarians while they were entrenching: the infantry, neglecting their opportunity, remained inactive and retired in a northerly direction. Octavian, leaving Lucius Cornificius in charge of the

36 B.C.

[Taormina.]

[1] Strabo, vi, 2, 3; Pliny, *Nat. hist.*, ix, 16 (22), 55; App., v, 100, 416; Dio, xlviii, 5; xlix, 1, 3. A figure of Neptune appears on a coin of Sextus (Grueber, *op. cit.*, p. 560, n. 1 [no. 7, Pl. cxx. 5]).

[2] App., v, 96, 400; 100, 419; 101–2; Dio, xlviii, 54, 7; xlix, 1, 4. Dio here remarks that if Menas had not deserted with all the ships which he commanded, Octavian would have failed. His judgement was unsound.

[3] App., v, 103, 429; Dio, xlix, 2, 1.

[4] Livy, *Epit.*, 129; Vell., ii, 79, 4; App., v, 105, 435; 106, 438—108, 447; 109, 450; Dio, xlix, 2, 2–4; Oros., vi, 18, 26.

[5] App., v, 104, 430–1.

[6] See p. 220.

36 B.C. army, put to sea at dawn, fought a battle, and suffered a defeat. The news caused grave disturbances in Rome, where Sextus had many friends; but Octavian, who went ashore and reached a place of safety, though he was momentarily prostrated by the disaster, and is said to have begged a friend to kill him, soon braced himself to rise to the occasion. Welcomed by his lieutenant, Valerius Messalla, who had been one of the proscribed, but now generously supplied his wants, he sent Maecenas to restore order in Rome, and directed Agrippa to send reinforcements to Cornificius, who, after a perilous march over an arid region, covered by lava that had been recently discharged from Etna, made his way safely to Mylae.[1]

Octavian, notwithstanding his defeat, had reason to be hopeful. He had a powerful army in the island; Agrippa had captured the fortress of Tyndaris, not far west of Mylae, which contained abundant stores; and though Sextus still held the north-eastern tract, he was threatened with starvation, for Taurus was about to seize the towns from which he drew supplies. Unless he could win a decisive victory at sea, his career would end. Octavian, suspecting that he was in correspondence with Lepidus,[2] who had long resented the humiliations to which he was subjected, and relying upon the skill of Agrippa, did not decline the challenge. On the 3rd of September [3] the fleets were arrayed off the promontory of Naulochus, a few miles east of Mylae. Troops belonging to both leaders were congregated on the shore to watch the final struggle. Arrows and blazing darts, stones hurled by catapults flew from ship to ship; pilots manœuvred to ram their antagonists or to smash their oars; but, as in the battle of Mylae, the invention of Agrippa played the leading part. The iron with which the poles were cased made all attempts to

Octavian's decisive victory.

[1] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, vii, 45 (46), 148; App., v, 103, 427–8; 105, 434; 109, 451–5; 110, 457–8; 111–5; Dio, xlix, 5–6; 7, 1–5; Oros., vi, 18, 27. Cp. A. Holm, *Gesch. Siciliens*, i, 1870, p. 332; *Rhein. Mus.*, xlix, 1894, p. 118; H. Nissen, *Ital. Landesk.*, ii, 968; and Grueber, *op. cit.*, p. 563, nos. 15–20 (Pl. cxx. 11–5).

[2] F. Brueggemann (*De . . . Lepidi vita*, &c., Münster, 1887, pp. 62–3), remarking that Lepidus was as hostile to Sextus as to Octavian, disbelieves the statement of Dio (xlix, 8, 3) that he secretly corresponded with the former.

[3] See p. 221.

sever them abortive, and whenever a Pompeian ship was firmly grappled the Caesarian legionaries leaped on board. Twenty-eight Pompeian galleys sank; Sextus with seventeen escaped to Messana; the rest were all captured or burnt or wrecked.[1] 36 B.C.

While Octavian remained in camp at Naulochus, Agrippa in conjunction with Lepidus blockaded Messana. Sextus with the remnant of his fleet had sailed for the East in the hope of joining Antony in war against Octavian. Lucius Plinius,[2] who commanded the inland forces of Sextus, and whom he had summoned from Lilybaeum to Messana, sued for peace, and, while Agrippa awaited the decision of Octavian, Lepidus not only assumed the responsibility of granting the request, but allowed his own army and the Pompeian troops, whose assistance he desired for his ulterior aims, to plunder the city. Intending to seize Sicily, which he had helped to reconquer, he forbade the Pompeians who still garrisoned towns to admit the troops of Octavian; but he had miscalculated his strength. When Octavian remonstrated he complained of the indignity with which he had been treated, and offered to give up his claim to Sicily and Africa in return for the provinces of which he had been despoiled: but his troops were not disposed to back him; his conduct in allowing Pompeians to plunder roused their indignation; and they had had enough of civil war. Octavian with a mounted escort went into his camp, and received the surrender of the Pompeians; the rest followed their example; and Lepidus was obliged to submit. Octavian expelled him from the Triumvirate, but permitted him to retain his pontifical dignity.[3] Senators and Roman knights who had served under Sextus were, with few exceptions, punished; but the Sicilian towns that voluntarily surrendered received free pardon. When

Lepidus expelled from the Triumvirate.

[1] *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 1; *C.I.L.*, iii, Suppl. 2, 14, 625 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 8893); Livy, *Epit.*, 129; Vell., ii, 79, 5; App., v, 116–21; Dio, xlix, 8–10; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 84, 4; Eutrop., vii, 6; Oros., vi, 18, 29. Cp. *Philol.*, lvi, 1897, p. 456, n. 171.

[2] Dessau, 8891. Appian incorrectly calls him Plennius.

[3] Livy, *Epit.*, 129; Vell., ii, 80, 1–4; Plut., *Ant.*, 55, 1; Tac., *Ann.*, i, 2; Suet., *Aug.*, 16, 4; App., v, 122–6; Dio, xlix, 11; 12, 2–5; l, 1, 3; 20, 3; Oros., vi, 18, 30–2.

36 B.C. the naval victory was announced, disturbances which had broken out in Etruria ceased; and Taurus followed up the work which he had done in Sicily by recovering without bloodshed the provinces of Africa, of which Octavian, without regard to the claims of Antony, retained possession.[1]

How Octavian dealt with mutiny.

Octavian, before he could return to Italy, had to deal with a mutinous outbreak, to crush which was impossible, while to face it without personal humiliation and disastrous surrender required in the highest degree firmness, tact, and knowledge of men. The army which he had in Sicily, including the troops of Lepidus and Plinius, was very large.[2] If, as we are told, he then rewarded his own men, they were dissatisfied, for they demanded instant disbandment and the same bounties that had been paid for the victory at Philippi. Octavian, promising that they should be duly rewarded along with their absent comrades when Antony returned to Italy, reminded them of the solemn oath which they had taken on enlistment, and held out hopes of the booty which they would acquire in a campaign which he contemplated against the Illyrians; but as the prospect was not attractive to war-worn men, he was finally compelled to allow those who had fought at Mutina and Philippi—twenty thousand strong—to quit the service, on the understanding that they should receive the balance of what had been promised for the former,[3] to hold out the hope of early release to the rest, and to pay them five hundred *denarii* (the equivalent of twenty pounds) apiece.

[£384,000.] Sixteen hundred talents, which he exacted from the Sicilian communities, helped to reimburse him for this outlay.[4] Many of the disbanded veterans were settled in Campania on land surrendered by the inhabitants of Capua, to whom territory in Crete and a bountiful supply of water were afterwards given in exchange:[5] the 7th legion colonized Baeterrae (Béziers) in Southern Gaul.[6]

[1] Dio, xlix, 14, 6; *C.I.L.*, x, 409; Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 893a.

[2] App., v, 127, 526. His figures seem questionable.

[3] See p. 67. [4] App., v, 128–9; Dio, xlix, 13; 14, 1–3.

[5] Strabo, x, 4, 9; Vell., ii, 81, 1–2; App., v, 127–9; Dio, xlix, 13–5; Oros., vi, 18, 33; *C.I.L.*, x, 3938 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 6317).

[6] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 4 (5), 36; Dio, xlix, 14, 4. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxi, 14–5, and *The Roman Republic*, iii, 322, note.

Nowhere was the success of Octavian more welcome than in Rome, which had suffered so grievously from the depredations of the corsairs.[1] Though one may ignore charges which even Suetonius[2] was willing to call slanderous, he had incurred odium in former years by cruelties, of which some were due to fear;[3] but if his character had not yet begun to mellow, he was learning the wisdom of conciliation. Senators and simple citizens trooped out of the city to meet him, and conducted him to the temples and to his house. On the following day he spoke in the Senate and in the Forum, recounting the acts of his administration, and caused copies of both speeches to be circulated. In celebration of the victory arrears of taxes were remitted, and the farmers of the taxes were excused from paying what they still owed to the treasury. Honours in profusion, some of which he declined, were offered by the Senate to the victor, who, in his turn, presented Agrippa—the creator of the fleet and the victorious admiral—with a golden wreath, bestowed decorations upon the troops, and rewarded Messalla, who had done good service in the war, with a place in the college of augurs. On the 13th of November Octavian entered the city in the minor triumph known as an ovation. He accepted the privilege, which had been conferred upon his adoptive father, of wearing on all occasions a laurel wreath; he allowed annual religious ceremonies to be instituted in commemoration of his victories and a gilded statue to be erected in the Forum, bearing the inscription PACE POST DIVTVRNAS TVRBAS TERRA MARIQVE RESTITVTA—PEACE RESTORED, AFTER PROLONGED DISTURBANCES, ON LAND AND SEA; and as he announced his intention of erecting on a plot which he had purchased on the Palatine a temple to Apollo, who was believed to have indicated the spot by striking it with lightning, the

36 B.C. Honours awarded to him: his conciliatory measures: restoration of tranquillity.

[1] Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iv, 31]), appealing to Velleius, ii, 79, 6, who says that Titius, by whom Sextus was afterwards put to death in Asia, was driven out of the theatre of Pompey in Rome by the execrations of the spectators, insists that Italy 'had long hoped for his [Sextus's] success and had bitterly regretted his defeat'. The inference seems hasty. Sextus had admirers in Rome, probably among those who had not been kept on short commons by his interception of supplies (see pp. 94, 97–8); but the evidence for the statement in the text is ample.

[2] *Aug.*, 71, 1.

[3] *Ib.*, 13; 27, 3.

36 B.C. Senate built for him on an adjoining site a mansion at the public cost. In every city of the peninsula his name was enrolled among those of its tutelary deities.[1]

Much had still to be done before tranquillity could be completely restored. Calvisius Sabinus was entrusted with the duty of hunting down the brigands who infested Sicily. Numerous slaves who had escaped and taken service under Sextus, and who under the pact of Misenum had been declared free, were arrested and restored to their former owners, while those who were unclaimed were put to death. Octavian resigned in favour of certain magistrates powers which had been assumed by the Triumvirate; forbade the title Triumvir, which since the degradation of Lepidus had become a misnomer, to be stamped upon the coins bearing his name that were to be issued from the Roman mint;[2] announced his intention of restoring Republican government so soon as Antony should return from the Parthian war; and declared his conviction that, now that civil war was ended, Antony would do likewise. The people, who, while they welcomed the announcement, perhaps felt that one supreme ruler was still needed, conferred upon Octavian the sacrosanctity of a tribune for his life.[3]

Meanwhile Antony was at last endeavouring to execute the plan, which he had formed three years before in agreement with Octavian, of chastizing the Parthians and avenging the disaster of Carrhae. Much had already been done by the soldier of fortune who had come to his aid

[1] *C.I.L.*, i, p. 461; Virg., *Aen.*, viii, 684; *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 21; Vell., ii, 81, 3; Pliny, *Nat. hist.*, xvi, 4 (3), 7; Seneca, *De benef.*, iii, 32, 2; Suet., *Aug.*, 22; 29, 3; 72, 1; App., v, 130; 131, 543; 132, 456; Dio, xlix, 15, 1–3, 5; 16, 1; Oros., vi, 18, 34; H. Cohen, *Descr. hist. des monn.*, &c., i², 175–9; *J.R.S.*, iv, 1914, pp. 194, 205, and Pl. xxxv, xxxvii.

[2] Grueber (*op. cit.*, pp. 3, 8 n. 2, 414, 580 n. 1), who remarks (p. 2) that, perhaps in consequence of a senatorial decree, intended to do honour to Octavian, the names of the moneyers were thenceforth excluded from the Roman coinage, a change which made it virtually monarchical.

[3] *C.I.L.*, ix, 4503 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 2488 [cp. p. 268 *infra*]); *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 1–3; Suet., *Aug.*, 32, 1; App., v, 131; 132, 547–9; Dio, xlix, 12, 4–5; 15, 6; Oros., vi, 18, 33. See pp. 221–2.

Appian (v, 132, 547) remarks that the corps of 'night watchmen' (*nocturni vigiles*), which policed the capital, was said to have been formed in 36 B.C. The statement to which he referred was incorrect. See Suet., *Aug.*, 25, 2; 30, 1; Tac., *Hist.*, iii, 64; Dio, lv, 26, 4–5; *Dig.*, i, 15, 3; Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 414; and O. Hirschfeld, *D. Kaiserl. Verwaltungsbeamten*², &c., 1905, p. 253, n. 1.

after the defeat at Mutina. Labienus, who, though Orodes had shrunk from granting the aid which he had been commissioned by Brutus and Cassius to solicit,[1] remained at his court, saw an opportunity after the battle of Philippi of distinguishing himself by treason against Rome. Antony was dallying with Cleopatra; Octavian was struggling with Antony's wife and brother in Italy. The field was open. Labienus persuaded Orodes to entrust him with a force for a war of conquest. Accompanied by Pacorus, a son of Orodes, he invaded Syria, where the army of occupation left by Antony, largely composed of soldiers who had served under Brutus, joined him; received the surrender of Apamea and Antioch; and while Pacorus subdued the rest of the country, except Tyre, which could not be taken without a fleet, occupied Cilicia and the inland cities of the province Asia. Two years passed away, during which these Roman provinces remained in Parthian hands, and Antony, though he made an abortive attempt to relieve Tyre, was too distracted by his misunderstanding with Octavian to make any effort to recover them. When, however, the threatened rupture had been averted at Brundisium,[2] he sent Ventidius to reconquer the lost territory. Suddenly attacking Labienus, who fled to join Pacorus in Syria, Ventidius intercepted him near Mount Taurus and, encamping on a hill, repulsed the rash onslaught of a Parthian division which had come to reinforce him. Labienus, who escaped from the rout, was ultimately caught and killed. Ventidius followed up his victory by regaining possession of Cilicia and Syria, which the Parthians had abandoned. In the following year Pacorus again invaded Syria; but Ventidius, who inveigled him into crossing the Euphrates at a spot which involved a circuitous march, gained time for assembling reinforcements and, when the Parthians rashly attacked his commanding position at Gindarus, not far from Antioch, utterly defeated them on the anniversary of Carrhae.[4] Antony, who presently appeared,

41 B.C. Q. Labienus overruns Asia Minor,

Early in 39 B.C.[3] but is chastized by Ventidius.

38 B.C.

June 9.

[1] See p. 80.

[2] See p. 105.

[3] Cp. Bürcklein, *Quellen u. Chronol. d. röm.-parth. Feldzüge*, pp. 51–2, and Gardthausen, *Augustus u. seine Zeit*, ii, 112, n. 23.

[4] Nominal, for June 9, 53 B.C.=May 6 of the Julian calendar.

38 B.C. removed his too successful lieutenant from command. 88 B.C. Fifty years before Ventidius had figured as a captive in the triumph of Pompeius Strabo: in the November following his victory he enjoyed the well-earned honour of a triumph and a thanksgiving service. The same distinctions were conferred upon Antony (who was not destined to celebrate his triumph), doubtless through the influence of his fellow Triumvir, who judiciously ignored the fact that he had made his sole contribution to the victory when he sent Ventidius to gain it.[1]

Ventidius, before he was superseded, had laid siege to Samosata, the capital of Commagene,[2] a district of Syria. Antiochus, the ruler of this tract, offered a thousand talents as the price of peace, and requested him to communicate the offer to his chief. Antony forbade his lieutenant to negotiate and continued the siege, but, encountering obstinate resistance, was fain to accept a much smaller sum.[3] Before he set out to fulfil his promise of assisting Octavian against Sextus,[4] he appointed Gaius Sosius to protect Syria and Publius Canidius Crassus to subdue the Caucasian tribes. Sosius overthrew Antigonus, who, though he had appeared as a captive in the second triumph of Pompey the Great,[5] had been installed by Pacorus as King of the Jews, delivered him over to Antony, who executed him, and restored to power Herod, the son of that Antipater who had supported Caesar in his Egyp-

Antony at Samosata.

37 B.C. His preparations for war with Parthia.

[1] *C.I.L.*, i, p. 461; Livy, *Epit.*, 127; Vell., ii, 65, 3; 78, 1; Val. Max., vi, 9, 9; Strabo, xvi, 2, 8; Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xiv, 13; 14, 6; 15, 1. 7; *Bell.*, i, 15, 2; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, vii, 43 (44), 135; Plut., *Ant.*, 34, 2; Juvenal, vii, 199–201; Frontin., *Strat.*, i, 1, 6; Flor., ii, 19, 3–7; Gell., xv, 4, 3–4; Justin., xlii, 4, 7–10; App., v, 52, 216; 65, 276; Dio, xlviii, 24, 6–8; 25–6; 27, 1–3; 39, 3–4; 40; 41, 1–4; xlix, 19; 20, 1–4; 21, 1; Eutrop., vii, 5; Oros., vi, 18, 23. Cp. Grueber, *op. cit.*, ii, 500, n. 1, and nos. 131–2 [Pl. cxiii. 19–20].

[2] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 212.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 34, 3; Dio, xlix, 22, 1–2. Dio, says Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 386, n. 4 [Eng. tr., iii, 288, n. §]), 'is wrong in saying that Antony started for Italy'. At all events his statement is misleading; but, although he seems to mean that Antony started for Italy in the consulships of Claudius and Norbanus (38 B.C.), the capture of Jerusalem, which he assigns (§§ 3–6) to that year, really occurred in 37, and he is perhaps referring to the journey to Italy which Antony made then, and which he describes in xlviii, 54, 1–6 (see pp. 112–3) and in xlix, 23, 1.

[4] See pp. 111–2.

[5] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 301.

tian campaign;[1] Crassus, by defeating the Albanians and Iberians and compelling their respective rulers to serve as allies, prepared the way for the Parthian expedition.[2] Antony, after he and his colleague had resolved to prolong their triumviral power, returned, as we have seen, to Syria, and, sending a messenger to fetch Cleopatra, made his arrangements for the coming campaign.[3] We do not know whether he had intended, when he left Cleopatra, to return, or whether she feared that he might forsake her; but he must have reflected that her support might eventually be useful, and from our knowledge of their subsequent intercourse it seems reasonable to infer that during his absence he corresponded with her, perhaps giving assurance that a political marriage could not make him forget his love. She desired to recover lands in the kingdom of Herod which had once belonged to Egypt; and Antony, although he could resist her demands when they became excessive,[4] allowed her to take possession of the rich districts round Jericho, and at the same time gratified her by other territorial gifts.[5]

36 B.C.

37 B.C.

His territorial gifts to Cleopatra.

A dynastic crisis had lately occurred in Parthia. Orodes, old and saddened by the fate of Pacorus, whose head, after he fell in the battle of Gindarus, had been sent by Ventidius, as a proof of victory, from city to city in Syria, abdicated in favour of Phraates, his eldest son. The new king, resolving to secure himself against all contingencies, instantly and treacherously murdered his father, his surviving brothers, and various prominent men. Monaeses, a powerful noble, fled with other survivors and joined Antony, who, taking instant advantage of this good fortune, promised to Monaeses the reversion of the Parthian throne, and made him a present, as a pledge of good faith, of three Syrian towns,[6] to be held till the end of the war.

He takes advantage of a crisis in Parthia.

36 B.C.

[1] Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xiv, 16; xv, 1, 2; *Bell.*, i, 17, 2; 18, 2–3; Plut., *Ant.*, 36, 2; Dio, xlix, 22, 3–6; Oros., vi, 18, 24. In July, 37 B.C., Herod with the assistance of Sosius captured Jerusalem (Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 15, 4; *Bell. Iud.*, i, 17, 8; 18, 2; *Hermes*, xxix, 1894, pp. 563–71). Cp. Grueber, *op. cit.*, ii, 508, n. 2, and no. 146 (Pl. cxiv. 9).

[2] Dio, xlix, 24, 1.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 36, 1; App., v, 95, 399; Dio, xlviii, 54, 6.

[4] Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 7, 9; *Bell. Iud.*, vii, 8, 4.

[5] See p. 228, n. 11.

[6] Arethusa, Hierapolis (Bambyce), and Larissa (Sizara).

36 B.C. Phraates, alarmed by the defection of his most powerful subject, sent envoys, who induced him by lavish promises to return. Antony, hoping to deceive Phraates into the belief that he did not contemplate invasion, permitted Monaeses to depart, and offered to make peace on the sole condition that Phraates should restore the standards that had been captured in the battle of Carrhae.[1] When he undertook the campaign which Caesar had contemplated, he must have known that to avenge that calamitous defeat would add enormously, in the West not less than in the East, to the prestige which he had won by his victory at Philippi; but to those who consider the significance of his later measures it will be evident that he had also conceived the grandiose idea of creating, like Alexander the Great, a vast Oriental kingdom, the provinces of which should be administered by satraps whom he would nominate.[2] The army, soon to be largely reinforced, which he assembled at Zeugma, where Crassus had crossed the Euphrates, consisted of ten legions and ten thousand cavalry,[3] for the most part Gauls and Spaniards, such as Caesar had employed. His plan of campaign, which was recommended by Artavasdes, the King of Armenia,[4] but which he may have independently formed or derived from the papers of Caesar, was utterly different from that which Crassus had followed to his own ruin. Crassus, rejecting the counsel of Artavasdes, had moved eastward from the Euphrates into Mesopotamia: Antony learned from Artavasdes, if he did not himself foresee, that in Mesopotamia not only would he lack supplies and be forced to dispense with Armenian aid, but his cavalry, inadequate in number, exposed to attack on the open plain, and unaccustomed to Parthian tactics, would be unable to resist the mounted archers, who had destroyed the army of Crassus, and were waiting to destroy his. On the other hand, if he advanced northward along the right bank of the Euphrates, and then turned eastward through Armenia, he would find abundant sup-

His plan of operations.

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 37, 1; Justin., xlii, 4, 11–6; Dio, xlix, 23–4.
[2] See Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.*, v, 360–3 (Eng. tr., ii, 24–6).
[3] Strabo, xi, 13, 4; Plut., *Ant.*, 37, 2; *Hermes*, xxxi, 1896, p. 71, n. 5.
[4] Strabo, xi, 13, 4; Plut., *Ant.*, 39, 1; Dio, xlix, 25, 1.

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

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plies; in that mountainous country he would be secure from attack; Canidius Crassus, the dynasts whom Canidius had subdued, Polemo, the King of Pontus, the King of Armenia with numerous squadrons, armed like the Parthians and conversant with Parthian tactics, would be waiting to join him; and, thus reinforced, he would move southward through Media upon the Parthian rear. These advantages would fully compensate for the length of the détour.[1] 36 B.C.

His campaign.

It was probably about the middle of May when Antony, bidding farewell to Cleopatra, opened the campaign.[2] The statement of Plutarch[3] that he marched 'through Arabia and Armenia' has occasioned the conjecture that, as he had concentrated his force at Zeugma in order to lure the enemy away from their base and deceive them as to his real aim, so he attempted to cover his northward march by a demonstration on the east of the Euphrates.[4] Advancing through Perre to Melitene and thence along the Euphrates to Satala, whence he turned eastward, he joined his reinforcements on the high plateau of Erzerum, where a review of the army, over one hundred thousand strong, was held.[5] But now, in his anxiety to gain time, he made a hazardous move. Entrusting his heavy baggage and his siege train to his lieutenant, Oppius Statianus, with orders to advance in company with Artavasdes by a circuitous route, he pushed on with the bulk of his army by a shorter road, impracticable for wagons, leaving the snow-clad pyramid of Ararat on his left, till he struck the middle Araxes, then turned southward across the treeless plain east of Lake Urmia, and laid siege to the hill-fort of Phraaspa, the capital of Artavasdes, King of the Medes, an enemy of his

[Takht-i-Sulemán (Solomon's Throne).]

[1] See pp. 223–5.

[2] See pp. 225–6.

[3] *Ant.*, 37, 2.

[4] See Pliny, *Nat. hist.*, v, 24 (21), 86; Gardthausen, *Augustus u. seine Zeit*, ii, 152, n. 16; and *Hermes*, xxxiii, 101–2.

[5] Plut., *Ant.*, 37, 2 Plutarch here says that Artavasdes appeared at the review with 6,000 horse and 7,000 foot; in a later passage (50, 1) that he had led 16,000 horse (ἱππεῖς ἑξακισχιλίους καὶ μυρίους) from Media. Th. Doehner, in view of the earlier passage, deleted καὶ μυρίους; but Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxi, 83–4), citing Strabo (xi, 14, 9), from whom we learn that Artavasdes, when he invaded Media with Antony, had 6,000 mail-clad horse, besides the rest of his cavalry, rightly retains the suspected words.

36 B.C. Armenian namesake and a dependant of the Parthian king.[1] But he had underestimated the mobility of the Parthians. When Phraates learned that instead of marching through Mesopotamia he had gone northward, he returned and in conjunction with a Median force attacked Statianus not far from the southern end of Lake Urmia. Statianus instantly sent messengers to Antony to ask for aid. Antony hurried to the rescue, but found that his baggage had been plundered, his siege train destroyed, and many of the escort slain. The King of Armenia had failed to assist Statianus and had withdrawn with his contingent to Armenia.[2] Returning to Phraaspa, Antony encountered the Parthian mounted archers and, thanks to his powerful corps of slingers, routed them; but, as Artavasdes with his cavalry was not present, comparatively few were slain.[3] Despite the loss of his engines, Antony resumed the siege. He had constructed, or had begun to construct, a mound (as Pompey had done at Jerusalem and Caesar in the Gallic War) to enable the besiegers to approach the fort, and apparently he found sufficient timber to make sappers' huts and catapults:[4] but the besieged made vigorous sallies; the besiegers were harassed by the Parthian archers; the foragers were allowed to go out, but attacked as they returned to camp. As, however, Antony persisted even after the autumnal equinox, Phraates, who feared that his own troops would disperse to spend the winter in their homes, offered to negotiate. Antony, hoping to retreat without dishonour, demanded the restoration of the standards and the prisoners that had been captured at Carrhae; but Phraates of course refused, and Antony was obliged to content himself with a promise that he should be permitted to retreat un-

[1] Strabo (who gives Phraaspa another name, Vera), xi, 13, 3; Plut., *Ant.*, 38, 1; Dio, xlix, 25, 1–2.

[2] Vell., ii, 82, 2; Plut., *Ant.*, 38, 1; Dio, xlix, 25, 3–5; 26, 1.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 39, 2–5; Dio, xlix, 26, 2. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxi, 103.

[4] Plutarch (*Ant.*, 38, 1) implies that it was impossible, for want of timber, to replace the lost engines; but Dio (xlix, 28, 1) says that the engines and the sappers' huts were burnt by the Medes during the siege, and the embankment, though Plutarch says that lack of engines forced Antony to erect it, would have been comparatively useless without them. If Plutarch is right in saying that the engines were captured or destroyed by Phraates, some must afterwards have been improvised.

molested. To protract the siege into the winter was out of the question, for it would have been hardly possible to feed his army or his cattle. Even before he departed and while he was waiting for the ratification of the peace, the Medes, destroying the mound, burned the huts and catapults, and the Parthians suddenly attacked the unwary legions. An old soldier, who had fought at Carrhae, urging Antony not to return, as he had intended, by the route by which he had come, but to cross the mountains of Tabriz, where he would be comparatively secure, offered to be his guide.[1] The advice saved the army from destruction; but the retreat was disastrous. The Gallic cavalry was of some slight use; but Artavasdes and his horsemen were not there to repel the Parthian archers. Antony adopted the precaution of marching in a hollow parallelogram, with his baggage within, and slingers covering his flanks and rear; but this device, although it reduced his losses, did not prevent incessant harassing attacks. Passes were held by the enemy; trenches were dug and palisades erected to delay the progress of the column. Little corn was to be procured, and that at famine prices. Antony was tempted to return to the plain by Parthians, who assured him that he would there find abundant water, but that if he clung to the mountains he would soon get none; but he was warned in time by a cousin of Monaeses, who, coming from the enemy's camp, told him that a force was awaiting his descent in ambuscade. He made one of his attendants swear to kill him if the situation should become desperate; but meanwhile he showed, as his friend Dellius testified, that he was still a leader of men. Consoling the wounded and personally attending to their wants, encouraging the able-bodied to endure the trials which he shared, he won, as he had done in more fortunate campaigns, the devotion and the love of all. After twenty-seven days, during which the enemy had been repelled in eighteen combats, the Araxes was reached. Since the army quitted Zeugma four and twenty thousand men had died, more by sickness than

36 B.C.

The retreat from Phraaspa.

[1] Vell., ii, 82, 2; Flor., ii, 20, 4. According to Plutarch (*Ant.*, 41, 1), the guide was a Mardian—an Asiatic from the south of the Caspian. May we suppose that he was a Roman who had settled there?

36 B.C. in battle; but the Parthians now ceased from troubling, for the line of retreat passed through Armenia. Artavasdes presented himself at the frontier and was received with a show of friendship; for Antony depended for supplies upon his goodwill. The troops suffered much from cold as they traversed the snow-clad mountains, and it is said that in this last stage of the retreat eight thousand men perished; but before the end of winter the remnant of the greatest army that had ever been assembled by a Roman general reached Syria. Clothing had been provided for the soldiers by the energy of Cleopatra, and with the funds which she contributed, and which Antony supplemented from his own purse, he was enabled to give a small present to every man.[1]

Antony returns to Alexandria.

He sets up kings and acknowledges his paternity of Cleopatra's twin sons.

Antony returned immediately to Alexandria, and about this time made dynastic arrangements as if he had attained his ambition of becoming a great Oriental monarch, appointing Amyntas, who had once been a clerk, and whom he had already made satrap of Pisidia, ruler of Galatia as well as of parts of Lycaonia and Pamphylia, and establishing Archelaus in the kingdom of Cappadocia, which he had granted to him five years before,[2] but which had been afterwards seized by Ariarathes.[3] At the same time he formally acknowledged his paternity of twin sons, Alexander and Ptolemy Philadelphus, whom Cleopatra had borne him.[4] While he was still at Alexandria, envoys from

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 130; Vell., ii, 82, 2–3; Plut., *Ant.*, 39, 6–7; 40–51; Frontin., *Strat.*, ii, 3, 15; Flor., ii, 20, 5–10; Dio, xlix, 26, 3–5; 27–31; Eutrop., vii, 6; Oros., vi, 19, 1. Dio (xlix, 32, 1–2) says that, although Antony's dispatches were false, his failure was rumoured at Rome, but that Octavian, who was still struggling unsuccessfully against Sextus Pompeius, and therefore thought it impolitic to publish the truth, offered sacrifices and held festivals in Antony's honour. Dio, always ready to explain motives, forgot that Sextus was defeated on the 3rd of September, before Antony began his retreat, and that news of his failure could hardly have reached Rome before the end of the year.

If Dio is right in assigning Antony's return to Egypt to 36 B.C., he must, as one may infer from Plutarch (*Ant.*, 51, 1), have hurried by carriage to the neighbourhood of Sidon in advance of the army, which could hardly have arrived before the early spring of 35. Dio (xlix, 31, 3) implies that the army wintered in Armenia. [2] See p. 91.

[3] Strabo, xii, 2, 11; 5, 1; Val. Max., ix, 15, ext. 2; Tac., *Ann.*, ii, 42; App., v, 75, 319; Dio, xlix, 32, 3. Cp. *Paulys Real-Ency.*, ii, 451.

[4] Dio, xlix, 32. According to Plutarch (*Ant.*, 36, 3), Antony would seem

Sextus Pompeius approached him with an offer of alliance, which he was not unwilling to accept, against Octavian. The last adventures of the defeated corsair, to which Appian devoted twelve tedious paragraphs, have no historical importance. He had intended to rely upon the friendship of the Triumvir whom he had once supported;[1] but when he learned that Antony had failed in the Parthian campaign he attempted to hedge. While his envoys were travelling to Alexandria he sent others to the King of Parthia. The latter were intercepted and conveyed to Antony, who confronted them with the former. Sextus contrived to raise mercenaries and gained some momentary successes against lieutenants of Antony, but was ultimately killed at Midaeium in the province of Asia. Antony, who had ordered his execution, presently relented; but the order, which reached the captor of Sextus later than the countermand, was perhaps mistaken for the final resolve.[2]

35 B.C.

The fate of Sextus Pompeius.

About this time the King of Media, who had quarrelled with Phraates, solicited the alliance of Antony. Though Antony agreed, his forces were far too reduced to allow of his invading Parthia, and his present aim was to punish the King of Armenia. He sent him a friendly invitation with the intention, it is said, of killing him; but as the suspicious overture was declined, he left Egypt, ostensibly to attack the Parthians, in the hope of finding the Armenian off his guard. Perhaps Octavian hoped that his absence from Cleopatra might be utilized for reviving his connexion with his lawful wife: at all events he made an effort to secure his friendship—if only for a time—in the interest

Antony's designs against Armenia.

to have acknowledged his paternity of Cleopatra's children at Zeugma, immediately before he began his Parthian campaign. Both he and Dio record the fact in connexion with the gifts which he made in 36 B.C. to Cleopatra. Although I have given reasons (p. 228, n. 11) for preferring the authority of Plutarch in regard to the latter, I here, not without hesitation, follow Dio; for it seems more probable that Antony made his formal acknowledgement of paternity at Alexandria than at Zeugma.

[1] See p. 103.

[2] Livy, *Epit.*, 131; Vell., ii, 79, 5; 87, 2; Flor., ii, 18, 8; Strabo, iii, 2, 2; App., v, 133–44; Dio, xlix, 17, 4–6; 18; Eutrop., vii, 6; Oros., vi, 19, 2. According to Appian, Sextus was killed at Miletus. The question is unimportant.

35 B.C. of peace.[1] He had no reason to fear attack from Antony's weakened army; he was himself about to undertake a campaign in Illyricum; and he had manifested his desire for friendly relations with his colleague not only by suppressing all public mention of his Parthian failure, but also by holding a festival in honour of his imaginary success. Accordingly he allowed his sister to visit her husband with two thousand legionaries, intended to serve as his bodyguard, and to present him with clothing for his army, transport cattle in place of those which had perished, and a sum of money. But Antony had now given himself up to Cleopatra, who, while she knew how to retain his sexual love uncloyed, could divert him by her 'infinite variety', and he had a grievance: the legionaries whom Octavian had promised in exchange for the loan of ships had been withheld.[2] Learning in Syria on his northward journey that his wife had reached Athens, Antony accepted her gifts, but ordered her to return to Italy, and returned himself to his mistress. In spite of the rebuff which she and her brother had received, Octavia remained a loving mother and a faithful wife. Though Octavian desired her to quit her husband's house, she continued to live there and to take as much care of the children whom he had had by Fulvia as of her own infant daughters.[3] But a rupture between the two Triumvirs was now inevitable.

Octavia rebuffed by Antony.

The aim of the campaign which Octavian had just begun, though it is not expressly stated by our authorities, is evident to all who have studied his career. Like his adoptive father,[4] from whom he had learned his first lessons in

Octavian's Illyrian campaigns.

[1] According to Plutarch (*Ant.*, 53, 1), it was generally believed that Octavian permitted his sister to visit her husband in order that, being neglected and insulted by him, she might give a colourable pretext for war; but, as Mommsen says (*Röm. Gesch.*, v, 368 [Eng. tr., ii, 32]), the mere fact that he was about to enter on the Illyrian campaign proves that he desired to keep the peace. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 14, 32.

[2] Whether Octavian required them for the Illyrian campaign or feared that they might be used against himself, I am unable to decide.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 52–3; 54, 1–3; Dio, xlix, 33. Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iv, 45, n. §]), contradicting his own text, accepts the view of Bouché-Leclercq (*Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 269) that Antony was not duped by the pretended sickness of Cleopatra (Plut., *Ant.*, 53, 4–5), but abandoned his proposed expedition spontaneously.

[4] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 325.

statesmanship, he purposed to safeguard the Italian frontier by subduing the tribes whose territory extended from the northern extremity of the Adriatic to the southern limit of Dalmatia and by an aggressive expedition into the basin of the Danube. Although Illyricum had long been a Roman province,[1] it was a scene of chronic unrest. The Iapodes, who inhabited the country behind Fiume, had plundered the Roman colony of Tergeste (now Trieste). Pirates sallied forth from the islands along the coast. The Dalmatians, not yet thoroughly subjugated, had inflicted a severe defeat soon after the battle of Pharsalia upon Caesar's lieutenant, Gabinius,[2] and, although Vatinius did his best to subdue them,[3] had withheld their tribute ever since. After the treaty of Misenum Octavian had been obliged to send Pollio to Dyrrachium, to suppress a rebellion of the Parthini.[4] 35 B.C.

The campaign opened in the northern area. While his lieutenants, moving eastward from Aquileia, crossed the Julian Alps and subdued the country as far as Emona, or Laibach, Octavian advanced in a south-easterly direction to Senia (now Zengg), and there joined his fleet, which, after defeating Sextus Pompeius, had sailed from Sicily. Reinforced by legionaries who manned it, he pushed on, still south-eastward, against the Iapodes, whose strongholds,[5] between the sea and the mountains, he captured unopposed. The highlanders of the tribe, who had raided Tergeste, were made of sterner stuff. Turning north-eastward, Octavian found his advance impeded by trees which they had felled, and when he ascended the valley of the Vrnjika they congregated by its source near Terpo, determined to fight; but he outmanœuvred them by detaching columns, which, ascending the heights on either side, fell upon their flanks and rear, and Terpo forthwith surrendered. But three thousand picked men were prepared to resist to the last. Hard by on the north-east, near the site of the modern Čakovac, was a hill-fort called Metulum,[6]

[1] See p. 247, n. 5. [2] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 216–7.
[3] Cic., *Fam.*, v, 10A; 10, 3; App., *Ill.*, 13.
[4] App., v, 75, 320 ; Dio, xlviii, 41, 7.
[5] Monetium, Avendo, Arupium. [6] See pp. 226–7.

35 B.C. divided by a valley into two parts, the higher facing south-east, the lower north-west. Octavian, after vainly attempting to take the stronghold by assault, invested it and erected a mound against the wall, extending along a steep declivity, which protected the south-western side of the upper fort. After an arduous struggle a battering-ram, planted on the mound, was brought to bear upon the wall, whereupon the defenders retreated within another, which they had hastily erected on the edge of the plateau behind. Octavian speedily constructed two parallel mounds, and, while the defenders were distracted by a demonstration which he directed against the lower fort, made an attempt, in the course of which he was thrice wounded, to deliver the assault. Undaunted by repeated failures, the assailants persevered until the defenders withdrew into the lower fort; but as Octavian required them to lay down their arms, they made a desperate onslaught on the position which they had abandoned, and, when it was repelled, the women, assembled in a building to which their guards had been ordered, in the event of a repulse, to set fire, committed themselves and their children to the flames. The fall of Metulum was decisive, and Octavian invaded Pannonia.[1] His immediate object was to capture Siscia, a strong place some sixty miles north-east of Metulum, near the confluence of the Kulpa with the Save, and thus to secure a base for a campaign, which Caesar had contemplated, against the Dacians.[2] The Segestani, to whom Siscia belonged, had twice repelled Roman attacks; but they were a loose conglomeration of clans, without a head. Receiving no offer of submission on his march, Octavian devastated the country and burned the villages. As he approached Siscia, delegates presented themselves and inquired what he wanted. He demanded hostages and permission to garrison the town. The leading men were ready to submit; but the multitude resolved to fight. The town was protected not only by the waters of the Kulpa and the Save, but also by dry channels connecting it with

[1] Without provocation, says Dio (xlix, 36, 1), who attributes to Octavian the motive of giving exercise and booty to the army.

[2] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 325.

either stream and by an entrenchment which had been thrown up between the Save and the northern end of the wall. Octavian was therefore forced to carry his contravallation round the outer banks of the two rivers and to bridge the Kulpa just below the confluence as well as opposite the town. Immediately north of the town he pitched his camp, from which he drew an entrenchment, forming part of the contravallation, to the Save, while two parallel mounds were erected against the northern section of the wall. A Pannonian contingent, which attempted to relieve the defenders, was repulsed, and on the thirtieth day of the siege the fort was taken by storm. Leaving a strong garrison to hold it, Octavian returned to Rome, where he empowered his wife and his sister to manage their own affairs without restriction and invested them with the sacrosanctity that had belonged, in the later Republic, to the tribunes of the people alone[1]—privileges which connoted the idea of Monarchy. It is said that in the spring he went to Gaul with the intention of invading Britain, but abandoned the design on hearing that the Segestani had rebelled;[2] but if the statement is correct, we may assume that he did not intend to do more than make preliminary inquiries, for it is hardly credible that he was ready to divert his forces from the campaign which he had begun. Returning to Siscia, he found that there was some foundation for the rumour: the Segestani had attacked the garrison, but had been severely punished. If he had not already decided, in view of the attitude of Antony, to postpone his campaign against the Dacians, he did so now, for during the rest of the year he was engaged in war with the Dalmatians. Their leader, anticipating attack, fortified Promona, a Liburnian town on the road by which the Romans must advance, and established outposts on a series of hills, which he entrenched, extending northward from the town. Commanding the road, these troops compelled Octavian to quit it and advance by a détour on its eastern side to the spot which he selected for his camp, close to and east of Promona. Prevented by the outposts

35 B.C.

34 B.C.

[1] Dio, xlix, 38, 1.

[2] Cp. App., *Ill.*, 24, with Dio, xlix, 38, 2–3, and see *Anc. Britain*, p. 367.

34 B.C. from investing the town, he sent a detachment by night along the route by which he had himself advanced to attack them from the west. The more northerly outposts were surprised in their sleep and butchered,[1] but the two nearest to Promona still held out. Octavian, however, succeeded in enclosing them both as well as the town by a contravallation; a force which attempted to relieve the garrison was routed; a sortie was repulsed, and the town was taken.

The fall of Promona enabled Octavian to advance into Dalmatia. After capturing and setting fire to Synodium, he entered the defile in which the army of Gabinius had been trapped. More cautious than his forerunner, he detached flanking columns, which, moving over the wooded heights, dislodged the enemy who were lurking in ambush, and finally laid siege to Setovia (not far north of the modern Spalato), which, standing on an eminence girt by rocky precipices, could only be subdued by famine. While the blockade was still in progress Octavian, leaving Taurus in command, departed for Rome to assume his second consul-

Jan 1, 33 B.C. ship, which he instantly resigned, and forthwith returned to Dalmatia. The starving garrison surrendered, restored the standards which they had taken from Gabinius, and promised to pay their tribute.[2] Thenceforth, for seventeen

[1] Cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 105, n. 2.

[2] The ancient authorities for the Illyrian war are Strabo, iv, 6, 10; vii, 5, 2. 4; *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 39–40; Livy, *Epit.*, 131–2; Vell., ii, 78, 2; Flor., ii, 23, 7; 24, 8–9; 25, 12; Suet., *Aug.*, 20; App., *Ill.*, 13, 15–28 (the principal source); Dio, xlix, 35–8; Oros., vi, 19, 3. See also *Hermes*, xxxiii, 1898, pp. 1–12, and, above all, G. Veith (*Schr. d. Balkankomm. d. K. Akad. d. Wiss. in Wien*, Ant. Abt., vii, 1914) and Kromayer-Veith, *Schlachten-Atlas*, &c., röm. Abt., col. 117–22 and Blatt 24. 1–5. Dio (xlix, 38, 3) incorrectly says that in 34 B.C. Valerius Messalla subdued the Salassi, an event which really occurred seven years later. F. L. Ganter (*Provinzialverwaltung*, &c., pp. 69–70) acutely conjectures that Dio found in his authority that the campaign belonged to a year in which Octavian contemplated an invasion of Britain. This happened both in 34 and 27, and Dio probably supposed that the former year was meant. [Mr. J. Hammer (*Prolegomena to an edition of the Panegyricus Messalae*, 1925, pp. 34–40), differing from Ganter, asserts that Messalla did subdue the Salassi in 34. Now Appian (*Ill.*, 17), after describing the futile expedition which Antistius Vetus undertook against the Salassi in 34, and which lasted two years, says that Octavian, war with Antony being imminent, made no attempt to punish them, but permitted them to retain autonomy, whereupon they resumed and continued their raids until Messalla

years, Dalmatia remained at peace; and during or just after the war Emona, Tergeste, and other towns were endowed with the rights of Italian municipalities,[1] while discharged veterans of the 2nd legion were settled in the Gallic town Arausio, or Orange.[2] Octavian, though, unlike Caesar, he was not disposed to Romanize the provinces, was obliged to reward the soldiers, and therefore to follow the example which Caesar had set, in pursuance of the policy of Gaius Gracchus, when he founded colonies of Roman citizens in Carthage, Corinth, and Gaul.[3] 33 B.C.

It is easy to imagine how the pacification of Illyricum enhanced the prestige of Octavian, who impressed upon the Senate the contrast between his own achievement and the failure of Antony.[4] To keep it before the eyes of the populace, he devoted the proceeds of the booty which he had gained to the rebuilding of a colonnade near the Flaminian Circus, which had been built more than a century before by Octavius, the conqueror of Perseus, and which he renamed the Octavian Portico, depositing there the standards recovered in the war.[5] Though he postponed the triumph which the Senate decreed,[6] he secured the fidelity of his marshals by granting them the same distinction.[7] In the effort to win the support of the Roman people he was aided by Agrippa as effectively as he had been not only in war, but from the moment when he left

Octavian commemorates his success and rewards his lieutenants.

Public services of Agrippa.

was sent against them and subdued them. Hammer makes no serious reply to Ganter. His case rests upon three assumptions—that Octavian's agreement with the Salassi, made in 34, was broken in the same year, that the renewed raids of the Salassi and the consequent punitive campaign of Messalla were compressed within whatever short space may be supposed to have remained of it, and that war with Antony, which did not begin till 31, was imminent in 34!]

[1] Th. Mommsen, *Res gestae*², &c., p. 121.

[2] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 4 (5), 36; Dio, xlix, 34, 4; 35, 1. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 322, note, and *Hermes*, xxxi, 15–7.

[3] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 28; iii, 321, and cp. *Class. Philol.*, x, 1915, p. 378.

[4] App., *Ill.*, 16.

[5] *Ib.*, 28; *Mon. Ancyr.*, iv, 2–4; Dio, xlix, 43, 8 (inaccurate). Cp. Mommsen, *Res gestae*², &c., p. 80.

[6] Livy, *Epit.*, 133; Suet., *Aug.*, 22; App., *Ill.*, 28; Dio, li, 21, 5.

[7] *C.I.L.*, i², p. 180; Dio, xlix, 42, 3. Dio (43, 6) incorrectly adds that Octavian procured a senatorial decree, under which certain individuals of humble origin were enrolled as patricians. See Th. Mommsen, *Res gestae*², &c., p. 34.

33 B.C. Apollonia to recover his inheritance. Before the close of the Illyrican campaign Agrippa had repaired at his own
34 B.C. cost the Marcian aqueduct,[1] which supplied Rome with
33 B.C. its purest water: in the following year, although he had already held the consulship, he became an aedile, with Octavian as his colleague, and, besides discharging the regular duties of the office, executed important public works. He constructed a fresh aqueduct, which he named, after the adopted name of his chief, the *Aqua Iulia*, repaired roads and public buildings at his own expense, thoroughly cleansed the sewers, actually rowing down the most ancient of the three[2] into the Tiber, and provided baths free of charge for both sexes. Lavish distributions of oil and salt, tickets dropped among humble spectators in the theatre, which entitled them to gifts of money and clothing, games conducted on a magnificent scale,[3] doubtless increased the popularity of the Government.

Antony's inglorious conquest of Armenia. 34 B.C.

Antony had meanwhile made an attempt to wipe out the discredit of his Parthian failure. His aim was to punish the King of Armenia, on whom he laid the blame. Advancing through Artaxata, as if he were about to renew the war, he induced him to come to his camp, where he fettered him, in recognition of his rank, with silver chains; the King's son, Artaxes, who was enthroned in his stead by the Armenian notables, was defeated by the King of the Medes, and Armenia remained at the disposal of Antony. After betrothing his son Alexander, upon whom he purposed to bestow the kingdom, to the daughter of the Median King, he returned to Alexandria, where he celebrated his inglorious conquest by a quasi-Roman triumph, and, while he sat on a gilded chair, placed upon a silver tribunal, caused the captive and his attendants to be paraded in chains before Cleopatra, to whom they refused

[1] Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxvi, 15 (24), 131; Frontin., *De aq.*, i, 9 (who gives the date incorrectly); Dio, xlix, 42, 2.

[2] 'This', says Prof. Stuart Jones (*Companion to Roman Hist.*, 1912, p. 152), 'would no longer be possible, as the water-level of Rome has risen at least 3 metres.'

[3] Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 128; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxvi, 15 (24), 104; Frontin., *De aq.*, i, 9; Dio, xlix, 43, 1–4. Dio (xlviii, 32, 3) incorrectly attributes the *Aqua Iulia* to 40 B.C.

to do homage.[1] He now made evident his intention of creating an Oriental monarchy. In a public assembly he named Cleopatra Queen of Kings and Caesarion, who, he affirmed, was the legitimate son of Caesar, King of Kings, and declared them joint rulers of Egypt, Coelesyria, and Cyprus, while he appointed the children—Ptolemy, Cleopatra, and Alexander—whom Cleopatra had borne to him sovereigns respectively of Syria with the whole of Asia Minor west of the Euphrates, Cyrenaica, Armenia, and, as soon as it should be conquered, Parthia. The two little boys appeared at the assembly, attended by guards belonging to their respective kingdoms, and attired, one in a Median, the other, as a successor of Alexander the Great, in a Macedonian dress.[2] In the following year Antony marched as far as the Araxes, ostensibly with the object of invading Parthia, perhaps in the hope of regaining the credit that he had lost in Italy, but returned after making an alliance with the Median King, who, in consideration of a gift of a part of Armenia and a promise of aid against the Parthians, restored the standards which he had captured,[3] and undertook to help him against Octavian. The unwary King, after a temporary success, was expelled from Armenia when Antony recalled his troops; the Median cavalry whom he himself lent were dispatched under Canidius Crassus, with Antony's sixteen legions, to Ephesus, in readiness for the coming war.[4]

34 B.C. He bestows titles and territorial gifts upon Cleopatra and her children.

33 B.C. His alliance with the King of Media.

By this time the rival Triumvirs had declared themselves. Octavian, although he had celebrated the imaginary victories of Antony in his Parthian campaign, had ignored the conquest of Armenia.[5] Coins struck in commemoration of the conquest, most probably after Antony assembled his army at Ephesus,[6] bore his image conjoined

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 131; Vell., ii, 82, 3; Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 4, 3; *Bell. Iud.*, i, 18, 5; Plut., *Ant.*, 50, 2; Tac., *Ann.*, ii, 3; Dio, xlix, 39–40; Oros., vi, 19, 3; Babelon, *op. cit.*, i, 195. 95.

[2] Plut., *Ant.*, 54, 3; Dio, xlix, 41, 1–3; *C.I.L.*, iii, 7232. Cp. Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 278, n. 5, and Ferrero, *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 472, n. 1 (Eng. tr., iv, 52, n. †).

[3] See p. 126.

[4] Plut., *Ant.*, 56, 1; Dio, xlix, 44.

[5] Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxiii, 37) conjectures that on January 1, 33, before Octavian resigned the consulship, he denounced in the Senate the recent proceedings of Antony in Alexandria.

[6] See p. 231.

33 B.C. with that of Cleopatra, whose new title was recorded; and it is not unreasonable to infer that he had already celebrated his marriage with the Egyptian Queen.[1] If he reflected, as he surely must have done, that bigamy with an Oriental, openly proclaimed while his Roman wife still lived, and his lavish distribution of Roman provinces would exasperate opinion in Italy against him, he may have calculated that the marriage, which Cleopatra probably demanded, would greatly strengthen his position in the East, that Cleopatra would place her wealth at his disposal, and that, since the inevitable contest with Octavian must assume the character of a contest between East and West, it would be to his advantage that the East should rally round him as the consort of an Eastern potentate.

His marriage with Cleopatra.

In the previous winter[2] Octavian had written to him, making various complaints.[3] An extract from his reply, in which he referred to the most delicate matters with Latin directness, has been preserved. 'What', he asked, 'has made you change? That I have connexion with the Queen? She is my wife. Am I beginning now, or was it nine years ago? Do you, may I ask, have connexion only with Drusilla? Good luck to you if, when you read this letter, you've not been with Tertulla or Terentilla or Rufilla or Salvia Titisenia or all of them!'[4] An acrimonious official correspondence followed, which was doubtless intended to influence opinion. Antony complained that Octavian had deprived their colleague Lepidus of office, appropriated the forces of Lepidus and Sextus Pompeius instead of sharing them with him, broken his promise, made four years before, to send twenty thousand legionaries in exchange for the ships which Antony had lent to him,[5] and sent back no more than seventy ships that remained after the victory at Naulochus.[6] He claimed as his due one-half of all that had been taken from Lepidus,

Acrimonious correspondence between Octavian and Antony.

[1] See pp. 227–31. [2] *Hermes*, xxxiii, 36–7. [3] Dio, l, 1, 5.
[4] Suet., *Aug.*, 69, 2. [5] See p. 113.
[6] Appian (v, 139, 577) says that after the war with Sextus Pompeius Octavian sent back seventy ships—all that had not been lost. According to Plutarch (*Ant.*, 55, 1), Antony complained that Octavian had retained ships which he had borrowed from him for the war. Dio (xlix, 14, 6), on the contrary, says that after the war Octavian sent to Antony an equal number of

and, in accordance with agreement,[1] one-half of the troops which Octavian had raised in Italy. Octavian had many grievances. Antony had appropriated Egypt, to which, as a Triumvir, he had no right; he had caused Sextus Pompeius, whom Octavian had spared, to be put to death, brought disgrace upon the Roman People by his treacherous seizure of the Armenian King, and defrauded the State by the gifts which he had bestowed upon the children of Cleopatra. Above all, he had dishonoured the memory of Julius Caesar by treating Caesarion as a member of the Julian family.[2] While these recriminations were being exchanged Antony was building a fleet and increasing his army. On the last day of the year the office which for the last ten years the rivals had shared was legally terminated.[3] 33 B.C.

ships in place of those that had been lost in the battle of Naulochus. Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxiii, 22 and n. 2), remarking that the ships mentioned by Appian were sent instead of the promised 20,000 legionaries (see p. 113, *supra*), and along with them Octavia with 2,000 men (Plut., *Ant.*, 53, 2; p. 130, *supra*), says that the attempt of Gardthausen (*Augustus u. seine Zeit*, ii, 148, n. 28) to reconcile Dio's statement with Appian's by the suggestion that Octavian afterwards sent back the missing ships is unfortunate; for, as Plutarch's statement shows, in 33 B.C. Antony had not received them. Precisely, what Gardthausen says is, that Antony's complaint, recorded by Plutarch, can only be reconciled with Appian's statement by the hypothesis that the ships required to complete the whole number (*Ersatzschiffe*) were detained at Tarentum, and not sent back till after Antony demanded them.

[1] See p. 105.

[2] Plut., *Ant.*, 55, 1; Dio, l, 1; 2, 1. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 41, n. 1.

[3] See pp. 231–45.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN OCTAVIAN AND ANTONY, THE RESTORATION OF PEACE, AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE PRINCIPATE

32 B.C. Octavian is forced to temporize with the Antonian consuls, Domitius and Sosius,

THE consuls, Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus and Gaius Sosius, who took office on the 1st of January, 32, were ardent supporters of Antony, and perhaps the termination of the Triumvirate emboldened them to attack Octavian. He and his rival might, indeed, continue, as they had done five years before, to act as if they were still vested with a power of which none could deprive them; but while Antony, as an Oriental potentate, was in his own sphere independent, the authority of Octavian, which could not dispense with the support of public opinion, must have been in some measure weakened. Dispatches had been received from Antony, in which he offered to resign his triumviral position and to restore the government to the Senate and the Roman People; and though Dio is prone to invent motives, one may accept his statement[1] that Antony hoped either to compel Octavian to disarm while he himself retained his forces or, in the event of his refusal, to bring him into odium. The dispatches led to negotiations, which show that Octavian felt the weakness of his position, between him and the consuls. Antony had sent a statement of the titles which he had conferred upon Cleopatra and Caesarion and of the gifts which he had bestowed upon her and her children to the Senate, whose confirmation he requested, at the same time recording his treatment of the Armenian King. Octavian pressed for the publication of the papers; the consuls, knowing that the disclosure of the gifts would redound to the discredit of Antony, objected. The negotiations resulted in a compromise. The consuls prevented the disclosure of the gifts, but consented to suppress the account of Antony's triumph for the conquest of Armenia, which they had wished to publish.[2] Octavian, anticipating trouble and perhaps expecting that Sosius would make some tactical mistake,

[1] xlix, 41, 6.

[2] *Ib.*, §§ 4–5.

now left Rome. On the 1st of February the Senate met.[1] Sosius seized the opportunity of eulogizing Antony and denouncing Octavian, and was only prevented from moving a decree against him by the veto of a tribune.[2] Was Cavour thinking of Octavian when, as a boy of twenty, he wrote in his diary, 'Pour être un homme d'État utile, il faut avant tout avoir le *tact* des choses possibles'? Having bowed to the necessity of temporizing with his adversaries, Octavian saw how it would be possible to crush them. On learning what Sosius had done, he returned to Rome. Though he was not legally entitled to convene the Senate, he had no reason to fear that his summons would be ignored, for, even if his personal prestige and the renown which he had won as a conqueror were not enough to secure obedience from an assembly which during ten years had been habituated to obey, the majority were on his side.[3] On the appointed day, surrounded by soldiers and friends, who carried hidden daggers, he entered the House, took his seat on the curule chair between the consuls, and, speaking with studied moderation, first vindicated his own conduct, then gravely accused Sosius and Antony. Not one of the Antonian senators—not even Sosius himself—ventured to reply. Octavian again rose and adjourned the session, adding that when the members reassembled he would produce documentary evidence in proof of the charges which he had made. It would seem that on this day or soon afterwards he replied to Antony's recent offer by declaring himself ready to resign his authority and inviting Antony to come to Rome and join with him in restoring Republican government:[4] Antony would of course ignore the invitation, but it would influence public opinion. The consuls, followed by some three hundred senators, left Rome, taking with them the dispatch, written by Antony, which Octavian had intended to produce, and soon afterwards joined Antony.[5]

32 B.C.

but constrains them to leave Rome.

[1] See pp. 234–5.

[2] Dio, l, 2, 3. Bouché-Leclercq (*Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 285) conjectures that Sosius proposed that Octavian should be invited to resign.

[3] This may be inferred from comparison of Suetonius's life of Augustus (35, 1) with the Monument of Ancyra, v, 6.

[4] See p. 243.

[5] Dio, l, 2, 4–6; 20, 6.

32 B.C. For the moment Octavian was baffled; but he remained the master. When he learned that the consuls and their followers had gone, he announced that he had allowed them to go and that any one who might wish was free to do likewise.[1] Not long afterwards he read a speech in the Senate, the purport of which is unknown, but which provoked Antony, when he heard of it, to divorce Octavia.[2] Cleopatra was still with him, for although, while he was at Ephesus, he had been persuaded by Domitius, who perhaps explained that her influence was resented in Rome,[4] to order her to return to Alexandria, she bribed Canidius Crassus to urge that she had made great contributions to the forces required for the coming struggle, and that her absence would discourage the Egyptians in the navy.[5] Octavia behaved as she had always done. When she was obliged to leave Antony's house in Rome, she took with her all his children whom she had cared for, complaining

May or June.[3]

Antony divorces Octavia.

[1] Dio, l, 2, 7. Cp. Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 2, who says that Antony was declared a public enemy. Dio (l, 4, 3) denies this, but in a later passage (20, 5) seems to make Antony affirm it.

[2] Livy, *Epit.*, 132; Plut., *Ant.*, 57, 2; Dio, l, 3, 2; Eutrop., vii, 6; Oros., vi, 19, 4. Ferrero's account of the divorce (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iv, 81 n. †, 268, 271–2]) is interesting. Cleopatra, he assures us, had 'realized that after the conquest of Persia [which she could hardly have been so sanguine as to expect] Antony would . . . be reconciled to Octavia at the expense of Egypt; he must therefore be forced to . . . divorce Octavia'. Antony 'hesitated . . . assembled his friends in Greece, and laid the question before them'. After 'a keen debate' 'Cleopatra's party was triumphant. Antony sent letters of divorce to Rome, and as though he feared this would make a bad impression upon the soldiers . . . delivered a speech [?], in which he promised to restore the republican constitution two months after the victory.' Examine the evidence. Dio (l, 3, 2), to whom Ferrero refers, is the only writer who describes what immediately led to the divorce. What he says is that Antony, on hearing of a speech which Octavian had read in the Senate, convened a meeting of the senators (Titius, Plancus, and others) who were with him, and, after opinions had been expressed on both sides—that is, it would seem, for and against war, perhaps also for and against the divorce—resolved to make war, and divorced Octavia. The promise which he afterwards made to restore the republican constitution was obviously intended to influence Italian opinion; but whether in making it he was thinking of the divorce there is nothing to show.

[3] *Hermes*, xxxiii, 1898, pp. 44–5.

[4] Cp. Ferrero, *Grandezza*, &c. (Eng. tr., iv, 270–1). The latest biographer of Cleopatra (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, xi, 767–8) thinks that Domitius fancied that the dismissal of Cleopatra would avert war.

[5] Plut., *Ant.*, 56, 2.

only that she might be regarded as partly responsible for the war. The Romans, says Plutarch,[1] especially those who had seen Cleopatra, pitied Antony, not her, for neither in beauty nor in youth was Cleopatra to be preferred to her. Unwittingly Antony, whether he divorced her of his own accord or prompted by his Queen, had presented Octavian with a weapon. Plancus and Titius, the slayer of Sextus Pompeius, who both had private reasons for detesting Cleopatra, immediately went to Rome, called upon Octavian, and informed him that Antony's will, which they had themselves witnessed and sealed, and with the contents of which they acquainted him, was in the custody of the Vestal Virgins. Octavian requested the Virgins to deliver it to him. They flatly refused, adding that if he insisted, he must come and take it. He did so, and read it aloud, first in the Senate, afterwards in the Forum. His hearers learned that Antony had again declared that the father of Caesarion was Julius Caesar, that he had bequeathed large legacies to the children whom Cleopatra had borne to himself, and that he had directed that his body should be interred side by side with hers.[2] If some were scandalized by the violence which Octavian had done to the Vestals, the disclosure which it enabled him to make strengthened his hands. Such was the general indignation at the un-Roman conduct of Antony that a rumour found credence that he intended to make Cleopatra Queen of Rome and to transfer the seat of Roman government to Egypt;[3] and doubtless the stories were already current that Roman soldiers in his bodyguard had the name 'Cleopatra' blazoned on their shields, that in Oriental garb and mingling with her eunuchs, he followed the litter in which she was carried, and that his bust and hers, as Osiris

32 B.C.

Plancus and Titius enable Octavian to publish Antony's will,

the contents of which arouse indignation in Italy.

[1] *Ant.*, 57, 2.

[2] Vell., ii, 83, 1–2; Plut., *Ant.*, 58, 2; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 1; Dio, l, 3, 2–5. Gardthausen (*Augustus u. seine Zeit*, ii, 179, n. 20) incorrectly says that the will was made public while Antony was in Armenia. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 16, note, and see pp. 246–7.

[3] Hor., *Carm.*, i, 37, 6–12; Propert., iii, 11, 31–2; Flor., ii, 21, 2; Dio, l, 5, 4; Eutrop., vii, 7. 'In reality', so Ferrero assures us (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 492 [Eng. tr., iv, 68]), Cleopatra 'entertained none of the ambitious projects with which she was credited by her enemies at Rome'.

32 B.C. and Isis, were exhibited side by side.[1] Though even in Italy he still had supporters, the instinctive hostility of West to East, which had been felt when the forces of Caesar were arrayed against Pompey,[2] was now aroused with greater intensity, and Octavian took advantage of it. While the Senate deprived Antony of the consulship to which he had been designated,[3] Octavian conceived the idea (unless, indeed, he adopted a suggestion made by Agrippa or Maecenas) of enlisting the support of the entire Western world and investing it with the appearance of an outburst of patriotic enthusiasm. In the last year of his life he published his own version of this movement: 'The whole of Italy spontaneously took an oath of allegiance to me and called for me as its leader in the war in which I won the victory of Actium. The same oath was taken by the provinces of Gaul, Spain, Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia.'[4] Of those who can appreciate the terse summary inscribed on the Monument of Ancyra only a purist would condemn the reticence of this statement; but history is justified in attempting to reveal what it has veiled. Needless to point out that such simultaneous spontaneity in the literal sense is inconceivable; but the suggestion that soldiers, visiting every Italian and every provincial community, 'dragooned' terror-stricken citizens into taking an oath from which only secret exasperation could be expected, is hardly acceptable.[5] Octavian must have known that persuasion would serve him better than violence. We may suppose that agents who combined knowledge of local sentiment with sense and judgement approached local magnates who were well disposed towards him, and impressed upon them

Roman citizens and Western provincials swear allegiance to Octavian.

[1] Hor., *Epod.*, 9, 11–4; Vell., ii, 82, 4; Flor., ii, 21, 3; Dio, l, 5, 1–3; 25, 3–4; Athenaeus, vi, p. 148.

[2] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 115.

[3] Dio, l, 4, 3. He says that Antony was not declared a public enemy, because such a course would have made it necessary to involve his Roman associates, unless they abandoned him, in the same condemnation; but, as Mr. Caspari points out (*Class. Quart.*, v, 1911, p. 231), he contradicts himself by adding that pardon and honours were offered to Antony's partisans on condition of their abandoning him. Suetonius (*Aug.*, 17, 2) says that Antony *was* declared a public enemy when Sosius and Domitius went to join him. It matters nothing whether he or Dio was right.

[4] See p. 247.

[5] See p. 249.

(if, indeed, the same thought had not already occurred to some), that an oath of allegiance taken by the citizens whom they represented, the report of which would be noised throughout the Roman world, would strengthen and give him confidence for the coming struggle more effectively than the formal conferment of extraordinary powers by a senatorial decree or a bill carried in the Forum. Patriotic citizens would respond gladly to the suggestions of their leaders, who, if they should encounter resistance from disaffected individuals, might be trusted either to overcome it by their influence or, if it proved obstinate, to ignore it. To avoid all appearance of compulsion, Octavian announced that the citizens of Bononia, who had long been dependants of the Antonian family, were not expected to take the oath.[1] 32 B.C.

Octavian obliged to impose taxes, which provoke riots.

But he doubtless foresaw that the sacrifices which the war demanded would not always be patiently borne. Immediately after, if not before, the Italians had been sworn, he was obliged to impose taxes—one-fourth of income upon all freeborn citizens, one-eighth of capital upon all freedmen who possessed two hundred thousand sesterces[2] (the equivalent of two thousand pounds). The burden of direct taxation, from which Romans, during more than a century, were wholly free, had been felt and resented under the Triumvirate;[3] and riots, aggravated by incendiarism, on the part of freedmen, were now only quelled by force, the spectacle of which cowed freeborn citizens who had resolved to defy the collectors.[4] It is said that Antony intended in the autumn to attempt a sudden invasion, and modern writers have assumed that he was encouraged by the disturbances which the taxes had provoked; but if there is any truth in the story, that experienced soldier, when he saw that Brundisium and Tarentum, the only harbours in which he could hope to land, were held by the squadrons of Octavian, abandoned a desperate enterprise,

[1] See p. 247.

[2] Dio (l, 10, 2–6), who mentions these taxes in his narrative of the events of 31 B.C., but whose words suggest that they had been imposed, as Plutarch says (*Ant.*, 58, 1), in the preceding year.

[3] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 121, and pp. 74, 106, 110, *supra*.

[4] Dio, l, 10, 2–6.

32 B.C. and took up his quarters with Cleopatra at Patrae, near the entrance of the Gulf of Corinth, where he purposed to winter.[1] When war was declared, the senators accompanying Octavian to the temple of Bellona, where he performed the customary religious rites, Cleopatra alone was named as the enemy,[2] perhaps because Octavian desired to keep up the appearance of having ended civil war[3] and was unwilling to exasperate adherents of Antony. An incident which had amused onlookers when Caesar was about to encounter Pompey, and which suggests that in Rome sympathies were still divided, was now repeated. Bands of urchins, calling themselves Caesarians and Antonians, marched through the streets, and after two days' fighting the Caesarians, who were doubtless more numerous, won.[4]

War declared —against Cleopatra.

By the end of the year the champions of the West and the East were both ready. Antony's discharged soldiers, settled in Italy, joined Octavian,[5] who, while he was concentrating his forces at Brundisium and Tarentum, had been careful to provide for the defence of the provincial coasts,[6] and had posted Cornelius Gallus, destined to end a brilliant career by a tragic death, with an army in Africa.[7] Antony, since he returned from his Parthian expedition, had increased his troops till they amounted, as the coins

Preparations of Octavian and Antony.

[1] See pp. 250–1. Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 514 [Eng. tr., iv, 85–6]) does not hesitate to invent a reason for Antony's not having invaded Italy: 'the Egyptian party was supreme in the general's tent, but unable to overcome the sullen resistance of the army, almost every officer of which was drawn by sentiment and inclination towards the Roman party'.

[2] Because, says Dio (l, 6, 1), whose ascription of motives is often open to suspicion, it was known that Antony would not desert her, and he might then be charged with having fought against his country on behalf of an Egyptian. Plutarch (*Ant.*, 60, 1) assigns a different motive—Antony could not be regarded as possessing the power which he had resigned to a woman; Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 513 [Eng. tr., iv, 85]) yet another—'it is clear that Italy placed no great faith in the charges against Antony disseminated by Octavianus'.

[3] The biographer of Augustus (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 326), evidently thinking of Appian's statement (v, 130, 540), that Octavian, after the victory of Naulochus, announced that the civil wars were over, says that by declaring war against Cleopatra alone he fulfilled this promise.

[4] Dio, l, 8, 6. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 121. [5] Dio, l, 6, 4.

[6] *C.I.L.*, xi, 623 (Dessau, 2672). Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 63 and n. 2.

[7] Dio, li, 9, 1; Oros., vi, 19, 15. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 63, n. 3.

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

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which he struck to pay them testify, to thirty legions;[1] but, as Octavian had prevented him from recruiting in Italy, two-thirds of the legionaries were Orientals.[2] He had ceded the Lesser Armenia to Polemo, the King of Pontus, in order to secure his aid; and other dynasts in Asia Minor sent auxiliaries.[3] Nineteen legions—one hundred thousand men, including auxiliaries[4]—were stationed in Greece along a line extending from Corcyra to Cape Matapan; four in Cyrene; the remaining seven in Syria and Egypt.[5] His fleet numbered five hundred ships of war.[6] 32 B.C.

Third consulship of Octavian.

On New Year's Day Octavian assumed his third consulship, and, since Antony, his designated colleague, had been deprived of office, associated with himself Valerius Messalla, who had served him well.[7] The support which he derived from the oath of allegiance was now constitutionally fortified. Antony ignored alike the sentence of the Senate and the law that had defined his term of office. Though he had announced that he intended to resign his triumviral authority (which had already lapsed) and to restore power to the Senate and the Roman People within six months after he gained the victory,[8] he described himself on the coins which he issued in this year as 'consul for the third time and Triumvir for settling the Republic'.[9]

Preliminary operations of Agrippa and Octavian.

Early in the year Agrippa crossed the Ionian Sea to prepare the way for his chief. Searching for a safe anchorage, he surprised Methone, near the south-western corner of the Peloponnese, and captured numerous vessels which, laden with grain and munitions, were sailing from Egypt, Syria, and Asia to the head-quarters of Antony.[10] Soon afterwards Octavian, taking with him senators and knights whom he suspected of intending to create disturbances in his absence, embarked at Brundisium. His fleet, carrying

[1] E. Babelon, *Monn. de la rép. rom.*, i, 200–4; Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic*, &c., ii, 526–30.

[2] *Hermes*, xxxiii, 68. Cp. Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xiv, 15, 10.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 60, 1; Dio, xlix, 33, 1; 44, 3; l, 6, 4–5.

[4] Plut., *Ant.*, 61, 1. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 54 and n. 3.

[5] Strabo, viii, 4, 3; Vell., ii, 84, 2; Plut., *Ant.*, 60, 2; 67, 3; 69, 2; Dio, l, 9, 3; 11, 3; li, 5, 6; Oros., vi, 19, 6–7. 15; *C.I.G.*, 4931–2. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 28–9, 32, 64–5, 68–9.

[6] Plut., *Ant.*, 61, 1.

[7] Dio, l, 10, 1. Cp. *C.I.L.*, i, p. 544.

[8] Dio, l, 7, 1–2.

[9] Babelon, *op. cit.*, i, 205.

[10] Dio, l, 11, 3; Oros., vi, 19, 6.

31 B.C. eight legions and five praetorian cohorts, consisted of not less than two hundred and fifty ships.[1] Hoping to surprise a squadron stationed near the promontory of Actium on the Gulf of Arta, he disembarked his troops successively on the coast of Epirus[2] at Panormus (Palermo[3]), Toryne (Arpitza[4]), where they were descried by scouts, and Glycys (Fanari[5]). The scouts instantly sailed to Patrae, which they probably reached in about twenty-four hours, and informed Antony that they had seen the hostile fleet. In great anxiety he set out for Actium. The embarkation of his troops and the voyage must have taken at least two days;[6] but his alarm was groundless, for the entrance of the gulf, less than half a mile wide, was closed by the ships[7] and fortified on either side. Octavian, finding himself balked, encamped about four miles north of the strait on the hill of Mikalitzi,[8] which, rising to a height of more than five hundred feet, commanded a view extending over the smooth silvery surface of the gulf, enclosed by the mountains of Aetolia and Acarnania, still further southward as far as the island of Leucas, or Leucade, and northward to [Gomaros.] Corcyra. His fleet anchored in the Bay of Comarus, about a mile to the westward; and from either angle of the camp he constructed entrenchments to protect the approach to the shore.[9] Antony pitched his camp on the southern of the opposite peninsulas that confine the entrance of the gulf, about two miles from the promontory of Actium, and connected the northern angles by earthworks with a little haven, in which one of his squadrons was stationed,[10] while

[1] Livy, *Epit.*, 132; Flor., ii, 21, 4. 6; Dio, l, 11, 4–6; Oros., vi, 19, 6. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 32 and n. 1.

[2] Plut., *Ant.*, 62, 2; Dio, l, 12, 1–2. [3] *Hermes*, xxxiv, 9, and n. 6.

[4] Ptol., *Geogr.*, iii, 13, 3. Cp. W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, iii, 8, and *Hermes*, xxxiv, 11, n. 1.

[5] Strabo, vii, 7, 5; *Itin. Ant.*, ed. Wesseling, p. 325. Cp. Leake, *op. cit.*, i, 232; *The Mediterranean Pilot*, iii[3], 1899, p. 337; and *Hermes*, xxxiv, 10, n. 2.

[6] *Ib.*, pp. 11–2. [7] See p. 251. [8] *Hermes*, xxxiv, 16–7.

[9] Strabo, vii, 7, 5; Dio, l, 12, 3–4; *The Mediterranean Pilot*, iii[3], 338. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 16–7.

[10] As Kromayer remarks (*Hermes*, xxxiv, 14, n. 3), correcting Gardthausen (*Augustus u. seine Zeit*, ii, 196), though we are not expressly informed that Antony occupied this harbour, the fact may be inferred from the construction of the earthworks, which would not have been required if the entire fleet had been inside the gulf.

the others rode at anchor in the broad expanse behind. In his eagerness to rescue the squadron which his enemy hoped to surprise he had entered a trap. 31 B.C. Antony's fleet entrapped in the Gulf of Arta.

Octavian, whose ships were exposed to the risk of south-westerly gales, was anxious to force on a battle; but Antony, though he did not decline an occasional skirmish, clung to his defensive position, for his legions were not yet concentrated.[1] So soon as they arrived he crossed the strait and formed a second camp on rising ground, about two miles south of his enemy's position.[2] Octavian in his turn refused to fight,[3] intending to gain his object by cutting off supplies, whereupon Antony attempted to blockade and prevent him from obtaining water. Sending his cavalry, supported by infantry, round the inner shore of the gulf, he took up a position just north of Mikalitzi in the valley of the Luro.[4] But the line which he had to hold was some five miles in extent; he could not keep it wholly closed; and while Octavian sent detachments into Greece and Macedonia with the aim of compelling him to divide his force, the renegade Titius and Statilius Taurus attacked and routed his cavalry, at the same time gaining over one of his allies, the King of Paphlagonia.[5] Domitius, now an enemy of Cleopatra, and others, who believed that Antony was doomed to fail, deserted to Octavian.[6] Dellius, who had been one of Cleopatra's lovers,[7] soon followed,[8] though Antony had tried to prevent his escape, and informed Octavian that Antony and Cleopatra had decided to fight their way out of the gulf and escape to Egypt.[9] He is deserted by Domitius and others.

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 63, 1; Dio, l, 13, 1–2. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 18.

[2] Dio, l, 13, 3.

[3] *Ib.*, § 4.

[4] Plut., *Ant.*, 63, 1; Dio, l, 13, 4. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 18.

[5] Livy, *Epit.*, 132; Dio, l, 13, 4–5. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 23, n. 4, and Kromayer-Veith, *Schlachten-Atlas*, &c., röm. Abt., cols. 125–6.

[6] Hor., *Epod.*, 9, 17–8; Vell., ii, 84, 2; Plut., *Ant.*, 63, 2; *Apopth. Aug.*, 2; Tac., *Ann.*, iv, 44; Dio, l, 13, 6; Serv. *in Aen.*, vi, 612. Suetonius (*Nero*, 3, 2) relates that the command of Antony's forces was offered to Domitius by opponents of Cleopatra, but that, on account of sudden indisposition, he would neither accept nor definitely refuse it, and accordingly deserted to Octavian. Fools there may have been who desired that Domitius should supplant Antony; but the biographer's statement is incredible. How did the opponents of Cleopatra fancy that Antony could be forced to resign?

[7] Seneca (the elder), *Suas.*, i, 7.

[8] See p. 252.

[9] Dio, l, 13, 8; 23, 1. 3; 30, 4.

31 B.C. Agrippa excludes him from the Peloponnese.

Meanwhile Agrippa was effectively supporting his chief. While the crews who manned Octavian's fleet, stationed in a healthy place, remained in perfect health, those of Antony were suffering from a malarious position.[1] Making a sudden descent upon Leucas, Agrippa captured the chief town and the ships that were lying in the port, whose commander, Quintus Nasidius, he defeated, seized Cape Dukato, the southern promontory of the island, and followed up his success by taking possession of Patrae.[2] While Octavian thus acquired an excellent harbour,[3] Antony found himself prevented from getting supplies by sea, and was compelled to have them carried by porters, impressed for the service, over mountain tracks.[4] By land and sea he was now excluded from the Peloponnese, while Octavian proceeded to blockade the entrance of the gulf. Sosius, indeed, made an attempt to retrieve the fortunes of Antony. Under cover of a fog he attacked and put to flight Arruntius, one of Octavian's naval officers, but, encountering Agrippa in his pursuit, was utterly defeated.[5] Antony now lost all confidence in his fleet.[6] His cavalry had been again routed by Octavian's outposts;[7] his troops were weakened not less than his oarsmen by hunger[8] and malaria; he was discouraged by the desertion of many of his followers;[9] and, abandoning all thought of offensive operations, he withdrew by night to the southern peninsula and took up his quarters in his original camp, where the bulk of his forces had remained.[10]

[1] Dio, l, 12, 8. Cp. Kromayer-Veith, *Schlachten-Atlas*, röm. Abt., col. 126.

[2] Vell., ii, 84, 2; Flor., ii, 21, 4; Dio, l, 13, 5; 30, 1. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 20.

[3] *Ib.*, 19 and n. 5. Cp. E. Oberhammer, *Acarnanien*, &c., 1887, pp. 7–14, and the map facing the title-page.

[4] Plut., *Ant.*, 68, 4. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 20–1, 24.

[5] Vell., ii, 84, 2; Dio, l, 14, 1–2. Cp. Livy, *Epit.*, 132.

[6] Plut., *Ant.*, 63, 3. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 21.

[7] Livy, *Epit.*, 132; Dio, l, 14, 3; Oros., vi, 19, 7. Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 526, n. 4 [Eng. tr., iv, 91, n. §]) corrects Orosius for saying that Agrippa captured Corcyra, which 'was abandoned by Antony's army'; but Dio (l, 12, 2), from whom we learn this, adds that Octavian [through Agrippa?] took possession of the island, and when Orosius says *Corcyram cepit*, he evidently means the same thing.

[8] Oros., vi, 19, 5. 7; Vell., ii, 84, 1; Dio, l, 14, 4.

[9] *Ib.*, 13, 7. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 26.

[10] Dio, l, 14, 3; 23, 3; Oros., vi, 19, 8. Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 538 [Eng. tr., iv, 98]), referring to the abortive attack which, according to

The information which Dellius had communicated to Octavian was true. An historian who does not underestimate the value of historical imagination has conjectured that a struggle had long raged between Roman senators, friendly to Antony, who wished him to continue the campaign, and Cleopatra, who desired him to return to Egypt and establish an oriental monarchy.[1] Unquestionably friends of Antony were enemies of Cleopatra and believed that her influence was baneful;[2] but that is all that can be safely said. Antony did not need the advice of amateurs upon the art of war. The course of events must have convinced him that Octavian was determined not to fight a decisive battle upon land, and that, in the conditions of contemporary warfare, he could not be compelled to do so. Could he then be decisively defeated on the sea? Antony, if he asked himself the question, though he may have cherished a trust in luck, must have answered, No. In naval warfare he was inexperienced, in naval strength inferior; and an order which he subsequently gave proves that he knew that victory was hopeless. His only course was to fight his way through the hostile fleet and escape to Egypt, where and in Syria his forces, strengthened by as many legionaries as might survive the conflict, were sufficient to encourage the hope that he would be able to defy attack. If he allowed Cleopatra to escape alone, he could effect nothing with the remnant of his troops, most of whom were Asiatics, weakened by desertion and disease, by remaining in a country where his prestige had already waned.[3] He and the Queen had agreed upon their plan; but it would seem that the decision had not been made

31 B.C.

He resolves to fight his way out of the gulf and escape to Egypt.

Orosius, Antony made upon Octavian's camp before he returned to the southern peninsula, says that he did so 'as a [pretended] guarantee' that he intended to continue the campaign'. Perhaps. But, even if the officers were momentarily deceived, Antony must have known that within a few days it would be clear that he intended to fight at sea, and that to burn his useless ships and to leave the masts and sails standing in the others (pp. 152–3) would suggest that he intended to escape.

[1] See pp. 254–5.

[2] Plut., *Ant.*, 59; Suet., *Nero*, 3, 2. Cp. p. 142.

[3] Cp. pp. 253–8, and the remarks of Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxiv, 26–8, 32, 49–52). His reasoning, generally sound, is vitiated by the assumption that Antony might expect to bring the 20,000 legionaries with whom he intended to man his fleet, intact to Egypt!

31 B.C. without mutual recrimination. The elder Pliny[1] relates that Antony feared that Cleopatra would attempt to poison him. Perhaps he remembered the Egyptian soothsayer who warned him that his Genius was abased by the Genius of Octavian; but to admit even to himself the necessity of retreat must have cost a bitter struggle. To save appearances, the matter was submitted to discussion. Calling a council of war, Antony put the question whether it would be better to depart and spin out the war in some other theatre or to remain and fight a decisive battle.[2] Cleopatra argued in favour of the latter, Canidius Crassus of the former course. His advice was that Cleopatra (whom he disliked) should be sent away, and that Antony should withdraw with the army into Thrace or Macedonia, and there fight a battle in which, as the better tactician, he would be victorious. To surrender the command of the sea to Octavian, who in Sicilian waters had gained such experience of naval warfare, would involve no disgrace; but for an able general to resign the advantage of fighting on his proper element and to deplete his legions for the service of his fleet would be sheer folly. Cleopatra, on the contrary, urged that suitable places should be garrisoned—evidently with the object of inducing Octavian to waste his strength by blockading them—and that the navy should fight its way out of the gulf.[3] Her advice was adopted; for Crassus was virtually proposing to abandon the fleet to destruction.[4] But to use it entire was impossible: the original complement of oarsmen had been greatly diminished by desertion and disease.[5] The best ships were therefore selected—two hundred and thirty, including sixty under the personal command of Cleopatra; the rest, which would be useless after the intended flight, were burned; and the treasure was conveyed on board by night.[6]

[1] *Nat. Hist.*, xxi, 3 (9), 12. [2] Dio, l, 14, 4.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 63, 3; Dio, l, 15, 1. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 30 and n. 2, where Kromayer corrects Gardthausen, i, 375–6.

[4] *Hermes*, xxxiv, 29 and n. 4, 37, n. 2, where Kromayer corrects Gardthausen, ii, 194.

[5] Vell., ii, 84, 1; Dio, l, 11, 2; 15, 4; Oros., vi, 19, 5.

[6] Plut., *Ant.*, 64, 1; Flor., ii, 21, 5; Dio, l, 15, 4; Oros., vi, 19, 9. 11. Plutarch (*Ant.*, 68, 1) says that Octavian, according to his own account, took

Twenty thousand legionaries were to embark along with two thousand archers and a corps of slingers:[1] the rest of the army was entrusted to Crassus, who was ordered to march immediately after the naval battle towards the eastern coast of Greece.[2] In giving instructions to his naval architect Antony had taken Agrippa for his model. Agrippa had built ships of extraordinary size for the war in which the corsairs had been defeated: Antony, but without foresight, did the same, and more.[3] He had, indeed, some biremes and triremes, but the bulk of his ships were equipped with four, six, nine, or even ten banks of oars, some of them rising ten feet above the water-line, while all that were larger than triremes carried storied turrets as platforms for artillery.[4] Disregarding the usual practice of clearing the decks before going into action, he retained the masts and sails,[5] which would enable him to make good his escape—as he assured the pilots, to pursue—if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's line. Octavian, reinforced by the squadrons of Agrippa and Arruntius, had more than four hundred ships, smaller but far swifter than those of Antony,[6] ranging from triremes to vessels with six banks of oars.[7] Since Agrippa was not only the admiral-in-chief and the creator of the fleet, but also the minister who had made it perfect as an instrument

31 B.C.

The fleets of Antony and Octavian.

300 ships in the battle of Actium. This statement, not inconsistent with *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 19–20, where Augustus says that he captured 600 ships altogether, besides those smaller than biremes (cp. Th. Mommsen, *Res gestae*², &c., p. 9, with *Philol.*, lvi, 1897, p. 462, n. 209), is obviously inconsistent with the number of Antony's ships, as given by the authorities quoted above, and can hardly be reconciled therewith even if we suppose that Octavian's account was misunderstood by Plutarch, and that he included the ships which Agrippa captured at Patrae and elsewhere and those that surrendered at Alexandria (Dio, li, 10, 4). Kromayer (*Philol.*, lvi, 463–6), observing that, according to Appian (v, 98, 406; 100, 419) and Orosius (vi, 18, 21. 25. 29), Octavian captured exactly 300 ships before the campaign of Actium, concludes that what Octavian really said was that he captured 300 in the entire campaign, and ingeniously argues that this is probable. But whoever consults the texts cited will find that Kromayer misrepresents Orosius and unduly strains the words of Appian.

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 64, 1; Dio, l, 23, 1.

[2] Dio, li, 1, 4. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 36–7, 50, n. 4.

[3] Dio, l, 23, 2.

[4] Virg., *Aen.*, viii, 693; Strabo, vii, 7, 6; Plut., *Ant.*, 61, 1; 66, 1; Flor., ii, 21, 5; Dio, l, 8, 5; 23, 2–3; Veg., *De re mil.*, iv, 33, 37; Oros., vi, 19, 9.

[5] Plut., *Ant.*, 64, 2.

[6] See p. 259.

[7] Flor., ii, 21, 6; Oros., vi, 19, 8.

31 B.C. of war, we may be sure that in organization and equipment it was superior: the oarsmen, healthy and well nourished, were not, like those of Antony, drawn from many nations and imperfectly trained,[1] but homogeneous and skilled. Eight legions and five praetorian cohorts—probably about thirty-five thousand souls—were to serve as fighting men.[2]

As the time for the great hazard draw near, both commanders, as was customary, harangued their combatant crews, who were congregated on the shore.[3] Before Octavian's legionaries embarked he took counsel with Agrippa. His purpose, he explained, was to allow the hostile fleet to emerge from the strait unopposed, for he was confident that with his swift galleys he would be able to overhaul and attack their rear, and that when the Antonians saw the flagship[4] trying only to escape they would desert to him. Agrippa objected that such a plan was impracticable: the enemy would hoist their sails, and it would be impossible to catch them, for Octavian's ships, to allow free movement to the fighting men, would of course be cleared for action.[5] Octavian accepted this advice and sent boats [6] to row round the fleet with final instructions for the commanders.[7]

Octavian accepts the advice of Agrippa.

Battle of Actium.

It was the 2nd of September.[8] The sea was calm when the blasts of many trumpets resounded from the gulf, and the Antonian ships, Antony himself commanding the starboard squadron, Marcus Octavius[9] the centre, Sosius the port,[10] advanced in the closest order just beyond the

[1] Dio, l, 11, 2. [2] Oros., vi, 19, 8.

[3] Needless to say that the tedious speeches which Dio (l, 16–22, 26–30) attributes to Antony and Octavian were composed by himself. Whether he had any authentic materials to work upon, we do not know.

[4] Cp. C. Torr, *Ancient Ships*, 1895, p. 99.

[5] Dio, l, 31, 1–2. Cp. Torr, *op. cit.*, 89 n. 193, 92.

[6] *ὑπηρετικά*. Cp. Torr, *op. cit.*, 115. [7] Dio l, 31, 3.

[8] *Ib.*, li, 1, 1; *C.I.L.*, i, pp. 320, 324, 328.

[9] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 110.

[10] According to Velleius (ii, 85, 2), Antony's fleet was directed by Publicola [Antony being inexperienced in naval warfare] and Sosius: Plutarch (*Ant.*, 65, 1) says that the starboard squadron was commanded by [L. Gellius] Publicola [under Antony?], the port by Caelius (Κοιλίος). Münzer in his biography of Gellius (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, vii, 1005) suggests that Κοιλίος may be a corruption of *Gellius*; but Plutarch evidently supposed that Caelius and Gellius were distinct. There are good reasons, however, for preferring

entrance of the strait, which, looking like floating fortresses, they completely filled, so that it was impossible either to break or to turn the line.[1] Cleopatra with her sixty ships remained behind the centre. If Antony had hoped to lure on his enemy, he was disappointed. Octavian, commanding his own starboard squadron, Arruntius the centre,[2] Agrippa the port, remained motionless at a distance of about a mile. Hours passed in complete inaction. Towards noon Sosius, becoming impatient, moved forward without orders.[3] Octavian, taking advantage of this mistake, withdrew his own squadron in the hope of enticing the enemy still further into the open sea; Sosius blindly followed; the rest of the Antonian fleet perforce did likewise, and while Agrippa drew back and extended the left and the centre, the battle, which Antony had already lost, began.[4] 31 B.C.

the authority of Velleius. The only Caelius with whom Plutarch's Κοιλίος (which may be a corruption of Σόσσιος) could be identified was a boon companion of Antony, Q. Caelius, mentioned by Cicero (*Phil.*, xiii, 2, 3; 12, 26) and by no other writer. Is it credible that such a man would have been placed in command of a squadron to the exclusion of Sosius, who had served Antony well both in the Senate and in naval war? Dio, who says (li, 2, 4) that Sosius was pardoned by Octavian, has already told us (l, 14, 2) that he was killed in the battle in which Agrippa defeated him (see p. 150). It is just conceivable that two leaders of the same name fought in the war; but I have no doubt that in the earlier passage Dio blundered.

[1] Strabo, vii, 7, 6; Plut., *Ant.*, 65, 3; Dio, l, 31, 4. Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxiv, 41, n. 2) points out that Gardthausen (*op. cit.*, ii, 194) assigned to the Antonian fleet a line so extensive that it would have been easy to break it anywhere.

[2] The position of Arruntius, which is not expressly stated, may be inferred from Plutarch, *Ant.*, 66, 2. According to Velleius (ii, 85, 2), Octavian's starboard squadron was commanded by M. Lurius [under Octavian?], while Agrippa directed the whole battle.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 65, 3; Oros., vi, 19, 10. Dio (l, 31, 5) says that as the enemy remained motionless, Octavian suddenly made both his wings advance with the intention of surrounding them, a manœuvre which, as Kromayer remarks (*Hermes*, xxxiv, 43, n. 5), would have been impossible. When Dio adds (§ 6) that Antony, fearing to be surrounded, reluctantly led his whole fleet into action, he is correctly describing the result, not of the imaginary movement which he attributes to Octavian, but of the impatient advance of Sosius. Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxiv, 43) asserts, on what grounds I cannot imagine, that the squadron [of Sosius] changed front towards the north (*Die Front dreht sich nach Norden statt nach Süden*). Groebe (W. Drumann's *Gesch. Roms*, i², 481–2) dissents from this view; but his reason—that the wind which favoured the escape of Cleopatra must have blown from the north or the north-west—is irrelevant; for that wind arose some hours after the movement of Sosius.

[4] Signor Ferrabino (*Rivista di Filologia*, N.S., ii, 1924, p. 454), quoting

31 B.C. Soldiers, congregated on either side of the strait, shouted encouragement to their comrades. The Caesarian ships had now ample sea-room, and made full use of their superior speed. If any of them failed to disable an opponent by its ram, the rowers instantly backed water, and either tried again or rowed hard against another; but, to avoid as far as they could the arrows of the archers and the discharge of ponderous missiles from the turrets, they never lingered, but made sudden swift attacks and as soon as they had inflicted any damage retreated rapidly out of range. Sometimes, indeed, the Antonians succeeded in grappling a trireme with their irons; but if they failed to get a firm hold they found themselves beset by two or three of the hostile vessels, which far outnumbered theirs, and could attack or retreat as they pleased. Occasionally in attempting to shatter the enemy's oars they were struck with heavy stones or even sunk;[1] but Agrippa was getting the mastery, for Antony's squadron, endeavouring to prevent him from surrounding the whole fleet, had become separated from the centre, when Cleopatra, seeing that the battle was lost, took advantage of the gap to break through.

Flight of Cleopatra and Antony.

A favourable breeze sprang up, and with her purple sails all set, accompanied by her whole squadron, she ran for the Peloponnese.[2] If Antony was then anxious to be with

the comment of Servius (Virg., *Aen.*, viii, 682), who says that Agrippa feigned flight, and that the enemy, being deceived, attempted to pursue (*cum aquilo ei* [Agrippa] *esset adversus, eo exercitio quo milites adsuevcrat adversus fluctus naves agere ad portum se fugere finxisse: qua re cum hostes decepti insequi conati essent*, &c.), observes that 'here we have the valuable admission that . . . the retrograde movement occurred not only on Caesar's right (as Plutarch, 65, says), but also on the left (where Agrippa was stationed), and in a foot-note adds that 'Evidently the movement of Agrippa described by Servius is the same as that noticed by Plutarch, 66 . . . only the explanation is different—a feigned flight in Servius, an encircling movement in Plutarch'. There is no inconsistency: Plutarch says that Agrippa extended the left and the centre, but omits to say that he first drew back, feigning flight; Servius omits to mention the extension.

[1] Flor., ii, 21, 6; Dio, l, 32. Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxiv, 40, n. 3) points out that Plutarch (*Ant.*, 66, 1), followed by Jurien de la Gravière (*La marine des Ptolemées*, &c., i, 1885, p. 76) gives a one-sided account of the battle, which he describes as a combat of artillery. If it had been merely that, how could Antony, who in artillery was superior, have been defeated?

[2] Hor., *Epod.*, 9, 7–8; Strabo, xvii, 1, 11; Vell., ii, 85, 3; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xix, 1 (5), 22; Plut., *Ant.*, 66, 2; Flor., ii, 21, 8; Gell., ii, 22, 23; Dio, l, 33, 1–3;

her, he obeyed a motive more imperative than love.[1] He 31 B.C.
had fought to secure retreat, and though victory was hopeless, retreat was still possible. With those captains who could get away he followed, and before sunset the remaining vessels of the armada, some of which were set on fire by blazing darts hurled by the Caesarians, were all captured or destroyed.[2]

Octavian had already dispatched a squadron in pursuit; but the commander shrank from an engagement, though two vessels were captured by an officer who acted without orders.[3] Plutarch,[4] in one of those passages which it would be irrational to disbelieve merely because they are vivacious, relates that during three days Antony, 'either through shame or resentment', refused to see Cleopatra, whose galley he had boarded, but that when he touched at Cape Matapan her women persuaded them 'to speak to each other', and 'not long afterwards to sleep together'. Shame he may well have felt, but why resentment? Had not he and Cleopatra agreed upon their plan? Yes, but one may imagine that, reflecting bitterly on the wreck of his career, he cursed the Egyptian enchantress whom he had loved too well. While his ships were anchored off the promontory he sent an order to Canidius Crassus, who had already begun to do what he desired, to march through Macedonia into Asia, and then, directing Cleopatra to make for Egypt, sailed to join the army which he had stationed in Cyrene.[5]

Oros., vi, 19, 11. Ferrabino (*op. cit.*, pp. 448–9) finds it difficult to understand how Cleopatra contrived to break through: I am unable to understand his difficulty.

[1] Groebe (*op. cit.*, pp. 481–2) rejecting the motive given by Plutarch—love for Cleopatra—(does he know Antony so intimately as to be sure that it had no influence?) agrees with Dio (l, 33, 3), who, always ready to explain motives with or without evidence, says that Antony supposed that the captains of his ships had fled, not in obedience to her, but in the belief that the battle was already lost. This was doubtless the well-founded belief of Cleopatra herself. Plutarch and Velleius (ii, 85, 3), who pronounced that Antony ought to have fought to the last, were unaware that his flight had been judiciously prearranged.

[2] Virg., *Aen.*, viii, 694; Livy, *Epit.*, 133; Vell., ii, 85, 3–6; Plut., *Ant.* 66; 68, 1; *comp. Demetr. cum Ant.*, 3; Flor., ii, 21, 7–8; Dio, l, 33, 3–8; 34; Oros., vi, 19, 11–2.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 67, 1; Dio, li, 1, 4.

[4] 67, 2.

[5] Plut., 67, 3; 69, 1; Dio, li, 1, 4; 5, 3. 6. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxiv, 50, n. 4.

31 B.C. Antony's land forces surrender to Octavian,

Meanwhile Octavian was following up his victory. Sending envoys to negotiate with Crassus and his army, he marched in the direction which it had taken. Crassus and his officers, abandoning their men, with whom they perhaps felt insecure, fled to join Antony, whereupon the legions surrendered to Octavian, who incorporated them in his own force.[1] Many of the Antonian soldiers as well as of his own had served their time and were accordingly discharged, but without receiving donatives, for which no funds were yet available. Fearing that mutiny might again break out, as it had done after the Sicilian war, he disarmed some of the disbanded troops and divided the rest into small groups, in the hope of preventing concerted action, before dismissing them.[2] But while the legionaries who remained counted on getting booty in Egypt and therefore gave no trouble, the disbanded men, as soon as they returned to Italy, began to raise disturbances. Octavian, fearing that Maecenas would be unable to control them, sent Agrippa back to Italy, authorizing him and Maecenas to read any letters which he might address through them to the Senate or to individuals and to make any alterations therein which circumstances or their own discretion might suggest.[3]

whose disbanded troops raise disturbances in Italy.

Octavian settles affairs in the lands which Antony had ruled.

Meanwhile he was himself settling affairs in the region which Antony had ruled. Corinth, the only town in Greece that did not immediately surrender, was taken by Agrippa before he returned to Italy. While Octavian made arrangements for founding Nicopolis, 'the city of victory', hard by the camp which he had occupied before the battle,[4] he

[1] Plut., 68, 2–3; Dio, li, 1, 4; 3, 1. See p. 157.

[2] Dio, li, 3, 1–2. Dio adds (§ 3) that Octavian, remembering the disturbances that had arisen in Italy in consequence of the recent taxes, excused freedmen from paying the fourth part of income, which they still owed. This statement is inconsistent with what he says in l, 10, 2 (see p. 145), and, if it is true, the freedmen must have been ordered to pay not only one-eighth of the capital, but also one-fourth of income. I have no doubt that Dio is confusing. Perhaps he found in his authorities that some freeborn citizens —not freedmen—had not yet paid their income tax, and in relating that Octavian excused them wrote ἐξελευθέρους (freedmen) in mistake for ἐλευθέρους.

[3] Dio, li, 3, 3–5.

[4] Strabo, vii, 7, 5–6; x, 2, 2; Vell., ii, 84, 2; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iv, 1 (2), 5; Plut., *Ant.*, 65, 2; 67, 3; Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 2080; Tac., *Ann.*, ii, 53; v, 10;

found time to visit Athens, and, since he deemed it politic 31 B.C.
to treat foreign religious observances as well as Roman with respect, to have himself initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres and Proserpine.[1] Advancing into Asia, he took up his quarters for the winter in the island Samos.[2] The provinces—Cilicia, Cyprus, Crete, Cyrene, and Syria—which Antony had bestowed upon Cleopatra or dynasts of his own creation, were of course restored to the Roman empire;[3] but Amyntas, who had deserted him before the battle of Actium,[4] Archelaus, whom he had made King of Cappadocia,[5] and Polemo were confirmed in their dominions, while Cleon, an adventurer who had once supported but finally forsaken him, was rewarded with a tract in Pontus. Communities in Crete which had aided Octavian received the gift of autonomy. In dealing with Romans who had sided with Antony Octavian was careful to discriminate. Some were put to death, others merely fined, others, including Sosius and a brother of Sextus Pompeius, who was spared for the sake of his mother, Mucia, pardoned.[6] But about the end of the year urgent letters from Agrippa warned Octavian that his presence was required in Italy, for the disbanded soldiers were in a dangerous mood.[7]

Recalled to Italy, he provides for the disbanded soldiers.

After a stormy passage, in which the rigging of his galley was carried away and one of the great oars that served as rudders smashed, Octavian landed at Brundisium. Almost all the senators who had remained in Italy, loyal citizens, and even many private soldiers whom he had ordered to appear and who doubtless hoped for some relief, were assembled in the streets to meet him. For the present his only care was to remove all risk of disorder by providing for the disbanded veterans. Having exacted contributions from communities in Asia, he was able to grant bounties

Suet., *Aug.*, 18, 2; Dio, l, 13, 5; li, 1, 3; Pausanias, v, 23, 3; vii, 18, 8; x, 38, 4; B. V. Head, *Hist. num.*², p. 321.

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 68, 4; Suet., *Aug.*, 93; Dio, li, 4, 1.

[2] Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 2.

[3] *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 31–3.

[4] See pp. 149, 252.

[5] See p. 128.

[6] Strabo, xii, 8, 8–9 (cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 64, n. 1); 16; Vell., ii, 86, 2; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 3; App., iv, 42; Dio, li, 2.

[7] Plut., *Ant.*, 73, 2; Dio, li, 4, 2–3; Oros., vi, 19, 14.

30 B.C. to the soldiers on the spot; but those, present there or absent, who had served in all his campaigns needed allotments which would enable them to subsist for the remainder of their lives. The old soldiers of the 8th legion colonized Forum Iulii; representatives of other legions were settled in Italian municipalities which had sided with Antony, on lands belonging to various Italian communities thereafter classed as military colonies, and in colonial foundations, to some of which additional lands were assigned, that had decayed in consequence of the civil wars. Landowners who were obliged to surrender their holdings to the new occupants were either transferred to Dyrrachium, Philippi, and other towns or, if they had not sided with Antony, received payment or promises of payment in compensation. Though Octavian was unable for the moment to pay in full, he counted on fulfilling his promise with the treasure to be obtained in Egypt.[1]

He embarks for Asia.

About a month after he landed in Brundisium Octavian embarked for Asia. To shorten the voyage and avoid the risk of storms in rounding Cape Matapan, he had his ships carried across the isthmus of Corinth on a prepared track covered by greased hides. So quickly did he reach his destination that Antony and Cleopatra heard on the same day of his departure and his arrival.[2] Antony had suffered a fresh reverse. Pinarius Scarpus, whom he had left in command of the division which he stationed in Cyrene, refused to receive him and even put to death the messengers whom he sent to announce his coming.[3] Plutarch[4] found in some authority that he was hardly prevented by his friends from committing suicide: at all events, on returning to Alexandria, he shut himself up in a small house near the island of Pharus,[5] whither evil tidings arrived. Canidius Crassus personally announced the defection of the

Antony suffers reverses.

[1] *C.I.L.*, v, 2501, 2503 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 2243, 2336); *Mon. Ancyr.*, iii, 22–8; Hyginus, *De lim.*, ed. Lachmann, p. 177; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, iii, 4 (5), 35; Tac., *Ann.*, i, 42; ii, 63; iv, 5; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 3; Dio, li, 4; Th. Mommsen, *Res gestae*[2], &c., p. 63; *Hermes*, xxxi, 17–8; *The Roman Republic*, iii, 320, note.

[2] Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 3; Dio, li, 5, 2. Cp. F. W. Sturz's edition of Dio, ii, 1824, p. 620, n. 65.

[3] Plut., *Ant.*, 69, 2; Dio, li, 5, 6. Cp. Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic*, &c., ii, 583 (no. 1, Pl. cxxii. 7).

[4] *Ant.*, 69, 2.

[5] *Ib.*, § 3; Strabo, xvii, 1, 9.

legions, and soon afterwards Antony learned that Herod, to whom he had sent an envoy in the hope of securing his fidelity, had visited Octavian in Rhodes, to justify himself for having acted against him, and had reinforced his army with legions trained in Roman discipline. Antony forthwith abandoned his retreat and rejoined Cleopatra in the palace.[1] 30 B.C.

Cleopatra had never despaired. To secure the safety of her voyage and to deceive her subjects, at least for a time, she caused the prow of her galley to be decorated in token of victory and, as it approached the great lighthouse of Alexandria, ordered her musicians to play triumphal airs. Immediately after landing in the royal harbour, she executed notables whose hostility she knew or suspected, confiscated their property, levied troops, and, hoping to purchase the aid of the King of Media, sent him the embalmed head of his enemy and namesake, Artavasdes, the King of Armenia, whom she had put to death.[2] At the same time she built ships with the intention of sailing to Arabia; and, when Antony returned to her, she registered her beloved son, Caesarion, and he Antullus, his son by Fulvia, as having attained their majority, to provide for the continuance of the government, celebrating the occasion by festivities.[3] Hoping, however, to obtain favourable terms, they conjointly sent envoys to Octavian, Cleopatra offering to abdicate in favour of her children and, without the knowledge of Antony, sending her throne, a golden sceptre, and a golden crown in token of good faith, while Antony professed himself willing to live as a private individual in Egypt or even, if he could not obtain that favour, in Greece.[4] Octavian, accepting the gifts, made no reply to Antony, but promised to allow Cleopatra to retain her kingdom if she would either put Antony to death or banish him.[5] On receiving his message, she and her husband sent a second embassy. Cleopatra offered money: Antony ex-

Cleopatra acts vigorously.

Cleopatra and Antony send embassies to Octavian, who makes promises to her, but ignores him.

[1] Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 6, 6; Plut., *Ant.*, 71, 1–2.

[2] Dio, li, 5, 3–5.

[3] *Ib.*, 6, 1; Plut., *Ant.*, 69, 2; 71, 2; Oros., vi, 19, 13.

[4] Plut., *Ant.*, 72; Dio, li, 6, 4–5. Plutarch does not mention Cleopatra's offer or the sending of the throne and sceptre, but says that she begged the kingdom for her children: Dio, who does not mention this request, is also silent about Antony's offer. See p. 162, n. 2.

[5] Dio, li, 6; Plut., *Ant.*, 73, 1. Dio says nothing about the alternative, banishment.

30 B.C. cused himself for his intimacy, which, he pleaded, rested upon mutual love, with an Egyptian Queen, sent Publius Turullius, one of the assassins of Caesar, under the charge of the ambassadors, and promised to commit suicide if by so doing he could ensure the safety of Cleopatra. Octavian executed Turullius and, again ignoring Antony, sent an answer, in which threats were combined with promises, to the Queen.[1] A final embassy, of which Antullus was a member, carried gold to Octavian, who, still declining to reply to Antony, renewed his promises to Cleopatra and sent Thyrsus, one of his freedmen, with orders to speak to her kindly and assure her that Octavian was her lover. If our authorities[2] had no warrant for the motive which they assigned—the hope that she might put Antony to death and refrain from carrying out the threat, which she was reported to have uttered, that, if she were hard pressed, she would destroy all her treasure and commit suicide—it is not unlikely that they divined the truth.

Disappointments of Cleopatra.

Meanwhile the plans of Cleopatra had miscarried. The Arabians of Petra, prompted by Quintus Didius, the Governor of Syria, burned the ships which she had built;[3] dynasts from whom she had solicited aid, refused it; gladiators who spontaneously marched from Cyzicus to fight for Antony were intercepted and afterwards put to death.[4] Cornelius Gallus,[5] having taken over the division which Antony had quartered in Cyrene, seized Paraetonium, at the north-western extremity of Egypt; an attempt which Antony made to recover it failed;[6] and he prepared to make his last stand in defence of the Queen.

Antony loses Paraetonium.

[1] Val. Max., i, 1, 19; Dio, li, 8, 1–4. I am reluctant to accept the statement of Dio that Turullius was living with Antony, who would hardly have betrayed a friend.

[2] Cp. Dio, li, 8, 4–7, with Plut., 73, 1; 74, 1. Plutarch records only one embassy, which one would be inclined, at first sight, to identify with the third, described by Dio; but I suspect that, ignoring the second, he amalgamated the reports of the three.

[3] Whether, as Dio says (li, 7, 1), the ships had been built on the coast of the Red Sea or carried across the Isthmus of Suez into the Red Sea (Plut., *Ant.*, 69, 2 [cp. Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 316, n. 2]), is a question with which even the most meticulous research need not concern itself.

[4] Plut., *Ant.*, 69, 2; Dio, li, 7.

[5] See p. 146.

[6] Flor., ii, 21, 9; Dio, li, 9, 2–4; Oros., vi, 19, 15. Cp. *Paulys Real-Ency.*, xi, 773.

Octavian had by this time arrived in Egypt. Accompanied by Herod, who contributed eight hundred talents to his exchequer and supplied him with all necessaries, he marched through Syria and the Sinaitic desert to Pelusium, which instantly surrendered, in obedience, it was said, to Cleopatra, who, beguiled by Thyrsus, believed that Octavian was her lover! Dio, who vouches for the truth of this rumour, while Plutarch appears to disbelieve it, adds that when Octavian was approaching Alexandria, she secretly forbade her subjects to oppose him.[1] Antony was not of this mind. Hearing on his return from Paraetonium that Pelusium had surrendered, he encountered Octavian and routed his cavalry.[2] The statement of Plutarch[3] that he thereupon challenged Octavian to a duel, and that Octavian answered that many ways to die were open to Antony, may be accepted; for the challenge and the reply were alike characteristic. Antony now prepared to fight simultaneously on land and sea. While arrows, to which papers were attached, containing a promise of six thousand sesterces for every man, were shot into Octavian's camp, he arrayed his army in line of battle. But when his galleys were approaching those of Octavian the rowers raised their oars in token of friendly understanding; the cavalry followed the example of the fleet;[4] the forsaken infantry was defeated; and Alexandria forthwith surrendered.[5] Antony is said to have exclaimed that Cleopatra had betrayed him.

30 B.C. [£192,000

Octavian seizes Pelusium.

Antony, [£60]. deserted by his fleet and cavalry, is defeated, and Alexandria surrenders. Aug. 1.[6]

[1] Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 6, 7; *Bell. Iud.*, i, 20, 3; Plut., *Ant.*, 74, 1; Flor., ii, 21, 9; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 3; Dio, li, 9, 5–6; Oros., vi, 19, 14. The alleged statement of Herod, reported by Josephus (*Ant. Iud.*, xv, 6, 6; *Bell. Iud.*, i, 20, 1), that he had advised Antony to kill Cleopatra in order to save himself, but that Antony refused, is discredited by W. Otto, the latest biographer of Herod (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, Suppl. ii, 47).

[2] Plut., *Ant.*, 74, 2; Dio, li, 10, 1. Orosius (vi, 19, 16), who says that Antony was defeated, evidently confounded this combat with the decisive battle that followed.

[3] *Ant.*, 75, 1.

[4] Dio (li, 10, 4) says that the fleet joined Octavian by the order of Cleopatra. Plutarch, who had no love for her, does not make this charge.

[5] Strabo, xvii, 1, 10; Livy, *Epit.*, 133; Vell., ii, 87, 1; Plut., *Ant.*, 76, 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 3; 71, 1; Dio, li, 10, 2–5. Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxiii, 65, n. 5), with whom I agree, holds that Plutarch (from whom Dio differs) is right in making the desertion of the fleet and the cavalry precede the defeat of the infantry.

[6] Macrob., i, 12, 35; Oros., vi, 19, 16; *C.I.L.*, i, p. 328; Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 8744a.

30 B.C. Accompanied by a eunuch and two of her women, Cleopatra had shut herself up in a mausoleum which she had recently built. If we may believe Plutarch, whose narrative was partly based upon an account of her last days written by her physician, she dreaded the resentment of her husband, and sent a messenger to tell him that she was dead, hoping (so Dio adds) that he would commit suicide. Antony bade a trusted servant, Eros, to fulfil a long-standing promise and dispatch him. Eros plunged a sword into his own body and fell dead, whereupon Antony, stabbing himself in the bowels, collapsed upon a couch and begged bystanders to put him out of pain. They fled. Presently Cleopatra's secretary entered the room and told him that she wished to see him. Rising, but unable to walk, he had himself carried to the mausoleum. Cleopatra, who would not allow the gate to be opened, caused a rope to be lowered through the window of her room, and when it had been fastened round his body, she and her women with desperate efforts hauled him up, and laid him upon a bed. Asking for wine, while she stood over him and called him by endearing names, he tried, so long as he remained conscious, to console her, and urged her, in any dealings which she might have with the followers of Octavian, to put her trust in Proculeius, that Roman knight whose virtues Horace[1] praised. Proculeius himself, sent by Octavian, to whom the bloodstained sword had been conveyed, appeared at the entrance of the mausoleum just before Antony died.[2] Suspecting doubtless that he had come to arrest her, Cleopatra, though she consented to converse with him through the aperture in the gate, refused to admit him; but while Cornelius Gallus, whom Octavian had also commissioned to confer with her, was engaging her attention, he contrived to effect an entrance by a ladder. Catching sight of him, she attempted to stab

Antony, deceived by Cleopatra, stabs himself,

and dies in her presence.

[1] *Carm.*, ii, 2, 5–8. Ferrero, who denies (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iv, 275]) that Antony loved Cleopatra, might without more perversity deny that Nelson loved Lady Hamilton.

[2] Livy, *Epit.*, 133; Vell., ii, 87, 1; Plut., *Ant.*, 76, 2–78, 1; 82, 2; Flor., ii, 21, 9–10; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 4; Dio, li, 10, 5–9; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 86, 3; Eutrop., vii, 7; Oros., vi, 19, 16–7. As Drumann says (*Gesch. Roms*, i², 361, n. 6), the mausoleum was not the royal sepulchre mentioned by Strabo (xvii, 1, 8).

herself with a dagger which she habitually carried (for, as she often declared, she would not permit herself to be exhibited in a triumph[1]); but, wresting the weapon from her hand, he begged her to trust Octavian and, in conjunction with Epaphroditus, a freedman of Octavian, who presently arrived, assured her that she should be considerately treated, and gave her leave to remain in the mausoleum until she should have interred Antony. After performing the funeral rites, by permission of Octavian, with due honour, she was conveyed with every token of respect to the palace, where, in response to her request, Octavian consented to visit her. Her physician recorded that, with his connivance, she abstained from food, hoping to be allowed to die, but that Octavian, by threatening to make her children suffer, compelled her to abandon her resolve.[2]

30 B.C.

She is prevented from committing suicide.

Did Octavian intend, as ancient writers[3] said or implied, to exhibit Cleopatra in his triumph? That he desired such a display for its own sake, to gratify vanity, is hardly credible. He must have reflected that while it would please the idle populace, it would tend to dishonour the memory of the great Dictator, whom he revered and whom he always called his father; for it was known to all that he had loved her, many remembered how he had entertained her in his villa beyond the Tiber, and her statue was still in the temple of Venus Genetrix, where it had been placed by his command. That Octavian would have allowed her to meet the common fate of foreign potentates exhibited in triumphs—to be led away when all was over to execution—nobody will believe.[4] It has been suggested[5] that he

Did Octavian intend to exhibit her in his triumph?

[1] Porphyr. *ad* Hor. *Carm.*, i, 37, 30.

[2] Plut., *Ant.*, 78, 2; 79; 82, 1–2; Dio, li, 11.

[3] Hor., *Carm.*, i, 37, 31–2; Plut., *Ant.*, 84, 3; 86, 2; Flor., ii, 21, 10; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 4; Dio, li, 11, 3; 13, 1.

[4] Perhaps I ought to have said 'no sensible man'. I find that A. Stein (*Untersuch. zur Gesch. Aegyptens*, &c., 1915, p. 62, n. 3) holds that Octavian would not have hesitated to put Cleopatra to death after the triumph. Is any instance recorded of the execution on such an occasion of a woman? Arsinoe, who figured in the triumph of Caesar, was not executed by Caesar's order, but by Antony, to please Cleopatra. See p. 92; Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 4, 1; App., v, 9, 34; and *The Roman Republic*, iii, 280. [According to Dio (xliii, 19, 3), Arsinoe was the first woman exhibited in a triumph; but Zosime had appeared in the third triumph of Pompey. See *The Roman Republic*, i, 320.]

[5] By E. Groag (*Klio*, xiv, 1915, pp. 62–5).

30 B.C. purposed to leave her free to avoid the ignominy of the triumph by a voluntary death,[1] because he desired to annex Egypt to the empire and knew that she possessed letters from the Dictator and had knowledge of political secrets which he did not wish to be revealed. But he intended to annex Egypt by right of conquest; he could impound the documents; and the suggestion is stultified by a fact which is known to every reader of Roman history: an effigy of Cleopatra was exhibited in the triumph, and the conclusion is inevitable that Octavian intended that she should herself be displayed to the Roman populace.[2] One can only suppose that he deemed it politic that all who might come to celebrate his victory should see with their own eyes the Egyptian Queen against whom alone the Senate had declared war—a living proof that he had saved the Roman empire from Oriental tyranny—and that he trusted that her humiliation and popular gratitude for the service which he had rendered to his country would obliterate the recollection of the honours which the Dictator had conferred upon her.

Octavian's interview with Cleopatra.

The story of Octavian's interview with Cleopatra has been told by both Plutarch[3] and Cassius Dio,[4] whose narratives agree in various particulars, while the points of difference are not irreconcilable. Octavian found her reclining on a couch with the love-letters which she had received from the Dictator in her lap and his portraits by her side. She rose, deferentially saluted him, recounted the honours which his adoptive father had heaped upon her, repeated his loving words, kissed the letters, which she begged Octavian to read, knelt in adoration before the portraits, and, looking shyly up, glanced sweetly at Octavian, and, when he remained unmoved, neither avowing the love of which she

[1] Groag (*op. cit.*, p. 66), noticing the absurd suspicion of Th. Nöldeke (*Zeitschr. d. Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellsch.*, xxxix, 1885, p. 350, note) that Octavian murdered Cleopatra, of course denies that there is any evidence that he was such a fool.

[2] It might perhaps be objected that the display of the effigy only proves that if Cleopatra had survived, Octavian would have exhibited her, not that he did not prefer that she should commit suicide; but there is evidence (pp. 165, 167–8) that he tried to prevent her doing so, none that he gave her an opportunity.

[3] *Ant.*, 83.

[4] li, 12; 13, 1–4.

had been assured nor even promising to allow her to retain her kingdom, begged him to let her die and be buried with her husband. He merely repeated his assurance that she might count upon honourable treatment; and finally, affecting to change her mind, she expressed a feigned hope that Livia and Octavia, to whom she would like to give some of her ornaments, would plead for her. While the cautious reader may find nothing improbable in the story, he will note that, according to Plutarch, only an official of her treasury, whose ears she soundly boxed for insolence under the eyes of her smiling visitor, was present at the interview, and, since it is unlikely that the official related his own humiliation, will conclude that while Cleopatra may have given a discreet account to her physician, Octavian in his autobiography described the scene.[1] If our authorities can be trusted, she led him to believe that she still clung to life; and Epaphroditus and others who had been directed to watch her relaxed their vigilance. 30 B.C.

Publius Cornelius Dolabella,[2] a young noble who accompanied Octavian, being enamoured of the Queen, told her that within three days she and her children were to be removed from Alexandria.[3] She asked permission, which Octavian readily granted, to pay her last tribute to the memory of her husband, and, going with her maids of honour, Iras and Charmion, to the tomb, kissed and covered it with flowers. Soon after she returned a peasant appeared at the gate with a basket of figs, which her guards Death of Cleopatra.

[1] Bouché-Leclercq (*Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 335–8), Stein (*op. cit.*, p. 58, n. 4), and the biographer of Cleopatra (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, xi, 776) prefer the version of Plutarch to that of Dio. Stein, like other German scholars who are always searching for signs of what they call 'tendencious' narrative, remarks that Dio, 'following the pro-Caesarian tradition', depicts Octavian as a virtuous hero, who resisted the allurements of the Egyptian courtesan. Dio's account may, as Stein thinks (p. 257), or may not have been based upon the lost autobiography of Augustus. Supposing that it was, I see no reason to believe that Augustus falsified the facts. All that we have been told of Cleopatra justifies us in believing that she may have appealed to his amorous instincts; and, if they were awakened, policy obliged him to keep them under control. Bouché-Leclercq, indeed, remarks that she must have known that Octavian would repel the advances of a woman who had been the mistress of his adoptive father; but had he not already told Thyrsus to assure her that he also was her lover?

[2] See *Paulys Real-Ency.*, iv, 1296. 330.

[3] Plut., 84, 1.

30 B.C. allowed to be conveyed to her. She wrote a letter to Octavian, sealed and entrusted it to Epaphroditus for delivery, and then lay down to die. Some time before she had made experiments on condemned criminals, to whom she administered poisons and ordered serpents of various kinds to be applied, and had found that while some of the victims suffered torments, those who were bitten by asps died peacefully.[1] Breaking the seal of the letter, Octavian read an entreaty that she might be interred, as Antony had himself directed,[2] side by side with him. Suspecting that she had committed suicide, he sent messengers, who, forcing the door of the mausoleum, found her, exquisitely dressed and covered with jewels, extended upon the bed, Iras lying dead at her feet and Charmion dying. Punctures were noticed upon the Queen's left arm. Octavian, supposing that she had perhaps only swooned, directed that Psylli (hereditary serpent-charmers and suckers of poison conveyed by serpents) should be summoned; but it was too late. The last entreaty of the Queen was granted: her body was laid, with all due honour, in the tomb of the great soldier who had loved her; and Iras and Charmion, whose devotion pleads for the character of their mistress, were honoured with a splendid funeral.[3]

How Octavian treated the children of Antony and Cleopatra.

In dealing with the children and the partisans of Antony, Octavian, having manifested respect for Egyptian sentiment by his treatment of the Queen, acted with a characteristic blend of ruthlessness and clemency. Antullus, to whom his daughter Julia had once been betrothed, and who, after vainly begging for his life, sought sanctuary in

[1] Plut., *Ant.*, 71, 4; Aelian, ix, 11; Dio, li, 11, 2. [2] See p. 143.

[3] Virg., *Aen.*, viii, 697; Hor., *Carm.*, i, 37, 26–7; Strabo, xvii, 1, 10; Livy, *Epit.*, 133; Vell., ii, 87, 1; Lucan, ix, 891–3; Celsus, v, 27, 3; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, vii, 2 (2), 14; viii, 25 (38), 93; Stat., *Silv.* iii, 2, 119–20; Plut., *Ant.*, 85. 86, 1–3; Flor., ii, 21, 11 (inaccurate); Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 4; Zenobius, v, 24; Aelian, ix, 11, 61; Dio, li, 13, 4–5; 14; 15, 1; Ps. Victor, *De vir. ill.*, 86, 3 (inaccurate); Eutrop., vii, 7; Oros., vi, 19, 18; Isidor., *Etymol.*, xii, 4, 14. According to Stähelin (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, xi, 781), the attribution to Cleopatra of the colossal bust described by Maspero (see *The Roman Republic*, iii, 185, n. 1) is unfounded.

If one were to ask Groag why, on his theory (see pp. 165–6), Octavian gave the order to the Psylli, the only conceivable answer would be either that Octavian invented and circulated the story—I find that this has been suggested (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, xi, 777)—or that he knew that the Psylli would fail!

a shrine which Cleopatra had erected in memory of Caesar, was dragged from the statue, to which he clung, and slain.[1] Caesarion, that inconvenient reminder of the love by which the Dictator had shocked Roman pride and, moreover, the legitimate heir to the Egyptian throne, who barred the way to annexation, was also put to death; for, as Arius, a famous member of the Alexandrian Institute, remarked to Octavian, there was danger in a plurality of Caesars. The other children whom Fulvia and Cleopatra had borne to Antony were sent to Rome, where Octavia educated them with her own, and were handsomely provided for.[2] From her own two daughters by Antony three Roman emperors[3] were to be descended. We shall not hear of her again until the time comes to record her death; and since I do not expect to live so long, let me now pay my tribute to a character in which strength and sweetness were harmoniously combined. Roman history knows no nobler woman, and it is the simple truth that there are still students of the past who feel the inspiration of her unselfish devotion to the public weal, maternal kindness, and forgiving magnanimity. While other partisans of Antony were pardoned, Canidius Crassus and Cassius of Parma, the last surviving assassin of Caesar,[4] were executed; and though Artaxes, the son of that King of Armenia whom Cleopatra had killed, was allowed to retain his kingdom, Octavian refused to restore to him his captive brothers because he had put to death Romans in Armenia. The people of Alexandria were considerately treated. When Octavian entered the city after his final victory, he conversed amicably with Arius, walking with him hand in

30 B.C.

The writer's tribute to Octavia.

Octavian's treatment of Antony's partisans and of the Alexandrians.

[1] Dio (li, 15, 5) seems to date the execution of Antullus after the death of Cleopatra, Plutarch (*Ant.*, 81, 1, compared with 82, 1) before.

[2] Vell., ii, 87, 2; Plut., *Ant.*, 81. 87; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 5; Dio, li, 15, 5.

[3] Caligula, Claudius, and Nero.

[4] The last surviving assassin of Caesar, says Stein (*op. cit.*, p. 48, n. 2), was probably Turullius (see p. 162, *supra*), not, as Velleius and Orosius relate, Cassius Parmensis; for we learn from Valerius Maximus (i, 7, 7) that Cassius was executed in Athens immediately after the battle of Actium. No. Valerius, telling us that Cassius fled to Athens after the battle and there had a nightmare, concludes, 'between this night and the capital punishment which Caesar [Octavian] inflicted upon him a very short space of time intervened (*inter hanc noctem et supplicium capitis, quo eum Caesar adfecit, parvulum admodum temporis intercessit*).

30 B.C. hand; and, ascending a tribunal, he read a speech in Greek, in which he assured the citizens, who prostrated themselves before him, that no harm should befall their city, for he desired to do honour to Alexander the Great, its founder, to their god Serapis, and to Arius, his friend. To manifest his reverence, he had the sarcophagus of Alexander conveyed to him from its shrine, placed upon it a crown of gold, and covered it with flowers.[1]

Annexation of Egypt.

But it was necessary to decide the fate of Egypt, which had become the prize of conquest. Though Caesar had forborne to annex the country, of which he had recognized Cleopatra as the sovereign in accordance with her father's will,[2] it had long been virtually a client kingdom;[3] it was now without a legitimate ruler; and Octavian formally added it to the Roman empire.[4] The arrangements for its administration remained to be made, but Octavian had probably already decided that the first Governor should be Cornelius Gallus. To promote the fertility of the Delta, which was destined to be the principal granary of Rome, he employed his soldiers or those who had served under Antony in cleansing the canals into which the Nile periodically overflowed and in excavating others;[5] to commemorate the conquest, he founded on the battle-field, near Canopus, where he had defeated Antony, a city—another Nicopolis—in which, as in the Nicopolis near Actium, quinquennial games were to be held; he caused an image

[1] Vell., ii, 87, 2–3; Plut., *Ant.*, 80; *Apophth. Aug.*, 3; Suet., *Aug.*, 17, 5; 18, 1; 89, 1; Dio, li, 16; Oros., vi, 19, 20; Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Republic*, &c., ii, 536–7 (nos. 243–6, Pl. cxvii. 3–5). Dio (li, 16, 4), whose statement Stein (*op. cit.*, p. 64, n. 2) prefers to that of Plutarch, apparently thinks that Octavian's conversation with Arius occurred after the death of Cleopatra. The question is comparatively unimportant; but I see no reason for preferring Dio's chronology.

[2] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 202 and n. 2.

[3] *Ib.*, i, 326–7; ii, 66–8, 149–50; iii, 176, 181–2, 184–5.

[4] Strabo, xvii, 1, 12; *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 24; *C.I.L.*, vi, 701–2 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 91); Vell., ii, 39, 2; Suet., *Aug.*, 18, 2; Censorinus, *De die natali*, 21, 9; Eutrop., vii, 7; H. Cohen, *Descr. hist. des mon.*, &c., i², 1880, pp. 62–3.

[5] Suet., *Aug.*, 18, 2; Dio, li, 18, 1; Ps. Victor, *Epit. de Caes.*, 1, 5. Cp. *C.I.L.*, iii, 6627 (Dessau, 2483). In consequence of maladministration the canals had become choked with mud, and famines had occurred in 42 (App., iv, 108, 456) and 41 B.C. (Seneca, *Nat. quaest.*, iv, 2, 15). Cp. Jos., *In Ap.*, ii, 5. The work of cleansing the canals, begun in 30 B.C., was not completed until 26. See p. 260.

of Alexander to be engraved upon his signet ring; and before he left the city he not only paid all his soldiers with the treasure found in the palace, but presented them with two hundred and fifty sesterces apiece on condition of their refraining from pillage, and rewarded all the senators and knights who had helped him in the war.[1] 30 B.C. Octavian's troops and [£2 10s.] supporters rewarded.

Important business had still to be transacted in the countries that had obeyed Antony. Through the Sinaitic peninsula Octavian travelled to Syria, again accompanied by Herod, who loyally assisted him, as far as Antioch, and thence, turning westward, to the province Asia, where he wintered, entering upon his fifth consulship in Samos.[2] He won popularity by restoring to various cities works of art which Antony had taken from the temples to adorn the palace of Alexandria;[3] but his statesmanship was tried by an unexpected event. Tiridates, who had been chosen King of Parthia in the room of Phraates, was unable to retain his position and, after a civil war, in which he was defeated, fled to Syria. Both appealed to Octavian, who replied amicably to the envoys of Phraates, but permitted Tiridates, though he did not openly espouse his cause, to remain in Syria, doubtless calculating that he would there foment disturbances in Parthia, which would turn to the advantage of Rome.[4] Octavian certainly did not forget that it was necessary to secure the eastern frontier and to stabilize the relations of Rome with Parthia; but his extraordinary command did not authorize him to attempt a settlement which could hardly then be effected without war. Octavian in Syria and Asia. 29 B.C. His treatment of Tiridates.

Meanwhile the Senate was preparing to honour Octavian. Triumphal arches were to be erected at Brundisium, where he was expected to land, as well as at Rome; a quinquennial festival was to be held in his name, services of thanksgiving on every anniversary of his birthday and of 30 B.C. Octavian honoured by the Senate 30 B.C.

[1] Strabo, xvii, 1, 10; Suet., *Aug.*, 17; 21, 5; 30, 2; 41, 1; 71, 1; Dio, li, 18, 1; Oros., vi, 19, 19.

[2] Jos., *Ant. Iud.*, xv, 7, 4; *Bell. Iud.*, i, 20, 3; Suet., *Aug.*, 26, 3; Dio, li, 18, 1; Oros., vi, 19, 21. Cp. Grueber, ii, 536, n. 1 (nos. 240–2, Pl. cxvii. 2). Mommsen (*Res gestae*², &c., p. 136), relying upon Dio (*l. c.*), says that Octavian entered upon his fifth consulship in Asia, not (as Suetonius says) in Samos. But Samos was not distinct from Asia.

[3] Strabo, xiii, 1, 30; xiv, 1, 14; *Mon. Ancyr.*, iv, 49–51; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxiv, 8 (19), 58.

[4] Dio, li, 18. See pp. 260–1.

the day on which the announcement of his final victory had been received; the Vestal Virgins, the Senate, the citizens with their wives and children were to welcome him on his entry into the city; the shrine of his adoptive father was to be decorated with the rams of captured ships. The statues of Antony were demolished; his birthday, the 14th of January, was declared a day of evil omen;[1] and when the news of his suicide arrived additional days of thanksgiving and an additional triumph were decreed, while the commencement of a new Alexandrian era was dated from the day on which Alexandria had been captured. Lucius Saenius, consul extraordinary in the last two months of the year,[2] carried a law, pursuant to a senatorial decree, by which Octavian was empowered to add to the number of patricians, and also received the power without the office of censor.[3] Priests, when they offered prayers for the Senate and the Roman People, were to do the same for Octavian, and at all banquets, public and private, libations were to be made in his honour. The tribunician power was granted to him for life. When, on the first day of the new year, he entered upon his fifth consulship, his acts were solemnly confirmed; and when his dispatch relating to Phraates was received, the Senate decreed that whenever poems were recited in honour of the gods, his name should be associated with theirs, that a tribe, to be called after his family the Julian, should be added to the existing thirty-five, that at all festivals he should be entitled to wear the triumphal wreath, that the day on which he returned to the city should be celebrated by public sacrifices and should thenceforth be a holiday, and that he should be authorized to nominate new members of the priestly colleges, as many as he pleased.[4] One of the few decrees which he himself in his last days recorded[5] was that by which the temple of Janus was to be closed, for the

Jan. 1, 29 B.C.

[1] *Not. Scavi*, 1923, p. 194. [2] *C.I.L.*, i, p. 544. [3] See pp. 261–2.

[4] Strabo, xiv, 6, 6; *Mon. Ancyr.*, ii, 1, 21; Plut., *Cic.*, 49, 3; *Ant.*, 86, 4; Tac., *Ann.*, xi, 25; Suet., *Aug.*, 27, 5; Dio, li, 19; 20, 1–3; Censorinus, 21, 9. Stein (*op. cit.*, pp. 17–8), citing Wissowa (*Relig. u. Kultus d. Römer*[2], p. 82), remarks that it does not follow from the senatorial decree relating to the recitation of poems that Octavian was deified, and that if he was, his Genius was meant.

[5] *Mon. Ancyr.*, ii, 42–5.

third time in Roman history, in celebration of the world-wide peace which he had restored.[1] 29 B.C.

and deified in Asia.

Octavian, before he departed from Asia, allowed temples to be erected at Ephesus and Nicaea for the worship of his adoptive father, and for the worship of himself in Pergamum and Nicomedia:[2] he had terminated a century of unrest, and in his greatness Orientals saw a revelation of divinity. Journeying through Italy, he rested near Naples, while he was recovering from illness, and on four successive days listened to Virgil reading the *Georgics*, which he had lately finished,[3] and in which he promised to write an epic in honour of the conqueror.[4] When he entered the city his brother consul offered sacrifices for his safe arrival —an unprecedented honour. On the 13th of August he celebrated his long-deferred triumph for victories in Illyricum, on the next day for the victory of Actium, and on the next for the conquest of Egypt,[5] when Alexander and Cleopatra, children of Antony, walked in the procession with other captives, and an effigy of the dead Queen, borne in a litter, was exhibited for all to see. It was noticed that the conqueror on this occasion departed from established usage, his colleague and the other officers of state not preceding him, but following in company with those senators who had taken part in the campaign. He conferred extraordinary honours upon Agrippa, and, hoping perhaps to annul the recollection of the taxes which he had been compelled to impose two years before, bestowed largesses from the spoils of Egypt on a magnificent scale. Every citizen—even young boys—received four hundred sesterces, every discharged soldier settled in a colony one thousand; arrears of taxes were remitted;[6] and Octavian per-

He returns to Rome, celebrates his triumphs, distributes largesses, and dedicates temples.

[£4.]

[£10.]

[1] Livy, i, 19, 3; Vell., ii, 38, 3; Flor., ii, 34, 64; Suet., *Aug.*, 22; Dio, li, 20, 4; Oros., vi, 20, 1. 8; Grueber, ii, 535, n. 2 (nos. 236–9, Pl. cxvii. 1).

[2] Tac., *Ann.*, iv, 37; Suet., *Aug.*, 52 (who says that Augustus would not allow temples to be erected in his honour, even in the provinces, except jointly in his own name and that of Rome); Dio, li, 20, 6–7. As Warde Fowler says (*Roman Ideas of Deity*, 130), the deification of Rome shows 'the desire of the provincials to recognise the overwhelming strength . . . which that name implied'.

[3] Donatus, *Vita Verg.*, ii, 40.

[4] *Georg.*, iii, 46–7.

[5] *C.I.L.*, i, pp. 328, 478–9; Macrob., i, 12, 35.

[6] Virg., *Aen.*, viii, 714; *C.I.L.* i, pp. 324, 328, 478–9; *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 21; iii, 8–9, 17–9; Livy, *Epit.*, 133; Vell., ii, 89, 1; Plut., *Ant.*, 86, 2; App., *Ill.*,

29 B.C. formed an act of renunciation which must have increased the esteem in which he was now held. In the second year
41 B.C. of the Triumvirate Lucius Antonius, to whom a triumph was awarded for an insignificant victory, had received a gift of bullion from every one of the thirty-five tribes.[1] Such gifts had hitherto been made, with rare exceptions, by provincial communities alone; but the case of Lucius created a precedent, now followed by the tribes, each one of which presented Octavian with a thousand pounds of gold. Resolving to nullify the precedent and to revert to Republican usage, he returned the offering to the donors.[2] In consequence of the lavish distribution of Egyptian treasure the value of real property in Italy enormously increased, and the rate of interest fell from twelve to four per cent.[3] While a new Senate House, called after Julius Caesar, the foundations of which had been laid in the first year of the Triumvirate,[4] was now dedicated, and a statue symbolical of Victory, adorned with Egyptian spoils, was placed therein, the statue of Cleopatra was suffered to remain in the temple of Venus Genetrix, where Caesar had placed it.[5] At the dedication of Caesar's shrine[6] divers shows were held—chariot races, gladiatorial combats, exhibitions of wild beasts, in which a rhinoceros and a hippopotamus, never before seen in Rome, were slaughtered for the delectation of the populace, though Octavian, suffering from one of his frequent illnesses, was unable to be present.

Festivities: triumphs: repair of temples.

28 B.C. He had not yet recovered when, early in the following year Agrippa presided at additional games, the first of the quinquennial festival in commemoration of the victory of Actium, as well as at an athletic display in a stadium erected in the Field of Mars.[7] Soon afterwards lieutenants of Octavian were allowed to triumph in recognition of victories which they had gained over rebellious tribes in

28; Suet., *Aug.*, 22; 41; Dio, li, 21; Macrob., i, 12, 35; Oros., vi; 20, 1. 8 (chronologically inaccurate). Cp. Babelon, *Monn. de la rép. rom.*, ii, 64–7. 154–63, and Grueber, ii, 14.

[1] Dio, xlviii, 4, 6.

[2] *Mon. Ancyr.*, iv, 26-30; Dio, li, 21, 4. Cp. Th. Mommsen, *Res gestae*[2], &c., p. 89.

[3] Suet., *Aug.*, 41, 1; Dio, li, 21, 5; Oros., vi, 19, 19. Cp. Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 72, n. 1.

[4] Dio, xlvii, 19, 1.

[5] Suet., *Aug.*, 100, 2; Dio, li, 22, 1.

[6] See p. 75.

[7] *Mon. Ancyr.*, iv, 31–3; Dio, li, 22, 3–6. 9; liii, 1, 4–6.

Gaul, Spain, and Africa;[1] and the temple on the Palatine, which had been planned after the victory at Naulochus, sacred to Apollo, whom Octavian delighted to honour, whom some fondly imagined to be his father, and to whose favour the victory of Actium was piously ascribed, was solemnly dedicated.[2] Documents recording arrears of taxation were burned; the dole of corn was increased fourfold; and, in accordance with a senatorial decree, eighty-two temples, which in the civil wars had fallen into decay, were repaired, the cost in the case of those which had been founded by individuals being defrayed by their descendants, while Octavian made himself responsible for the rest.[3] 28 B.C.

Octavian plans the resettlement of the constitution.

But in the midst of festivities, largesses, administrative duties, while he was founding a new colony in Carthage,[4] even while his lieutenant Marcus Crassus was conducting a victorious campaign for the protection of Macedonia against the Dacians and the Moesians,[5] Octavian, despite ill health, was planning the resettlement of the Roman constitution. Practically he was still ruling as a monarch in virtue of that authority, unconstitutional but not illegal, which, as he held, had been conferred upon him, and which had certainly been recognized, by the prevalent feeling of the Western world before he entered upon the struggle with Antony; but that authority was provisional, and he was now expected to fulfil the promise which he had made after he delivered Italy from piracy[6]—to restore constitutional government. He did not need the warning that had been given on the Ides of March, fifteen years before, and, unlike the merciful Dictator who perished then, he had effected insurance against opposition by a ruthless proscription.[7] It was evident, indeed, to him, as it must have been to all who had lived through the civil wars and could read the signs of the times, that to restore the Republic,

[1] Dio, li, 21, 6; *C.I.L.*, i, pp. 461, 464, 478–9.

[2] Virg., *Aen.*, viii, 704; *Mon. Ancyr.*, iv, 1–2; *C.I.L.*, i, pp. 325, 403; Suet., *Aug.*, 29, 1–3; 52; 94, 4; Dio, liii, 1, 3. Cp. *J.R.S.*, iv, 1914, pp. 194, 200–1 219, and see p. 119, *supra*.

[3] *Mon. Ancyr.*, iv, 17–8; Ovid, *Fasti*, ii, 59–63; Suet., *Aug.*, 30, 2; 32, 2; Dio, liii, 2, 1, 3–5.

[4] App., *Pun.*, 136; Dio, lii, 43, 1.

[5] Livy, *Epit.*, 134; *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 9–10; Flor., ii, 22, 3; 26; Dio, li, 23–7.

[6] See p. 120.

[7] Cp. Tac., *Ann.*, i, 2.

28 B.C. even in the form in which it had existed between the dictatorship of Sulla and of Caesar, was impracticable: monarchy there must needs be if the empire were to hold together; but it must be so far veiled as not to offend Republican sentiment, and some share of power must be reserved for the Senate and (even though few Italians cared for Republican institutions[1]) in appearance, for the Roman People. One condition was indispensable. Experience had shown that a professional army, though it had shattered constitutional government, was essential to the security of the empire;[2] that, to avoid the evils which had arisen from leaving it to be irregularly rewarded by its commander,[3] it must be pensioned by the State; and that it must be controlled, not by the Senate, but by the general who had raised it and led it to victory, and whom alone it was willing to obey. In fine, if I may quote the words of Rostovtzeff,[4] though the new state was to be in some sort a restored republic, 'it had to keep the main instruments of the revolutionary period, the revolutionary army and its revolutionary leader'. How to combine these seeming incompatibles—that was a problem to test the indispensable quality of a statesman, 'le *tact* des choses possibles'. But with that quality Octavian had been endowed.

Besides inborn capacity, matured by the fifteen years' experience that had followed the initiation which he received in boyhood, Octavian had many advantages. Though Italy, as a whole, was still flourishing,[5] individuals, among whom were members of noble families,[6] had suffered much. The Roman world, whose feelings were expressed by Horace and Virgil, was longing for the security which Octavian alone could give, and was disposed to venerate its saviour as almost divine. Long tenure of power suc-

[1] Cic., *Att.*, vii, 7, 5. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, i, 219–20; iii, 29.

[2] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 37–8.

[3] *Ib.*, p. 162.

[4] *Social and Econ. Hist. of the Roman Empire*, 1926, p. 40.

Mommsen (*Res gestae*², p. 74) held that after the battle of Actium Octavian retained only 18 legions; Hardy (*Mon. Ancyr.*, p. 34) accounted for 22. Prof. Ritterling (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, xii, 1216–7), using fresh evidence, has given reasons for believing that the number was 27. For the purpose of this book the question is comparatively unimportant.

[5] Varro, *Rer. rust.*, i, 2, 3. 6. 7. Cp. M. Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, pp. 494–6 (n. 25).

[6] Suet., *Aug.*, 41, 1.

cessfully exercised, his rescue of Italy from the famine threatened by the corsairs, his beneficent campaign in Illyricum, his deliverance of the West from Oriental domination, the extinction of civil war and the restoration of peace had given him immense prestige; he was the master of many legions and of a powerful fleet; he had acquired popularity by generous largesses and by politic remission of taxes; above all, he had never given offence, as Caesar had done, by any such display as might imply that he deemed himself exalted above his fellow-citizens. For the show of power he cared nothing. His mode of life was that of a homely bourgeois. He not only did not demand, but rejected such forms of address as might be required by a monarch; he conversed not only with senators but also with humble citizens as if they were his equals, never resented differences of opinion, and could tolerate, when he chose, not only contradiction but even insolence. At his own table he so guided the conversation that good fellowship prevailed among all his guests and between himself and them.[1] He had the discernment to choose the ablest men as ministers, and there was that in him which moved them to give him loyally of their best, and which, unpretentious though he was, compelled the reverence of all. 29 B.C.

Cassius Dio, who fancied that he could rival Thucydides in composing speeches, devoted the greater part of his Fifty-second Book to two homilies, supposed to have been addressed to Octavian, which he ascribed respectively to Agrippa and Maecenas; but, though the latter has an interest for the history of Severus Alexander,[2] we cannot draw from either any relevant inference, except that Octavian did take counsel with those faithful friends, whether in their houses or in that upper room in his own on the Palatine in which he used to work,[3] before he announced his purpose to the Senate.

Purging of the Senate.

To prepare for the settlement, Octavian in his fifth consulship undertook, in conjunction with Agrippa, consul designate, upon whom and himself the censorial power had

[1] Suet., *Aug.*, 53–6.

[2] See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, i, 1867, p. 43, n. *, and P. Meyer, *De Maecenatis oratione a Dione ficta*, Berlin, 1891.

[3] Suet., *Aug.*, 72, 2.

29 B.C. been conferred,[1] the duty of calling over the names of senators—the regular preliminary to the census which was to be taken, after an abnormal interval, in the following year. The Senate, into which freedmen, private soldiers, and others had found their way through favouritism or bribery, was enormously overgrown, numbering over a thousand members[2]—more than three times as many as in the dictatorship of Sulla.[3] Octavian, urging them to consider severally whether they deserved their rank, induced fifty or sixty to resign; then, knowing that there were a hundred and forty with whom conscience had not done its work, he and Agrippa formally degraded them and publicly recorded their degradation. At the same time a few new members were admitted,[4] and, in accordance with the law carried by Saenius,[5] Octavian increased the number of patricians, from whose ranks alone certain offices
28 B.C. could be filled.[6] In the following year Octavian and Agrippa
Octavian and Agrippa consuls. were colleagues in the consulship, and Octavian, who, in virtue either of the triumviral power, silently retained, or of the extraordinary command[7] with which he had been informally invested, had hitherto, like the dictators of old, been attended by twenty-four lictors, transferred twelve to the service of Agrippa,[8] and made upon oath the customary declaration that he had discharged his duty in
The census. his preceding year of office.[9] The census was then taken; and immediately afterwards the solemn expiatory sacrifice on behalf of the Roman People which, in the best days of the Republic had regularly followed the census, was held after an interval of forty-one years.[10] The names of

[1] See pp. 261–2. [2] Suet., *Aug.*, 35, 1; Dio, lii, 42, 1.
[3] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 43, 50, 62, 355–6.
[4] *Mon. Ancyr.*, ii, 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 35, 1–2; Dio, lii, 42, 2–4.
[5] See p. 172.
[6] Dio, lii, 42, 5; *Mon. Ancyr.*, ii, 1; Tac., *Ann.*, xi, 25. I disregard the statement of Dio (lii, 41, 3–4) that in 29 B.C. Octavian received the *praenomen* Imperator as a hereditary distinction, because Prof. D. McFayden (*The Hist. of the Title Imperator*, &c., 1920), although some of his arguments seem to me inconclusive, has shown that it is wrong. Octavian had assumed the *praenomen* in 38 (Gruober, ii, 411), if not in 40 (*C.I.L.*, i, p. 461). See McFayden, pp. 32–5.
[7] See pp. 144–5. [8] Dio, liii, 1, 1. See p. 239. [9] Dio, liii, 1, 1.
[10] *Mon. Ancyr.*, ii, 2–3. The preceding census had been taken in 70 B.C., but not before the end of April (Cic., *In Q. Caecil. div.*, 3, 8).

four million and sixty-three thousand Roman citizens were registered,[1] Octavian being designated *princeps senatus*, 'head of the Senate';[2] all who could obey the summons assembled in the Field of Mars; the three destined victims —a sow, a sheep, and a bull—were driven thrice, according to ancient ritual, around the multitude; and while they were being immolated to Mars a prescribed prayer was recited for the preservation and the aggrandizement of the State.[3] In the course of the year Octavian published an edict which plainly signified his intention of restoring constitutional authority: those acts of the Triumvirate that involved injustice were formally annulled.[4] The Senate was summoned to meet on the ensuing New Year's Day, when he would enter upon his seventh consulship; and it is reasonable to suppose that before that memorable session he came to an understanding with the leading senators, particularly with those who were devoted to him and whose attendance he had ensured,[5] about the nature of the contemplated settlement. On the appointed day he entered the House, carrying the manuscript from which he was about to read the speech[6] that was to announce the restoration of the Republic.

28 B.C.

Triumviral acts of injustice annulled.

Jan. 1, 27 B.C.

The Principate.

Picture him as he rose from the curule chair. His portraits, familiar to us all, justify the admiration expressed by Suetonius.[7] Though he did not stand above the middle height, his presence was imposing, his gaze so penetrating (though, except when he was roused to anger, the expression of his eyes was mild) that many lacked the nerve to meet it.[8] Still a young man, for he had not completed his thirty-sixth year, he had lived so strenuously that his countenance must have borne the marks not only of much suffering but of constant preoccupation with affairs of state:

> Deep on his front engraven
> Deliberation sat and public care.

[1] *Mon. Ancyr.*, ii, 3–4.
[2] *Ib.*, i, 44 (cp. *Klio*, Beiheft xix, 1927, p. 59); Dio, liii, 1, 3.
[3] *Dion. Hal.*, iv, 22. Cp. W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience*, &c., 1911, pp. 215–6.
[4] Tac., *Ann.*, iii, 28; Dio, liii, 2, 5.
[5] *Ib.*, § 7.
[6] *Ib.* Cp. Suet., *Aug.*, 84, 2.
[7] *Ib.*, 79, 1.
[8] *Ib.*, 1–2.

27 B.C. His resignation of extraordinary power and of the command of the armed forces of the State, which left him with no more than the dignified position of *princeps*,[1] or 'first citizen', the consular authority, and the tribunician power, was not accepted: the Senate, whose action was confirmed by a plébiscite, requested him to resume his powers, which he did in such a way as to give some colour to his claim that the Republic was restored.[2] Leaving to the Senate the government of those provinces in which no disturbance was to be feared, and for the protection of which few troops were required, he reserved for himself the rest—Nearer Spain and with it Lusitania, Transalpine Gaul, Syria, Cilicia, Cyprus, and Egypt—with all the legions necessary to hold them; but his command was to be restored at the end of ten years to the Senate, which formally conferred it. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the entire forces, military and naval, of the empire, with the sole right of levying troops, of making war, and of concluding peace; he was to have supreme control of the finances; and even over those provinces that were assigned to the Senate he retained an unobtrusive power. The senators who were to rule them were to be nominated by him and to hold office for no more than a year: the officers who

[1] Augustus was then and thenceforth recognized as the first citizen; but when he was first designated *princeps*, as distinct from *princeps senatus*, is not known; for, while he called himself, and Tacitus called him by this title, it is not mentioned in any inscription relating to him (except the *Monumentum Ancyranum*), though often in connexion with Claudius and later emperors. See pp. 263–4.

[2] E. Meyer (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, xci, 1903, pp. 385–431=*Kl. Schr.*, 1910, pp. 441–92) argues that Octavian really wished to restore the Republic, Gardthausen (*Neue Jahrb.*, xiii, 1904, pp. 241–51) that he did not. Does not the answer depend upon what the question means? Pelham (*Essays*, 1911, pp. 31–2), who agrees with Meyer, thinks that Octavian desired to revitalize the political institutions of Rome —'the primary assembly, the elective magistracies, and even the senate'. In this respect, he admits, 'Augustus's hopes were falsified'. I believe that he was too shrewd to entertain them. He must have known that, as Pelham says (p. 36), 'No effective partnership was possible when the real strength was all on one side'. Gardthausen (p. 245), citing the statement of Meyer (p. 415) that 'under Augustus the Senate was again to assume the control of the State', asks how it happened that if such was really his wish, it was not fulfilled, though it was in his power to give the Senate means of establishing its position. Rostovtzeff, whose remarks (*op. cit.*, pp. 38–43) I have read since this book was virtually finished, confirms my view.

were to administer his provinces might remain as long as he pleased. Procurators, so-called, whose duty was to supervise financial affairs, were appointed by him for the senatorial as well as for his own provinces; and thenceforth the governor of every province was to receive a fixed salary.[1] On the 13th of January the settlement was completed.[2] It was decreed that the door-posts of Octavian's house should be publicly decorated with leaves of laurel, symbolical of victory, that the civic wreath of oak leaves should be hung above his gate—a testimony that by and after his victory he had saved or spared human life—and that a golden shield should be placed in the Senate House, which, he afterwards declared, 'as its inscription testifies, was awarded to me by the Senate and the Roman People in recognition of my uprightness, clemency, justice, and piety'.[3] Three days later the Senate, on the motion of Munatius Plancus, decreed that the title 'Augustus' (the Revered)—the name by which he was thenceforward known—should be conferred upon Octavian.[4] Finally, acting upon a third decree, a tribune, Sextus Pacuvius Taurus, carried a plébiscite, by which, just as the month Quintilis had been called Julius,[5] the month Sextilis was thenceforth to be called Augustus.[6]

27 B.C.

Jan. 16.

In the last weeks of his life Augustus in that laconic monument the majesty of which impresses all who have

[1] Strabo, xvii, 3, 25; Suet., *Aug.*, 47; Dio, liii, 4, 3–4; 5, 4; 8, 5; 11–5; 16, 1.

[2] *C.I.L.*, i, p. 384.

[3] *Mon. Ancyr.*, vi, 17–21; Dio, liii, 16, 4; *C.I.L.*, ix, 5881 (Dessau, 82); Cohen, *Descr. hist. des monn.*, &c., i², 66. 30, 109. 341; Babelon, ii, 294–5. 1–3; Grueber, ii, 18 n. 2, 19.

[4] Ovid, *Fasti*, i, 590; Livy, *Epit.*, 134; *Mon. Ancyr.*, vi, 16–7; *C.I.L.*, i, p. 312; Vell., ii, 91, 1; Suet., *Aug.*, 7, 2; Dio, liii, 16, 6; Censorinus, 21, 8; Oros., vi, 20, 2 (chronologically inaccurate). Prof. Haverfield (*J.R.S.*, v, 1915, pp. 249–50) argued that the abbreviation AUG. (for *augur*), found on coins of Antony that must have been in circulation in 27 B.C., may have suggested the title *Augustus*, which is frequently abbreviated to AUG. I agree with Prof. Lily Ross Taylor (*Class. Rev.*, xxxiii, 1918, pp. 158–61) that this is improbable; but Haverfield (*ib.*, xxxiv, 1919, pp. 65–6) replied satisfactorily to one of the lady's objections—that AUG. does not occur on coins of Augustus before 19.

[5] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 332.

[6] Livy, *Epit.*, 134; Macrob., i, 12, 35. This change was made in 27, though Suetonius (*Aug.*, 31, 2), Dio (lv, 6, 6), and Censorinus (*De die natali*, 22, 16) date it 8 B.C. See *Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 361–2.

27 B.C. the sense of style described the settlement in two sentences: 'In my sixth and seventh consulships, after I had extinguished civil wars, having by universal consent been put in possession of supreme authority, I transferred the commonwealth from my own power to the control of the Senate and the Roman People. . . . After that time I stood above all in influence,[1] but of power I had no more than my colleagues in each several magistracy.'[2]

Courtly writers of the Augustan Age of course anticipated or endorsed his view. In the year before the settlement he had been described on a coin struck in Asia Minor as 'Caesar, Imperator, son of the deified, consul for the sixth time, vindicator of the liberty of the Roman People';[3] the *Fasti* of Praeneste[4] declared that the oaken wreath was given because he restored the Republic to the Roman People; Velleius,[5] recording that after twenty years of civil war he had renewed peace, affirmed that he had restored validity to the laws, authority to judicial decisions, dignity to the Senate, and had re-established the ancient power of the magistrates.

But there was another point of view. The municipality of Pisa described Augustus as 'the principal guardian of the Roman Empire and the governor of the whole world';[6] Strabo,[7] who wrote principally for Greeks, while he noted the division of the provinces into groups to be administered respectively by Augustus and the Senate, affirmed that 'his country conferred upon him the administration of the empire' and that 'he was the supreme authority for life in war and peace'; Suetonius[8] explained that, after think-

[1] It would appear from fragments of the *Res gestae divi Augusti* discovered in 1914 by Sir W. Ramsay at Pisidian Antioch (*J.R.S.*, vi, 1916, pp. 105–29) that for (*praestiti omnibus*) *dignitate* we should read *auctoritate* (*praestiti omnibus*). See the remarks of A. von Premerstein (*Hermes*, lix, 104–6) and Ramsay and von Premerstein (*Klio*, Beiheft xix, 1927, pp. 96–7, 119).

[2] *Mon. Ancyr.*, vi, 13–6, 21–3.

[3] Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 92. 218 (=Babelon, ii, 61. 147); Grueber, p. 537 (no. 248, Pl. cxvii. 6).

[4] *C.I.L.*, i, p. 384. Cp. vi, 1527 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 8393. 35).

[5] ii, 89, 3.

[6] *C.I.L.*, xi, 1421 (Dessau, 140. 9–10).

[7] xvii, 3, 25.

[8] *Aug.*, 28, 1. Suetonius, says Mommsen (*Res gestae*[2], &c., p. 146), 'blunders badly, for while Caesar did not even think of resigning the substance of his authority, he not only thought of restoring his extraordinary power, but

ing of restoring the Republic, he decided that to entrust 27 B.C.
the government to popular control would be dangerous, and therefore retained it; Dio[1] roundly asserted that from the time of his fifth, and especially of his seventh, consulship the Roman government was monarchical. There was truth in either view, the whole truth in neither. If Velleius was what Macaulay[2] called him, a 'vile flatterer', his statements were literally correct: Augustus did restore validity to the laws and authority to judicial decisions; he respected the dignity of the Senate; and under him the magistrates discharged their proper functions. The Senate was empowered to select from its own ranks the officers who managed the treasury.[3] It still played an important part in administering its own provinces and in tendering advice, when he asked for it, to its principal member,[4] whose title, *princeps*, which implied no more than primacy in a commonwealth,[5] was sanctioned by Republican usage.[6] The settlement was ratified without any revolutionary or even constitutional innovation by the time-honoured authorities —the Senate and the Roman People. The administration was thenceforward to be conducted under Republican forms. The power exercised by Augustus was conferred by a senate and with the consent of a people[7] which felt, as they continued to feel throughout his life, that his supremacy was indispensable for the well-being of the State; it was conferred for a limited time; and, although far wider in extent, it was similar in principle to the extraordinary power that had been conferred upon Pompey a generation before:[8] for, as it has been truly said, the Roman Emperor from first to last was *legally* a citizen whom the

did actually restore it to the people.' Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 578–80 [Eng. tr., iv, 131–3]) notwithstanding, I cannot believe that Octavian entertained for a moment the thought of retiring into private life.

[1] lii, 1, 1; liii, 11, 4; 17, 1.

[2] G. O. Trevelyan, *Life . . . of Lord Macaulay*, 1881, p. 690.

[3] Tac., *Ann.*, xiii, 28–9; Suet., *Aug.*, 36; Dio, liii, 2, 1.

[4] Suet., *Aug.*, 35, 4; Dio, liii, 21, 5.

[5] Pelham (*Essays*, p. 110) calls it 'a title of courtesy accorded by general usage'. See, however, pp. 263–5.

[6] *The Roman Republic*, iii, 570. Cp. Pelham, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–8, and R. Heinze (*Hermes*, lix, 73–94).

[7] Gaius, i, 5. [8] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 169–72, 201–2.

27 B.C. Senate and the People had invested with authority.[1] On the other hand, the people, although they continued to elect the magistrates, as they had done under the dictatorship of Caesar, regularly voted for the candidates whom Augustus, like the Dictator, recommended;[2] and the laws which they occasionally passed were not due to popular initiative, but were introduced or suggested by him.[3] Of the Senate it might have been said, as Lucan[4] said of Pompey, *stat magni nominis umbra*. While Augustus invariably treated it, as he treated his colleagues in the consulship and the priestly colleges, with profound respect, while he maintained and even increased its privileges,[5] and consulted it when he required advice,[6] it no longer possessed even the diminished power which it had exercised in the last century of the Republic. It might pass decrees which Augustus proposed (for it was as easy to achieve his aim by a senatorial decree as by an edict, more soothing to senatorial pride, and in appearance more constitutional); but though he could tolerate contradiction in debate and even such an outburst as 'Senators ought to have the right of speaking freely on state affairs',[7] his tribunician power authorized him to prevent or to close discussion, and in fact the Senate was powerless to do anything which he disapproved. Since he had been invested with 'the higher command'[8] over all magistrates, except his colleagues in the consulship, since he was the master of the armed forces of the State, which he alone had the right and the power to increase, since the control of foreign policy belonged to him alone, even his colleagues, though legally his peers, were really subordinate.

It was in the provinces that the fruits of the settlement were most evident; and the provincials, who, remote from courtly influences, comprehended its significance, recognized Augustus as their Imperator.[9] The position of Egypt was exceptional; for, since it was to be the principal

[1] Pelham, *Outlines of Rom. Hist.*[2], 1895, p. 376.
[2] Suet., *Aug.*, 40, 2; Dio, liii, 21, 6–7. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 330.
[3] Dio, liii, 21, 3. Cp. Willems, *Le droit public rom.*[5], pp. 447–8.
[4] i, 135. [5] Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.*, iii, 886.
[6] Dio, liii, 21, 5–6. [7] Suet., *Aug.*, 54. [8] See pp. 265–7.
[9] See D. McFayden, *The Hist. of the Title Imperator*, &c., pp. 47, 52.

granary of Rome, precautions were necessary to prevent any one from intercepting the supplies. The province was really a dominion belonging to Augustus, who intended to maintain the absolute Ptolemaic rule; and Cornelius Gallus, the first Governor, whom he called a prefect, was in reality a viceroy. No Roman senator or knight might visit the country without the permission of Augustus, who doubtless saw as clearly as his adoptive father that under an ambitious adventurer it might become a source of trouble;[1] and while other provincial cities had their councils, he withheld this privilege from Alexandria.[2] The Egyptians recognized him as another Pharaoh, to whom the divine honours which his predecessors had received were due; and he was worshipped as *Ζεὺς Ἐλευθέριος Σεβαστός*—Zeus, the Revered Deliverer.[3] He governed his other provinces, as Pompey had governed Spain,[4] through *legati*—ex-consuls or ex-praetors—whose tenure of office depended on his will.[5] Apart from Egypt, the provinces which he controlled were really one, in which he could develop an administrative system modifiable according to circumstances, but uniform in principle—the aim of securing good government. Republican governors had been chosen, as a rule, by lot; the legates of Augustus, the fittest men whom he could find, receiving adequate salaries, being no longer virtually irresponsible, no longer free to enrich themselves by requisition, knowing that merit would be certainly rewarded, had every incentive to govern well. The troops whom they commanded were enrolled, discharged, and paid by Augustus, and if they went to war, they waged it by his direction and under his auspices. Thus his provinces were relieved from the abuses which under the Republic most provinces had suffered;[6] and those of the Senate were better off than before. In them also the supreme military authority and the control of foreign

27 B.C.

[1] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 202, n. 1.

[2] Strabo, xvii, 1, 12; Tac., *Ann.*, ii, 59; *Hist.*, i, 11; Dio, li, 17, 1–2; Eutrop., vii, 7; *C.I.L.*, iii, 14147. 5 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 8995). Cp. U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge . . . d. Papyruskunde*, i, 1, 1912, pp. 28–9.

[3] Wilcken, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 119–21. Cp. *Ägypt. Urkunden aus d. Kgl. Museum zu Berlin*, ii, 1898, 543.

[4] See *The Roman Republic*, ii, 147.

[5] Dio, liii, 13, 6.

[6] See *The Roman Republic*, i, 123, 125–32; ii, 257–9.

27 B.C. policy belonged to Augustus; the proconsuls who governed them, like the legates, could no longer make requisitions; the revenue, in so far as it belonged to Augustus, was received by his procurator;[1] and the 'higher command'[2] enabled him, without unduly encroaching upon senatorial privilege, to exercise a wholesome influence. If it was in a later period that certain laws were specified as not binding upon Augustus, and that he was empowered to conclude treaties at his discretion, to convene the Senate whensoever he pleased, and in short to do anything and everything which he might deem essential to the welfare of the State,[3] the settlement which he concluded made it possible for him and the best of his successors to organize that government which, despite certain faults, kept barbarians for four centuries at bay and enabled civilization to resist their onslaught when it came. Though, in the view of Tacitus, the work of permanent officials and that municipal activity to which inscriptions testify did not compensate for the atrophy of genius, the achievement of Augustus was worth its inevitable cost. For in those days what the Roman world required was not self-government, but good government.

[1] Dio, liii, 15, 3.

[2] See p. 184.

[3] *C.I.L.*, vi, 930 (=C. G. Bruns, *Fontes iuris Rom.*[6], 1893, pp. 192–3, and Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 244). Cp. Dio, liii, 32, 5; liv, 3, 3; and Th. Mommsen, *Res gestae*[2], &c., p. 148. Pelham (*Essays*, pp. 77–8) explains why the right of convening the Senate, though it was inherent in the tribunician power, was granted expressly in 22 B.C.

PART II

THE RATIFICATION OF CAESAR'S 'ACTS'

PROFESSOR A. C. Clark in his revision (1908) of J. R. King's edition of *Philippics I, II, III, V, VII* makes himself responsible (p. 92) for the statement that Caesar's acts were confirmed 'by a decree of the senate, not by a law'; but the words of Cicero, *si quam legem de actis Caesaris confirmandis . . . tulisse M. Antonius dicitur*,[1] seem to imply that the decree was followed by a law. Groebe conjectures[2] that this law was accepted by the popular assembly on March 17 (the day of the decree): von Premerstein has proved that the date was June 2 or 3.[3]

THE ABOLITION OF THE OFFICE OF DICTATOR

The dictatorship was abolished a few days before the execution of Herophilus,[4] which occurred not later than April 13,[5] 44 B.C.

Haverfield,[6] remarking that Merivale and other English writers 'say that the dictatorship was abolished', condemns the statement as inaccurate, and affirms that, 'As Mommsen (*Staatsrecht*, ii, 685) points out, the dictatorship "abolished", *i.e.* forbidden for the future . . . was the extraordinary office held by Caesar, which is distinct from the dictatorship of the Punic Wars'. Admitting that Merivale could appeal to Cicero,[7] he insists that 'it merely suited' Cicero's 'argument to identify the two offices', and adds that 'a dictatorship was not regarded as impossible in B.C. 22'.

When Haverfield wrote these words he was young and unduly influenced by Mommsen, whom he revered. The mere fact that Augustus refused the dictatorship which he was urged by the Senate and the People to accept,[8] does not prove that the office had not been 'forbidden for the future' 22 years before. Intrinsically, it is incredible that Antony, when he proposed the abolition, would have explained that he had in mind only 'the extraordinary office held by Caesar'; for any such explanation would have weakened the effect which his proposal was intended

[1] *Phil.*, v, 4, 10. [2] W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, i², 1899, p. 415 [68, 6].
[3] *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung f. Rechtsgesch.*, röm. Abt., xlii, 1922, pp. 132, 137–9. See p. 16, *supra*.
[4] *Phil.*, i, 2, 4–5. [5] See p. 5, n. 7.
[6] *Class. Rev.*, iii, 1889, p. 77. [7] *Phil.*, i, 2, 4; ii, 36, 91.
[8] *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 31–2. Cp. Vell., ii, 89, 5, and Suet., *Aug.*, 52.

to produce. What guarantee can you give, Conservatives might well have objected, that some future dictator, appointed for a patriotic purpose, will not contrive, like Caesar, to make his office perpetual? Better abolish the office, root and branch, for ever. If the supposed explanation had been given, Cicero's statement—that Antony had *absolutely* abolished the very name of dictator, though it had been often legitimate, on account of the still fresh recollection of a perpetual dictatorship (*cum dictatoris nomen, quod saepe iustum fuisset, propter perpetuae dictaturae recentem memoriam funditus ex re publica sustulisset*) would have been scouted as manifestly false. For Mommsen's assertion there is no evidence; and it is contradicted by the emphatic words of Appian[1]—ὁ δὲ Ἀντώνιος . . . ἐψηφίσατο μὴ ἐξεῖναί πω κατὰ μηδεμίαν αἰτίαν περὶ δικτάτορος ἀρχῆς ⟨μήτε εἰπεῖν⟩ μήτ' ἐπιψηφίζειν μήτε λαβεῖν διδομένην, κτλ.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF MACEDONIA AND SYRIA TO ANTONY AND DOLABELLA RESPECTIVELY

That the provinces of Macedonia and Syria were assigned in 44 B.C., after the death of Caesar, to Antony and Dolabella respectively is stated, more or less inaccurately, by Appian[2] and Dio,[3] implicitly by Cicero in two letters, which enable us to fix approximately the date.[4] Writing from Puteoli to Atticus[5] on the 18th of April, he remarks that war with the Parthians is apparently imminent, but that Dolabella will see to it (*ita mihi videtur bellum illud instare. Sed Dolabella et Nicias* [a grammarian, whom Cicero mentions jocosely] *viderint*); in a later letter[6] (of April 27 or 28), replying to one in which Atticus had told him that Antony intended to propose in the Senate on the 1st of June that the Gallic provinces should be assigned to him [in exchange for Macedonia[7]], he asks whether the Senate will be free to decide the question. As

[1] iii, 25, 94. Cp. Livy, *Epit.*, 116, and Dio, xliv, 51, 2.

[2] *B.C.*, iii, 8, 26–8; 12, 42; 24, 90–1; 27, 103–4; iv, 57, 247, &c. As W. Sternkopf observes (*Hermes*, xlvii, 1912, pp. 352–3), the remark of Cicero (*Phil.*, vii, 1, 3) that Antony, after December 20, 44, still regarded Macedonia as belonging to himself [although on June 1 he had exchanged it for the Gallic provinces], since his brother Gaius [to whom it had been assigned by lot on November 28 (p. 33, *supra*)] had been recalled, is to be explained by the fact that it had been originally assigned to him.

[3] xlv, 15, 2; xlvii, 29, 1. Nicolaus of Damascus (30) is another authority as far as Antony is concerned.

[4] See *Hermes*, xxxiii, 1898, p. 187; xlvii, 356–7.

[5] xiv, 9, 3. [6] xiv, 14, 4.

See pp. 192–3.

the two consular provinces had doubtless been assigned simultaneously, the date was evidently before the 18th of April.

In regard to the way in which the two consuls obtained their provinces, the account given by Appian, who fancied that Macedonia and Syria had been assigned in advance to Brutus and Cassius by Caesar,[1] is, as Sternkopf remarks,[2] negligible. Dio, though his narrative is not free from mistakes, tells the truth when he says (implying that the consular provinces had been named, according to the regular procedure, by the Senate) that Antony obtained his by lot; and, though he does not expressly say that Dolabella did the same, we may reasonably assume that he followed the example of his colleague.[3] E. Schwartz,[4] disregarding Dio's statement, conjectures, on the insufficient ground that Dolabella was recognized as the future Governor of Syria within a month after the death of Caesar, that Caesar had assigned that province to him and Macedonia to Antony in advance. But, as Sternkopf says,[5] there is no sufficient evidence that Caesar made any provision for the assignment of provinces for 43 B.C.; if he named those

[1] Appian's blunder, many times repeated (iii, 2, 5; 7, 23–4; 8; 12, 42; 24, 91; iv, 57, 245), and anticipated by Florus (ii, 17, 4), has been accepted as an article of faith by English scholars, though its falsity had been successively exposed by E. Schelle (*Beitr. zur Gesch. d. Todeskampfes d. röm. Republik*, Dresden, 1891), E. Schwartz (*Hermes*, xxxiii, 226–7), and P. Groebe (*op. cit.*, p. 434), whose arguments have been supplemented by Sternkopf (*Hermes*, xlvii, 340–7). The most conclusive proof is that Cicero, when he was pleading the cause of Brutus and Cassius in 43 B.C., admitted (*Phil.*, xi, 12, 27–30) that the provinces of Macedonia and Syria, which they then occupied, were not legally theirs. Dio (xlvii, 21, 1) says the same; and it is evident from a remark which Cicero made to Atticus on June 2, 44 (*Att.*, xv, 9, 1, with which cp. *Phil.*, iii, 9–10, §§ 24–8) that Caesar had not allotted any praetorian provinces for 43. As Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iii, 325]) cites *Att.*, xv, 9, 1, which, he imagines, has 'hitherto been neglected', I may remark that he quotes it incorrectly: the true reading is *O rem miseram! primum ullam ab istis* [the Caesarian party], *dein, si aliquam, hanc legatoriam provinciam.* The pointless *nullam* (ab istis), which Ferrero adopts, was due to a later hand. Sternkopf (pp. 344–5) completes his predecessors' arguments by an explanation of the way in which Appian's blunder arose, and I unhesitatingly endorse it because it occurred to me independently while I was reading the earlier part of the section which he devoted to the subject: the authority whom Appian followed (cp. Plut., *Brut.*, 19, 2) grouped all the assassins—Brutus, Cassius, Decimus Brutus, Trebonius, and Tillius Cimber —who assumed the government of provinces in 44 after the death of Caesar in one category, though Brutus and Cassius did so later than the others. [I am glad to find that Messrs. W. W. How and J. D. Denniston in their recently published volumes (1926), to which I occasionally refer, follow Sternkopf on this and other points.]

[2] *Hermes*, xlvii, 353–4.

[3] *Ib.*, pp. 354–5.

[4] *Ib.*, xxxiii, 187.

[5] *Ib.*, xlvii, 356.

which Antony and Dolabella were to govern as proconsuls, it is impossible to conceive how the false view that he assigned in advance the self-same provinces to Brutus and Cassius originated; and, moreover, when he died, Dolabella was not yet legally consul.[1]

THE DATE OF ANTONY'S DEPARTURE FROM ROME FOR CAMPANIA

On April 26, 44 B.C., Cicero received at Puteoli a letter from Atticus,[2] apparently written while Antony was still in Rome.[3] The letter must have been dispatched, at the latest, on April 24 or the early morning of the 25th.[4] On the 1st of May Cicero learned at Cumae (near Puteoli), just before starting for Pompeii, what Dolabella had done at Rome in the absence of Antony:[5] the letter that conveyed this news must have been dispatched not later than April 28 or the morning of April 29.[6] Antony must therefore have left Rome before April 29, and, as letters (except

[1] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 331. Dolabella was recognized for the first time as consul by Antony on March 17 (*Phil.*, i, 13, 31). Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iii, 326–8]) defends Schwartz's conjecture. It is 'unlikely', he says, 'that Antony and Dolabella, who were on terms of intimacy with Caesar . . . should not have arranged for their proconsulships with the dictator. . . . Syria and Macedonia were most important . . . for the [Parthian] war which Caesar proposed to begin. . . . It was therefore natural that he should have wished to entrust these provinces to friends upon whom he could rely if he needed their help [? though they were then mutually hostile]. Finally this hypothesis enables us to explain . . . the manner in which the Macedonian legions came under the command of Antony'. Since, according to Appian (iii, 25, 93–5), the decree concerning these legions was passed after Antony proposed the abolition of the office of dictator, Ferrero infers that it was passed 'in the first days of April. As, however,' he continues, 'Antony was obliged to agree with Dolabella on the question of these legions and secure a compromise with him, it is clear that the two men were already regarded as the future proconsuls of these two provinces during the early days of April. This . . . proves that the two provinces were not given to the consuls either by the people or the Senate; had they thus been given, the moment of appointment would also have seen a decision on the question of the legions.' Why would it not have seen such a decision if the appointment had been made, as Ferrero maintains, by Caesar? Surely he would have arranged for the disposal of the available legions. If Antony and Dolabella could effect a compromise in spite of his arrangements, why not also in spite of any senatorial decision?

[2] xiv, 14, 1.

[3] *Ib.*, § 4.

[4] According to Groebe (*op. cit.*, i², 428), on April 22; but see *Att.*, xiv, 20, 1; xvi, 14, 2; and *The Roman Republic*, iii, 376.

[5] *Att.*, xiv, 15, 1; *Phil.*, i, 2, 5.

[6] According to Groebe, April 27; but see n. 4.

when the courier was extraordinarily active) generally required four or five days for transmission from Rome to Puteoli, probably not earlier than April 22.

THE GAMES ALLUDED TO BY CICERO ON MAY 22, 44 B.C. (*Att.*, XV, 3, 3)

Drumann[1] remarks that Appian's account[2] of the games given by the aedile Critonius conflicts with the allusion which Cicero made to them in the letter written on May 22; for the *ludi Cereales*—the games at which Critonius apparently presided—took place in April (12–9), when Octavius had not reached Rome. He admits that, on account of the prevailing disturbances, they may have been postponed till the following month, but thinks it more probable that Appian misapplied to the games held by Critonius what he said immediately afterwards[3] about the later games—*ludi victoriae Caesaris*—in honour of Venus Genetrix. I doubt it. According to Cicero's account, Octavian was interfered with, not by Critonius (whom he does not mention), but by the tribunes. Dr. C. M. Hall[4] says that, unless the *ludi Cereales* were postponed, the games in question must have been the *ludi Florales* (April 28–May 3). No doubt; but, according to Appian, Antony, who was then in Campania, was in Rome at the time of the games, and Cicero in his letter of May 22 evidently referred to news which he had just received from Atticus in a letter written on the 21st.[5] No games are mentioned in the calendars for May, and I therefore conclude that (unless an extraordinary display was given, which is unlikely) the games at which Octavian was first prevented from exhibiting the gilded chair of Caesar were the *ludi Cereales*, postponed from April to May. The only doubt that lingers in my mind is, whether Octavian made this attempt after the first rebuff which he suffered from Antony;[6] but it seems probable that the rebuff was earlier than May 19—corresponding to April 19, the day of the Cerealia and the most important day of the games.

Ferrero,[7] indeed, infers from the omission of Antony's name in Cicero's quotation from the letter written by Atticus on May 18 (xv, 3, 3) that he did not return until May 19; but I doubt whether any one who reads the letter will be impressed by this argument.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 89. [2] iii, 28, 105–7. [3] § 107.
[4] *Nicolaus of Damascus' Life of Augustus*, 1923, p. 92.
[5] *Att.*, xv, 3, 1. [6] See p. 14.
[7] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 70, n. 1 (Eng. tr., iii, 52).

THE *LEX TRIBUNICIA DE PROVINCIIS*, OTHERWISE CALLED *LEX DE PERMUTATIONE PROVINCIARUM*

The epitomizer of Livy[1] relates that a law concerning the exchange of provinces (*lex de permutatione provinciarum*) was forcibly enacted by Antony; Cicero[2] that a plébiscite relating to the provinces (*lex tribunicia de provinciis*) assigned provinces to the consuls for five years.[3] O. E. Schmidt[4] and Groebe[5] distinguish the former from the latter, and refer it to a later date; E. Schwartz[6] denies the existence of the former on the ground that Cicero does not [expressly] mention it; Sternkopf[7] demonstrates that the two were identical and settles every question connected therewith.

The *lex tribunicia de provinciis* is not mentioned by the historians—Appian, Dio, and the rest—a sufficient answer to Schwartz. Let us see first what we can learn from our best authority. Cicero clearly implies[8] that Antony obtained the provinces of Gaul (as we shall presently see, in exchange for Macedonia) against the will of the Senate, for he tells us that he learned at Leucopetra that it was expected that in the senatorial session of the 1st of August Antony would resign his claim to the Gallic provinces and submit to the authority of the Senate: it is clear therefore, says Sternkopf,[9] that the epitomizer of Livy was right in saying that Antony had obtained them by a *lex*, that is, a bill accepted by the popular assembly. From the *Philippics*[10] we learn also, assuming the correctness of the MSS., that the *lex tribunicia de provinciis* prolonged the government of Antony from two to six years; but, as Cicero says in a letter[11] that the sinecure office of *legatus* which Dolabella conferred upon him was to last five years,[12] it has been reasonably concluded that in the Fifth *Philippic*[13] *sexennium* was written by a copyist in mistake for *quinquennium*.[14] The prolongation of the consular commands is mentioned also by Cicero in a letter,[15] in which, remarking that Atticus had told him that Antony

[1] 117. [2] *Phil.*, v, 3, 7. [3] See p. 192.
[4] *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, 13. Suppl., 1884, p. 718. [5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 433–5.
[6] *Hermes*, xxxiii, 203. [7] *Ib.*, xlvii, 357–77.
[8] *Phil.*, i, 3, 8. Addebant [municipes Regini] . . . Antonium . . . remissis provinciis Galliis, ad auctoritatem senatus esse rediturum.
[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 359. [10] i, 8, 19; ii, 42, 108–9; v, 3–4, §§ 7–9.
[11] *Att.*, xv, 11, 4. [12] Cp. *Phil.*, viii, 9, 28. [13] 3, 7.
[14] The emendation was made by O. E. Schmidt (*op. cit.*, p. 708), who pointed out that a copyist might easily have written *sexennium* if *Vennium* was in the original manuscript.
[15] *Att.*, xiv, 14, 4. *Quae scribis Kalendis Iuniis Antonium de provinciis relaturum ut et ipse Gallias habeat et utrisque dies prorogetur, licebitne decerni libere?* This passage, combined with *Phil.*, i, 3, 8, which I have already quoted,

intended to propose in the Senate on the 1st of June that he should have the Gallic provinces and that his own tenure and that of Dolabella should be prolonged, he asks whether senators will be free to vote as they please. Comparing this letter with the passage which I have cited [1] from the Second *Philippic*, where we learn that on the 1st of June Antony dispensed with the Senate and proceeded [through a plébiscite] to prolong his tenure of the provinces, Sternkopf [2] concludes unanswerably that on June 1 or 2 Antony obtained through a *lex tribunicia* what he had intended to obtain from the Senate,[3] and that, as Cicero says nothing about a second law, the *lex tribunicia* (which he mentions) was identical with the *lex de permutatione provinciarum* (which he does not mention). As the reader doubtless knows already, later events prevented the prolongation of the tenure of the consuls from taking

is sufficient to prove that Antony exchanged Macedonia not for Cisalpine Gaul only, but also for Gallia Comata (Transalpine Gaul north of the Province); but, as the conclusion has been disputed, Sternkopf (pp. 372–7) adduces further proofs. On the 20th of December Cicero moved in the Senate that the provinces held by Decimus Brutus and Lucius Plancus—Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul—and by the other provincial governors should remain under their control, in accordance with the Julian law, until their successors should be appointed (*Phil.*, iii, 15, 38): evidently Decimus and Plancus were named because their provinces were claimed by Antony. On the 1st of January, 43, imagining the panic that would have arisen if Antony could have invaded Transalpine Gaul (*si . . . in illam ultimam Galliam penetrare potuisset* [*Phil.*, v, 13, 37]), he regards is as self-evident that he would have done so if Decimus Brutus had not resisted his advance. Groebe, however (*op. cit.*, p. 436), cites three other passages in support of the theory that Antony did not claim Transalpine Gaul before 43; in the Fifth *Philippic* (2, 5) Cicero hints that some senator will propose to assign Transalpine Gaul to Antony (*Est enim opinio decreturum aliquem M. Antonio illam ultimam Galliam, quam Plancus obtinet*); in the Seventh (1, 2) he says that it is asserted that Antony is willing to give up Cisalpine, but demands Transalpine Gaul (*remittere eum nobis Galliam citeriorem, illam ultimam postulare*); in the Eighth (9, 27) he professes to quote Antony's words in reply to the envoys whom the Senate sent to him in January, 'I surrender Cisalpine Gaul, I demand Transalpine' (*Galliam, inquit, togatam remitto, Comatam postulo*). Sternkopf's reply is conclusive: these three passages, as the other four prove, merely involve a diminution of the earlier claim—a diminution quite intelligible in view of the military situation, which had been radically altered by the action of Octavian and the resistance opposed by Decimus Brutus to Antony. Finally, pointing to another passage in the Eighth *Philippic* (8, 25), where Cicero, quoting from an earlier proposal of Antony (made of course on unacceptable conditions [see p. 42])—*Utramque provinciam* [Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul] *remitto*—Sternkopf (pp. 375–7, with which cp. G. Long, *Cic. orat.*, iv, 211, note) asks whether these words do not constitute a further proof that the *lex tribunicia de provinciis* gave to Antony not only Cisalpine, but also Transalpine Gaul.

[1] p. 192, n. 10. [2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 367, 380. [3] See p. 15.

effect; and, as Sternkopf[1] points out, the exchange of provinces was *in itself* unimpeachable (for Decimus Brutus, the Governor of Cisalpine Gaul, was not entitled to retain it after 44 B.C.,[2] though just before the end of that year Antony was forced by the aggression of Octavian to attack him), and was therefore not noticed by Cicero when he was inveighing against Antony. What he laid stress upon was that Antony intimidated the Senate and got the people to prolong his command in defiance of a law of Caesar,[3] which limited the tenure of consular provinces to two years.

Now let us see how far the evidence of the historians agrees with that of Cicero. Appian[4] says, correctly, that Antony obtained Cisalpine Gaul in exchange for Macedonia by a plébiscite, not, as he had intended, from the Senate; but he mixes these truths with fictions—for example, that Cicero was in Rome when the plébiscite was passed, and that Antony required Decimus Brutus to accept Macedonia [which had been allotted on November 28 to Gaius Antonius[5]] in lieu of Cisalpine Gaul. Dio[6] says, correctly, that Gaul was given to Antony in exchange for Macedonia, incorrectly that it was given by the Senate: he is also responsible for the fiction that on this occasion Cicero was in the Senate, whereas he was never there from April 7 to December 19, except on September 2. As Sternkopf[7] remarks, the historians emphasize the exchange of provinces, Cicero the prolongation of tenure: hence the erroneous view that the *lex de permutatione provinciarum* was distinct from the *lex tribunicia de provinciis*, with which it was really identical.[8]

[1] p. 368.

[2] Sternkopf might have made the same remark about Plancus, the Governor of Transalpine Gaul, the reversion of which Antony also obtained by the plébiscite.

[3] See *The Roman Republic*, iii, 285.

[4] iii, 30; 37, 150; 49, 198; 63, 257–8, &c.

[5] See p. 33.

[6] xlv, 25, 1; xlvi, 23, 4 (cp. xlv, 9, 3). The former passage is in a speech which Dio attributes to Cicero, the latter in one which he attributes to Calenus.

[7] p. 367.

[8] Two conceivable objections, to which Sternkopf (pp. 369–71) takes the trouble to reply, hardly deserve even a foot-note. The epitomizer of Livy says that Antony carried the law *de permutatione provinciarum* by violence (*per vim*), which might suggest to a perverse controversialist that the law was not a plébiscite: the answer is that Cicero (*Phil.*, ii, 42, 109), speaking of the *lex tribunicia de provinciis*, which, as its name shows, was unquestionably a plébiscite, says that *Antony* prolonged the tenure of the provinces (*numerum annorum provinciis prorogavit*). Antony, I may add, was the agent who set the tribunes to work, and an epitomizer must leave something to the common sense of his readers.

Sternkopf scents another objection, to be based upon a question which Cicero put to Atticus (xv, 10) on June 5 or 6, 44 B.C.—'If any violence should be done in the case of Decimus' [Brutus], &c. (*Si vero aliquid de Decimo*

It is not certain whether the law was passed on June 1 or 2. Schwartz[1] decides for the earlier date, because on the later Dolabella, in virtue of the authority which the law conferred upon him, appointed Cicero as one of his lieutenants.[2] This is not a bad reason; but it is obviously inconclusive. Sternkopf[3] cautiously leaves the date open; Groebe[4] prefers June 2, on the grounds that the senatorial meeting on the 1st was stormy and Antony thereupon had recourse to the popular assembly,[5] and that the Pupian law forbad the meeting of the assembly on the same day as a meeting of the Senate, unless the former took place first. But, to say nothing of the fact that the content of the Pupian law is uncertain,[6] Cicero addressed the people on December 20, 44, immediately after he had delivered the Third *Philippic* in the Senate,[7] nor is there any evidence that the senatorial session on June 1 was stormy: what Cicero[8] says is that senators [in sympathy with himself] who wished to attend on that day fled when they saw that Antony had assembled a force to overawe them. I have tentatively followed Schwartz.

I am astonished to find that the late K. Fitzler, who in his biography of Augustus[9] ignored or was ignorant of Sternkopf's article, cited Appian[10] and Cicero in support of the statement that

gravius): the objector would say, 'Evidently the exchange of Macedonia for Cisalpine Gaul had not yet been legalized in the first week of June. How, then, can you maintain that the *lex de permutatione provinciarum* was identical with the *lex tribunicia de provinciis*, which had been passed on June 1 or 2?' I had hastily written that only an obstinate fool would raise an objection which did not deserve refutation when I discovered that that eminent Ciceronian, Otto Eduard Schmidt (*Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, 13. Suppl., 1884, p. 718), had quoted this letter to show that the *lex de permutatione provinciarum* was passed later than June 2. Let me, with due contrition, give the answer: Cicero's words merely point to the attack which, after the *lex de permutatione provinciarum* had been passed, Antony might be expected to make sooner or later on Decimus, and which he did make at the end of the year.

Any one who thinks it worth while may read the note (p. 371, n. 1) in which Sternkopf confutes Groebe (*op. cit.*, pp. 435–6), who refers the *lex de permutatione provinciarum* to the end of the year.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 189, n. 5.

[2] *Att.*, xv, 11, 4. Lange (*Röm. Alt.*, iii², 500, n. 8), remarking that June 2 was not a comitial day, substituted (a.d.) *III.* (Non.) (June 3) for *IIII.* I doubt whether Antony would have troubled himself about comitial days. Remember the events of January, 43 B.C. (p. 39, *supra*).

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 369–71, 380.

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 437–8.

[5] *Phil.*, ii, 42, 108–9.

[6] See P. Willems, *Le sénat*, &c., ii, 1883, pp. 151–6, and R. Y. Tyrrell and L. C. Purser, *The Correspondence of Cicero*, iii, 1890, pp. 298–300.

[7] See p. 37.

[8] See n. 5.

[9] *Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 283.

[10] iii, 30.

the plébiscite which transferred the Gallic provinces to Antony could not have been earlier than the end of August. I have already referred to the relevant text of Appian and the former (*Phil.*, i, 3, 8) of the two passages in Cicero: like the latter (*Att.*, xvi, 7, 1), it only proves that before the Senate met on August 1, 44, it was hoped that Antony would give up his claim—sanctioned by the plébiscite of June 1—to the Gallic provinces; and any one who will take the trouble to read the letters written by Cicero to Atticus on July 6, 9, 10, and 11 (xv, 29, 1; xvi, 5, 3; 4, 4; 2, 4) will see that Appian, when he assigned the plébiscite to a time later than the *ludi victoriae Caesaris* (July 20–31), made one of his many blunders.

THE *LEX IULIA MUNICIPALIS*

All scholars who have studied the question agree that the problem of the *lex Iulia municipalis* has at last been solved by Professor A. von Premerstein.[1] Commenting on the unfinished state of the text both of this law[2] and of that which related to the colony founded by Caesar at Urso[3] (Osuna), he concludes[4] that Antony deliberately published both without revision in the belief that their very defects would convince his opponents that they had been taken unaltered from the mass of documents left by the dictator.

THE PROVINCES ASSIGNED TO BRUTUS AND CASSIUS

Crete was undoubtedly assigned to Brutus.[5] According to Nicolaus of Damascus,[6] Cassius was to have Illyricum; according to Dio,[7] Bithynia: Plutarch[8] and Appian[9] agree in giving him Cyrenaica. Sternkopf,[10] comparing *Phil.*, ii, 38, 97 (*Nuper fixa tabula est, qua . . . statuitur . . . ne post M. Brutum pro consule sit Creta provincia*) with 13, 31 (*cur ludi Apollinares incredibili M. Bruti honore celebrati? cur provinciae Bruto, Cassio datae . . .?*), shows that both provinces were assigned before September 19, 44 B.C. (the date on which the Second *Philippic* was feigned

[1] *Zeitschr. d. Savigny-Stiftung f. Rechtsgesch.*, röm. Abt., xlii, 1922, pp. 45–152 (especially 86–128).

[2] C. G. Bruns, *Fontes*[6], &c., 1893, pp. 104–13.

[3] *Ib.*, pp. 123–40 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 6087).

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 128. Cp. 111–2.

[5] *Phil.*, ii, 38, 97; xi, 12, 27; Plut., *Brut.*, 19, 2; App., iii, 8, 29 (cp. *Hermes*, xxviii, 602, nn. 3–4); Dio, xlvii, 21, 1, compared with xlv, 32, 4, and xlvi, 23, 3.

[6] 28.

[7] xlvii, 21, 1.

[8] *l. c.* Plutarch's Λιβύη=Appian's Κυρήνη. Cp. Plut., *Ant.*, 54, 3, with Dio, xlix, 41, 3.

[9] *l. c.*

[10] *Hermes*, xlvii, 384–5.

to have been delivered),[1] and most probably after July 13, the last day of the festival in honour of Apollo,[2] while he admits that the date—August 1—conjecturally fixed by Groebe[3] is possible.

AN UNWARRANTED INFERENCE

M. Gelzer[4] corrects E. Schwartz for having asserted[5] that Brutus and Cassius, while they were in Campania, prepared for the campaign which they afterwards undertook in the East. Schwartz relied upon the fact that they had assembled fleets[6] and upon the suspicion that they were already in communication with the East.[7] Gelzer remarks that the vessels were small,[8] but omits to add that the fleet of Brutus included triremes and other ' excellent ships' (*navigia luculenta*), while that of Cassius was 'really fine' (*plane bella*).[9] Still, for a reason which Gelzer does not give, I am inclined to think that Schwartz was hasty. The fleets may have been intended as a protection against pirates;[10] Brutus had resolved on June 8 to go to Asia in obedience to the senatorial decree that gave him the corn-commissionership,[11] and, two days later, was collecting ships for that purpose,[12] and there is no evidence that he changed his mind before Cicero saw his fleet; the passage which Schwartz quotes from the letter which Brutus and Cassius jointly addressed to Antony merely shows that they were accused of tampering with the armies [evidently in Macedonia and Syria] and of sending messages over sea, which charges they denied; and although they may have already thought of going ultimately to those provinces, it is rash to affirm that they were preparing to do so.

ATT., xvi, 7, 1. 5; *PHIL.*, i, 3, 8. 10

On August 19, 44, Cicero wrote to Atticus that at Leucopetra, soon after the 6th, he had heard from persons of distinction who had lately come from Rome that on the 1st (*Kalendis*) there was to be (*fore*) a full meeting of the Senate, which Brutus and Cassius had requested all consulars and ex-praetors to attend; that it was hoped that Antony would accede to the wishes of the Senate; and that his own absence was provoking comment. In a later

[1] See p. 25.

[2] Brutus, as urban praetor, was responsible for this festival, though in his absence C. Antonius presided.

[3] *Op. cit.*, iv, 1908, p. 34, n. 1.

[4] *Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 998.

[5] *Hermes*, xxxiii, 192.

[6] *Att.*, xv, 12, 1; xvi, 1, 3; 4, 4.

[7] *Fam.*, xi, 3, 2.

[8] *Att.*, xvi, 1, 3.

[9] *Ib.*, 4, 4.

[10] *Ib.*, 2, 4.

[11] *Ib.*, xv, 11, 2.

[12] *Ib.*, 12, 1.

section (5) of the same letter he remarked that his absence from the Senate on the 1st of August was regretted by Brutus, whom he had met on his return voyage. In the First *Philippic* he told substantially the same story, explaining (if the MSS. can be trusted) that the expected meeting of the Senate had been fixed for the 1st of August (*Kalendis Sextilibus*), and also making it clear that the disposition of Antony had not then been favourable.

Reading the letter apart from the speech, one might at first suppose that as Cicero heard in August of the expected meeting of the Senate, the date fixed for it was the 1st of September, and that he omitted to specify the month because it would be obvious. Accordingly Halm deleted *Sextilibus* in the speech, and suggested that *Sep.* had been mistaken by a copyist for *Sex.* Merivale, Groebe, and others, however, retain *Sextilibus*, and Mr. W. W. How[1] thinks it 'just possible that *fore* might be used of an event now past, but future when the speakers left Rome'. Let me give my reasons for believing that it was so used. Cicero's informants must have left Rome in July. If the expected meeting of the Senate was that of September 1, they evidently ignored the approaching and very important meeting of August 1, which is at least unlikely; and it is doubtful whether they were then aware that there was to be another on the 1st of September. If they spoke of the former, Cicero would not have had the least fear of being misunderstood when he wrote *Kalendis*; for Atticus would know perfectly well what was the session to which they referred. Any one who read the letter and the relevant sections of the speech successively would conclude that the meeting which undoubtedly took place on the 1st of August was that in which it was hoped that Antony would conform to the wishes of the Senate, and that the hope was falsified. To delete *Sextilibus* is a violent expedient and uncalled for: Cicero reported what his informants expected when they left Rome.

DID CICERO PUBLISH THE SECOND *PHILIPPIC*?

George Long[2] says that the Second *Philippic* was not published; Watson[3] that it 'was probably published after Antony had left Rome' on November 29, 44 B.C. Tyrrell[4] makes the same statement positively, and so does Professor A. C. Clark.[5] There is no

[1] *Cicero: Select Letters*, ii, 1926, p. 498.
[2] *Cic. orat.*, iv, 477.
[3] *Select Letters*[3], 1881, p. 503.
[4] *The Correspondence of Cicero*, vi, 1899, p. xxv.
[5] *Philippic Orations I, II, III, V, VII*, 1908, Introduction to the Third Oration.

direct evidence that the lampoon was ever published—that is to say, offered for sale, like Cicero's other works—in Cicero's lifetime: we only know that copies were sent to Atticus and Marcus Brutus. But Cicero certainly wished to publish, and may have felt that he could safely do so after Antony had gone to Cisalpine Gaul or after his defeat at Mutina.

OCTAVIAN'S SPEECH OF NOVEMBER 9 (?), 44 B.C.

E. Schwartz[1] finds that Appian,[2] in his report of Octavian's speech of November 9 (?), makes him say 'the opposite of what he really said'. According to Appian, Octavian spoke about Caesar, dilated on the wrongs which he had himself suffered from Antony, and promised to act for his country against him. Cicero[3] merely says, 'What a speech! It has been sent to me. He swears, "So may I attain the honours of my father", and at the same time extends his right hand to the statue' (*At quae contio! Nam est missa mihi. Iurat 'ita sibi parentis honores consequi liceat' et simul dextram intendit ad statuam*). Where is the contradiction? Cicero quotes six words from the speech, which confirm the first statement of Appian.

ANTONY'S VISITS TO TIBUR AND ALBA IN NOVEMBER, 44

According to Appian,[4] Antony, when he was about to enter the Senate [on November 28, 44], learned that the Martian legion and the 4th had deserted to Octavian. After speaking a few words he hurried to Alba[5] in the hope of recalling the deserters, but, being received with missiles from the walls, retired, sent 500 *denarii* apiece to the men of his other legions, and proceeded with his bodyguard and some time-expired volunteers to Tibur, whither the bulk of the Senate, many Roman knights, and the most prominent of the other citizens went to do him honour and voluntarily swore to be true to him. Thence he marched with the three remaining Macedonian legions to Ariminum. It will be noticed that Appian says nothing about the meeting of the Senate which Antony convened for the 24th of November, nor about the nocturnal meeting on the 28th, which Cicero describes. In regard to the legions with which Antony marched he is wrong.[6]

Cicero says that between the 24th and the 28th Antony returned

[1] *Paulys Real-Ency.*, ii, 232.
[2] iii, 41, 169.
[3] *Att.*, xvi, 15, 3.
[4] iii, 45; 46, 188–9.
[5] Evidently Alba Longa, not, as Tyrrell supposes (*op. cit.*, vi, p. xxv), Alba Fucens.
[6] See pp. 201–2.

to Tibur, harangued his troops, and forthwith went back to Rome. He was already aware that the Martian legion had taken its stand at Alba [to join Octavian], and on the 28th, just before the proceedings in the Senate opened, he learned that the 4th also had deserted.[1] Thereupon he hastily passed a motion for granting the honour of a thanksgiving service to Lepidus,[2] in the evening carried out the assignment of the praetorian provinces,[3] and afterwards left the city, his departure being virtually a disgraceful flight.[4] Thus Cicero is silent about the alleged journey to Alba, apparently knows nothing about a second visit to Tibur, and makes no mention of the exodus of the senators and other notables to speed the parting of Antony.

Is it possible to construct a trustworthy narrative from the two authorities? Appian is certainly wrong in saying that Antony learned as he was about to enter the Senate that the two legions had deserted; for Cicero, a more trustworthy witness, remarks that he already knew of the defection of the Martians. I see no reason to distrust Cicero's account of the first visit to Tibur, though Appian does not mention it, nor Appian's of the second, though Cicero is silent. Cicero's contemptuous description of the departure of Antony may safely be discounted as virulent rhetoric. The question is, When did Antony go to Alba (for we can hardly reject Appian's statement that he went there)? Tyrrell[5] says that on the night of the 28th of November, after the late session of the Senate, 'Antony hastened from Rome, first to Tibur, then to Alba'. It seems to me more probable that he went to Alba immediately after he passed the motion in honour of Lepidus,[6] and that this journey accounted for his irregular action in convening the Senate after dark.

THE ASSIGNMENT OF PROVINCES ON NOVEMBER 28, 44

This note is intended to help any one who may find it difficult to understand the passage in the Third *Philippic* (10, 24–6) on which the words 'In the evening . . . allotted to another' (page 33) are based. It has been explained by Sternkopf.[7] Eighteen provinces were disposed of, for thirteen of which lots were drawn. The remaining five were Cisalpine Gaul and Gallia Comata, or Transalpine Gaul north of the Province, both of which had been

[1] *Phil.*, xiii, 9, 19, compared with iii, 3, 5–7; 8, 19–20; 9, 24; *Fam.*, xi, 7, 2.
[2] *Phil.*, iii, 9, 23–4.
[3] *Ib.*, 10.
[4] *Ib.*, § 24; 11, 27; *Fam.*, x, 28, 1.
[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. xxiv–xxv.
[6] Cp. Groebe, *op. cit.*, p. 440.
[7] *Hermes*, xlvii, 385–97 (especially 393–7).

assigned in June to Antony[1] by a plébiscite, Syria, which had been assigned by the same vote to Dolabella, the [Narbonian] Province, and Nearer Spain, both of which were already in the possession of Lepidus.[2] The thirteen assigned by lot were Asia, Crete, Cyrenaica, Further Spain, Sardinia, Sicily, the two divisions of Africa,[3] Illyricum, Macedonia, Greece, Bithynia, and Cilicia.

HOW MANY LEGIONS DID ANTONY LEAD INTO CISALPINE GAUL?

According to Appian,[4] there were six legions in Macedonia in 44 B.C.; one of them was transferred to Dolabella;[5] four joined Antony at Brundisium; one was left in Macedonia;[6] Antony sent the troops from Brundisium along the Adriatic coast to Ariminum,[7] and, after leaving Rome, marched for Ariminum with three Macedonian legions (the one that had been left in Macedonia having arrived in Italy), a veteran legion (Alaudae?), and a number of recruits.[8] Octavian informed Cicero that, while Antony was marching for Rome [from Brundisium] with Alaudae, three Macedonian legions were marching along the Adriatic coast for Ariminum.[9] Two of these three—the 4th and the Martian legion —deserted to Octavian before Antony left Rome.[10] According to Cicero,[11] who says that Antony went to meet four Macedonian legions at Brundisium,[12] he marched for Gaul with an army 'diminished' (*mutilatum*) [by the loss of the two legions that had deserted], expecting to be joined by his brother Lucius with one legion. This, says E. Schwartz,[13] was evidently the legion that, as we learn from Appian, had remained in Macedonia. Rather it was the legion that, as we may infer from the statement of Octavian, had either been left by Antony at Brundisium or had not arrived when the three mentioned by Octavian started for Ariminum: one that remained in Macedonia joined Marcus Brutus,[14] and Schwartz's conjecture leaves us in the dark as to what became of the other. Had

[1] See p. 192, n. 15.

[2] If these two provinces were not among the five for which lots were not drawn, Crete and Cyrenaica, which had already been assigned to Brutus and Cassius (see pp. 196–7), must have been; but, as Sternkopf points out (p. 396), confirming my own independent view, it is incredible that Antony, immediately before the war on which he was about to embark, would have subjected to the lot the provinces held by Lepidus, with whom he had an understanding.

[3] See *Bell. Afr.*, 97, 1. [4] iii, 24, 92. [5] iii, 25, 95.
[6] iii, 43, 175. [7] iii, 44, 183. [8] iii, 46, 189–90.
[9] *Att.*, xvi, 8, 2. [10] See p. 33. [11] *Phil.*, iii, 12, 31.
[12] *Fam.*, xii, 23, 2. [13] *Hermes*, xxxiii, 227, n. 4. [14] *Phil.* x. 6, 13.

Antony left it at Brundisium? I think not. Remember, Cicero does not say that he met four legions there, but only that he went to meet them; no satisfactory reason can be imagined for his having left one behind, nor is there any evidence that he did; Appian distinctly says that all which he met marched for Ariminum; Appian may be believed when he says that a legion from Macedonia afterwards joined him, and it can only have been the one commanded by Lucius, whom Appian does not mention. On the other hand, Appian, who fails to account for the legion that joined Brutus, is wrong in saying that Antony met four at Brundisium. I conclude that Antony, after he left Rome, marched from Tibur for Ariminum with one Macedonian legion, Alaudae, and some recruits, and was afterwards reinforced by the remaining Macedonian legion under his brother; and I find that this is also the conclusion of Groebe.[1]

Let us see whether the record of later events supports this conclusion—in other words, whether it supports Appian, who says that Antony entered Cisalpine Gaul with four legions, or Octavian and Cicero, from whose combined statements it follows that he was accompanied by three. Before the end of January he had six,[2] three being composed of recruits, some, if not most of whom had been raised in Cisalpine Gaul.[3] In the battle of Forum Gallorum he had two—the 2nd and the 35th[4]—not using Alaudae: two of the three legions of recruits deserted after the battle of Mutina;[5] when the Triumvirate was formed he had, besides those contributed by Plancus and Pollio and those that had belonged to Decimus Brutus, seven of his own, which included three raised in Picenum by Ventidius and the remaining legion of recruits.[6] Is it not clear that Octavian and Cicero were right?

COULD DECIMUS BRUTUS HAVE CRUSHED ANTONY IN APRIL, 44?

Decimus, says Tyrrell,[7] 'had a considerable military force [three legions] . . . though it had, as Appian says (ii, 124 [, 519]), lost much of its spirit, owing to the severe labour it had recently undergone. He could, therefore, have played a considerable part in public affairs immediately after the Ides [of March] if he had been a man of large views or even of resolute courage'. Was

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 440 [153, 12].
[2] *Phil.*, viii, 8, 25. Cp. pp. 205–6.
[3] *Fam.*, x, 33, 4–5.
[4] See p. 52.
[5] *Fam.*, x, 33, 5.
[6] *Ib.*, § 4. Cp. Groebe, *op. cit.*, p. 469.
[7] *Op. cit.*, vi, pp. lxxvii–lxxviii.

Tyrrell here following his mentor, O. E. Schmidt,[1] who asserts that Decimus could have marched to Rome in fourteen days and gained supremacy for the assassins of Caesar? Schmidt was thinking of the letter[2] in which Cicero told Atticus that Cassius and Marcus Brutus complained that Decimus had lost opportunities (*querebantur . . . amissas occasiones Decimumque graviter accusabant*). If, as seems probable, they meant that Decimus ought to have marched against Antony, their complaint lacked judgement. It was known at Rome on the 19th of April that Decimus had joined his legions.[3] As the news must have taken three or four days to reach Rome, we may assume that Decimus arrived in his province about the 15th.[4] That he could have marched to Rome[5] in fourteen days with tired men is improbable; it is not certain that the legions were then assembled, ready to start; and one may reasonably ask whether Decimus could have made arrangements, on the spur of the moment, for feeding them. Assume, however, that Schmidt is right, and that Decimus could have reached Rome by the 29th of April. Antony was then in or travelling to Campania, where he was about to raise veteran soldiers. Decimus, at the time when he would have started, could not have heard that Antony had committed any overt act which would justify him in taking the unconstitutional and revolutionary step of quitting his own province without authority from the Senate and marching to attack the senior consul; and it is very doubtful whether, if he had attempted to do so, his soldiers would have followed him, or have consented to fight against old comrades, commanded by a general who was then greatly respected. A more reckless proceeding could hardly be imagined. If Decimus was not 'a man of large views or even of resolute courage', he was at least sane.

ON APPIAN, *B. C.*, iii, 48

Appian, after relating that Octavian ordered the recruits whom he had raised in Etruria to assemble at Arretium,[6] says that his troops urged him to declare himself propraetor, and expressed a wish to march on Rome in order to compel the Senate to grant him this distinction, but that he checked them with the assurance

[1] *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, 13. Suppl., 1884, p. 713.

[2] *Att.*, xv, 11, 2.

[3] *Ib.*, xiv, 13, 1–2.

[4] I find that Prof. E. T. Merrill (*Class. Philol.*, x, 1915, p. 258) says the same.

[5] 250 Roman, or about 230 English, miles by the Clodian Way—the shortest route.

[6] iii, 42, 174. In § 191 Appian incorrectly substitutes Alba for Arretium.

that the Senate would grant it spontaneously, and, when they remonstrated, explained that it sided with him not out of gratitude, but from fear of Antony and because it had no army, and that it would continue to do so until Antony had been overthrown, but no longer. 'Wherefore', he added, 'I pretend to be their servant. Let us not prematurely reveal our pretence: if we usurp office, they will accuse us of insolence or violence; but if we are respectful, they will probably grant it spontaneously from fear, lest I should get it from you'. It seems to me likely that the attitude of the troops and of Octavian is here described with some approximation to the truth; but since the statements of Appian are unsupported, and his Third Book contains not only many demonstrable blunders, but also some fictions, I have not used them in my narrative.

THE DATE OF *FAM.*, xi, 5

In this letter (§ 1), if the reading *a. d. V. Idus Dec.* is correct, Cicero tells Decimus Brutus that he returned to Rome on the 9th of December. E. Ruete[1] gave reasons for altering *Idus* to *Kal.*, and, if he was right, the date was November 27. Groebe[2] and Sternkopf,[3] in agreement with Tyrrell,[4] defended the MSS.; but Ferrero,[5] admitting that Sternkopf 'has overthrown several . . . arguments by Ruete, by showing that' *Fam.* xi, 6, 1 ' is a separate epistle, written probably in September', nevertheless insists that 'the decisive argument [for Ruete's emendation] is that' *Fam.* xi, 5 was written before Cicero 'knew of the revolt of the [Martian and 4th] legions';[6] for 'otherwise he would have mentioned this revolt to Decimus as an argument in favour of resistance', &c. I do not think that any one who reads xi, 5 carefully will regard this argument as decisive; but anyhow Sternkopf[7] gives a good reason for rejecting the emendation. When Cicero left Rome in October, he did so in dread of Antony, which made him resolve to abandon his intention of returning by November 12.[8] Therefore it is incredible that he would have entered the 'lion's den' on November 27, when Antony had not yet quitted Rome.

[1] *D. Correspondenz Ciceros in . . . 44 u. 43*, Marburg, 1883, pp. 35–7.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 441 [162, 9].
[3] *Philol.*, lx, 1901, pp. 299–305.
[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 43–4.
[5] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 156, n. 1 (Eng. tr., iii, 116, n.†).
[6] See p. 33, *supra*.
[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 299.
[8] *Att.*, xvi, 13c, 1, compared with 12.

THE ORDER OF THE SPEECHES IN THE SENATE ON JANUARY 1, 43

Ludwig Lange,[1] citing a passage from one of Cicero's letters to Brutus[2] and three from his *Philippics*[3] (to which he might have added a fourth[4]), holds that Fufius Calenus, Sulpicius Rufus, and Servilius Isauricus spoke before Cicero: Groebe[5] remarks that, as regards Sulpicius, the Digest[6] conflicts with this view. Calenus undoubtedly preceded Cicero;[7] and since on two occasions in this year Servilius did the same,[8] it seems reasonable to conclude that on the 1st of January the usual order was observed. The case for Sulpicius rests only upon the debate referred to in the letter to Brutus.

THE DATE OF THE TENTH *PHILIPPIC*

The Eighth *Philippic* was delivered on February 3,[9] a day or two after the return of the ambassadors, Piso and Philippus.[10] F. L. Ganter,[11] remarking that when Cicero wrote the letter to Cassius (*Fam.*, xii, 5) in which he prophesied that if Decimus Brutus could break the blockade of Mutina, the war would soon be over,[12] the events of February 2 and 3—the meeting of the Senate that followed the return of the ambassadors and the delivery of the Eighth and Ninth *Philippics* on the following day—were vividly present to his mind, and that he must have written it immediately afterwards, but not till after the Tenth, concludes that the Tenth followed very soon after the Eighth. This conclusion, he adds, is supported by the first sentence of the Tenth—*Maximas tibi, Pansa, gratias omnes et habere et agere debemus, qui*

[1] *Röm. Alt.*, iii, 1871, p. 510 (=iii², 520).
[2] i, 15, 7.
[3] vii, 9, 27; ix, 1, 3; x, 1, 3.
[4] xiv, 4, 11.
[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 441–2 [168, 10].
[6] i, 2, 2, 43.
[7] *Phil.*, v, 1, 1, compared with x, 1, 3.
[8] *Ib.*, vii, 9, 27; xiv, 4, 11.

[9] The date is fixed by comparing *Phil.*, viii, 2, 6, in which Cicero announces that military dress is to be assumed on the following day (*saga cras sumentur*), with a fragment of a letter (Nonius, p. 538, 26–7) in which he tells Octavian that he himself assumed it on February 4.

[10] Tyrrell (*op. cit.*, p. 58) infers from § 1 of the Eighth *Philippic* that it 'was delivered the day after the ambassadors returned'. But the passage—*Confusius hesterno die est acta res, C. Pansa, quam postulabat institutum consulatus tui . . . Vicit L. Caesaris* [sententia] *. . . qui verbi atrocitate dempta oratione fuit quam sententia lenior*—proves only that the speech was delivered on the day after the senatorial session in which Lucius Caesar carried a motion that Cicero condemned; and Ganter supposes that the session took place on the day after the ambassadors returned.

[11] *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, cxlix, 1894, p. 616.
[12] See p. 45.

cum hodierno die senatum te habiturum non arbitraremur, ut M. Bruti . . . litteras accepisti, ne minimam quidem moram interposuisti quin quam primum maximo gaudio et gratulatione frueremur: the senatorial session of the 3rd was so recent that members were surprised at being summoned again. Therefore the Tenth must be dated February 4, to which the fragment of Nonius—*Pridie Nonas Februarias . . . descendi ad forum sagatus*, &c.—seems to point[1] (for 'one may suppose that a session of the Senate had taken place before Cicero went into the Forum'), or soon after.

Doubtless when Cicero wrote to Cassius the events of February 2–3 (though he did not refer to them) were 'vividly present to his mind', but whoever reads the letter without prejudice will see no necessity for concluding that it was written immediately afterwards; the first sentence of the Tenth *Philippic* proves only that senators had not expected to be summoned on the day on which it was delivered, and if we may infer from Nonius that the Senate met on the 4th of February, it does not follow that the Tenth *Philippic* was delivered then.

THE DATE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN ROME OF THE MURDER OF TREBONIUS

Immediately after the news of the murder of Trebonius reached Rome Dolabella was declared a public enemy.[2] Antony was aware of this when he wrote the letter which Cicero read in the Thirteenth *Philippic*,[3] delivered on March 20; and between the declaration and that speech occurred the discussion[4] regarding the question of sending a second embassy to Antony, which led Cicero—at the latest in the first week of March[5]—to deliver the Twelfth *Philippic*.[5] We may conclude, then, says Groebe,[6] that Dolabella was proclaimed an enemy in the latter part of February. Probably, but perhaps at the beginning of March.

THE DATES OF THE TWELFTH *PHILIPPIC* AND OF THE DEPARTURE OF PANSA FROM ROME

The Twelfth *Philippic* was delivered between February 23[7] and March 19, the day on which, as will presently appear, the consul Pansa left Rome; for the Thirteenth, before which Pansa started,[8] was delivered on March 20. Groebe[9] thinks that the date of the

[1] See p. 205, n. 9, *supra*. [2] See p. 46. [3] 11, 25.
[4] See p. 47. [5] See the next article. [6] *Op. cit.*, pp. 445–6 [195, 7].
[7] *Phil.*, xii, 10, 24. The Terminalia mentioned there were on February 23.
[8] *Phil.*, xiii, 20, 46. [9] *Op. cit.*, pp. 447–50.

Twelfth was probably in the first half of March; but we can approximate more closely to the truth. Antony, in the letter which Cicero in the Thirteenth read to the Senate, alluded to the proposal that had been made to send a second embassy to negotiate with him.[1] The letter, unless the messenger who carried it was unusually slow, could hardly have been dispatched by Hirtius, to whom it was addressed, before March 13; the report of the debate in which the proposal was discussed, and which took place on the day before the delivery of the Twelfth, would have taken not less than five days (if the messenger travelled at the ordinary rate of fifty Roman miles a day)[2] to reach Antony. The Twelfth therefore could hardly have been later than March 7.

On March 19 a meeting of the Senate was held, at which Pansa was present.[3] On the 20th, as we learn from a letter which Cicero wrote then to Plancus,[4] the Senate met again. Ten days later Cicero wrote another letter to Plancus, referring to one which he had received from him, mentioning a recent meeting of the Senate, and implying that before it took place Pansa had left Rome.[5] Lange[6] holds that this meeting was later than that of March 20; Groebe identifies the two, principally because, on Lange's theory, Plancus, without awaiting an answer to a dispatch which Cicero noticed in his letter of March 20, must have written a second only a few days later, which is nowhere else referred to, and the contents of which substantially tallied with those of the first. This, says Groebe, is in the highest degree unlikely. Therefore, he concludes,[7] in Cicero's letter of March 30 the meeting of March 20 was referred to, and Pansa must have left Rome on the previous day. I will only add that, if Pansa had started early on March 20, Cicero's remark, that Pansa was not in Rome when the meeting took place, might still hold good.[8]

THE RIVER SCULTENNA

In 43 B.C., says Gardthausen,[9] the Scultenna flowed immediately under the walls of Mutina,[10] but in the Middle Age the name applied to the upper course of the Panaro, which crosses the Aemilian

[1] *Phil.*, xiii, 17, 36. [2] See my *Anc. Britain*, p. 727.
[3] *Fam.*, xii, 25, 1. [4] *Ib.*, x, 6, 1. [5] *Ib.*, 10, 1.
[6] *Röm. Alt.*, iii, 520. [7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 447–50 [203–9].
[8] It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that the letter to which Cicero referred on March 30 was not the one (*Fam.*, x, 7) which Plancus wrote to Cicero on March 23 (see p. 49); for he was then on the north of the Rhone, and his letter could not have reached Rome by the 30th.
[9] *Augustus und seine Zeit*, ii, 37–8.
[10] App., iii, 73, 298; Dio, xlvi, 36, 3.

Way about 6 kilometres south-east of the town:[1] accordingly he conjectures that the westernmost affluent of the Panaro flowed in 43 B.C. in the bed of the easternmost branch of the Secchia, which actually skirts the site of Mutina.[2] But, says Groebe,[3] according to Appian[4] and Dio,[5] Antony moved closer to Mutina and confined himself to occupying the terrain between it and the Scultenna. The Scultenna, therefore, being separated by Antony's camp from Mutina, must [I would add, in that part of its course] have been some considerable distance from the walls; and we must conclude that either it was identical with the Panaro, or the stream beneath the walls was either a channel, incorrectly called the Scultenna, linking the Panaro with the Secchia, or a western arm of the Panaro, flowing into the Secchia.

THE DATE OF THE BATTLE OF FORUM GALLORUM

If the manuscripts of the letter[6] in which Servius Galba described the battle of Forum Gallorum are correct, it was fought *a.d. XVII. Kal. Maias* (April 15). Groebe,[7] however, controverting Holzapfel,[8] points out that, according to Cicero,[9] the battles fought by Pansa (at Forum Gallorum), Hirtius, and Octavian (in defence of his camp) occurred on the same day, and that, according to Ovid,[10] Octavian fought on April 14. Therefore, he concludes, either the MSS. are wrong or (which is incredible) Ovid made a mistake. Evidently for (a.d.) XVII. (Kal. Maias) one must read *XVIII.*[11] I may add that from the *Feriale Cumanum* (*C.I.L.*, x, 8375 [Dessau,

[1] Cp. R. Bodewig, *De proeliis apud Mutinam commissis*, 1886, p. 14.
[2] Cp. *ib.*
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 450 [210, 12].
[4] iii, 65, 267–8.
[5] xlvi, 36, 3; 37, 1–2.
[6] Cic., *Fam.*, x, 30, 1.
[7] *Op. cit.*, pp. 454–5.
[8] *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, cxlix, 400–3.
[9] *Phil.*, xiv, 10, 25–6.
[10] *Fasti*, iv, 625–8.

[11] As Groebe says, the attempt of Mommsen (*Hermes*, xvii, 625–6) to reconcile the MSS. with the *Fasti* by the supposition that the fighting lasted two days is refuted by the statement of Cicero.

I must add, however, that, as Groebe admits, Holzapfel's view is supported by the argument (with which I express agreement in a later article [p. 215]) that in a letter written by Pollio (*Fam.*, x, 33, 3) his earlier letter, x, 31, is referred to, and that it was posted at Gades on the day of the battle, from which it would follow that the date and place given in the last section—*XVII. Kal. April. Corduba*—should read *XVII. Kal. Maias Gadibus.* But since *ex hypothesi April.* and *Corbuba* are wrong, one may suppose either that Pollio wrote *XVIII.* or that in dating the battle he made a mistake of one day. He may himself have received a letter from Galba and have confused the date of the letter (April 15) with that of the battle (April 14). The testimony of Ovid, I repeat, is decisive.

Inscr. Lat., 108]) we learn that Octavian gained his first victory on April 14—*XVIII. Kal. Mai. Eo die Caesar primum vicit.* The date—*a. d. XII. Kalendas Maias*—given in the MSS. for Galba's letter is obviously wrong, for it was certainly written on the day after the battle.

THE BATTLE OF FORUM GALLORUM

The principal authorities for the battle of Forum Gallorum are Servius Galba,[1] who took part in it, and Appian.[2] Asinius Pollio,[3] Cicero,[4] and Suetonius[5] add, more or less truly, a few particulars. The battle is also described, very briefly, by Dio,[6] and noticed by Frontinus,[7] the epitomizer of Livy,[8] and Orosius.[9] 'Appian's narrative', says George Long,[10] 'is much better' than that of Galba. This is an inept remark. Appian's account is lively; but those who know him will read it with caution and will conclude that, wherever it conflicts with the letter of Galba, who described only what he had himself seen or learned from sure sources, it is not to be trusted. Comparing the two, one notices that Galba does not mention Carfulenus, perhaps because, as we learn from Pollio, Carfulenus was killed in the action, and Galba, who was preoccupied by the recollection of his own movements, succeeded to the command which Carfulenus had held; that Appian,[11] who says that at the outset of the battle the Martians entered the marsh [on either side of the Aemilian Way], is at variance with Galba, from whom we learn that when the Martians were formed in line the defile of marsh and forest had been passed; that whereas Galba (doubtless expressing himself loosely) says that Antony, in attempting to storm the camp of Pansa, lost many men and accomplished nothing,[12] Appian[13] relates that he slaughtered many of the recruits who had taken refuge there; that Appian[14] incorrectly says

[1] *Fam.*, x, 30. [2] iii, 66, 272–3; 67–70. [3] *Fam.*, x, 33, 4.

[4] *Phil.*, xiv, 9–10; 12, 31. Cp. *Brut.*, i, 3, 4. Cicero (*Phil.*, xiv, 10, 27) incorrectly says that Antony had three legions in the battle.

[5] *Aug.*, 10, 3–4. Suetonius reproduces a calumny, circulated (so he says) by Antony, that Octavian fled. He was not present in the battle, but remained in camp with Hirtius, and, after Hirtius left him to encounter Antony, defended it successfully (*Phil.*, xiv, 3, 6; 10, 28; 14, 37; Dio, xlvi, 37, 7; Oros., vi, 18, 47. E. Schelle (*Beiträge*, &c., Dresden, 1891, p. 14, n. 4) thinks that Suetonius confused the battle of Forum Gallorum with the first battle of Philippi. See p. 86, *supra*.

[6] xlvi, 37, 4–7. [7] *Strat.*, ii, 5, 39. [8] 119.

[9] vi, 18, 4. [10] *Cic. orat.*, iv, 694. [11] 67, 275.

[12] Mr. W. W. How (*Cicero, Select Letters*, ii, 1926, p. 529) says that 'Galba seems [throughout] to exaggerate the enemy's losses and minimize his own'.

[13] 69, 284. [14] 69, 285. Cp. *Phil.*, xiv, 10, 27.

that Hirtius attacked Antony with only one legion and that Antony bivouacked during the night in Forum Gallorum, and evidently exaggerates when he says[1] that Octavian's praetorians were all destroyed.

THE BATTLE OF MUTINA

I have not described the battle of Mutina, because a satisfactory description is impossible. Nobody who has qualified himself by studying modern military movements in original sources to appraise the value of ancient descriptions would attempt to base an account upon the narratives of Appian[2] and Dio;[3] and, apart from the statement of Cicero[4] that Decimus Brutus made a sortie from Mutina, we have no contemporary evidence to correct or supplement them. The battle is noticed by the epitomizer of Livy,[5] Velleius,[6] Suetonius,[7] Florus,[8] Eutropius,[9] and Orosius.[10]

THE DATE OF ANTONY'S ARRIVAL AT FORUM IULII

According to the MSS. of a letter[11] written by Plancus to Cicero, Antony with his advanced guard reached Forum Iulii *Idus Maias*. As this reading is nonsensical, Tyrrell and Purser adopt an

[1] 69, 282. Cicero (*Phil.*, xiv, 12, 31; 14, 36) is doubtless equally at fault when he says that the 4th legion, commanded by Hirtius, did not lose a single man! When he says (9, 26) that if Pansa had been able to restrain the impetuosity of the Martian legion, the issue would have been decided in one battle—in other words, the intervention of Hirtius would have been unnecessary—it is impossible to decide whether he was speaking rhetorically or relying upon an opinion expressed in the dispatches received from the consuls and Octavian (2, 6).

[2] iii, 71, 291–4. [3] xlvi, 38, 4–7; 39, 1.

[4] *Fam.*, xi, 14, 1. Cp. *Brut.*, i, 4, 1; 2, 2. Dio (xlvi, 40, 2) says that Brutus's soldiers merely watched the battle from the walls. Holzapfel (*Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, cxlix, 403–5), controverting the suggestion that Brutus, when he saw that his allies had won, broke through the contravallation, points out that on the following morning he was unaware, as he said himself (*Fam.*, xi, 13, 1), that Hirtius had been killed in the action. Oddly enough, Holzapfel failed to see that this objection, which is inconclusive, would tell equally against his own view—that Dio's narrative does not exclude the possibility that Brutus attacked the contravallation on the day after the battle, when the enemy were already in retreat. Is it not clear from Cicero's words (*Brut.*, i, 4, 1)—'Brutus's sortie . . . contributed greatly to the victory' (*Bruti eruptio non solum ipsi salutaris fuit, sed etiam maximo ad victoriam adiumento*)—that he believed that it had been made during the battle? If he was not misinformed, we must suppose either that Dio was or that, as Tyrrell maintains (*op. cit.*, p. 141), his statement is attributable to 'obvious Caesarian partisanship'.

[5] 119. [6] ii, 61, 4. [7] *Aug.*, 10, 4. [8] ii, 15, 4–5.
[9] vii. 1. [10] vi, 18, 5. [11] *Fam.*, x, 17, 1.

emendation, *Id. Maiis*—'on the 15th of May'. But, says Groebe,[1] this won't do either; for Plancus, in his camp on the Isère, knew on the 11th[2] that Lucius Antonius had reached Forum Iulii, and a courier would have required at least four days to convey the news to him: we must therefore retain the MS. reading and supply what must have dropped out—*a. d. VIII*, the 8th of May. I take leave to tell the over-confident editor that even his correction will not do. To begin with, Lucius Antonius was not Mark Antony; and, secondly, Plancus did not know on the 11th of May even where Lucius was. It is true that the MS. reading is *a. d. V. Idus Maias*; but Tyrrell gives a good reason for adopting Wesenberg's emendation, *a. d. III.* (the 13th): if Plancus, who in the preceding sentence said that he crossed the Isère on the 12th, had really sent his brother in advance with the cavalry on the 11th to encounter Lucius, it is impossible to believe that he would not have written *miseram*—'I had sent'—instead of *misi*, for, as every scholar knows, his Latinity was unimpeachable. I therefore doubtfully accept the reading *Id. Maiis*—doubtfully, because something, perhaps *pridie*, may have dropped out before *Idus Maias*.

THE DATES OF *FAM.*, x, 15, 17, 21 (1–6), 21 (7)

Groebe[3] refers *Fam.*, x, 15, to May 12; Tyrrell,[4] I think correctly,[5] to May 13. For the dates of 21 (1–6), 21 (7), and 17 (in regard to which Tyrrell is wrong) see Groebe, *l. c.* I am inclined to think that he antedates 17 and 21 (1–6) by one day, and that the former was written on May 28, the latter on May 30. Groebe says that though 21, 1, seems at first sight to have been written two days after 15, closer examination shows that it was written on May 29, immediately after the junction of Antony with Lepidus, and that the letter which Plancus had written two days before (*scripsique tibi triduo ante*) was 17. Now it appears from 23, 2 that Antony joined Lepidus on May 29, but that Plancus, who was nearly 40 miles off, did not get news of their junction until they had advanced within 20 miles of his position, when he began to return; and 21, 5, shows that that letter was written when he was on the point of returning.

ON APPIAN, *B. C.*, iii, 82, 334–6

Appian, immediately after narrating the junction of Plancus with Decimus Brutus, says that decemvirs were appointed by the Senate to require from Antony an account of his administration

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 464 [256, 5]. [2] *Fam.*, x, 15, 3. [3] *Op. cit.*, i, 465–7.
[4] *Op. cit.*, vi, 145–6. [5] See the preceding article.

with the view of invalidating the 'acts' of Caesar. He is certainly wrong about the date; for Antony's laws, including those based upon Caesar's papers, real or forged, had been annulled more than four months before.[1] Groebe[2] rejects his statement absolutely, remarking that it is unsupported, that if such a commission had been appointed, Cicero would have mentioned it, and that, as Lange observed,[3] Appian confounded it with a commission appointed to distribute lands to soldiers who had been loyal to the State.[4] Tyrrell, who in one passage[5] seems inclined to agree with Lange, says in another[6] that Cicero referred to the alleged commission in a letter addressed to Decimus Brutus;[7] but as this letter was written about the end of May, it almost certainly refers to the agrarian commission. Willems[8] gives a sound reason for accepting Appian's statement, apart from the chronological error. Appian[9] himself mentions the agrarian commission [which he calls a commission appointed to distribute bounties], evidently distinguishing it from the other, which must accordingly have been appointed in connexion with the annulment of the laws of Antony.[10]

THE DATE OF *BRUT.*, i, 10

Tyrrell[11] argues that the date of this letter was early in June, because, first, it was apparently written before the news that Lepidus had joined Antony reached Rome, 'that is before June 9th', and, secondly, when Cicero alluded to the 'fickleness' (*levitatem* [§ 2]) of Lepidus, he was probably thinking of a letter (*Fam.*, x, 21, 1–6) which Plancus had written to him [from the Isère] on May 13, and which 'arrived in Rome towards the end of the month'. The first reason is not bad, though the date 'June 9th' is only based upon a calculation of the time that the dispatch[12] in which Lepidus confessed what he had done would have taken to come from the river Argens[13] to Rome; but it is far from conclusive. The second is worthless. The letter of Plancus was really written on May 30,[14] and Cicero may have been thinking of a letter[15] written by Decimus Brutus on April 29, where he called Lepidus 'that weathercock' (*hominem ventosissimum*). The letter in ques-

[1] See p. 46.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 459–60.
[3] *Röm. Alt.*, iii, 530, n. 7 (iii², 541, n. 2).
[4] *Fam.*, xi, 20, 1.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. liv, n. §.
[6] *Ib.*, p. 203.
[7] *Fam.*, xi, 14, 1—Mirabiliter . . . laetor mea consilia . . . a te probari de decemviris, etc.
[8] *Le sénat*, &c., ii, 757, n. 1.
[9] iii, 86, 355.
[10] See *Phil.*, xii, 5, 12.
[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 224.
[12] *Fam.*, x, 35.
[13] See p. 60.
[14] See p. 211.
[15] *Fam.*, xi, 9.

tion was certainly written after Cicero knew that Antony had arrived in the Narbonian province, a fact which he apparently learned first from Plancus's letter of May 13,[1] and probably, though not certainly, before June 9.

ON APPIAN, *B. C.*, iii, 82, 337–9[2]

Appian says that Octavian (apparently at the beginning of June, 43 B.C.) privately asked Cicero to obtain the consulship for him, as the consuls Hirtius and Pansa were both dead, and to get himself elected as his colleague, promising that Cicero should have the power, as he desired only the honour. Cicero, Appian continues, urged the Senate to agree to this proposal, lest Octavian should use his army against them, and to appoint a man of mature age and judgement as his colleague; but the Senate derided the ambition of Cicero.

This rubbish, which no one capable of weighing evidence would accept even if there were no means of disproving it, is demolished by a passage in one of Cicero's letters to Marcus Brutus.[3]

DID OCTAVIAN SEND TWO EMBASSIES TO THE SENATE?

Appian, who describes the embassy which Octavian sent to Rome to demand the consulship, says in an earlier paragraph[4] that the envoys who were sent to him by the Senate in May, and to whom his soldiers refused to listen,[5] came in response to an embassy which he had sent to demand payment of the bounties that had been promised to his troops,[6] and adds that the Senate appointed a decemviral commission to distribute the money. In my narrative[7] I have ignored these statements, because the first is unsupported, and Cicero, who repeatedly referred to a decem-

[1] *Ib.*, x, 15, 3. [2] Cp. Plut., *Cic.*, 45, 3, and Dio, xlvi, 42, 2.

[3] i, 10, 3. See p. 63, and cp. *Hermes*, xxxiii, 217–8. I am not sure, however, that Schwartz, though he rightly refers to the letter of Cicero, quoted above, is justified in condemning absolutely the statement of Plutarch (*Cic.*, 45, 3. Cp. 46, 1) that Octavian used to say that he had sought the consulship with the aid of Cicero. Plutarch may have been referring, not to the early attempts of Octavian, which Cicero (*Brut.*, i, 10, 3) exposed in the Senate, but to the occasion in August, 43, when, according to Appian (iii, 90, 370), the Senate, alarmed by the approach of Octavian and his army, sent messengers to inform him that he might stand for the consulship in absence, and to the audience which, according to the same writer (92, 382), Octavian afterwards granted to Cicero, who dilated upon the zeal with which he had [recently?] urged the Senate to give him the consulship.

[4] iii, 86, 353–6. [5] See p. 58. [6] See pp. 39, 54. [7] p. 58.

viral commission which was to distribute lands to loyal soldiers,[1] would probably have confirmed it if it had been true. Ferrero[2] 'can hardly believe that Octavian had recourse to so revolutionary a proceeding' as to send two embassies. As I have just implied, I doubt whether he did send two; but merely to ask for payment would hardly have been revolutionary. Ferrero, however, assumes that Octavian *wrote* to the Senate—parenthetically I may remark that whether he wrote or sent an embassy matters nothing—asking for two donations—2,000 sesterces apiece, which the Senate had promised in January to the men belonging to the two legions that deserted Antony,[3] and 20,000 sesterces apiece, which Octavian had promised to all his soldiers.[4] In support of this assumption he cites the relevant passage in Appian and Dio, xlvi, 40, from which he infers that 'disputes arose concerning the . . . *senatus consultum* of January 3 [promising payment], that the Senate applied the act literally . . . regarding the number of those who had the right to the *donativum*, but that some arrangement was made in virtue of which they resolved to give only half'. Perhaps; but in connexion with the decemviral commission there is no mention in Cicero's correspondence of pecuniary rewards.

THE MOTIVES OF OCTAVIAN FOR JOINING ANTONY

The epitomizer of Livy[5] says that Octavian resented the treatment which he had received from the Senate, and was therefore reconciled to Antony; Velleius[6] that Antony reminded him that they were both menaced by the Pompeian faction, and threatened to join Brutus and Cassius unless he would join him; Plutarch[7] that Octavian was offended by the senatorial decrees in favour of Brutus and Cassius. Appian,[8] who agrees with the epitomizer, adds that Octavian needed the aid of Antony against Brutus and Cassius. Suetonius[9] remarks that after Lepidus and 'the rest of the leaders and their armies' [Plancus, Pollio, and the legions of Decimus Brutus] joined Antony, Octavian 'abandoned the cause of the Conservatives' on the pretext that some of them had acted and spoken against him. According to Dio,[10] he saw that he could not overcome Antony and Lepidus, and hoped with their aid to overcome Brutus and Cassius. One may doubt whether the astute youth allowed personal resentment, though he doubtless felt it, to

[1] *Fam.*, xi, 21, 2–5; 22, 2. Cp. 20, 1; 24, 2.
[2] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 211, n. 3 (Eng. tr., iii, 158, n. §).
[3] See p. 39.
[4] App., iii, 48, 197.
[5] 119.
[6] ii, 65, 1.
[7] *Brut.*, 27, 1.
[8] iii, 80, 326; 96, 396.
[9] *Aug.*, 12.
[10] xlvi, 52, 2.

hurry him into a momentous decision, or whether Antony's idle threat (if, indeed, it was made) had any influence; but the authorities and the facts of the situation support what I have written in the text.

WHY DID POLLIO JOIN ANTONY?

Those who take pleasure in studying ingenious but unverifiable conjectures will find a good example in *Mnemosyne* (xlvii, 1919, pp. 77–83), where J. van Wageningen argues that Pollio joined Antony because his pride was hurt by the neglect and the contempt with which he believed himself to have been treated by the Senate.

[Lange[1] and Holzapfel[2] hold that Pollio's letter, *Fam.*, x, 31, which is dated *XVII. Kal. April.* (March 16) *Corduba*, was really written at Gades and dispatched thence on April 15; and (if for '15' one may substitute '14'[3]) Holzapfel's argument is conclusive. He relies principally upon a comparison of § 1 with another letter of Pollio (x, 33, 3). In the former passage Pollio says that, since navigation has begun (*postea quam navigari coeptum est*), he will write to Cicero as often as he can: in the latter that he wrote to Cicero, to the consuls, and to Octavian in April, and that the ships conveying the messengers left Gades on the day on which Pansa fought the battle [of Forum Gallorum]—that is, says Holzapfel, on April 15[4]—'for since the winter [when navigation was ordinarily suspended] no ships sailed before that day' (*nulla enim post hiemem fuit ante eam diem navigatio*). This passage alone settles the question; but, as Holzapfel remarks, the identity of *Fam.*, x, 31 with the letter written on April 15 [or 14] results also from a comparison of their contents. In the latter Pollio requested to be informed how he could best serve the State (*scripsi, ut me faceretis certiorem quonam modo plurimum possem prodesse rei publicae*); in the former he expressed astonishment that Cicero had not written to tell him whether he could serve the State better by remaining in his province or by leading his army into Italy (*Illud vehementer admiror non scripsisse te mihi, manendo in provincia an ducendo exercitum in Italiam rei publicae magis satis facere possim*[5]): in x, 31, 6, he says that he has written to [the consul] Pansa (*ex litteris, quas Pansae misi, cognosces omnia*); in x, 33, 3, he recalls that in April [on the 15th] he wrote to the consuls.]

[1] *Röm. Alt.*, iii, 531 (=iii², 541).

[2] *Jahrb. f. cl. Philol.*, cxlix, 405–6.

[3] See pp. 208–9.

[4] See p. 208. Groebe, though he follows Holzapfel, argues in another note (*op. cit.*, pp. 453–5) inconsistently, but rightly, that the date of the battle of Forum Gallorum was April 14.

[5] § 6.

WHERE WAS THE TRIUMVIRATE FORMED?

Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian conferred near Bononia (Bologna) on an islet, which, according to Appian, was formed by the river Lavinius (Lavino), according to Plutarch and Dio, by a river which flowed past Bononia.[1] Florus, who does not mention the islet, places the meeting 'at the confluence, between Perusia (*sic*) and Bononia' (*apud Confluentes inter Perusiam et Bononiam*); and this statement supports the conjecture of Gardthausen[2] that by an islet (*νησῖδα, νησιδίῳ*) Plutarch, Appian, and Dio meant a peninsula. Moreover, the place was connected with the opposite banks by bridges,[3] which would hardly have been built for the convenience of any one who might visit a small island, unless they were linked to a trunk road.

From the statement of Plutarch that the site was close to Bononia (*περὶ πόλιν Βονωνίαν*) and surrounded by a river (*ποταμῷ περιρρεόμενον*) it has been inferred[4] that the islet was not formed by the Lavino, but by the Reno. Ferrero[5] locates the conference 'in the little island (*sic*) formed by the [assumed] confluence of the Reno and Lavino', which, he adds, is now a tributary of the Samoggia. H. Nissen,[6] remarking that the mention of bridges proves that the island must have been traversed by the road from Aquileia—why not by the Aemilian Way?—concludes that it was near Bagno.

THE LAST DAYS OF MARCUS CICERO

Any one who may think it worth while to collate the three detailed accounts[7] of the fate of Cicero will find that a few statements, sufficient to satisfy reasonable curiosity, may be accepted as trustworthy. In the following conspectus everything important is included. My narrative takes account of those incidents only in regard to which the three writers agree.

[1] Plut., *Cic.*, 46, 2; *Ant.*, 19, 1; Flor., ii, 16, 3; Suet., *Aug.*, 96, 1; App., iv, 2, 4; Dio, xlvi, 55, 1. Appian, who does not mention Bononia, says that the place of meeting was 'not far from Mutina' (Modena).

[2] *Aug. u. seine Zeit*, ii, 49, n. 1.

[3] App., *l. c.*

[4] Dio, ed. Sturz, ii, 1824, p. 506. 265.

[5] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 237 (Eng. tr., iii, 179).

[6] *Ital. Landesk.*, ii, 1902, pp. 260–1.

[7] Others may be found in Livy, *Epit.*, 120; Vell., ii, 66, 4; L. Seneca, *De tranq. animi*, 16, 1; Flor., ii, 16, 5; Eutrop., vii, 2; Augustine, *De civit. Dei*, 30; and Oros., vi, 18, 11.

LIVY, *Fr.* 120.[1]

On the approach of the Triumvirs Cicero quitted Rome for his Tusculan villa, and thence made his way across country to his Formian villa, intending to embark at Caieta. After putting to sea several times and encountering adverse winds, he returned to his [Formian] villa, little more than a mile from the sea, saying that he would die in the Fatherland which he had often saved. His slaves were prepared to fight for him; but he bade them set down the litter, stretched out his head, and was beheaded, his hands also being cut off.

PLUTARCH, *Cicero*, 47–8.

Cicero, on hearing of the proscription, quitted his Tusculan villa for Astura, intending to sail to Macedonia and join Brutus. From Astura he sailed as far as the Circeian promontory, landed there, perhaps in dread of the sea, travelled on foot 100 stades (about 12 Roman miles) towards Rome, changed his mind, and returned to Astura, where he spent the night. Thence he sailed to Caieta, and rested in his [Formian] villa. His slaves, anxious to save him, were carrying him back in a litter towards the sea when Herennius, a centurion, and Popillius [Laenas], a military tribune, whom he had defended in a trial for parricide,[2] with their attendants, were informed of his whereabouts. When they appeared, Cicero ordered the slaves to set down the litter, put out his head, and was beheaded, his hands also being cut off.

APPIAN, iv, 19–20.

Cicero fled in a small boat, but, as he could not endure the roughness of the sea, took refuge in his [Formian] villa near Caieta. After resting there he was carried back in a litter by his slaves, who were ready to fight for him, towards the sea. A centurion, [Popillius] Laenas, who had won a lawsuit through his advocacy, was guided with a few soldiers to the path, and, seeing that he was outnumbered, exclaimed, 'Let the centurions in the rear come up.' The slaves were overawed by this ruse; Laenas dragged Cicero's head out of the litter, and cut it and his [right] hand off.

THE NUMBER OF LEGIONS UNDER ANTONY AND OCTAVIAN IN THE CAMPAIGN OF PHILIPPI

Groebe,[3] citing Cicero (*Fam.*, x, 8, 6; 24, 3; 32, 4; 33, 4) and Appian (iii, 84, 348; 88, 364; 92, 381; iv, 3, 9; v, 6, 25), observes that the entire forces of the Triumvirs, when the Triumvirate was formed, amounted to forty-three legions. According to Appian (iv, 3, 9), whose statement Groebe accepts, Lepidus, retaining three of his ten legions in Rome, gave three to Octavian and four to Antony, so that each might lead twenty against Brutus and Cassius. But Appian states (iv, 108, 454) that immediately before the battle of Philippi the combined forces of Antony and Octavian on the spot numbered no more than nineteen legions, that Antony had left one at Amphipolis (iv, 107, 447), and that on the day of the first battle two were being transported from Brundisium across the Adriatic. How are the remaining eighteen to be accounted

[1] Quoted by M. Seneca, *Suas.*, vi, 17.

[2] Cp. Val. Max., v, 3, 4.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 468–70.

for? If we may believe a statement which Appian (v, 22, 87. Cp. 5, 21) ascribes to Antony's adherent, Manius, twenty-eight took part in the campaign (apparently of Philippi), and it follows that six must have been detached for various services, about which we are not informed. At all events Appian was misinformed or blundered when he said that Antony and Octavian were to command forty legions in the campaign. If that were true, Gaul, Spain, and other provinces would have been denuded of their garrisons, though Appian himself says (iv, 3, 9) that Lepidus was to govern Spain through his *legati* (who presumably were not to be left defenceless), and Plutarch[1] that six legions were assigned for the protection of Gaul.[2]

THE PASS OF THE SAPAEI

L. Heuzey and H. Daumet,[3] followed by D. Kalopothakes,[4] who trusted Strabo,[5] located the pass of the Sapaei, which is described correctly by M. Besnier,[6] in the neighbourhood of Burun Kaleh, some 30 miles east of its real position, and accordingly gave an impossible extension to the march recommended by Rhascuporis. Relying upon an erroneous emendation—*Ἔβρον*—of *Ἔρμον*, the name of the river into which, as Appian[7] says, the Harpessus flowed, they, like Leake,[8] identified the latter with the branch of the Hebrus which flows through the valley of Arda. See Kromayer, *Schlachten-Atlas*, &c., röm. Abt., col. 118.

THE REDISTRIBUTION OF PROVINCES AFTER THE BATTLES OF PHILIPPI

According to Appian,[9] the provinces that had belonged to Lepidus (Spain and the Narbonian province of Gaul) were taken over by Antony and Octavian, while Cisalpine Gaul, which, with Transalpine Gaul, had belonged to Antony, was to be autonomous. In other words, Appian implies that the partition made in the conference near Bononia[10] was, with the modifications here indicated, to hold good. Dio[11] says that Octavian was to have Spain and

[1] *Ant.*, 18, 3. Cp. App., v, 22, 87.

[2] Von Domaszewski (*Neue Heidelb. Jahrb.*, iv, 1894, p. 186) infers from Appian, iv, 108, 454, that the Triumvirs had raised the nineteen legions which they commanded at Philippi to an extraordinary strength by drafting men from other legions.

[3] *Mission archéol. de Macédoine*, 1876, pp. 98–9.

[4] *De Thracia*, &c., 1893, pp. 20–1.

[5] vii, fr. 43.

[6] *Lex. de géogr. anc.*, 1914, p. 668.

[7] iv, 103, 432.

[8] *Travels in Northern Greece*, iii, 1835, p. 216.

[9] v, 3, 12.

[10] See p. 70.

[11] xlviii, 1, 3; 22, 2.

Numidia (New Africa), Antony Gaul and (Old) Africa. Appian,[1] however, shows that the whole of Africa belonged to Octavian; and Dio[2] agrees with him in regard to the conference near Bononia. F. L. Ganter[3] rightly prefers the statement of Appian.

Dio[4] says that Sardinia and Sicily, being occupied by Sextus Pompeius, and other provinces, not yet subdued, were left out of account. Ganter,[5] citing Appian,[6] according to whom all the provinces, except Sardinia, that had been allotted to Octavian were in a state of war before the siege of Perusia, insists that Dio is wrong. Otherwise, he says, as Sextus's claim to Sicily was not disputed, he would already have been recognized as the lawful possessor. I cannot follow this argument. The claim of Sextus to Sicily was not recognized before the treaty of Misenum.[7] Still, Dio's statement is irreconcilable with the fact, related by Appian,[8] that Sextus occupied Sardinia, evidently for the first time, in 40 B.C.

AFFAIRS IN AFRICA (42–40 B.C.)

The narratives of Appian (iii, 85, 351; iv, 53–6; v, 12, 46–7; 26, 102–3) and Dio (xlviii, 17, 6; 21–3), in certain respects irreconcilable, present difficulties which F. L. Ganter[9] has cleared up. His principal conclusions (I only notice those with which my narrative is concerned) are these. While Appian's chronology is correct throughout, Dio's narrative is vitiated by his having supposed that the struggle between Cornificius and Sextius preceded the formation of the Triumvirate, whereas, apart from other reasons, especially the fact that Sextius was obliged at the end of May, 43, to resign his legions,[10] and was therefore deprived of the power to make war, it is assigned by the epitomizer of Livy[11] and by Jerome[12] to the following year. Misled by this initial error, Dio (xlviii, 22, 2) defended the action of Sextius in attacking Fango on the plea that under the arrangement made by Antony and Octavian after the campaign of Philippi Old Africa was to belong to Antony, the fact being that the authority of Fango, as the representative of Octavian, over the whole of Africa was recognized by Sextius from the middle of 41 till the following winter. Appian, on the other hand, was wrong in saying (iv, 53, 227) that Sextius

[1] iv, 2, 7; v, 12, 46.
[2] xlvi, 55, 4.
[3] *Provinzialverwaltung*, &c., Argentor., 1892, p. 3, n. 5.
[4] xlviii, 2, 1.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 3, n. 5.
[6] v, 24, 97.
[7] App., v, 72, 305.
[8] v, 56, 238.
[9] *Op. cit.*, pp. 18–21.
[10] Cic., *Fam.*, xi, 14, 2; App., iii, 85, 351.
[11] 123.
[12] Ed. Schoene, p. 139.

governed New Africa under Caesar, by whom he meant Octavian. The statement is inconsistent with the later passages (v, 12, 46; 26, 102) in which he relates that Octavian, on returning from Philippi, requested Antony's representatives in Rome to order Sextius to surrender Africa to him in accordance with his recent agreement with Antony,[1] and that Sextius made over the government to Octavian's adherent Fango. Evidently Appian, finding in his authority that Sextius had been Governor of Africa under Caesar, mistook Caesar, the Dictator, for his adopted son. Sense of proportion has forbidden me to narrate the struggle between Cornificius and Sextius in detail; but any one who desires fuller information will find an excellent account by Ganter in *Philologus*, liii, 1894, pp. 144–6.

THE MARRIAGE OF OCTAVIAN WITH SCRIBONIA

According to Appian,[2] Octavian, after returning from Gaul in 40 B.C., made proposals for a marriage with Scribonia, the sister of Sextus Pompeius. Dio[3] relates that, before his departure for Gaul, which he mentions in a later passage,[4] Octavian commissioned Mucia, the mother of Sextus, to visit her son, and married Scribonia. Ferrero[5] argues with great probability that the chronological contradiction can be explained 'if we do not confuse the intervention of Mucia with the negotiations for the marriage, as Dion has done'. 'In May', he concludes, 'Octavianus sent Mucia to Sextus to bring about a peace, but without result . . . when he returned [from Gaul] in August, he heard of the negotiations between Sextus and Antony,[6] and attempted to impede them by this marriage proposal. This hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that Appian speaks of these marriage negotiations without mentioning Mucia.'

THE ATTACK ON TAUROMENIUM

Ferrero[7] says that 'the refusal' of Lepidus to join in the attack on Tauromenium[8] 'explains' the 'change of plan' (alleged by him) under which Octavian resolved to attack it himself. The explanation is equally rash and superfluous. Messalla had been ordered to attack Tauromenium in conjunction with Lepidus; but he accompanied Octavian, and, whether Lepidus was corresponding

[1] See p. 101. [2] v, 53, 221–2. See p. 103. [3] xlviii, 16, 2–3.
[4] xlviii, 20, 3. [5] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 332, n. 1 (Eng. tr., iii, 248, n. ‡).
[6] See pp. 101–2, *supra*.
[7] *Grandezza*, &c. (Eng. tr., iv, 16, n. ‡). [8] See p. 115.

with Sextus or not,[1] there is no evidence that he refused to join in the attack, or that he could have reached Tauromenium before Octavian and Messalla arrived.

THE DATE OF THE BATTLE OF NAULOCHUS

From the *Fasti Amiternini*[2] we learn that a festival was held on September 3, 'because on that day [Augustus] Caesar . . . conquered in Sicily' (*quod eo die Caes . . . vicit in Sicilia*), and from another inscription[3] that 'the army of Lepidus surrendered to Caesar' ([exer]*citus Lepidi tradidit se Caesari*). Groebe,[4] remarking on the authority of Mommsen[5] that the festival probably related to the surrender of Lepidus, which, he asserts, occurred on September 3, concludes that, as the surrender was some days later than the victory of Naulochus, the latter must be referred to the last days of August.

This reasoning is very loose. The word *vicit* plainly means 'won the battle', not 'accepted the surrender of Lepidus'. The date of the surrender is missing in the inscription, and was arbitrarily supplied by Mommsen from the *Fasti*. As Fitzler[6] observes, the events that intervened between the battle of Mylae[7] and the surrender of Lepidus cannot be compressed into the time which Mommsen's conjecture implies; moreover, we learn from Appian[8] that the autumnal rains began before the battle of Naulochus. The inevitable conclusion is that the battle was fought on September 3.

WHEN WAS THE TRIBUNICIAN POWER FIRST CONFERRED UPON OCTAVIAN?

Appian[9] relates that after the overthrow of Sextus Pompeius (36 B.C.) Octavian was appointed tribune for life with the object of inducing him to resign his triumviral power, which he had promised to do eventually. This statement is partly confirmed by Orosius,[10] according to whom the tribunician power was conferred upon Octavian, when he entered Rome in the minor triumph (*ovans*) in that year, by a senatorial decree. Dio,[11] without mentioning the tribunician power, says that at this time Octavian was invested with the sacrosanctity of a tribune and the right

[1] See p. 116.
[2] *C.I.L.*, i, p. 324.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 310 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 108).
[4] W. Drumann, *Gesch. Roms*, iv², 1908, p. 585, n. 9.
[5] *Hermes*, xvii, 633.
[6] *Paulys Real-Ency.*, x, 316.
[7] See p. 115.
[8] v, 117, 485.
[9] v, 132, 548.
[10] vi, 18, 34.
[11] xlix, 15, 5–6.

of sitting upon the tribunician benches; in a later chapter[1] he observes that in 30 B.C. the tribunician power for life was conferred upon him with the extraordinary right of granting protection to all who might ask for it up to the limit of one mile outside the boundary (*pomerium*) of the city and pardon in criminal trials. Augustus himself remarks[2] that at the time of writing (A.D. 14) he is in the thirty-seventh year of his tribunician power, evidently reckoning from 23 B.C., when under the revised constitutional settlement, he renounced the consulship and relied upon the tribunician power for carrying out domestic reforms;[3] in a later passage,[4] without giving any date, he records that it was enacted by law (*lege*) that he should be sacrosanct and should hold the tribunician power for life.

The statements of Appian and Orosius have been widely accepted;[5] but, says Dr. Hardy,[6] the passages in Dio 'favour the view that the two privileges were given separately, *sacrosanctitas* in 36 B.C., and the *tribunicia potestas* in 30'. 'The motive', he adds,[7] 'suggested by Appian for the grant of the perpetual tribuneship cannot be correct, since the latter could never have compensated for the loss of the triumviral power, and Dio's assertion . . . is, I think, confirmed by the . . . Monument [of Ancyra]. To the objection that, if Augustus had been referring to two conferments, he would have written not *lege* but *legibus*, I reply that *lege* is used to contrast the nature of the present grants with that of those previously mentioned [in the preceding sentence of the Monument], which was *senatus consulto*.' Dr. Hardy apparently forgets that, according to Dio, who alone records the gift of 30 B.C., it was made *senatus consulto*, which may or may not have been followed by a law. Still, the motive assigned by Appian is suspicious;[8] and Dr. Hardy's view[9] is probably right, though it is conceivable that a grant made in 36 B.C. may have been renewed, with the addition of the extraordinary privileges mentioned by Dio, in 30, just as the grant of 30 was renewed in 23.[10]

[1] li, 19, 6.
[2] *Mon. Ancyr.*, i, 28–30.
[3] *Ib.*, 3, 19–21 (Greek).
[4] *Ib.*, ii, 21–3.
[5] See Th. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsr.*, ii³, 872 n. 6, 873 n. 1, H. F. Pelham, *Essays*, 1911, p. 73, and Pauly-Wissowa, *Real Ency.*, x, 337–8.
[6] *The Monumentum Ancyranum*, 1923, p. 42.
[7] *Ib.*, p. 64.
[8] May he not have mistakenly given an extended sense to the limited grant which Dio describes?
[9] Anticipated by P. Willems (*Le droit public rom.*⁵, 1884, p. 422).
[10] 'What modification in his [Augustus's] tenure . . . was now made' [was any?], says Pelham (*op. cit.*, p. 74), 'is not clear, but . . . the "tribunicia potestas" was brought into new prominence.'

THE ANTONIAN INFANTRY IN THE PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN

According to Velleius,[1] Antony had thirteen legions in the Parthian campaign: according to the epitomizer of Livy,[2] eighteen; according to Pseudo-Victor,[3] fifteen: Florus[4] and Justinus[5] give the correct number—sixteen. That Velleius was wrong is proved by the fact that Antony, after he had lost two legions, marched from Phraaspa to attack the Parthians with ten, at the same time leaving a sufficient force to prosecute the siege.[6] That the number given by the epitomizer is excessive is suggested by the fact that, according to an eyewitness[7] (Dellius, Plutarch's authority), the legions in all numbered only 60,000 men, which yields a suspiciously low average. The accuracy of Florus and Justinus is attested by the statement of Plutarch[8] that Antony in 33 B.C., when he was in Armenia [having raised two legions to replace those which he had lost[9]], had sixteen.[10]

THE ROUTE WHICH ANTONY FOLLOWED IN HIS PARTHIAN CAMPAIGN

The starting-point of Antony in his Parthian expedition was Zeugma on the Euphrates.[11] The army which he assembled there consisted of ten legions and 10,000 horse:[12] in Armenia he was reinforced by six legions, 16,000 cavalry under Artavasdes, the King of Armenia, and 14,000 light-armed auxiliaries furnished by client princes.[13] All the ancient authorities agree that he marched through Armenia.

Mommsen,[14] whose view was for a long time dominant, held that Antony, crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma, marched past Carrhae and Nisibis to the Tigris, but, instead of advancing thence on Ctesiphon and Seleucia, moved northward into Armenia, and thence into Media Atropatene. Johannes Kromayer gave reasons for indicating a different route—from Zeugma northward by way of Perre to Melitene, thence along the Euphrates to Satala, thence eastward across Caranitis (the plateau of Erzerum) to the watershed between the Euphrates and the Araxes, south-eastward past

[1] ii, 82, 1. [2] 130. [3] *De vir. ill.*, 85, 4.
[4] ii, 20, 10. [5] xlii, 5, 3.
[6] Plut., *Ant.*, 39, 2; Frontin., *Strat.*, iv, 1, 17; Dio, xlix, 25, 3.
[7] Plut., 37, 2. [8] 56, 1.
[9] Vell., ii, 82, 2; Flor., ii, 20, 3. [10] See *Hermes*, xxxiii, 23, 27, 29.
[11] Strabo, xi, 13, 4. [12] See p. 124.
[13] See the preceding article, p. 125, n. 5, and Plut., *Ant.*, 37, 2.
[14] *Röm. Gesch.*, v, 1894, p. 364 (Eng. tr., ii², 1909, p. 34).

Bajezid to the middle Araxes, and finally southward past the eastern bank of Lake Urmia to Phraaspa (Takht-i-Sulemán).[1] He points out[2] that while no ancient writer says that Antony (on his march to Phraaspa) crossed the Euphrates, Dio[3] says that he did not. Moreover, the length of the march from Zeugma to Atropatene, according to Strabo,[4] was 8,000 stades, or about 1,000 Roman miles, and the route formed a bow-shaped curve: the route traced by Kromayer measures, he tells us,[5] 8,144 stades,[6] and corresponds with the simile of Strabo. The last stage of the march traversed a treeless plain,[7] a statement which applies only to the plain east of Lake Urmia;[8] for Antony intended to retreat from Phraaspa by retracing his steps,[9] and he unquestionably retreated northwards to the Araxes.[10]

Strategical considerations confirm Kromayer's view. In choosing the route through Armenia Antony was guided by the King of Armenia,[11] who had given similar advice to Crassus;[12] he certainly took the same route in his second expedition,[13] and Caesar intended to adopt it in the campaign which his death prevented.[14] The cavalry which Antony assembled at Zeugma were not only inadequate in number, but, being Gauls and Spaniards, ill-fitted to cope with the Parthian mounted archers, to whose tactics they were unaccustomed: if he had advanced through Mesopotamia, where the Parthians were waiting to oppose him, he would have endangered the success of the expedition, and, as they might have attacked his weak army on level and therefore favourable ground, they would not have allowed him to reach Armenia.[15] On the other hand, by marching northward from Zeugma he gained the twofold advantage of abundant supplies, which were not to be found in Mesopotamia, and of moving through a mountainous country, in which the Parthian cavalry would be comparatively useless.[16] His plan of campaign depended upon the junction of the force which he assembled at Zeugma with the army of the Caucasus, which had fought under Canidius Crassus, and with the contin-

[1] Cp. *Hermes*, xxxi, 76–9, with Kromayer-Veith, *Schlachten-Atlas*, röm. Abt., Blatt 24. 7, and, for the site of Phraaspa, see *Journ. Roy. Geogr. Soc.*, x, 1841, pp. 47, 56, cited by V. Gardthausen, *Augustus u. seine Zeit*, i, 295–6.

[2] *Hermes*, xxxi, 73–4.

[3] xlix, 25, 1.

[4] xi, 13, 4.

[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 74, 77–9.

[6] Measured, I suspect, not *via* Perre, but along the Euphrates.

[7] Plut., *Ant.*, 41, 1.

[8] *Hermes*, xxxi, 74–6.

[9] Plut., *l. c.*

[10] Gardthausen, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

[11] Strabo, xi, 13, 4.

[12] See *The Roman Republic*, ii, 160.

[13] Plut., *Ant.*, 52; Dio, xlix, 39, 3; 44, 1.

[14] Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 44, 3. Cp. *Hermes*, xxxi, 80–1.

[15] *Ib.*, 72–3.

[16] *Ib.*, 73.

gents of his allies; and, as Kromayer remarks,[1] the region in which the roads by which these several contingents must have marched converged was the plateau of Erzerum.

Major A. Günther,[2] who has traversed the whole terrain, endorses Kromayer's opinion; Hans Delbrück[3] disputes it. Unlike Mommsen, who, of course accepting the recorded fact that Antony passed through Armenia, supposed that he entered it from Northern Mesopotamia, he insists that he marched from Zeugma to Phraaspa across Mesopotamia almost in a straight line. Kromayer[4] has taken the trouble to confute him. As this has been in great measure done by anticipation in this note, it is enough to point out that since, as Kromayer observes, we are expressly informed by the epitomizer of Livy[5] that Antony in retreating from Phraaspa 'returned to Armenia', he must have advanced to Phraaspa from that region.

THE ALLEGED PROCRASTINATION OF ANTONY

Mommsen,[6] Gardthausen,[7] and others, relying on the epitomizer of Livy,[8] who says that Antony, dallying with Cleopatra, was slow in entering Media, maintain that he began the Parthian campaign too late. Kromayer,[9] taking for granted the correctness of the route which he has traced,[10] vigorously repels this charge. Not one, he remarks, of the other ancient writers who used Livy's history, even hints that Antony procrastinated; nor does our best authority, Plutarch, who derived his information from Dellius,[11] Antony's companion and friend. Plutarch,[12] indeed [evidently expressing his own opinion], blames Antony for having entered Media too early, because he was longing to spend the winter in the arms of Cleopatra.

According to Kromayer,[13] who supports his statement by calculating the duration of the march, it is 'chronologically impossible' that Antony took the field too late. He began his retreat from Phraaspa, at the latest, in the middle of October.[14] The siege of that fortress must have lasted a considerable time: considering

[1] *Ib.*, 82.
[2] *Beitr. zur Gesch. d. Kriege zwischen Römern u. Parthern*, 1922.
[3] *Gesch. d. Kriegskunst*, i[3], 1920, pp. 478–84.
[4] *Schlachten-Atlas*, &c., röm. Abt., col. 124.
[5] 130.—Antonius . . . cum . . . nulla re prospere cedente retro rediret . . . in Armeniam reversus est.
[6] *Röm. Gesch.*, v, 364 (Eng. tr., ii, 27–8).
[7] *Augustus u. seine Zeit*, i, 293.
[8] 130.
[9] *Hermes*, xxxi, 90–100.
[10] See the preceding article.
[11] Strabo, xi, 13, 3; Plut., *Ant.*, 59, 2.
[12] *Ant.*, 37, 3.
[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 92.
[14] Plut., *Ant.*, 40, 1. 3.

the statements of Plutarch (38, 1 [with which Kromayer compares Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum*, vii, 24, 1], 40, 1–3) and Dio (xlix, 26, 1; 27, 1. 3. 5), one may assume that it began as early as the middle of August. Then, remarking, truly enough, that the larger an army is, the more slowly does it move, and that Napoleon in his retreat from Moscow could only make an average daily march of $2\frac{4}{5}$ German (about $13\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{0}$ English) miles, he concludes that Antony in his much longer march from Zeugma to Phraaspa could not have covered more than from 2 to $2\frac{1}{2}$ German (approximately $9\frac{1}{3}$ to $11\frac{2}{3}$ English) miles, and must therefore have left Zeugma at the latest at the end of April or the beginning of May.

I have no fault to find with Kromayer's calculations, though the distance which Antony had to march would have been substantially reduced if, as Kromayer now holds,[1] he marched from Zeugma to Melitene not along the Euphrates, but through Perre; but the texts which he cites hardly warrant the conclusion that the siege of Phraaspa lasted two months. Plutarch says in the first passage that the construction of the siege terrace (χῶμα = *agger*) was slow and laborious; Caesar says that the construction of the *agger* at Avaricum lasted twenty-five days. The second passage throws no fresh light on the duration of the siege. From the first passage in Dio we learn that Antony abandoned it temporarily (though the siege was of course continued during his absence) in the hope of rescuing Statianus: the others contain nothing to suggest that the siege lasted longer than that of Avaricum. The epitomizer, and therefore almost certainly also Livy, evidently thought that Antony took the field too late; the mere fact that the other writers who followed Livy are silent on this point proves nothing, for they wrote almost as concisely as the epitomizer. Though Antony, Cleopatra notwithstanding, could at need bestir himself, I suspect that, whatever the reason may have been, he did not leave Zeugma before the middle of May.

THE SITE OF METULUM

Since I wrote my narrative of Octavian's Illyrian campaign K. Pick and W. Schmid[2] have objected, as joint authors, to Veith's identification (which I accepted) of the site of Metulum with Viničica in the neighbourhood of Munjava. Veith had relied partly upon an inscription,[3] which, as he explained in his reply,[4] ad-

[1] *Schlachten-Atlas*, &c., röm. Abt., Blatt 24. 7.

[2] *Jahreshefte d. österreich. archäol. Inst.*, xxi-xxii, Erster Teil, 1922, cols. 280–99, especially 281–2, 289–95.

[3] *C. I. L.*, iii, 10060.

[4] *Jahreshefte*, &c., Zweiter Teil, 479–89.

mitting that its evidence is inconclusive, was 'only a welcome confirmation of a series of other arguments'.

Schmid insists that Veith's identification contradicts Appian, according to whom Metulum was completely destroyed;[1] but, Veith replies, the inscription is of late date, and it does not follow from Appian's statement that a Roman town was not built upon the site and called by the same name, just as the Roman Carthage received the name of the Punic city, though not only had it been razed to the ground, but a curse had been pronounced upon any one who should attempt to rebuild upon its foundations. Schmid denies that any trace of a wall is discernible upon the plateau of Viničica. Granted, says Veith; but the wall of which Appian speaks was not only battered by the Romans, but burnt by the Iapodes, and was therefore doubtless built of wood. Veith then proceeds to show that the site which Schmid selects—St. Michael, between Trieste (Tergeste) and Ober-Laibach (Nauportus)—is out of the question. For Nauportus was in the territory of the Taurisci, and Tergeste in that of the Carni;[2] therefore *ex hypothesi* the territory of the Iapodes, to whom Metulum belonged, must have penetrated, like a wedge, between the two. Even if it did, which is improbable, is it credible that the Iapodes would have made their principal stronghold in such a remote and exposed spot?

Nothing daunted, Pick and Schmid published a rejoinder,[3] which Veith countered in a single page.[4] I have no hesitation in expressing agreement with Dessau,[5] who accepts Veith's identification and rejects that of Schmid.

WHEN DID ANTONY MARRY CLEOPATRA?

Plutarch[6] affirms that Antony had two wives simultaneously, a thing which no Roman had ever done before, and that he divorced his lawful wife to please the one whom he had married in defiance of the laws. Eutropius[7] says that Antony, divorcing Caesar's sister (*repudiata sorore Caesaris*), married Cleopatra, and in the same breath adds that he made war against the Persians [that is, the Parthians]. If he meant that the Parthian expedition followed the divorce, he blundered; but allowance must be made for the extreme conciseness of his narrative, and, moreover, the past participle *repudiata* does not necessarily imply that the

[1] *Ill.*, 21.
[2] Strabo, iv, 6, 10; vii, 5, 2.
[3] *Op. cit.*, 495–502.
[4] *Ib.*, 507–8.
[5] *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit*, i, 1924, p. 402, n. 2.
[6] *Demetrii cum Ant. comp.*, 4, 1.
[7] vii, 6.

divorce preceded the marriage.[1] Eusebius,[2] like Eutropius, says that Antony married Cleopatra *repudiata sorore Caesaris*.

Johannes Kromayer,[3] controverting the view generally accepted before he wrote, argued that Antony married Cleopatra, not in 32 B.C., immediately after he divorced Octavia, but four years earlier; and he believes that the marriage was the motive of the new Egyptian era adopted then, the first year of which corresponded with the sixteenth of her reign.[4] Besides the passage which I have cited from Plutarch, he refers to a well-known letter, which Antony wrote to Octavian, and from which Suetonius[5] gives an extract: 'What has made you change? That I have connexion with the Queen? She is my wife. Am I beginning now, or was it nine years ago?' (*Quid te mutavit? Quod reginam ineo? Uxor mea est. Nunc coepi an abhinc annos novem?*) The intimacy of Antony with Cleopatra began at the earliest in the spring or the summer of 41 B.C. The ninth year therefore began in the spring or the summer of 33, and it follows that Cleopatra was married to Antony before he divorced Octavia. Again in the autumn of 34 Antony declared [falsely] that Cleopatra had been the wife of Julius Caesar[6]—an announcement which would have had no point if Antony had not already acknowledged her as his wife. Evidently the marriage occurred in 36, when Antony recognized his children by Cleopatra as legitimate.[7] Finally, Plutarch, when he says that Antony did what no Roman had ever done before, and when he compares him as a bigamist with Alexander the Great, makes it evident that he meant wives properly so called.

M. L. Strack,[8] a meritorious scholar who fell in the late war, accepted Kromayer's theory: Gardthausen,[9] the biographer of Augustus, has endeavoured to confute it. He begins by pointing out that, as we may gather from the statement of Porphyry,[10] it was the gift of Coelesyria and other lands, which Cleopatra received from Antony in 36,[11] that occasioned the new Egyptian

[1] See the passage in Madvig's *L.G.*, § 431, obs. 2, quoted in *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*[2], 1911, p. 669.
[2] *Ed.* Fotheringham, 1923, p. 244.
[3] *Hermes*, xxix, 582–4; xxxiii, 36.
[4] See *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, xxxix, 1917, pp. 161–4.
[5] *Aug.*, 69, 2.
[6] Dio, xlix, 41, 2.
[7] *Ib.*, 32, 4; Plut., *Ant.*, 36, 3.
[8] *Hist. Zeitschr.*, cxv, 1916, p. 489.
[9] *Neue Jahrb. f. d. klass. Altertum*, xxxix, 158–69.
[10] *Fragm. hist. Graec.*, ed. C. Müller, iii, 724. 9.
[11] Gardthausen (p. 164) points out that, according to Plutarch (*Ant.*, 36, 1), Cleopatra received Phoenicia, Coelesyria, Cyprus, a part of Cilicia, the balsam districts in Judaea (Jericho), and the maritime district of Nabataean Arabia. Remarking that, according to Schürer (*Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes*, i[4], 1901, p. 363, note=i[2], 1890, p. 296, n. 5), Josephus (*Ant. Iud.*, xv, 4, 1) assigns

era; and, though Kromayer[1] argues that its effect upon the political situation was not sufficiently important, the view that the motive was her marriage rests merely upon conjecture.[2] But in dealing with Kromayer's other arguments Gardthausen is less successful. Admitting that an enactment legitimizing bigamy might have been passed in favour of Caesar, he insists[3] that in the case of Antony it was impossible. Granted: one may infer as much from Plutarch. But what was there to prevent Antony from marrying Cleopatra according to Egyptian rites? One need not quarrel with Gardthausen for declining[4] to draw the inference which to Kromayer seems inevitable from the statement that Antony pretended that Cleopatra had been a lawful wife of Caesar; but when he struggles to explain away the words of Plutarch, his reasoning is unsound. Plutarch, he insists,[5] does not say that Antony had simultaneously two legitimate wives: on the contrary, he says that Cleopatra lived with him in a union not sanctioned by the laws (*μὴ κατὰ νόμους*). Yes, not sanctioned by *Roman* laws; but when Plutarch says that Antony did what no Roman had ever dared to do, and when he compares him with Alexander, the inference which Kromayer draws is irresistible: on Gardthausen's theory there is no point in Plutarch's censure, for innumerable Romans had done what Gardthausen maintains that Plutarch affirmed about Antony—had simultaneously a mistress and a wife.

the gift of Arabia, Judaea, and Phoenicia to 34 B.C., 'when Antony was on the point of marching against Armenia', he insists, arbitrarily, that Josephus was referring to the increase of the original gift. Plutarch, he says, and Dio (xlix, 32), who both refer the gift to 36 [Plutarch before, Dio after the Parthian expedition], give it a much wider extension. I may add that since Josephus assigns the gift which he mentions to the time when he was about to begin his Parthian expedition, he too, Schürer notwithstanding, assigns it to 36. [I find that Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxix, 571–9), who shows (*ib.*, 580, n. 3) that Josephus exaggerated the gift, and W. Otto in his biography of Herod (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, Suppl. ii, 43 and n.*) confirm what I have said.]

[1] *Hermes*, xxix, 579–82. Cp. Letronne, *Recueil des inscr. de l'Égypte*, ii, 1848, pp. 90–3. Gardthausen (*op. cit.*, p. 165), remarking that Egyptian policy had long aimed at the acquisition of these lands, points out that in various states of Asia Minor eras were altered from less substantial motives than that which Kromayer rejects.

[2] Professors Grenfell and Hunt (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, xii, 1453, p. 170), though they are silent about the question of the marriage, are inclined to infer from the double reckoning of years that from 36 to 30 B.C. Antony was joint ruler of Egypt with Cleopatra. Do they not forget that in 34 he recognized her and Caesarion as joint rulers? Apparently they are unaware that Bouché-Leclercq, whom they cite as sharing their view, recanted (*Hist. des Lagides*, iv, 329) what he had said in his second volume, and expressed agreement with Porphyry.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 166. [4] *Ib.* [5] *Ib.*

It is true, as Kromayer of course admits, that Plutarch in another passage,[1] referring to the year 35, speaks of Cleopatra as the 'beloved' (ἐρωμένη)—in other words, the mistress—of Antony in contradistinction to Octavia, his wife (γαμετή); but, Kromayer insists, Plutarch was evidently here writing as the moralist who regarded Cleopatra—not, according to Roman law, a wife—as no better than a kept woman. In reply to the argument which Kromayer bases upon Antony's recognition of his children by Cleopatra Gardthausen[2] asserts that Antony only did what any private individual could do—legitimized his children born out of wedlock. Let Gardthausen read the observations of Gaius,[3] and he will find that this privilege was not granted before the later Roman Empire. The extract, however, which Suetonius quotes from Antony appears to Gardthausen conclusive. Antony, he supposes,[4] was replying to a letter in which Octavian had [presumably] reproached him for being unfaithful to Octavia. When he called Cleopatra his wife (*Uxor mea est*), he meant that she was what she had been for the past nine years—a mistress, to whom he had been faithful. This, Gardthausen insists, is proved by the fact that Antony went on to rally Octavian on *his* marital infidelities: 'Do you, may I ask, have connexion only with [Livia] Drusilla?' (*Tu deinde solam Drusillam inis?*) Gardthausen's argument, dialectically fair, is not as conclusive as he thinks. Octavia alone was the wife of Antony in Roman eyes, and if Cleopatra was then his wife in Egyptian law, he was aware that no Roman would recognize her as such: therefore, if he was charged with being unfaithful to Octavia, he might not unreasonably retort that his accuser was unfaithful to Drusilla. Gardthausen will have it that if Antony had had two wives, Octavian would have had no right to charge him with being unfaithful to Octavia. Nonsense! Cleopatra was a notorious Egyptian: her marriage, if she was then married, was not recognized in Rome; and Octavian had a right to protest in the name of outraged Roman sentiment.

Gardthausen is evidently unaware that he has convicted himself of inconsistency. He tells us that Octavia patiently endured the infidelities of her husband, to avert a breach between him and her

[1] *Ant.*, 53, 4. [2] *l. c.*

[3] i, 64–5. Cp. T. C. Sandars, *The Institutes of Justinian*[5], 1874, pp. xl, 37–9.

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 167–8. The supposition rests upon Gardthausen's punctuation—*Quid te mutavit, quod reginam ineo?* I prefer that of Ihm—*Quid te mutavit? Quod reginam ineo?* If Antony was merely suggesting a reason for Octavian's altered tone, one cannot confidently assume that Octavian had reproached him for his intimacy with Cleopatra.

brother, so long as they did not cause open scandal; but when he married his mistress she could endure no longer. Divorce was her only remedy. Antony married Cleopatra, as we may infer from coins which bear his portrait in conjunction with hers,[1] in 32 B.C.; and the divorce followed soon afterwards. Thus Gardthausen gives his case away! After denying that it was possible for Antony to have two wives at once, he ends by insisting that he had![2]

But it does not follow that Antony married Cleopatra in the year 36. The fact upon which that date rests—that Antony then recognized the younger children of Cleopatra as his own—is inconclusive; for it was not until the time of Constantine that children born in concubinage could be made legitimate under Roman law by the subsequent marriage of their parents; and since Antony therefore acted in disregard of Roman law, it is not certain what his recognition implied. Gardthausen is, indeed, justified in appealing to the coins that bear the portraits of Antony and Cleopatra in support of his view that their marriage occurred in 32; for, as Grueber[3] remarks, although Babelon[4] assigned them to 34, the prow of a ship figured on the reverse below the head of Cleopatra 'records the assistance given by her in furnishing Antony with a navy', and supports the opinion of that great numismatist, the Count de Salis, that they were struck in 32. But if this makes it probable that the marriage had occurred in the early part of that or in the preceding year, it is not conclusive proof. We must be satisfied with the probability, based upon the coins combined with the statements of Plutarch and Eusebius, that the marriage shortly preceded the divorce of Octavia. If Antony's recognition of paternity implied in Egyptian law that he had married Cleopatra, Kromayer is right; but it is hardly credible that the marriage could have been kept secret, and it is inconceivable that Octavian, if he was aware of it, would have allowed his sister in the year following its hypothetical date to visit the husband who had espoused her rival.

THE DURATION OF THE TRIUMVIRATE AND THE ALLEGED *COUP D'ÉTAT* OF 32 B.C.

Mommsen,[5] remarking that the decemviral commission appointed by a plébiscite (the *lex Terentilia*) in 451 B.C., having failed to complete its work within the statutory period, prolonged its own office for a second year, held that the date fixed for the

[1] J. N. Svoronos, Τὰ νομίσματα . . . τῶν Πτολεμαίων, iv, 1908, Nr. 1897–8, Taf. LXIII, 22–4. Cp. pp. 137–8, *supra*.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 167, 169.

[3] *Op. cit.*, ii, 525–6.

[4] *Op. cit.*, i, 195–6.

[5] *Röm. Staatsr.*, ii³, 720–1.

termination of the second period of the Triumvirate had no legally binding force, and that, although the Triumvirs were under a moral obligation to resign then, the office did not by rights terminate until it was surrendered: consequently he maintained that the Principate, established in 27 B.C., was evolved from a legitimate office. Johannes Kromayer,[1] on the contrary, argued that the Triumvirate actually terminated on December 31, 33, that Octavian seized power in 32 by a *coup d'état*, and therefore that the Principate was illegitimate. Pondering Mommsen's argument, I tacitly anticipated a comment which, I find, has been already published[2]—that Roman history relating to the fifth century B.C. is too uncertain to serve as a basis for constitutional deductions. Four noteworthy papers on the subject have appeared within the last few years.

W. Kolbe,[3] the author of the first, remarks that although the Triumvirs did not, as he maintains, enter upon their second period on the 1st of January, 37, that date is given as the commencement of the period in the consular *Fasti*.[4] Evidently, he says,[5] this entry was made in order to create the impression that Octavian, before the foundation of the Principate, had duly observed constitutional requirements.

Kolbe then puts the question, Was the prolongation of the Triumvirate, upon which Octavian and Antony decided in September, 37, subsequently confirmed by a plébiscite? Appian, he observes, makes two different statements: in his *Civil Wars*[6] he says that Octavian and Antony prolonged the Triumvirate without again asking [as they had done in 43] for the sanction of the Roman People (οὐδὲν ἔτι τοῦ δήμου δεηθέντες[7] [the words, I may remark,

[1] *D. rechtl. Begründung d. Principats*, 1888.

[2] *Hist. Zeitschr.*, cxvii, 1917, pp. 15–6. Cp. *Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1925, p. 68, n. 1.

[3] *Hermes*, xlix, 274–5.

[4] *C. I. L.*, i, p. 440; i², p. 28.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 276.

[6] v, 95, 398. Cp. Dio, xlviii, 54, 6.

[7] Ulrich Wilcken (*Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1925, pp. 70–1) argues that these words mean 'as they no longer deemed [the consent of] the People in any way necessary' (*da sie das Volk in keiner Weise mehr nötig halten*). Since they did not in September, 37, refer the question to the People, self-evidently they did not then deem their sanction necessary; but Wilcken means that on legal or constitutional grounds they deemed popular sanction unnecessary—in other words, held that the *lex Titia*, which had originally legalized the Triumvirate, justified their action—though Octavian afterwards changed his mind. I see nothing in the Greek to suggest that they troubled themselves about the constitutional aspect of the matter; nor do I believe that they could have misinterpreted the *lex Titia*, which fixed the termination of the Triumvirate on December 31, 38; but for the purpose of this article the question is unimportant.

do not imply that such sanction was not afterwards given]); in his *Illyrica*[1] he says that on the 1st of January, 33, two years of the second quinquennial period remained, and he adds that the prolongation of the period had been confirmed by the Roman People. These statements, says Kolbe,[2] although Mommsen[3] calls the first a blunder and the second an oversight, deserve attention, for *Illyrica*, in so far as it related to Augustus, was based upon his autobiography;[4] but there is a contradiction, which cannot be explained away (Kolbe means in regard to the plébiscite) between the relevant statements in the *Civil Wars* and in *Illyrica*. Kromayer holds, as I do, that there is no such contradiction.[5]

In which of the two passages, Kolbe proceeds to ask, was Appian right? Turning to coins and inscriptions for the answer, he finds that in and after 37 Octavian called himself 'Triumvir for the second time' (*IIIvir iterum*), but that in and after 31 (I should say 32) he no longer bore the title *IIIvir*.[6] Suppose, he says, that the renewal of the Triumvirate in 37 was not confirmed by the Roman People; then, according to Roman ideas, there was merely a continuance of the mandate given to the Triumvirs in 43: but in that case one cannot see what right Octavian had to call himself *IIIvir iterum* [a designation which would imply a formal renewal of the mandate] or why he no longer bore the title in or after 31. If he did not use the title after 32, it was because the law did not authorize him to do so. We must conclude then that what Appian stated in *Illyrica* was right; and it is so far confirmed by the monument of Ancyra that the duration of the Triumvirate is there given as ten years.[7] But, I may add, the implied statement of Appian that the second quinquennial period lasted till the end of 32 is contradicted by the monument. Immediately after writing this last sentence I find that Kolbe[8] says substantially the same: in the monument, he observes, Augustus, contradicting the statement in his autobiography—I shall consider hereafter whether he

[1] 28. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 277. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 718, nn. 1, 3.

[4] *Ill.*, 14–5. Schwartz (*Paulys Real-Ency.*, ii, 228–9) notwithstanding, Appian's blunder (22) about the canal at Segeste (cp. Dio, xlix, 37, 3, who shows that it was made by Tiberius) does not prove that he did not use Augustus's autobiography.

[5] Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iii, 295, n.*]), like Kolbe, misunderstands the passage in the *Civil Wars*.

[6] Referring to the coins that bear the legend *Imp. Caesar Divi f. IIIvir iter r. p. c.: cos. iter. et tert. desig.*, Kolbe remarks that Babelon (*op. cit.*, ii, 58–60) assigns them to the years 33–31, but that the conjunction *et* shows that *desig(natus)* belongs to *iter(um)* as well as to *tert(io)*, and therefore that the coins must belong to the years 37–34. As Grueber shows (*op. cit.*, ii, 414), they were probably struck in 37.

[7] *Hermes*, xlix, 277–8. [8] *Ib.*, p. 279.

really made it—which Appian reproduced, says that he was a Triumvir for ten consecutive years, 'a statement which, taken literally'—how else could it be taken?—'points to 33 as the last year' of the Triumvirate. Mommsen,[1] who accepts this date, relies upon the *Fasti*; but, Kolbe repeats,[2] the entry in the *Fasti* rests upon an historical perversion. My readers will agree that that remains to be proved. Further, says Kolbe, in the monument, upon which Kromayer relies, the word συνεχέσιν ('consecutive') contains a palpable falsification: it assumes, what the *Fasti* affirm, that the second Triumvirate began on January 1, 37. Kromayer,[3] indeed, supposes that the enactment which authorized the second period was retrospective; but, Kolbe insists, this will not do, for the text of the enactment is unknown. Moreover, Kromayer's hypothesis is irreconcilable with a fact recorded in 32; for Octavian in this year described himself as a legitimate Triumvir.[4] Did he? We shall see. Meanwhile I may remark that, as Kolbe[5] has himself pointed out, Antony described himself as a Triumvir after 32.[6] We shall consider presently whether he had any legal right to the title which he claimed. That the enactment which authorized the second period was retrospective is evident, except on the groundless assumption that the entry in the *Fasti* was false; and I agree with Wilcken, who remarks that the word συνεχέσιν is evidence of its truth.[7]

Kolbe proceeds to deal with the attack of the Antonian consul Sosius on Octavian. Octavian, he remarks, was in Rome on the last day of 33,[8] but must have left soon afterwards. Dio[9] relates that when Sosius 'on the first day of the month' (τῇ νουμηνίᾳ) attacked him, he was not present, for, anticipating the attack, he had not remained in Rome (σὔτε ὅλως ἐν τῇ πόλει διητήθη), and these words are not consistent with the view that the νουμηνία in question was the 1st of January. They imply that Octavian had been absent some time before the Senate met, for we learn from Dio[10] that at the beginning of the year he was negotiating with

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 718, n. 1.
[2] See p. 232, *supra*.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
[4] *Hermes*, xlix, 279–80.
[5] *Ib.*
[6] Babelon, *op. cit.*, i, 205.
[7] Wilcken (*op. cit.*, pp. 76–7) observes that the authors of the enactment, holding that the first period had legally ended on December 31, 38, dated the second retrospectively in order to indemnify Antony and Octavian for their illegal retention of the office. Dessau (*Philol. Woch.*, 1925, col. 1018), who agrees with Wilcken that the second period ended on December 31, 32, does not believe that it was dated retrospectively, but gives no reasons. It seems to me that Octavian, always cautious, must have welcomed the indemnity which Wilcken postulates.
[8] Dio, xlix, 43, 7.
[9] l, 2, 4.
[10] xlix, 41, 4–5.

the consuls on the question whether dispatches received from Antony should be published,[1] and a compromise was effected. Now, Kolbe remarks, it is inconceivable that these negotiations should have followed the attack which Sosius made upon Octavian, and therefore that attack could not have been made on the 1st of January. The *νουμηνία* then was the 1st of February.[2]

Hermann Dessau emphatically dissents from Kolbe's view. Octavian, he says,[3] may well have left Rome on the 31st of December, 33; and, replying[4] to Wilcken, who admitted this, but repeated Kolbe's principal argument,[5] he denies that there is any reason to suppose that the negotiations, which were not friendly, did not follow Sosius's attack, and asks whether Dio would have used *νουμηνία*, without specifying the month, to denote the 1st of February. I believe, for a reason which apparently occurred neither to Kolbe nor to Wilcken, that in this case he did. If Dessau reads Dio's narrative (l, 2, 4–5) carefully, he will find that after Octavian left Rome with the object of avoiding the senatorial session on the *νουμηνία* he did not return until he judged that the time had come for him to summon the Senate himself. The negotiations were then over; but while they lasted Octavian was in Rome. It therefore seems clear that he did not leave Rome to avoid the session of the *νουμηνία* until they were over, and that the *νουμηνία* was the 1st of February.[6] Having established this

[1] See p. 140.

[2] *Hermes*, xlix, 281–2. Kolbe does not strengthen his case by remarking (p. 282, n. 3) that ' when the *νουμηνία* of January is meant, Dio says ['on the first day of January'] *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τοῦ Ἰανουαρίου νουμηνίᾳ* [xl, 47, 1] or ['on the first day of the month in which . . . entered upon the consulship'] *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ νουμηνίᾳ ἐν ᾗ . . . ὑπατεύειν ἤρξαντο* [xxxvi, 42, 3; xli, 1, 1]. The truth is that Dio specifies the month when the context does not show what month is meant. In at least five passages (xlii, 27, 1; lvii, 8, 5; 17, 1; lviii, 17, 2; lx, 10, 2), as Dessau points out (*Philol. Woch.*, 1925, col. 1022, n. 14), he describes the 1st of January as *νουμηνία* simply, because, I may add, the context does show that January is meant.

[3] *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit*, i, 1924, p. 24, n. 1.

[4] *Philol. Woch.*, 1925, col. 1021–2. Dessau is, I think, right in rejecting one of Kolbe's arguments, which seemed to me hardly worth mentioning—that the consuls held the *fasces*, and therefore presided in the Senate, in alternate months, and that Sosius, as the junior consul, did not preside till February. Dessau thinks it very questionable whether the interchange of *fasces* (see *The Roman Republic*, ii, 325, n. 9) was customary in this period.

[5] *Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1925, p. 78, n. 2.

[6] Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iv, 54, n.†]) denies that the negotiations occurred in 32 at all! 'Dion', he says, 'puts the despatch of the message [Antony's official dispatch], the insistence of Octavianus and the resistance of Sossius [*sic*] and Domitius among the events of . . . 34 . . . events during the first weeks of . . . 32 did not seem to leave room for any such discussion, and as the donations [see p. 137] . . . were made in the autumn of 34 it is

important date, Kolbe asserts[1] that the mere fact that the consuls of 32 negotiated with Octavian about the official treatment of an official document[2] proves that he was then in an official position,

difficult to understand why Antony should have waited more than a year before announcing them. . . . Finally, throughout . . . 33 relations between Octavianus and Antony were strained, on account of these . . . donations, and this . . . inclines us to believe that official information had been communicated. If Dion had not told us that Sossius and Domitius were then consuls, the discussion might be placed at the outset of . . . 33. . . . As Dion seems to have committed at least one inaccuracy, it is better to assume that he was mistaken in the consuls for the year. Domitius and Sossius were probably the senators to whom Antony addressed his despatch, and as they were consuls in the following year [32] Dion has confused their action as consuls in 34 [*sic*] and as senators and Antony's friends in 33. . . . Possibly Dion [xlix, 41, 4] meant' by ὑπατεύοντες ἤδη τότε [being then already consuls] 'that when Sossius and Domitius raised this opposition they were . . . already consuls-elect; this explanation would harmonise perfectly with the events of . . . 33'. Accordingly Ferrero (*Grandezza*, &c., iii, 482–3 [Eng. tr., iv, 60–1]) tells the story thus: 'Octavianus . . . requested Antony's agents to read the letters in the session of January 1, 33. They . . . refused. Octavianus insisted, and they then consented to read the despatch dealing with the Armenian war [Dio, xlix, 41, 5] . . . On January 1, 33, when he [Octavian] presided . . . as consul, he . . . told the story of the . . . donations and subjected them to severe criticism.' On this Ferrero bases a later paragraph (*Grandezza*, &c. [Eng. tr., iv, 270]), which is stultified unless his dating is correct.

That Octavian criticized the donations on the only day of his consulship is not improbable; but Ferrero's arguments are unsound. To say that Dio puts 'the insistence of Octavian and the resistance of Sosius and Domitius among the events of 34' is misleading. Dio, immediately after mentioning the donations, which were made in 34, says that Antony recorded them in a dispatch which he sent to Rome, and adds that the dispatch was not publicly read, because Domitius and Sosius, who were then consuls (ὑπατεύοντες ἤδη τότε) objected. Though Dio here neglected chronological sequence, he could anticipate without being misunderstood (except by his Italian critic) because his narrative showed that Domitius and Sosius were consuls not in 34, but in 32; and presumably he thought it best to say how the dispatch was received in the same breath in which he said that it was sent. There was ample time in the first weeks of 32 for negotiations which were evidently short. Dio does not say when Antony announced the donations; but it is easy to understand why he should not have wished them to be discussed before 32, when the consuls would be his devoted friends. Dio has not been convicted of any inaccuracy, and to every one who has carefully read his history the assumption that 'he was mistaken in the consuls for the year' will appear even more absurd than the suggestion that when he said that Domitius and Sosius were consuls he meant that they were only consuls-elect.

[1] *Hermes*, xlix, 283.

[2] Kolbe means the letter which, according to Dio (xlix, 41, 6), Antony wrote to the Senate, offering to resign his position as Triumvir. There is no evidence that the consuls took any notice of this offer; but Kolbe's argument would apply equally to the negotiations that resulted in a compromise (p. 235, *supra*). A. Bauer (*Hist. Zeitschr.*, cxvii, 20), believing that the offer

that is that he was still a Triumvir.[1] It only proves that he continued to act as a Triumvir, as both he and Antony had done in 37 after the expiration of their legal term. If he was still a Triumvir, why did he find it necessary to negotiate at all?[2] The meeting of the Senate on the 1st of February was summoned, Kolbe continues, in virtue of Octavian's triumviral power. For the view that that power had expired on the 31st of December, 33, the participation of the consuls in the session is inconvenient. Kromayer[3] tries to explain it away by saying that they attended despite a legally invalid summons; but if it was invalid, their politic course would have been to stay away. The mere fact that they did attend proves that Octavian was still a Triumvir.[4] No. It only proves that they did not defy the authority which Octavian, whether his legal term had or had not expired, still exercised. When, however, Kolbe[5] rejects Kromayer's contention that the mere presence of Octavian's soldiers in the House proves that he was engaged in a *coup d'état*, I agree: even if Octavian was still a Triumvir, he needed military protection.[6] Furthermore, says Kolbe,[7] the fact that Antony was deprived in 32 of the consulship, to which he had been designated, and of 'all his other power' (*τὴν ἄλλην ἐξουσίαν πᾶσαν*[8]) proves that up to that time his position, and therefore also that of Octavian, was legitimate. Does it not merely prove that he continued, as he had done in 37, to exercise triumviral authority?

Finally, says Kolbe,[9] by way of justifying a statement which he has already made,[10] there is the evidence of an inscription found at Trieste—*Imp. Caesar cos. desig. tert. IIIvir. r.p.c. iter. murum* was made in 33, finds in it a proof that Antony regarded January 1, 32, as the termination of his office. But it is not certain whether the offer was made in 33 or 32.

[1] An opponent might be tempted to reply that four years before Octavian had been invested with the tribunician authority for life; but the statement which Appian made to this effect is more than doubtful. See pp. 221–2.

[2] Cp. *Hist. Zeitschr.*, cxvii, 20.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 14. Kromayer (p. 7) holds that Octavian after the expiration of the Triumvirate retained the military command (*imperium*) inherent in the office, but forfeited it by entering Rome. Rather an excess of subtlety?

[4] Kolbe, *op. cit.*, p. 284. Wilcken (*op. cit.*, p. 79) endorses Kromayer's argument.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 285.

[6] Is it not superfluous for Kolbe (pp. 286–7) to refute the contention of Kromayer (p. 20) that Augustus himself (*Mon. Ancyr.*, vi, 14), when he said that he had acquired (*potitus*) supreme power in 31, admitted by the word *potitus* that he had executed a *coup d'état*? Executed it 'with the approval of all' (*per consensum universorum*)!

[7] Wilcken (*op. cit.*, p. 74) repeats and amplifies Kolbe's argument. See p. 242, where I examine Wilcken's reasoning.

[8] Dio, l, 4, 3.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 288.

[10] See p. 233, *supra*.

turresque fecit.[1] Mommsen, indeed, assigned it to 33;[2] but his date rested upon his hypothesis that the Triumvirate ended in that year. Surely it rested also, though insecurely, upon the fact that Octavian was then in Illyricum? When Kolbe insists that if the inscription had belonged to that year, Octavian would have been called *cos. II*, he apparently forgets that on the same day, January 1, on which Octavian took office he resigned.[3]

Having, as he believes, proved that the Triumvirate lasted till the end of 32, Kolbe proceeds to examine the relevant passage in Appian. Rejecting the view of Gardthausen,[4] that when Antony and Octavian prolonged their office in September, 37, they did not count the remaining months of that year, but made the second quinquennial period begin on January 1, 36, he holds that the situation was the same as in 43, when the Triumvirate was first established. In both cases the plébiscite (which in 37 could hardly have been passed before November), ignoring the remaining weeks of the current year, made the Triumvirate run *ad calendas sextas*, that is, to the 1st of the sixth following January. Thus the second *quinquennium*, which, like the first, was loosely so called, would end on the 31st of December, 32.[5] Admitting that his conclusion is irreconcilable with the statement of Augustus in the monument of Ancyra,[6] Kolbe professes himself unable to explain why he there contradicted what he had said [or rather what he is supposed to have said[7]] in his autobiography. Perhaps, he suggests, Augustus wished to harmonize the monument with the *Fasti*, in which the second period was dated from the 1st of January, 37. I need hardly remind the reader that, the plébiscite of 37 being no longer extant, the suggestion that it made the second term run *ad calendas sextas* is conjectural; and if it did, those who accept the statement of the *Fasti* may reasonably conclude that *calendas sextas* meant January 1, 32.[8]

Kolbe[9] then considers the position of Octavian from 32 to the foundation of the Principate. Speaking of the oath of fidelity under which Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia named

[1] *C. I. L.*, v, 525 (Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 77).

[2] In his edition of the Monument of Ancyra (*Res gestae*[2], &c., 1883, p. 12) to 33 or 32.

[3] *C. I. L.*, i, p. 544; App., *Ill.*, 28; Suet., *Aug.*, 26, 3; Dio, xlix, 43, 1. Kolbe's argument, which had been already stated by Gardthausen (*Augustus*, &c., ii, 164, 175–6), has been repeated by Wilcken (*op. cit.*, pp. 73–4), who also forgot that Octavian resigned his second consulship on January 1.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 175, n. 15.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 289.

[6] See pp. 233–4, *supra*.

[7] See p. 243, *infra*.

[8] See p. 245, n. 2.

[9] *Op. cit.*, pp. 290–3.

him as their leader[1] in the imminent struggle with Antony, he again controverts Kromayer, who regards it as a proof that the Triumvirate had expired.[2] The leadership conferred upon Octavian did not, he maintains, include the rights of legislation and of the administration of finance: the power which Octavian restored to the Senate and the Roman People[3] in 27 was, as Mommsen explained,[4] the constituent authority (*constituirende Gewalt*) inherent in the office of Triumvir. Pointing to a passage in which Dio[5] says that in 28 Octavian (then a consul) gave the [12] *fasces*—the symbol of consular authority—to his colleague Agrippa, using the rest himself (*τοὺς φακέλους τῶν ῥάβδων τῷ Ἀγρίππᾳ συνάρχοντί οἱ κατὰ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον παρέδωκεν αὐτός τε ταῖς ἑτέραις ἐχρήσατο*), he follows Mommsen[6] in inferring that hitherto Octavian had had 24 *fasces*, and that this symbol of extraordinary power belonged to the Triumvirate. Is it certain that it did not belong to the extraordinary command which had been conferred in 32 upon Octavian? When Kolbe concludes that up to the year 27 Octavian continued to exercise the triumviral power [because nobody could prevent him] beyond the terminal date, I agree, with this reservation: I would say that he continued to exercise the power which he had exercised as a Triumvir, but that in so doing he was careful to make no allusion to the Triumvirate. Was not the consulship, which he held from 31 to 27, combined with the extraordinary command, enough? Kolbe, admitting that in the period 31–27 he was never on coins or in inscriptions designated as Triumvir, remarks that we have to do with a contradiction between form and substance: Octavian exercised the power without the title, but tried to let it appear that the power was not legally terminated until he resigned it. 'Exercised the power without the title'—Yes: 'tried to let it appear', &c.—No. Augustus himself insisted that he had held the triumviral power for ten years—not more.

Antony, disregarding alike the fixed termination of his office and the senatorial decree by which he had been deprived of all authority, called himself on coins both *cos. tert.* and *IIIvir r. p. c.*[7] Kolbe[8] looks upon this as evidence that Antony as well as Octavian held that the office had not terminated on the date legally fixed: we are justified, he adds, in regarding it as confirming Mommsen's view of the constitutional aspect of the Triumvirate. No, I reply:

[1] *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 3–6.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 17.
[3] *Mon. Ancyr.*, vi, 13–6.
[4] *Röm. Staatsr.*, ii³, 719.
[5] liii, 1, 1.
[6] *Op. cit.*, i³, 1887, p. 387, n. 5. Every one would agree with Kolbe that Appian, iv, 2, 6, to whom Kromayer (pp. 12–3) appeals, proves nothing.
[7] Babelon, *op. cit.*, i, 205.
[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 294.

it only proves that both knew that they could not be forced to resign.

Finally, Kolbe[1] arrives at this conclusion: 'the fact that Octavian did not resign his triumviral position, though morally he was bound to do so, on the 31st of December, 32, cannot be regarded as an usurpation. Kromayer notwithstanding, the constituent authority of the Triumvir is the legal foundation on which the Principate firmly and securely rests.' I agree neither with Kolbe nor with Kromayer. The Principate rested upon Octavian's restoration of the power with which he had been invested in 32. Between that date and the preceding 1st of January his power was based upon the triumviral authority, which, as I hold, he illegally retained, supported by his own statesmanship.

This, if I am not mistaken, is also the view of Bauer,[2] who remarks that Augustus never called himself a Triumvir in or after 32, and that in the monument of Ancyra he described the power which he surrendered in 27 as an extraordinary military command. He argues[3] that the title *IIIvir r. p. c. iter.*, combined with the statement of Augustus that he held the Triumvirate for ten consecutive years, makes it certain that the plébiscite of 37 was retrospective, and therefore that the second period lasted from January 1 to December 31, 33. The initial date, he adds, is confirmed by the *Fasti*; and Augustus knew nothing of the theory that his Triumvirate lasted till he voluntarily resigned. Referring to the statement in *Illyrica*, Bauer says[4] that Appian, when he depends upon himself alone, is untrustworthy; but Appian clearly implies[5] that in writing the later chapters of *Illyrica* he used the autobiography of Augustus. It might, indeed, be argued that though he used it for his description of what happened in Illyricum, he derived his incidental statements about the Triumvirate from some other source. Still, we must take account of the possibility that here also his authority was the autobiography. Then we have to choose between two alternatives: which is more likely, that Appian, whose inaccuracies are notorious, misrepresented his author when he said that on the 1st of January, 33, two years of the second Triumvirate remained, or that Augustus, in order to gain a posthumous reputation for scrupulous observance of legality, deliberately made two false statements—first, that the second period began on the 1st of January, 37, and, secondly, that he had been a Triumvir for ten consecutive years? That he was capable of falsifying history for a political object I do not deny;

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 294–5.
[2] *Hist. Zeitschr.*, cxvii, 13–6.
[3] *Ib.*, p. 19.
[4] *Ib.*, p. 22.
[5] *Ill.*, 14–5.

but was the only conceivable object worth gaining, and was it likely to be gained when the falsity of the supposed misstatements was sure to be exposed? If we had only to choose between Augustus and Appian, I should unhesitatingly regard Augustus as the more trustworthy.

But another question remains. If the relevant entry in the *Fasti* can be trusted, if Augustus told the truth, the inscription of Trieste must be referred to the year 33. Bauer,[1] like Kolbe, refers it to 32 without attempting to explain away the discrepancy of this date with his own theory. Does he suppose that the author of the inscription or the stone-cutter made a mistake in describing Octavian as *IIIvir r. p. c. iter.*? That would be a rash assumption. On the other hand, in order to accept the date 33, it must be granted that the description *cos. II* was omitted because Octavian had resigned his consulship on the 1st of January, and that (as he did not hold his third consulship till 31) *cos. desig. tert.* was inserted a year before the normal time. This assumption presents no difficulty; for on coins of 37 he was described as *cos. iter. et tert. desig.*

It remains to examine the important paper recently published by Wilcken, who, while he repeats some of Kolbe's arguments, has given fresh reasons for believing that the date fixed for the termination of the second quinquennial period was December 31, 32. Remarking[2] that in the pact of Misenum[3] Antony and Octavian named the consuls in advance for the years 34–31, and that, according to Appian,[4] it was hoped that in the last year they would 'restore the rights of citizenship to the People' (*ἀποδώσειν τῷ δήμῳ τὴν πολιτείαν*), he concludes that at the time of the pact (39 B.C.) it was believed that in 32 they would still be Triumvirs. He does not explain how this belief came to be held two years before the plébiscite which, if he is right, fixed the termination of the Triumvirate in 32! Is that credible? Is it not more probable that in 39—two years before Antony and Octavian arbitrarily prolonged their authority—people believed that the Triumvirate would terminate on the date fixed by the *lex Titia*—December 31, 38 B.C.—and that, if it were then to be renewed, the second period would terminate on December 31, 33? Appian's statement is simply inexplicable unless we suppose that he was thinking confusedly of that which he made in *Illyrica*, 28—that on the 1st of January, 33, two years of the second period remained.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

[2] *Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1925, p. 69. Cp. Dessau, *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit*, i, 24, n. 2.

[3] See p. 108, *supra*.

[4] v, 73, 313.

Recurring to the hope alleged to have been entertained at Misenum, Wilcken says[1] that one can understand, on the supposition that the Triumvirate was expected in 39 to last till the end of 32, that Octavian consented that Domitius and Sosius, friends of Antony, should be consuls in that year; but, he adds, it is extremely improbable that two years later (in 37) he should have allowed the termination of the office to be fixed for December 31, 33. Does Wilcken, then, believe that in 39 Octavian foresaw the date that was to be fixed by the plébiscite of 37?

Affirming on the alleged authority of Dio that in July, 32, the Senate and the Roman People annulled Antony's triumvirate, Wilcken[2] infers that the People, which had shown by the plébiscite of 37 that it attached great importance to the strict observance of the quinquennial period, must have held that he was still legally Triumvir. Now what Dio[3] says is that Antony was deprived (he does not say expressly by whom) of the consulship for which he was designated and of 'all his other power' (*τὴν ἄλλην ἐξουσίαν πᾶσαν*). Antony called himself a Triumvir not only in 32, but in 31, and, as such, exercised authority; but the fact that he was declared to have forfeited this authority does not prove that it was legal. The Senate, if it had dared, might have declared in 37 that both Antony and Octavian were no longer Triumvirs.

Further, Wilcken,[4] citing the statement of Dio[5] that Antony promised in 32 to resign his office (*τὴν ἀρχὴν*) and 'all the power that belonged to it' (*τὸ πᾶν αὐτῆς κράτος*) two months after the victory which he expected, calmly asserts that 'Antony therefore is here expressly designated a *triumvir rei publicae constituendae*'. Expressly! No, nor implicitly. Suppose that in August, 37, he had promised to resign in the following October: would that have proved that he was then legally Triumvir? Does Wilcken forget that he has himself argued[6] that Antony maintained that he had a right to retain the office without popular sanction? Antony in 32 was in possession of power, and promised to resign it. That is all.

Wilcken argues[7] that since Antony and Octavian did not cease on January 1, 37, to regard themselves, on the ground of the *lex Titia*, by which they had received their appointment, as Triumvirs, it is clear that when they agreed in the autumn of that year upon

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 74. Wilcken rejects the view of Kromayer (*op. cit.*, pp. 10, 15) that what was annulled was not Antony's triumvirate (which, Kromayer holds, had already expired), but the *imperium* belonging thereto, which Kromayer believes to have continued.

[3] l, 4, 3. [4] *Op. cit.*, p. 75. [5] l, 7, 1.

[6] p. 71. [7] pp. 76–7.

a new quinquennial period, they did not think of reckoning it from January 1. Therefore they fixed December 31, 32, as the terminal date. Now there is absolutely no evidence that during the first nine months of 37 they regarded themselves as Triumvirs on the ground of the *lex Titia*. That law had fixed a precise date—December 31, 38—for the termination of the office. If they held that it nevertheless entitled them to retain their authority indefinitely, why did they think it necessary to prolong the term? Their doing so was simply a high-handed exercise of power.

Again, Wilcken[1] observes, citing Franz Blumenthal,[2] that Dio does not say that in 32 Octavian had lost his triumvirate. No, nor in 31. But may we not reasonably doubt whether Sosius would have dared to propose a decree against Octavian in 32,[3] if Octavian had then been legally Triumvir.

Wilcken derives another argument[4] from comparison of a passage in the *Epitome*[5] of Livy with a statement of Dio,[6] both of which, he assures us, have been proved by Blumenthal[7] to be based upon the autobiography of Augustus. In the *Epitome* we read that before the divorce of Octavia (which occurred in May or June, 32[8]), 'Mark Antony would neither come to the city [Rome] nor, though the period of the Triumvirate had expired, resign his command' (*cum M. Antonius . . . neque in urbem venire vellet neque finito triumviratus tempore imperium deponere*, etc.); in Dio that Antony wrote to the Senate, offering to resign his office, not that he intended to do so, but in the hope that Octavian might be constrained to disarm or, if he refused, might incur general odium. Wilcken regards the words *neque in urbem . . . deponere* as implying the gist of the answer which, as he supposes, Octavian gave to the letter of Antony; and his translation would differ from mine. The fact, he says, that Augustus in his autobiography, on which the passage is based, fixed the end of the second quinquennial period on December 31, 32, excludes the view that *finito triumviratus tempore* denotes December 31, 33. Further, the context is opposed to such a view; if it were true, one would expect those words to precede *neque in urbem venire vellet*, for they would then be the reason for Antony's coming to Rome as well as for his resignation. 'So', Wilcken concludes, 'this passage also reinforces the arguments for 32 as the last year of the second *quinquennium*'.

I reply that, even if the passages in question were based upon the autobiography of Augustus, it has not been proved that in it he fixed the end of the second *quinquennium* on December 31, 32.

[1] p. 78. [2] *Wien. Stud.*, xxxvi, 7. [3] See p. 141.
[4] pp. 80–1. [5] 132. [6] xlix, 41, 6.
[7] *Wien. Stud.*, xxxvi, 5. [8] *Hermes*, xxxiii, 1898, pp. 44–5.

If it had been, all the articles that have been written on the question of the duration of the Triumvirate would be waste paper. I am not surprised that Wilcken is so anxious to persuade us to accept his interpretation of the *Epitome*; for, unless it is true, the authority whom Livy followed fixed the end of the Triumvirate in 33. I believe that any unbiased scholar would approve my translation. Wilcken's would run somewhat as follows: 'as Mark Antony would neither come to the city nor resign his power as soon as the period of the Triumvirate should have expired,' &c. If the epitomizer had meant this, would he not have made his meaning clear by writing *cum primum* [or *simul ac*] *triumviratus tempus finitum esset* instead of *finito triumviratus tempore*? On my hypothesis to make *finito triumviratus tempore* precede *neque in urbem venire vellet* would have been comparatively pointless: the fact that the period of the Triumvirate had expired was not so much a reason for Antony's accepting Octavian's alleged invitation to come to Rome[1] as for his resigning his illegal authority.

Finally, Wilcken argues[2] that there is no contradiction between Appian's statement in *Illyrica* (28), which, like Kolbe, he regards as based upon the autobiography of Augustus, and the monument of Ancyra. His argument is at least ingenious. In the monument[3] Augustus recorded that he had been *princeps senatus* for forty years (ἐπὶ ἔτη τεσσαράκοντα); but, as he received the title in 28 B.C.[4] and wrote in A.D. 14, it is clear that he only reckoned complete years. Still, in order to make good his case, Wilcken must prove that Octavian did not actually hold his triumvirate as long as he was (on Wilcken's hypothesis) legally entitled to do; and accordingly he maintains that Octavian resigned in July, 32, when Antony was degraded by the Senate.[5] Now there is no evidence for this resignation; and Dessau (though he himself maintains,[6] also without evidence, that Octavian resigned even earlier, after the consuls left Rome to join Antony[7]), insists that there is no analogy between the relevant passages in the monument, for while in one we find ἐπὶ with the accusative ἔτη, in the other the dative (ἔτεσιν δέκα) appears alone. I question whether Greek scholars would found any chronological argument upon this distinction; nor can I agree with Dessau when he says[8] that Augustus, using a round number, simply reduced the period from the formation of the Triumvirate in 43 B.C. to its [alleged] termination on December 31,

[1] Wilcken infers from the *Epitome* that Octavian replied to Antony's letter by this invitation. [2] p. 85. [3] vii, 4, 2–5.
[4] Not 29, as Dr. Hardy says (*Monumentum Ancyranum*, 1923, p. 51). See Dio, liii, 1, 3. [5] Dio, l, 4, 3. [6] *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit*, i, 30.
[7] See p. 141, *supra*. [8] *Philol. Woch.*, 1925, col. 1021.

32—11 years, 1 month, 4 days—to 10 years. Admitting that Augustus was generally precise in his statement of numbers, he argues that he was unwilling to call attention to the real duration of the Triumvirate, for there were unpleasant circumstances connected with its inception. I might be inclined to ponder Dessau's argument if he could satisfactorily explain how unpleasant circumstances were consigned to oblivion—why attention was not rather called to them—by writing 'ten' instead of 'eleven'.

I have examined the arguments of Kolbe, Wilcken, and Dessau without prejudice, and I claim to have shown that they are inconclusive. My reasons for dating the termination of the Triumvirate December 31, 33 B.C., are shortly these. First, the epitomizer of Livy implicitly states that in the earlier half of 32 the period of the office was already past; secondly, the one solid argument for supposing that it extended to the end of that year rests upon the statement of Appian in *Illyrica*, and, although Appian in writing that book used the autobiography of Augustus, it is not certain that he made the statement in question upon its authority, nor that, if in making it he followed the autobiography, he interpreted it correctly;[1] thirdly, it is impossible to reconcile the statement of Augustus, who had no motive for perverting the truth, in the monument of Ancyra with the statement of Appian, except by the assumption that he resigned his authority several months before the legal term, and, although he had ceased in 36 to call himself Triumvir on his Roman coins, I cannot believe that in the critical year 32 he would have given up an authority which, on Wilcken's theory, legally belonged to him while Antony retained it. But the documents that would finally settle the question are not extant. We do not know the contents of the plébiscite that confirmed the prolongation of the Triumvirate in 37; the *Fasti* record the date of the commencement of the second period, but not its termination;[2] and the autobiography of Augustus has perished.

[1] I can conceive that, while Octavian may have thought it expedient to date the second quinquennial period—not, as Wilcken and Dessau hold, a sexennial period—retrospectively from January 1, 37, Appian, knowing that Antony and Octavian prolonged their office for five years in the autumn of that year, assumed that the first nine months, during which they had retained their authority illegally, were not included, and therefore that the terminal date was to be December 31, 32.

[2] The termination was of course December 31—whether of 33 or 32 B.C. If, as in the *lex Titia*, it was expressed by the words *ad pr. Kal. Ian. sext.*, it remains doubtful, under Roman reckoning, whether (the initial date being January 1, 37) *Kal. sext.* meant January 1, 32 or 31. The former seems to me more probable (cp. *The Roman Republic*, ii, 166, n. 2); but, if the reckoning was not inclusive, the plébiscite may have named *Kal. quint.* or *V.*

ANTONY'S WILL

Professor Rostovtzeff,[1] referring to 'Octavian's publication of the last will and testament of Antony, which he was alleged to have deposited with the Vestal Virgins', finds it 'hard to believe in the authenticity of this document, unless we assume that Antony was practically insane'; and, developing this view,[2] he says, 'I cannot help thinking that the testament of Antony was a forgery of Augustus and of . . . Plancus and M. Titius. . . . It was all-important for Augustus to convince Italy that Antony was a slave of Cleopatra and almost a madman (Plut., Ant., 60; Cassius Dio, 50. 5, 3). . . . Little wonder if Augustus had recourse to forging a document which nobody but a madman would have kept in Rome.'

Undoubtedly it was all-important for Octavian to rouse Italian sentiment against Antony; but the eminent historian's novel conjecture requires examination. The alleged contents of the will were a renewed declaration that the father of Caesarion, Cleopatra's eldest son, was Julius Caesar, a bequest of legacies to the children whom she had borne to Antony, and a clause directing that his body should be interred side by side with hers.[3] Before Plancus and Titius returned to Rome he had declared that Caesarion was Caesar's son, and had written to inform the Senate that he had bestowed Roman provinces upon Caesarion and Cleopatra's other children;[4] and although the dispatch in which he announced the gifts and requested the Senate to confirm them had not yet been publicly read, their temporary suppression was due to the caution of the consuls, who were his partisans.[5] The direction which he is said to have given for his funeral may have shocked Italian sentiment, but not so much as the announcement of the territorial grants which he had made to his children. So far, therefore, whether he was or was not 'practically insane', I see no reason for questioning the authenticity of the will. Rostovtzeff does not explain in what way he supposes that the alleged forgery was accomplished. Does he disbelieve the statement of Plancus and Titius that Antony's will, which they professed to have witnessed and sealed, was in the custody of the Vestals, and mean that Plancus, Titius, and Octavian, drafting a fictitious document, concocted the whole story? Or, admitting that Octavian took the will from the Vestals, does he believe that what he read in the Senate was a forged version? In the former case the Vestals would have

[1] *Social and Econ. Hist. of the Roman Empire*, 1926, p. 29.
[2] *Ib.*, p. 494, n. 24.
[3] See p. 143.
[4] Dio, xlix, 41, 2–4.
[5] See pp. 137, 140.

denied that the will had been deposited with them; in the latter they would have exposed and denounced the forgery. The statement of Plutarch[1] that many were scandalized by the seizure and disclosure of the will is credible enough; but to provoke the revered Virgins by forgery would indeed have been 'practically insane'.

THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO OCTAVIAN

'The whole of Italy spontaneously took an oath of allegiance to me and called for me as its leader in the war in which I won the victory of Actium. The same oath was taken by the provinces of Gaul, Spain, Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia' (*Iuravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte sua et me belli quo vici ad Actium ducem depoposcit. Iuraverunt in eadem verba provinciae Galliae, Hispaniae, Africa, Sicilia, Sardinia*[2]). Such was the account which Augustus gave in the last year of his life of the movement that armed him for his struggle with Antony. Suetonius[3] is alluding to it when he says that Octavian 'excused the people of Bononia, because they had been from ancient times dependants of the Antonian family, from joining in the oath taken by the whole of Italy' (*Bononiensibus . . . quod in Antoniorum clientela antiquitus erant, gratiam fecit coniurandi cum tota Italia*), and Dio[4] (less explicitly) in a passage in which he states that Octavian was supported not only by Italy, but also by the above-mentioned provinces and Illyricum.[5]

[1] *Ant.*, 58, 2. Cp. Dio, l, 3, 4.
[2] *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 3–6.
[3] *Aug.*, 17, 2.
[4] l, 6, 4.
[5] As Augustus omitted to mention Illyricum, Mommsen (*Res gestae*[2], &c., p. 98) maintained that before the battle of Actium it was not a separate province. But since Appian (*Ill.*, 15) says that, in so far as it was then [59 B.C.] under Roman dominion, it was placed together with the Gallic provinces under the command of Caesar, it must either have been an appanage of Cisalpine Gaul or a separate province, and the latter alternative seems to be supported by Caesar, who (*B. G.*, v, 1, 5) called it a *provincia*, and offered just before the Civil War to give up Transalpine Gaul, provided that he might retain two legions and Cisalpine Gaul, or even one legion and Illyricum (*The Roman Republic*, ii, 331), and by Hirtius (*Bell. Alex.*, 42, 1–2; 43, 1. 5; 47, 5), who repeatedly calls Illyricum a *provincia*. Dr. Hardy remarks (*The Monumentum Ancyranum*, pp. 112–3) that if Cornificius, Vatinius, and others who commanded in Illyricum between 48 and 44 'were not governors, they must have been legates of the proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul', of which 'there is no indication, and', he continues, 'after 42 B.C. there was no province of Cisalpine Gaul, so that Illyricum must either have lost its provincial status, or have been attached to Macedonia, or have been a separate province. As', he concludes, 'the first hypothesis is inconceivable, and the second ruled out by the fact that Macedonia belonged to Antony's half of the empire, I see no possibility of escaping the third supposition. Nor is the omission of Illyricum by Augustus made any easier by Mommsen's

Mr. Caspari[1] has argued, first, that the oath was not, as modern historians, except Mommsen[2] and Ferrero,[3] suppose, 'the outcome of a spontaneous burst of enthusiasm', but ' a *coup d'état* by which

argument, for the adhesion of a district certainly occupied by several legions we should hardly have expected to be passed over in silence. The omission, therefore, is a difficulty not satisfactorily explained.'

I can see no difficulty. I suggest that Augustus omitted to mention Illyricum because he did not receive, and did not think it prudent to ask for any pledge of support from the half-barbarous natives of a country in which he had recently waged a war of conquest, or even, perhaps, from the Italians settled in the principal towns, and that Dio mentioned it because auxiliaries drawn from the province and perhaps detachments from the Roman army of occupation formed part of the force which he led against Antony. I agree with Dr. Hardy's conclusion that Illyricum was a separate province, but not with the first step in his argument. There is no evidence that between 48 and 44 either C. Antonius or Sulpicius Rufus held any command *in* Illyricum. Cornificius was certainly not Governor of the province: he was Caesar's quaestor during the campaign of Dyrrachium and was sent by him in 48 B.C. with the rank of propraetor to regain possession of the province, the natives of which, unlike the Roman residents, had adhered to Pompey from the beginning of the Civil War (*The Roman Republic*, iii, 216). He may have been sent to support the Governor, if there was one at the time: he could not have been sent to supersede him, for Caesar would not have appointed a Governor, which he had no authority to do. Vatinius may have been appointed Governor as well as Commander-in-Chief in 45 B.C., when Caesar was Dictator (App., *Ill.*, 13. Cp. *The Roman Republic*, iii, 326 and n. 2); but originally he was summoned by Cornificius to his assistance from Brundisium after the disaster that befell Gabinius (*The Roman Republic*, iii, 217. Cp. p. 131, *supra*). Sternkopf (see pp. 200–1) has given good reasons for believing that Antony appointed a Governor of Illyricum in November, 44 B.C. [Hardy was evidently unaware that Mommsen, while he always held that in Caesar's proconsulship Illyricum was an appanage of Cisalpine Gaul, affirmed twice (*Ges. Schr.*, iv, 162 [=*Hist. Zeitschr.*, xxxviii, 1877, pp. 8–9], 173 [=*Hermes*, xxviii, 603]) that in his dictatorship it was a separate province, ruled by Vatinius. In *Res gestae*[2], p. 98, he remarks that during the war between Caesar and Pompey and under Caesar's dictatorship the province, 'so called by Caesar (*b. G.* 5, 1), Cicero (fam. 13, 77), and the author of bell. Alex.', was separately administered, and that hitherto it has generally been believed that the existence of the province began then. But, he continues, since C. Antonius and Cornificius were undoubtedly military commanders rather than provincial governors—have I not said so?—the same may be said of Sulpicius and Vatinius, since the war against the Dalmatians lasted after the civil war; and, since Caesar himself contemplated an expedition into the Danubian region, so far from its being certain that Illyricum was then included in the drawing of lots for the provinces [Sternkopf (*Ciceros Ausgewählte Reden*, viii, 1912, p. 112), following Mommsen's article in *Hermes*, cited above, held that in November, 44, it was], it is probable that the administration was unchanged. When Dio (xlviii, 28) speaks of Illyricum as a province, he is following, as usual, the nomenclature of his own time. Evidently Mommsen's view wobbled.]

[1] *Class. Quart.*, v, 1911, pp. 230–5.

[2] *Röm. Staatsr.*, i[3], &c., 696–7.

[3] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 512–3 (Eng. tr., iv, 84).

Octavian, with the help of his army, sought to coerce Italy into military allegiance', and, secondly, that it was taken in the earlier part of 32 B.C., 'previous to Octavian's entry into Rome'. Nobody, as he says, will believe in 'an infinity of coincidences which led all the . . . communities of Italy to take the self-same oath by an independent inspiration', and, on the other hand, everybody will agree with him in rejecting 'Mommsen's desperate expedient of explaining away the statement [of Augustus] as a lie pure and simple'. One may also accept, in the sense which I have indicated in my narrative,[1] Mr. Caspari's conclusion that 'If the people of Bononia . . . were specially exempted by Octavian from the oath, this can only mean that he made it incumbent upon Italy in general'. But it does not follow that reluctant citizens were terrorized by the swords of the soldiery into taking an oath which, if it had been extracted by such means, would have been futile; and when Mr. Caspari discovers 'a still more damning piece of information . . . in Cassius Dio, who narrates that Octavian's army had partly been mustered *by force of threats*', I am confident that every reader who turns to the passage[2] will marvel at the fertility of his imagination.

Let us test Mr. Caspari's arguments for dating the oath. Ferrero assigned it to the end of July on the ground, as Mr. Caspari remarks, that 'Octavian dared not execute his *coup* until the revelations contained in Antony's will had helped to prejudice public opinion in his favour'. But, Mr. Caspari objects, at that time Octavian 'was undisputed master of Rome': why, then, he asks, did he not 'obtain his right of levying troops by an empowering act of the normal type?' Ferrero[3] notwithstanding, there were many Caesarian senators[4] to pass a decree and at least one tribune[5] to propose a bill. Mr. Caspari admits that he cannot answer his own question; so I will do so for him. Since Octavian did not take the trouble to procure a decree or a bill, though he had the means of doing both, he evidently did not see anything to be gained by doing either. He already commanded a powerful army and a powerful fleet: he had the prestige that resulted from ten years' tenure of the triumviral power, fortified by the renown that he

[1] See pp. 144–5.

[2] I, 3, 4—*κἀκ τούτου* [Antony's will] *περιοργὴς ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον γενόμενος οὐκ ὤκνησεν οὐτ' ἀναζητῆσαι αὐτὰς οὔτε λαβεῖν, οὔτε, ἐς τε τὸ βουλευτήριον, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐς ἐκκλησίαν ἐσκομίσαι καὶ ἀναγνῶναι. τοιαῦτα γάρ που ἐν αὐταῖς ἀνεγέγραπτο, ὥστε μηδ' αἰτίαν τινὰ παρ' αὐτῶν καίτοι πιθανομώτατον πρᾶγμα ποιήσας σχεῖν.* The substance of these words is given in my narrative (p. 143).

[3] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 505, 512 (Eng. tr., iv, 79 and 84).

[4] See p. 141.

[5] See p. 141.

had won by freeing Italy from the scourge of piracy and restoring Roman authority in Illyricum and by the popularity which the beneficent administration of Agrippa had earned; by the publication of Antony's will he had awakened the instinctive hostility of the West against the East; and the manifestation of loyalty which he had secured, no matter by what means, throughout Italy and the Western provinces was worth more to him than any formal conferment of power by either a senatorial decree or a law passed by the heterogeneous populace in the Forum. What surprises me is that Mr. Caspari failed to see that since Octavian could have legalized his power, but omitted to do so—until he assumed the consulship in 31 B.C.—he felt no need of such a sanction.

Secondly, says Mr. Caspari, 'In view of the preparation for war which Antony had been pushing . . . for some time past,[1] Octavian had everything to gain by hastening the issue'. Though he was not going to sail before the end of the year? Is it not self-evident that he had everything to gain by postponing the issue until he should have educated public opinion by the disclosure of Antony's will?

'Lastly', says Mr. Caspari, 'the taxation riots[2] which followed . . . the *iuratio* cannot, on Ferrero's hypothesis, have taken place before August or September of the year 32. In the autumn of that year Antony had arrived within striking distance of Italy, and actually prepared for an immediate attack on the very ground that Octavian might still be having his hands tied by the unsettled condition of the country. If Italy at this crisis was still seething with discontent against Octavian, can it be doubted that Antony would have pressed home his onset? Yet . . . he tamely abandoned his enterprise, as though the prospects of a surprise landing were too poor to be worth taking into account. This failure . . . can only mean that the commotion in Italy had spent its strength, and that the *iuratio* was already an event of the remoter past.'

Now Dio,[3] the only writer who says that Antony contemplated 'a surprise landing', and who, moreover, gives a very suspicious reason for his having abandoned his intention,[4] says nothing about 'the very ground' on which, according to Mr. Caspari, he prepared for attack; while Plutarch,[5] who emphasizes the intensity of the 'commotion', clearly implies that at the time when Antony was

[1] Mr. Caspari cites Dio, l, 9, 2–3. [2] See p. 145. [3] l, 9, 2.

[4] Dio says that Antony abandoned his intention because he learned that Octavian's 'scouts'—vessels sent to ascertain his movements—were at anchor off the Acroceraunian mountains, and, suspecting that Octavian was there with his entire fleet (!), returned for that reason (!) to the Peloponnese, in order to winter at Patrae. Well may Kromayer remark (*Hermes*, xxxiii, 59) that the contradiction is self-evident. [5] *Ant.*, 58, 1.

making the preparations (which he does not mention) for attack it was at its height, for he blames Antony for having neglected the advantage which it gave him. Antony knew better than Plutarch or even modern writers like the late Professor Pelham[1] what was practicable. Octavian's army was stronger than his, and the only harbours open to him—Tarentum and Brundisium—were occupied by Octavian's squadrons and backed by fortified towns.[2]

'It may be objected', says Mr. Caspari, 'that on this hypothesis' —that the *iuratio* occurred before Octavian entered the Senate with his troops and there denounced the consuls[3]—'too little time is allowed for the preparation of the *iuratio* by Octavian.' Yes indeed, and the objection is unanswerable. Mr. Caspari, who (wrongly) supposes that the session of the Senate in which the consul Sosius attacked Octavian was on the 1st of January,[4] allows a month, which, he says, would have given Octavian 'all the leisure he needed to devise and carry out his scheme of coercion.' Now, apart from the fact that to carry out the *iuratio* by mere 'coercion' at all, and above all at that time, would have been folly, I cannot believe that Octavian devised his scheme and sent his agents and his troops all over Italy to terrorize citizens into taking a useless oath within one month and without employing any propaganda to prepare their minds.

THE POSITION OF ANTONY'S SHIPS WHEN OCTAVIAN ATTEMPTED TO SURPRISE THEM

Kromayer, tacitly disregarding the statement of Dio,[5] argues[6] that Antony's ships were in the Gulf of Arta, behind the entrance, 'for otherwise the blocking of the entrance would have had no object'. According to Dio, the entrance was blocked by the ships. Kromayer says that Octavian did not attempt to force a passage, because the water was shallow and crossed by sandbanks: citing *The Mediterranean Pilot*, iii, 365, he observes that between Prevesa and the promontory of Actium there is a bank covered by only one fathom (1·82 metre) of water. I reply that the bank, if it existed in 31 B.C., must have been much smaller than it was when the relevant edition of *The Mediterranean Pilot* was published; for if the channel had been only 6 feet deep, Antony's fleet, which included ships with ten banks of oars, could not have got through.

[1] *Outlines of Rom. Hist.*², 1895, p. 355. [2] See p. 145.
[3] See p. 141. [4] See pp. 234–5. [5] l, 12, 8.
[6] *Hermes*, xxxiv, 14, and n. 1. Cp. Kromayer-Veith, *Schlachten-Atlas*, &c., röm. Abt., Blatt 24. 9.

WHEN DID DELLIUS DESERT ANTONY?

'Plutarch',[1] says Ferrero,[2] 'places the desertion of Dellius[3] too early, if Dion's statement (l. 23) be correct, that Dellius informed Octavianus of Antony's final resolution'. Ferrero thinks that the alleged statement is true, 'for', he continues, 'on September 2, before the battle, Octavianus was . . . aware of Antony's intentions, as upon the day following the battle he was able to tell the soldiers of his rival's flight. . . . Bouché-Leclercq,[4] however, observes: "The project of . . . taking flight was no hasty decision on the eve of the battle, and Dellius was sufficiently intimate with those in command to have foreseen the adoption of this plan." This objection seems to me ill-founded. The proposal for retirement . . . was sedulously concealed. . . . The Roman party was told that the object of the naval battle was to crush the enemy. Thus . . . Dellius, who had long been doubtful of Antony's real intentions . . . resolved to desert at the last moment, as soon as he was convinced that Antony would abandon the struggle. . . . Moreover, Dion, l. 23, says that the desertion of Dellius and some others decided Antony to carry out his plan; obviously, therefore, his desertion must have been one of the last.'

Plutarch does not fix the time of Dellius's desertion;[5] nor can I discover any reason to believe that it occurred 'at the last moment'. Dio does not say that it 'decided Antony to carry out his plan' [of retreating to Egypt]. What he says is that Antony, after he had formed his plan and had harangued his men in view of the imminent battle, ordered prominent individuals in his *entourage* to embark 'lest . . . they should attempt anything revolutionary, as Dellius and others had done when they deserted' (*μή τι νεωτερίσωσι . . . ὥσπερ ὅ τε Δέλλιος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς αὐτομολήσαντες*). In an earlier chapter[6] Dio related that Antony, after sending Dellius and Amyntas on a recruiting expedition to Macedonia, suspected that they intended to desert, and attempted to prevent their doing so. Does not this suggest that Dellius, who was intimate with Antony, and who doubtless saw as clearly as he that the only course open to him was to make the best of his way to Egypt, had not waited till 'the last moment' to desert?

[1] *Ant.*, 59, 2.
[2] *Grandezza*, &c. (Eng. tr., iv, 99, n. ‡).
[3] See p. 149, *supra*.
[4] *Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 300, n. 3.
[5] If Plutarch meant, as Kromayer (*Hermes*, xxxiv, 37, n. 3) seems to suppose, that Dellius deserted at the beginning of the campaign, he was certainly wrong, for Dellius was associated with Amyntas in an expedition which Antony dispatched to Macedonia (Dio, l, 13, 8. Cp. p. 149, *supra*); but whoever reads the relevant chapter (59) carefully will see that Plutarch did not necessarily mean what Kromayer assumes.
[6] l, 13, 8.

THE OBJECT OF ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA IN THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM

Admiral Jurien de la Gravière [1] and Johannes Kromayer [2] have demonstrated that, as Merivale [3] affirmed, the flight of Cleopatra and Antony during the battle of Actium had been prearranged, and therefore that the treachery attributed by Josephus [4] to the Queen and the alleged motive of Antony in following her were imaginary.[5] Cleopatra would have gained nothing by abandoning Antony; for the woman against whom alone war had been declared [and who had supplanted Octavia] had nothing to hope for from Octavian. Antony would not have burned the ships which he could not use [6] if he had had any hope of winning the battle: he had had no experience of naval warfare; and his fleet was of inferior strength.[7] His purpose was simply to force his way through the hostile fleet and escape to Egypt.[8]

[1] *La marine des Ptolemées*, &c., i, 1885, pp. 68–84.

[2] *Hermes*, xxxiv, 2, 32, 34.

[3] *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, iii, 1851, p. 321.

[4] *In Apion.*, ii, 5.

[5] Nevertheless, an argument of Jurien (p. 79), which Kromayer (p. 2) endorses, is weak. He asks whether it is conceivable that Nelson would have entertained the idea of quitting the battle of Trafalgar to follow Lady Hamilton. The cases are not parallel. If Lady Hamilton had been on board of one of the British ships, and Nelson had found that he was losing the battle (both suppositions are absurd), I am not sure that he would not have followed her if she had fled.

[6] See p. 152.

[7] One of Kromayer's arguments, however, is unsound. Even, he says (p. 32), if Antony could have overcome Octavian in close fighting, the clumsiness of his ships would have prevented him from following up his success. This is inconsistent with Kromayer's own statement (p. 35) that Antony before the battle left masts and sails standing in order to make good his escape in case he should succeed in breaking through. If the ships were fast enough to run away, they were fast enough to pursue.

[8] Bouché-Leclercq, who finally (*Hist. des Lagides*, ii, 306–7) arrives at substantially the same conclusion as Kromayer, holds (p. 305) that Dio, after stating that Antony and Cleopatra agreed in deciding to escape, contradicts himself by attributing her flight to fear and his to the belief that the movement of her squadron was not ordered by her, but was 'un sauve-qui-peut général', and remarks further (p. 306, n. 2) that Kromayer leaves certain points obscure: 'If Antony's only thought was to escape, why did he not give the order to his officers, who appear from Dio's narrative to have manœuvred with a wholly different object and to have been dismayed by the desertion of their leaders.' Is it not self-evident that Antony could not trust his officers (to whom he had misrepresented the object of leaving his masts standing) to approve his purpose, and that he knew that the harder they fought, the better would be his chance of breaking the blockade? If

But Ferrero, who accepts the arguments of Jurien and Kromayer, endeavours to improve upon them and argues that if Cleopatra could have got her own way, the battle of Actium would never have been fought. 'During this winter' [32–31 B.C.], he says,[1] 'Cleopatra strove to avert the war . . . and to persuade Antony to return to Egypt in the spring without waiting for the enemy; the Roman party [Domitius and others] . . . threw its influence upon the side of war.' Readers who demand evidence for this assertion must turn to a later page,[2] on which Ferrero asks why Cleopatra had 'come to oppose the continuation of hostilities'. Answering his own question, he says that she 'had insisted upon the divorce of Octavia in order to compromise Antony, and make any repeal of the "Donations" [the territorial gifts which Antony had bestowed upon her[3]] . . . impossible. When this object had been attained, what further interest had she in the continuation of the war [which had not yet begun]? . . . If Antony were defeated, the downfall of the Egyptian empire was inevitable . . . if Antony were triumphant, he would . . . have no further need of the Egyptian alliance, and would be obliged to establish himself at Rome.' But 'if she could persuade Antony to return to Egypt with his army without fighting, Octavianus would not venture to attack them in Egypt, where they could dispose of thirty legions'. Then, after remarking that 'Cleopatra's programme, neither peace nor war, was disastrous to' Domitius and his colleagues, who 'required that Antony should be reconciled to Octavianus or should crush him', he assures us that 'This difficulty explains . . . the quarrels between Antony and Cleopatra, which must have been very keen . . . if, as Pliny[4] says, Antony sometimes feared that she would poison him'. 'Withdrawal to Egypt', Ferrero continues, 'meant for Antony the betrayal of his Roman friends and the final abandonment of Italy . . . [his] Roman spirit hesitated before this project . . . the struggle was long and severe, and the queen

Dio contradicts himself, the judicious reader will accept his well-grounded statement that Antony and Cleopatra purposed to return to Egypt, and disregard his ascription of motives, for which he could hardly have had direct evidence. But I cannot discover any contradiction. Dio says that, the result of the battle appearing doubtful, Cleopatra, woman-like, was unable to endure prolonged suspense, and therefore gave the signal to depart. If she ever explained her motives, it is more than improbable that Dio saw the record, but his imaginative statement is probable enough. It does not need profound knowledge of human nature to believe that when she counselled return to Egypt, she hoped that the way would be cleared by victory.

[1] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 520 (Eng. tr., iv, 90).

[2] Eng. tr., iv, 273–5.

[3] See p. 137, *supra*.

[4] *Nat. Hist.*, xxi, 3 (9), 12.

would probably have proved unsuccessful, if Antony had not been enfeebled by much fatigue, constant strain and debauchery.'

Now, as I have shown in my narrative (page 151), Antony resolved to retreat to Egypt because he saw that he could neither force Octavian to fight a decisive battle upon land nor defeat him on the sea, and must therefore break through the hostile fleet and escape. As there is no evidence for the theory that during the winter of 32–31 Cleopatra tried to prevent war altogether and 'to persuade Antony to return to Egypt without waiting for the enemy', Ferrero is obliged to rely upon the conjecture that after the divorce of Octavia (which occurred nearly a year before the war began) Cleopatra had nothing to gain by war. His argument is concerned with the efforts which she made to induce Antony to retreat after the war had dragged on throughout the summer of 31; but unless he means that the considerations which he supposes to have influenced her then had led her to try to avert the war, his theory collapses. It may be granted that 'if Antony were defeated, the downfall of the Egyptian empire was inevitable'; but why, 'if Antony were triumphant', would he 'have no further need of the Egyptian alliance'? Egypt would still be as useful to him as it was to the triumphant Octavian, and, even if he were 'obliged to establish himself at Rome', would he not be able to install his queen there, as Caesar had done, and so to gratify her pride? Whether there was any 'struggle' between him and her is doubtful: that 'the struggle was long and severe' may safely be denied, for the experienced soldier knew his own business and comprehended the military situation, which required him to retreat. That a man, only 52 years old, whose physical vigour was notorious, had become so 'enfeebled by much fatigue, constant strain, and debauchery' that he could not resist a woman is a baseless assertion, which may be dismissed as rhodomontade.

Was not Ferrero's judgement warped by his belief[1] that the view that Antony had married Cleopatra in 36 B.C. will alone explain 'the great riddle of Actium'. The riddle, such as it was, had been explained before Ferrero wrote by Jurien and Kromayer.

[Since I wrote the foregoing paragraphs I have read an article[2] in which Signor Aldo Ferrabino, while he acknowledges that Kromayer has disproved the alleged treachery of Cleopatra,[3] attempts to confute his explanation of Antony's object. Ferrabino holds that Antony was forced to fight by disaffection among his officers; that he fought not to retreat, but to regain prestige by victory;

[1] *Grandezza*, &c. (Eng. tr., iv, 7, n. †).
[2] *Rivista di Filologia*, N.S., ii, 1924, pp. 433–72.
[3] pp. 433 n. 1, 472.

but that his plans were ruined by treachery on the part of Sosius, commanding his port squadron.[1] Accordingly he composes a startlingly novel description of the later phases of the battle: 'At the moment in which Cleopatra's 60 ships went into action . . . to decide the victory by breaking the Caesarian line . . . Sosius retreated, as if defeated, within the gulf. . . . But . . . Cleopatra, with energetic resolution', &c. (*Nel momento in cui le 60 navi di Cleopatra entravano in azioni . . . per decidere della vittoria, tagliando in due la linea cesariana . . . Sosio retrocedette, quasi sconfitto fin dentro il golfo . . . Ma . . . Cleopatra, con energica risolutezza*,[2] &c.). Let us examine the evidence on which Ferrabino relies. We learn from Dio[3] that Sosius, having often borne arms against Octavian, fled and hid himself[4] (*πολλάκις τε γὰρ ἀντιπολεμήσας αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε φυγὼν καὶ κατακρυφθείς*). Quoting from Horace's 9th Epode (17–20)

verterunt bis mille equos
Galli, canentes Caesarem,
Hostiliumque navium portu latent
Puppes sinistrorsum citae,

Ferrabino argues[5] that the [alleged] movement of Sosius, viewed from Octavian's squadron, was a movement from right to left (*sinistrorsum*), that the last two verses of the passage quoted, like the first two, in which the desertion of Antony's Galatian cavalry is referred to, show that the ships (*puppes*) were commanded by a deserter, and that in the words *citae* and *latent* 'are exactly expressed the two acts of Sosius', recorded by Dio, *φυγὼν καὶ κατακρυφθείς*. The argument is ingenious: is it sound? Why did Sosius run away and hide himself if by retreating he had done an inestimable service to Octavian? Is it not self-evident that he ran away because he had borne arms against him? His retreat, if he did retreat, was the decisive event in the battle. Yet none of the ancient writers who described the battle says anything about it; while Plutarch, according to whom Antony's port squadron was commanded by Caelius, ascribes to him not a retrograde, but a prematurely forward movement.[6] Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that Sosius was a traitor. Is it credible that Horace

[1] pp. 458–9, 470–1. [2] p. 471. [3] li, 2, 4.

[4] Ferrabino (p. 449) cites the passage in which Velleius (ii, 86, 2) says that Sosius owed his life not only to Octavian's clemency but also to the fidelity of Arruntius (who in the battle commanded the squadron opposed to that which Ferrabino assigns to Sosius). I am inclined to think that Fr. Kritz (see his edition of Velleius, 1848, p. 389) was right in saying that the 'fidelity' of Arruntius consisted in protecting Sosius when he fled.

[5] pp. 450–1. [6] See p. 155.

could have expected his readers, without a plan illustrative of the battle, to infer his treachery from the words *sinistrorsum citae*? Is it not more likely that he had in mind the notorious flight, probably already attributed to treachery, of Cleopatra, that by *sinistrorsum citae* he meant 'hurrying to port'—that is, to Egypt,—and that the 'hostile harbour' in which the ships took refuge was the harbour of Alexandria? If Ferrabino's conjecture is right, the ancient historians were ignorant of the most important incident in the battle. In any case the conjecture does not affect the question whether Antony fought to win or to escape to Egypt.

In support of the view that he fought to win a decisive battle Ferrabino labours to prove that he was not, as Kromayer maintains, inferior to Octavian in naval strength. Kromayer relied upon the evidence of Florus,[1] who says that while Octavian had more than 400 ships, Antony had 200 less, though his numerical inferiority was compensated by greater size, and of Orosius,[2] who says that he had 170 and Cleopatra 60. But, says Ferrabino,[3] Antony in the speech which Dio [4] puts into his mouth implies that his own fleet was as strong or even stronger, and in a later passage [5] positively affirms that it was much stronger than Octavian's. The former statement cannot have been simply fictitious: [6] it must have been derived from some authority. Plutarch,[7] as Ferrabino observes,[8] tells us, quoting Augustus as his authority, but, I may remark, misunderstanding him,[9] that 300 ships were captured; the two hundred mentioned by Florus were, so Ferrabino affirms, burnt.[10] Add together the two figures, and you get 500—the number which, according to Plutarch,[11] Antony had at the outset of the war. 'See', says Ferrabino [12] triumphantly, 'how the supposed discrepancy [between Plutarch and Florus] has become agreement, thanks to the results of our researches on the sources' (*Ecco che la presunta oscillazione è divenuta una congruenza, grazie ai risultati della nostra ricerca sulle fonti*). One shrinks from disturbing such complacency; but would not Ferrabino's conclusion tend to show that Antony took into action all the 500 ships which he had originally assembled, although he had lost some in the campaign

[1] ii, 21, 5. [2] vi, 19, 9. 11. [3] p. 458. Cp. 471, n. 1. [4] l, 18, 5.

[5] l, 19, 4 . . . *ταῖς ναυσιν, αἷς κράτιστοί τ' ἐσμὲν καὶ παμπληθὲς αὐτῶν περίεσμεν.*

[6] Why not also the latter? Because it is irreconcilable with Ferrabino's view that Antony's fleet was equal in strength to Octavian's?

[7] 68, 1. [8] p. 457. [9] See p. 152, n. 6.

[10] Ferrabino gravely quotes the words of Florus, *Caesaris naves . . . illas* [of Antony] . . . *ignibus iactis ad arbitrium dissipavere.* Does he then suppose that Florus meant that the entire fleet was thus disposed of?

[11] *Ant.*, 61, 1. [12] p. 458.

and although, as Plutarch [1] and Dio [2] relate, he himself burned all that he was prevented by lack of oarsmen from using. Ferrabino of course refrains from such an inference; but, taking account of the ships $(60 + x)$ that escaped with Antony and Cleopatra, of those that were lost at Leucas and Patrae and in the defeat of Sosius by Agrippa, and of those which Antony destroyed, he concludes that his fleet, like that of Octavian, numbered 400 ships.[3] Moreover, replying to Kromayer's argument that since Antony, before going into action, left his sails standing, he must have intended merely to break the blockade, he maintains that his purpose, as he himself declared, was to use them for pursuing Octavian in case he should win the battle.[4] But, if Plutarch [5] may be trusted, Antony said this in order to deceive his pilots. Doubtless, as I have said in my narrative,[6] however much he may have distrusted his own power, he did not despair of victory, for without fierce fighting even to break through the hostile fleet would be impossible; but that he intended, win or lose, to return to Egypt is evident from the combined testimony of Plutarch [7] and Cassius Dio.[8] If that is granted, it matters little how many ships he took into action; but although Florus and Orosius may have underestimated the number, I think that Ferrabino has not allowed enough for the fact, attested by our best authorities, that Antony destroyed all the ships which he could not man, and that he trusts unduly to the rhetoric composed for Antony by Dio.]

THE COLLOQUY BETWEEN OCTAVIAN AND AGRIPPA BEFORE THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM

Kromayer,[9] remarking that Octavian's consultation with Agrippa must have been earlier than the day of the battle, and that Dio,[10] who refers it to a time before the fighting men embarked, supports this conclusion, says that the storm which, according to the argument ascribed by Dio to Agrippa, damaged Antony's ships only, really occurred on the day of the battle,[11] and that Dio confounded it with the four days' gale which, according to Plutarch,[12] immediately preceded the battle. Ihne's explanation [13]—that the four days' gale blew from the south-west, and therefore damaged Antony's fleet—he condemns as untenable, for Antony had as

[1] *Ant.*, 64, 1. [2] l, 15, 4. [3] pp. 457–8, 460.
[4] p. 470, n. 1. [5] *Ant.*, 64, 2. [6] p. 151, *supra*.
[7] *Ant.*, 63, 3. [8] l, 15, 1; 23, 3; 30, 4; 31, 1.
[9] *Hermes*, xxxiv, 39, n. 1. [10] l, 31, 1–3.
[11] Kromayer cites Dio, l, 32, 3, by mistake for 33, 3.
[12] *Ant.*, 65, 1. [13] *Röm. Gesch.*, viii, 385.

good harbours as Octavian, and the wind was probably a nor'-wester.[1]

Now the wind that arose on the day of the battle was not a storm at all: Dio describes it as a favourable wind (*ἀνέμου τινος κατὰ τύχην φοροῦ συμβάντος*)—favourable for the flight of Cleopatra[2]—which arose when her ships were standing out to sea. But when he implies that the whole of Antony's fleet had been thrown into disorder by the gale, he is manifestly wrong, for inside the gulf there was safe anchorage. In my narrative therefore I have ignored this part of the argument which he attributes to Agrippa.

OCTAVIAN'S FLEET IN THE BATTLE OF ACTIUM

According to Florus,[3] whose authority was probably Livy, Octavian had more than 400 ships. Orosius[4] says that he had 230 beaked ships and 30 swift triremes without beaks, whereupon Kromayer[5] remarks that as Orosius[6] relates that Octavian sailed from Brundisium with the same number of beaked ships, one of his statements is evidently wrong, for at Actium the fleet that sailed from Brundisium was combined with that with which Agrippa sailed from Tarentum. Assuming that Octavian had at that time (*damals*)—evidently Kromayer means when he sailed from Brundisium—about 600 ships of war all told,[7] he prefers the statement of Florus, and adds that when Plutarch[8] says that at the outset of the war Octavian had 250 ships, he must have been thinking only of the Brundisian fleet. I agree with this conclusion and with Kromayer's preference for the statement of Florus.

STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED BY FERRERO TO PLUTARCH AND DIO

Remarking that on the day after the battle of Actium Octavian 'invited Antony's fleet and army to surrender'—a statement in support of which he cites Plutarch[9]—and that the invitation was rejected, Ferrero[10] adds that 'Canidius could not venture to proclaim Antony's final orders and command the fleet to force a passage and sail to Egypt', and that 'on the seventh day' some of Antony's soldiers 'surrendered with the fleet'. For this last state-

[1] *The Mediterranean Pilot*, iii, 332.
[2] Plut., *Ant.*, 66, 2.
[3] ii, 21, 5.
[4] vi, 19, 8.
[5] *Hermes*, xxxiv, 32, n. 1.
[6] § 6.
[7] For the grounds on which this assumption rests see *Philol.*, lix, 1897, pp. 457, 459–60.
[8] *Ant.*, 61, 1.
[9] *Ib.*, 68.
[10] *Grandezza*, &c., iii, 538–9 (Eng. tr., iv, 102–3).

ment Ferrero cites the same chapter of Plutarch and Dio, li, 1. Was he dreaming? Or was the temptation to embroider irresistible? Plutarch nowhere says that Octavian invited the fleet to surrender; neither Plutarch nor Dio says that any of Antony's soldiers 'surrendered with the fleet', for all the ships, except those that escaped with Cleopatra and Antony, were destroyed or captured in the battle. Not less fictitious is Ferrero's later assertion[1] that 'Plutarch tells us that during the evening [after the battle] Antony's ships returned to the Bay in good order'. Plutarch has enough to answer for without having Ferrero's inventions ascribed to him.

THE CLEANSING OF THE EGYPTIAN CANALS

Mr. W. L. Westermann,[2] who infers from a statement of Strabo[3] that 'if the work [of cleansing the canals] had been done in 30 B.C., the change in the required rise of the Nile necessary to produce good crops would have appeared in the prefecture of Cornelius Gallus in 29', concludes that the 'bulk of the . . . reorganization . . . must be placed in 27–26 B.C. [under Aelius Gallus, from whom Strabo got his information[4]], with the possibility of adding 28 B.C. under Cornelius Gallus for the beginning', &c. Why not 30 also? I can see no reason to disbelieve Dio and Suetonius, who agree in saying that Octavian himself employed soldiers on the work.

OCTAVIAN AND TIRIDATES

Dio[5] tells us that Tiridates, when he fled to Syria in 30 B.C., brought with him a son of Phraates, whom he had kidnapped, and sent him to Octavian, then in the province Asia, who kept him as a hostage. According to Justinus,[6] who also remarks that the boy was kidnapped, Tiridates brought him to Augustus [at Tarraco (now Tarragona)] in Spain [four or five years later]. Augustus himself[7] states that among the Kings who fled to him as suppliants were 'Tiridates and afterwards Phraates, son of King Phraates' (*Tirida*[tes et postea] *Phrat*[es] *regis Phrati*[s filius]). Mommsen,[8] remarking that we may infer from the narrative of Isidorus Characenus[9] that Tiridates, after he fled to Syria, invaded Parthia, and that Phraates put his wives to death to prevent their falling into his hands, thinks it not improbable that the young

[1] *Grandezza*, &c. (Eng. tr., iv, 276).
[2] *Class. Philol.*, xii, 1917, pp. 239–42.
[3] xvii, 1, 3.
[4] ii, 5, 12.
[5] li, 18, 2–3.
[6] xlii, 5, 6.
[7] *Mon. Ancyr.*, v, 54—vi, 1.
[8] *Res gestae*², &c., pp. 136–8.
[9] *Geogr. Graec. min.*, i, lxxxii.

prince was kidnapped then. Accordingly, while he follows Dio in assigning the flight of Tiridates to 30 B.C., he holds with Justinus that the son of Phraates was brought to Augustus in 26 or 25, when he was in Spain, and finds no difficulty in supposing that Dio made the mistake of connecting the event with the flight of Tiridates to Syria. The reader has doubtless noticed that Augustus, unlike Dio and Justinus, says that a son of Phraates (perhaps not the one mentioned by them) fled to him as a suppliant, and, also unlike them, gives his name. But, says Mommsen, Tiridates may have led Augustus to believe that the boy was surrendering spontaneously.

While certainty is not attainable, it seems to me that Mommsen's conjectural explanation is at least plausible: at all events he is right in following Justinus rather than Dio.

THE *LECTIO SENATUS* OF 29 B.C. AND THE CENSUS OF 28

Dio[1] says that Octavian called over the names of the senators in 29 B.C. τιμητεύσας with Agrippa, whereupon Dr. Hardy[2] remarks, 'his words are misleading, for Augustus certainly did not assume the office of censor. On the contrary, his own statements[3] —"In my sixth consulship [28 B.C.] I held a census of the people with Agrippa as my colleague" (*In consulatu sexto censum populi conlega M. Agrippa egi*)—show that it was as consul . . . that he held the census. How then', Dr. Hardy asks, 'are we to interpret the statement in the *Fasti Venusini* (*C. I. L.* ix. 422 [Dessau, 6123] . . .) under the year 28?' from which we learn that Octavian and Agrippa held the census 'with censorial power' (*censoria potestate*). Mommsen[4] supposes that a law was passed in 29 conferring the censorial power on the consuls designate, and that Octavian and Agrippa retained it until the census was completed. But, Dr. Hardy objects, 'after 1 Jan. [28] no special grant was necessary, since the *censoria potestas* was clearly included in the *consulare imperium*', &c. Why, then, I may ask, were the words *censoria potest*[ate] inserted in the *Fasti*, and does Dr. Hardy forget that the *censoria potestas* was regularly conferred by a law (*lex centuriata*) even upon censors?[5] If he had remembered this, he might perhaps have hesitated to offer the opinion that 'the analogy

[1] lii, 42, 1.
[2] *The Monument of Ancyra*, pp. 55–6.
[3] *Mon. Ancyr.*, ii, 2.
[4] *Res gestae*[2], &c., p. 38.
[5] Cic., *De lege agr.*, ii, 11, 26. Cp. P. Willems, *Le droit public rom.*[5], 1884, p. 283.

of municipal towns gives a better explanation. When', he continues, 'a municipal magistrate is called *IIvir quinquennalis ex s. c. et d. d.*,[1] we must assume that he was elected *IIvir* in the ordinary way, but that, when the Roman senate and the local *decuriones* decreed a census, he took the title of *IIvir quinquennalis* and exercised censorial powers. Similarly in 29 B.C. the senate decreed a census for the next year, so that on 1 Jan. the censorial powers of the consuls were automatically evoked,' &c. Why must we assume that the *IIvir quinquennalis* 'was elected *IIvir* in the ordinary way'? Was he not superior in rank to the other *IIviri* and elected for the year in which the quinquennial revision of the *album decurionum*, one of his duties, was held.[2] Was the *senatus* in question 'the Roman senate'? Was it not rather, as Dessau holds, the municipal senate? I believe that Mommsen, who would not have missed the 'analogy' that appeals to Dr. Hardy, if it had been relevant, was right; and I suggest that Dio meant by τιμητεύσας not 'being censor', but 'exercising censorial power'.[3]

ON *MON. ANCYR.*, 5, 3–4; 6, 13–6

In my narrative (page 178) I have spoken of 'the extraordinary command with which' Octavian 'had been informally invested'. These words, based upon statements of Augustus—*iuravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte sua et me be*[lli] *quo vici ad Actium ducem depoposcit* and *in consulatu sexto et septimo, p*[ostquam bella[4] civil]*ia exstinxeram per consensum universorum* [potitus rerum omn]*ium rem publicam ex mea potestate in senat*[us populique Romani

[1] The only example that I can find in Dessau's *Inscr. Lat.* is 5673 (*C.I.L.*, xi, 6167). He remarks, however, that similar inscriptions are in *C.I.L.*, v, 376, 6522, and 6668.

[2] Willems, *op. cit.*, pp. 536, 547.

[3] I find that before the publication of his *Monumentum Ancyranum* Hardy argued (*Class. Quart.*, xiii, 1919, p. 45) that 'As Augustus explicitly states [*Mon. Ancyr.*, ii, 5–11] that on the two later occasions [8 B.C. and A.D. 14] he held the census *consulari cum imperio*, it is safe to assume that the census in 28 depended on the same *imperium*', &c. Exclusively?

[4] Like Wilcken, who follows F. Gottanka (*Suetons Verhältnis zu d. Denkschrift d. Augustus*, Munich, 1904, pp. 4, 65), I read *postquam bella* instead of *bella ubi*. But Wilcken is, in my judgement, wrong in separating *potitus rerum omnium*, which seems to him to denote 'an absolute authority, such as only an extraordinary constituent authority like the Triumvirate contains' from *consensum universorum*. Does he not forget that he himself argued (see p. 244, *supra*) that on receiving the 'extraordinary command' Octavian resigned the Triumvirate? Dr. Hardy's translation (*The Monumentum Ancyranum*, p. 151) seems to me accurate: 'after I had extinguished the civil wars, having been put in supreme possession of the whole empire by the universal consent of all, I transferred the Republic from my own power into the free control of the Senate and Roman People.'

ar]*bitrium transtuli*—were written more than a year before I read the papers of Wilcken and Dessau on which I have commented above (pages 241–5). Wilcken,[1] virtually agreeing with me, says that the words *consensum universorum* point to a *Notstandskommando*, that is, an extraordinary command: Dessau[2] denies that Octavian had such a command, remarking that only those who believe that the Triumvirate expired on December 31, 33, can consistently hold that view. But surely Wilcken, who believes that Octavian resigned his Triumvirate in July, 32, may be allowed to hold it. Dessau goes on to assert that *per consensum universorum* does not point to a command assumed in 32, but describes the situation in 28 and 27 after the conclusion of the civil wars. I should like to see how he would translate the passage. What Augustus says is not that after he had ended the civil wars he was put in possession of supreme power by universal consent, but that, after he had ended them by virtue of the authority that had been conferred upon him by universal consent, he resigned that authority. That he held *unofficially* an extraordinary command is certain; and Dessau virtually admits this when he says,[3] referring to the monument of Ancyra, that Octavian was empowered to conduct the war against Antony by a general demonstration of the Italian people (*Zur Führung des Krieges gegen Antonius liess er sich durch Massenkundgebungen der Bevölkerung Italiens . . . ermächtigen*).

THE PRINCIPATE

The view of Merivale[4] that the designation *princeps* was originally an abbreviation of *princeps senatus* has been controverted by Pelham,[5] who carelessly remarks[6] that 'no trace exists of the full title as applied even to Augustus'. In the *Monumentum Ancyranum*[7] Augustus tells us that he has been *princeps senatus* for forty years (*Princeps senatus usque ad eum diem quo scripseram haec per annos quadraginta fui*). But in the same record,[8] describing important events that occurred in his principate he repeatedly calls himself *princeps* simply; Tacitus[9] says that he ruled with the title of *princeps* (*nomine principis*; *principis nomine*); and in

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 83–4.
[2] *Op. cit.*, cols. 1018–9.
[3] *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit*, i, 30.
[4] *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, iii, 1851, pp. 452–7.
[5] *Essays*, pp. 49–60.
[6] p. 52.
[7] i, 44–5. Cp. *Klio*, Beiheft xix, 1927, p. 59.
[8] ii, 45; v, 44; vi, 6–7.
[9] *Ann.*, i, 1; 9.

inscriptions[1] Claudius and various later emperors are designated *princeps* without the addition of *senatus*, which occurs in the case of Pertinax[2] alone. Pelham[3] may be right in saying that it was 'natural . . . that Pertinax, living . . . when the senate seemed the only remaining obstacle to absolute despotism, should adopt as a popular measure the title of "princeps senatus" ': he is certainly right in adding that Augustus would not have adopted it [unless it was understood that it conveyed no executive power] 'in the presence of men who . . . must have associated the supremacy of the senate . . . with the rule of a hated oligarchy'. Of the three passages in Dio—liii, 1, 3; lvii, 8, 2; lxxiii, 5, 1—that have been quoted in support of Merivale's view the first and the third, as any one who reads them will see, are negligible; and I am not sure that Pelham[4] is right in saying that in the second—*πρόκριτός τε τῆς γερουσίας, κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ* [Tiberius] *ὠνομάζετο· καὶ πολλάκις γε ἔλεγεν ὅτι, Δεσπότης μὲν τῶν δούλων, αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, τῶν δὲ δὴ λοιπῶν πρόκριτός εἰμι*—Dio 'does apparently intend to identify the general title of "princeps" with the more special "princeps senatus" '. Tiberius, Dio relates, called himself by the time-honoured title, *princeps senatus*, and often said, 'I am master of my slaves, commander of the troops, first citizen of the rest.' The mere fact that the word *πρόκριτος* (*princeps*) is used twice does not, I think, necessarily imply the identification which to Pelham seems apparent. He holds[5] that 'a title was needed that should not merely be inoffensive, but should carry with it the requisite amount of dignity and clearly express the leading idea of the new system—that Augustus was the first citizen of the re-established commonwealth, a President with executive power.' When Pelham adds that the title ' "princeps senatus" would have been utterly inadequate and misleading', one may assent, if it had been the sole title; but *princeps senatus* Augustus, on his own showing, was.

I can find no evidence, except that of Augustus himself, Tacitus, and Horace,[6] that Augustus was designated by the title of *princeps*, as distinct from that of *princeps senatus*. When he spoke of himself in the *Monumentum Ancyranum* (of which Tacitus was perhaps thinking) as *me principe* or *principem*, he may have used the word in a merely popular sense or as an abbreviation of the official title; and I believe that if the shorter title had been officially conferred

[1] Dessau, *Inscr. Lat.*, 140, 206, 312, 579, 707, 751, 755, 758, 765, 772, 780, 799, 1234, 1374, 2666a, 5358, 5503, 5947a, 6043, 6225, 6468, 6472, 6675, 6680, 6927, 6988.

[2] *Ib.*, 408–9, 5842, 5845. [3] p. 55. [4] p. 51. [5] p. 54.

[6] *Carm.*, i, 2, 50. Hic ames dici pater atque princeps.

upon him, it would have been included with his other titles in the numerous inscriptions that relate to his career. Pelham notwithstanding, I conclude that Merivale was right.

HAD AUGUSTUS *MAIUS IMPERIUM* OVER THE SENATORIAL PROVINCES?

Professor Donald McFayden[1] has attempted to disprove the prevalent view, based upon passages in Dio and Ulpian, that Augustus was invested with the 'higher command' over the provinces that were reserved for the Senate. He is speaking principally of what followed Augustus's resignation of the consulship in 23 B.C.,[2] but also, as two of the passages which he quotes from Dio[3] prove, of the settlement of 27, with which alone I am at present concerned.

Dio says that the choice of legates by the senatorial proconsuls was subject to the confirmation of the Imperator (Augustus), and that he regularly gave instructions to the procurators, proconsuls, and propraetors; Ulpian[4] that proconsuls exercised the higher command in subordination to the *princeps*.

McFayden begins by appealing to Greenidge,[5] who affirmed that Ulpian 'can only mean that in any collision of authority the princeps is not inferior to the proconsul'. Then was the collision to end in a deadlock? It seems to me that Ulpian meant what he said. Pursuing his argument, the professor remarks that both Dio and Ulpian regarded the empire as an absolute monarchy, of which Ulpian 'as praetorian prefect was a natural champion', and that Dio 'has been convicted . . . of misunderstanding . . . senatorial decrees of the time of . . . Augustus in his search for the origin of the . . . powers possessed by the emperor in his own day'. Speaking of 23 B.C., he says that 'no law was needed to insure Augustus' supremacy over the senatorial provinces', for 'the proconsuls were quite ready to listen to his suggestions'; his acceptance of a 'permanent *maius imperium* in the senatorial provinces would have been ill advised', for 'it is hard to see how the formal division of the provinces between the senate and the princeps would long have survived'—an argument which is weakened by the writer's later admission[6] that 'it was clear almost from the beginning that the senate's monopoly of power over the "public" provinces could not last'. He suggests a reason for rejecting what Dio says about

[1] *Class. Philol.*, xvi, 1921, pp. 34–7.
[2] Dio, liii, 32, 5.
[3] *Ib.*, 14, 7; 15, 4.
[4] *Dig.*, i, 16, 8.
[5] *Roman Public Life*, p. 386.
[6] p. 41.

23 B.C., which I pass over, because it does not affect the credibility of what Dio says about 27. Finally, he insists that neither Strabo,[1] Suetonius,[2] nor Augustus himself confirms the statements of Dio and Ulpian, while Augustus's words, 'of power I had no more than my colleagues in each several magistracy' (*potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam qui fuerunt mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae*[3]) seem to prove that he had no 'legal imperium over the senatorial provinces', and Dio in other passages[4] emphasizes 'Augustus' surrender of the peaceful provinces to the senate in a manner which is difficult to understand if he retained legal rights over them'.

These arguments seem to me insufficient. I lay no stress upon the testimony of Ulpian, because it is not certain that he had in mind the arrangements of 27 B.C.; but, granted that Dio regarded the empire under which he wrote as an absolute monarchy and that he misunderstood various senatorial decrees, it is rash to infer that what he said about those arrangements was false. If proconsuls were 'ready to listen' to Octavian, it does not follow that such docility could have been counted upon when the Principate was founded. It is true that neither Strabo nor Suetonius nor Augustus expressly confirms the statements of Dio; but Strabo says that the country conferred upon Augustus 'the administration of the empire' (*τὴν προστασίαν τῆς ἡγεμονίας*) and that he was 'the supreme authority for life in war and peace' (*πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης κατέστη κύριος διὰ βίου*): Suetonius, whose narrative is extremely laconic, says that he often visited the senatorial provinces—obviously for reasons of state;[5] and the inference which McFayden draws from the statement of Augustus is hasty. 'Augustus', says Dr. Hardy,[6] 'makes this statement only in connexion with magistracies held by himself of a collegiate character. But, strictly speaking, there was only one such magistracy, viz. the consulship, and even this was held regularly only up to 23 B.C. . . . There is, however, no objection to applying the assertion to the *tribunicia potestas*, which, though not properly a magistracy, did in a way make Augustus a colleague of the tribunes. It is . . . true that the colleagues of Augustus in the consulship possessed, as he did himself, the *consularis potestas*, and that the tribunes still retained the *ius agendi cum plebe* . . . and all the other tribunician rights.' But 'The real point was not possession of the rights, but freedom to use them, and judged by this test, both consuls and

[1] xvii, 3, 25.
[2] *Aug.*, 47.
[3] *Mon. Ancyr.*, vi, 22–3.
[4] liii, 4, 3; 12, 1.
[5] Cp. 28, 1, where Suetonius says, briefly, that Augustus 'continued to administer the government' (*in retinenda* [republica] *perseveravit.*
[6] *The Mon. Ancyr.*, pp. 160–1.

tribunes were *umbrae sine re*.' As for the 'other passages' from Dio, on which McFayden relies, I am amazed that he should have drawn attention to them. The first is a sentence in the fictitious speech which Dio puts into the mouth of Octavian *before he resigned his extraordinary power*: in the second, after saying that the Senate persuaded him to retain his authority, Dio adds, what has never been disputed, that he declined to administer all the provinces. I cannot help thinking that McFayden is possessed by that restless desire for novelty which is responsible for so many untenable theories.

ADDENDA

Page 4, note 5. The statement in the text that Cleopatra 'poisoned her boy husband' is based only upon the testimony of Josephus, Porphyry, who may or may not have copied Josephus, and Dio (xlviii, 24, 2) whose chronology is wrong, and who may have confounded Ptolemy XV with a person said to be his brother, Ptolemy XIV (cp. Appian, v, 9, 35). Mr. Arthur Weigall (*Life and Times of Cleopatra*[2], 1923, pp. 133–4), while he admits that 'the death of the . . . young king may be attributed to Cleopatra without improbability', adds that 'there is really no reason to suppose that she had anything to do with it'; for, he asserts, the accusation 'would certainly have been made had the boy died of a sudden illness'. 'It must', he says (p. 25), 'be admitted that she caused the assassination of her sister Arsinoe. . . . But it must be remembered that political murders of this kind were a custom—nay a habit—of the period.' No doubt; but was there not a political motive for murdering Ptolemy XV—the desire to clear the way for the sovereignty of Caesarion, whom his mother really loved?

Page 22, note 2. Mr. J. D. Denniston (Cic., *Phil. I. II*, 1926, p. 77) argues that '(1) the context of Velleius's statement suggests that the *edictum* to which he refers was published just before the departure of Brutus and Cassius from Italy. . . . (2) *Plenum aequitatis* [*Phil.*, i, 3, 8], "a very reasonable proposal", would be a singular way of characterizing such a complete withdrawal from public life. (3) The Rhegians who brought Cicero a copy of the *edictum* expressed a hope that Brutus and Cassius would shortly be able to return to Rome.' This last reason depends upon the validity of the first, and Mr. Denniston seems to forget that Cicero in September (*Fam.*, xii, 2, 3) desired Cassius to return to Rome; the second does not impress me, for to assume the government of important provinces was hardly to withdraw from public life; the

first might have more weight if Velleius were remarkable for chronological precision. If Mr. Denniston's conclusion is right, it is surprising that Cicero's correspondence contains no allusion to a later manifesto.

Page 34, note. 3. In *The Roman Republic* (iii, 568, n. 9) I wrote, referring to the much-disputed letter of Decimus Brutus (Cic., *Fam.*, xi, 1), 'Prof. E. T. Merrill (*Class. Philol.*, x, 1915, pp. 241–59) has proved that it was not written on either March 16 or 17'. Mr. W. W. How (*Cicero, Select Letters*, ii, 1926, pp. 479–80) holds that it was written 'before dawn on March 17', but does not attempt to reply to any of Merrill's arguments, which at least deserve careful study.

Page 120. 'Calvisius Sabinus . . . Sicily.' I supposed that Sabinus, whom Appian mentions in this connexion, was identical with Calvisius Sabinus, whom he mentioned before (see p. 110); but Mommsen (*Röm. Staatsr.*, ii^3, 1075, n. 1) was perhaps right in conjecturing that he was the Sabinus named in an inscription printed by Dessau (*Inscr. Lat.*, 2488).

Page 178, note 6. I should have referred also to *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie*, ix, 1146, where Rosenberg approves the view of Kromayer that in 29 B.C. the Senate confirmed Octavian's assumption of the permanent title Imperator.

Page 239. The following footnote to 'legislation' (l. 4) should have been printed: 'B. A. von Groningen (*Mnemosyne*, liv, 1926, p. 6), who agrees with Wilcken and Dessau about the duration of the Triumvirate, says much the same'.

Page 245. '. . . the *Fasti* record the date of the commencement of the second period,' &c. This statement is not sufficiently explicit. The date is not mentioned in the consular *Fasti*, but has been inferred (*C.I.L.*, i, p. 449) from the *Fasti Colotiani* (*ib.*, p. 466 [cp. p. 72, *supra*]). Moreover the *IIIviri* are named in the consular *Fasti* before the consuls, who took office on January 1.

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